CoinShares PLC (CSHR) Earnings Call Transcript
September 14, 2026
Earnings Call Speaker Segments
Hello, everybody, and we appreciate you being on the call today. Prior to getting started, CoinShares wants to point out that anything said during this session and the accompanying webcast will contain forward-looking statements, which cover topics such as the company's plans, goals, expectations, and aspirations. These forward-looking statements rest on present-day expectations and assumptions and should not be viewed as guarantees of future performance or success. They carry risks and uncertainties, and actual outcomes may — and frequently do — differ materially from what those forward-looking statements express or imply. To learn more about these risks and uncertainties, please consult CoinShares' annual report on Form 20-F covering the fiscal year that closed on December 31st, 2025, along with other documents filed with the SEC. Except where the law requires it, CoinShares assumes no duty to update any forward-looking statements. Additionally, on this call, CoinShares will discuss certain non-GAAP financial measures. These non-GAAP measures might not be comparable to similar measures that other companies disclose, since not every company and analyst calculates them the same way. Management views these measures as offering helpful supplemental information, yet they should not be treated as replacements for financial measures put together under U.S. GAAP. Reconciliations between these non-GAAP measures and the most directly comparable GAAP measures appear in our earnings press release and investor presentation, both of which have been filed with the SEC and can be found on our investor relations website. Jean-Marie Mognetti, our Chief Executive Officer, and Richard Nash, our Interim Chief Financial Officer, will deliver today's earnings call. Jean-Marie, the floor is yours.
Thanks, Jeri, for handling that legal notice. For CoinShares, this release carries unusual weight. Since wrapping up our U.S. listing, this is the first time we're presenting results, and it signals the start of a continuing dialogue with the market now that we've settled into life as a company listed on Nasdaq in the U.S. I'll begin with the big-picture story from the first half, after which Richard will walk you through the figures in greater depth. In many respects, the opening six months of 2026 put our business model through a stress test. Markets for digital assets went through one of their most severe contractions of recent years. Bitcoin — in fact, over the period it fell roughly 32% from where the year started. Ethereum dropped around 48%, while the assets we manage shrank by about 25%. What I care about, though, is how the business comes through that kind of environment, and I believe there are six proof points that deserve a closer look. Proof point one: our clients remained with us, and we produced positive net flows. Even with a substantial drop in asset values, CoinShares brought in net inflows of roughly $28 million across the period. That distinction is meaningful. The reason our AUM fell was the market, not clients abandoning the platform. Proof point two: our flows beat the market by a wide margin. Whereas the wider industry saw significant redemptions, CoinShares delivered positive organic growth. Inside that, our physical platform in Europe — our growth engine — drew roughly $156 million in net inflows, which shows both the ongoing migration and the strength of our core European franchise. Proof point three: the economics of our asset management business have stayed resilient. Over the half, we brought in $14 million in management fees. Revenue was lower mainly because weaker digital asset prices pushed average AUM down. We're also still seeing the product mix in our European business move away from our legacy XBT products and toward our newly physical platform and BLOCK Index, which continues our product diversification. To phrase it another way, what really weighed on asset management revenue was the market backdrop and the resulting shift in product mix—not any erosion in the franchise itself. Proof point four: capital markets remained resilient even through an extraordinarily tough environment. In the half, the capital markets segment generated approximately $15 million of revenue and gains. That result demonstrates our approach to running this business; as market conditions deteriorated, we reduced lending activity and maintained a cautious posture toward deploying the balance sheet. Proof point five: the core operating businesses remained profitable even given the severity of the market correction. During the first half, segment EBITDA came in at $21.6 million. That number also reflects several one-off costs, not taken through equity, tied to the listing and the U.S. GAAP conversion, adding up to about $4.9 million. Adjusted for that amount, segment EBITDA would be nearer $26.5 million. The gap between that underlying segment performance and our reported GAAP loss matters. The reported result takes in the unrealized loss on the group XBT Pricing Differential, costs tied to completing our Nasdaq listing and the transition to U.S. Under GAAP, we also had the settlement of our historic share option plan, plus below operating income, the mark-to-market effect from our digital asset treasury position. Moving on to the sixth item: we entered the back half of the year with our balance sheet and our platform both positioned to gain from an upturn. At the close of June 30th, following repayment of what we owed to Intesa Sanpaolo, we held about $453 million in net asset and carried no long-term debt, along with roughly $414 million in capital available to us. Since then, conditions in the digital asset market have begun improving. Between June 30th and August 31st, Bitcoin climbed roughly 34%, and our AUM had rebounded to approximately $6.9 billion by the close of August, inching back toward where it stood in December 2025. So stepping away from the specific figures, what the first half tells us is fairly straightforward. Things got tough in the market really fast, and we came through it in good shape, just like we've managed to do on plenty of earlier occasions. Money keeps coming our way from clients. The asset management business at our core stayed in the black. So did our capital market division. Whenever circumstances called for it, we protected our capital, and we wrapped up the quarter with a balance sheet in excellent condition. When we spoke with investors on the pre-IPO roadshow about being resilient, that's exactly the idea — it isn't about sidestepping where the market cycle goes, it's about having a business model designed to find a way through those cycles. What matters here is that we aren't staying put. We keep expanding past passive listed offerings into active strategies, staking on-chain infrastructure, and fresh investment exposures. Everything we do has a single aim: making the frontier investable. Against that same backdrop, and backed by that same balance sheet strength, our board has introduced a proposal for a multi-year share repurchase program covering as much as 25% of shares outstanding. At tomorrow's AGM, we'll seek shareholder approval for it. I'll now pass things to Richard, who will walk you through the financial performance in greater detail. Richard, over to you.
Thank you so much, JM. I'd like to take you through the key financials for the first six months, and even more significantly, explain how conditions in the market shaped the way our business model delivered results over that period. As JM pointed out, prices for digital assets fell substantially during the first half. Against that backdrop, our AUM closed out the period at $5.5 billion, which is below the $7.4 billion we reported at December and the $8 billion recorded as of June last year. The key thing to focus on is the composition of that decline. Over the first half of 2026, market movements accounted for approximately $1.9 billion of the reduction in AUM, while across our platforms the group generated roughly $28 million in positive net flows. To pick up on what was mentioned before, the drop in AUM came mostly from the market rather than from clients pulling their money out. Moving on to the income statement, total GAAP revenue for the quarter came to $51.4 million, compared with $80 million a year earlier. Within asset management, the amount contributed to that top line was $40 million, a 33% decline, largely because average AUM was lower during the period. The remaining revenue is generated by our capital markets lending and staking operations, along with extra trading gains of $3.5 million from the operating segment, which brings the top line to $14.9 million in segment revenue and gains, up against $26.5 million for the same period last year. Like we said before, we deliberately took a cautious approach to putting capital to work in this period, which included scaling back our lending operations as the market got tougher. For the period, segment EBITDA came in at $21.6 million, down from $59 million in the first half of 2025. You can see in that drop the operating leverage that's baked into our model. Management fees respond pretty quickly when AUM moves, but a large share of our operating costs stay fixed over the near term. On top of that, reported expenses were pushed higher by costs we don't anticipate recurring at the same level we saw in the first half of the year — mainly expenses tied to finishing our Nasdaq listing and moving to U.S. GAAP. During the first half, non-recurring fees hit our segment EBITDA to the tune of roughly $4.9 million. If those charges hadn't been there, segment EBITDA for that stretch would have come in at $26.5 million. So yes, profitability took a big hit, but the core operating business still managed to stay in the black despite a really tough market. Now, if you look beyond segment EBITDA to our operating loss for the period, the swing versus last year is stark — from a gain of $75.9 million to a loss of $5.1 million in H1 2026 — and that's mainly because of two things that sit outside day-to-day operations. Two items dragged on our results. First, when the group's legacy option plan was settled as part of the Nasdaq listing, that produced a $6.1 million share-based compensation charge. Second, the XBT Pricing Differential moved against us by $34.7 million, going from an $18.1 million gain in 2025 to a $16.6 million loss in 2026. That second item is a big swing we haven't collected on, and it's putting heavy pressure on our reported figures. The reason it shows up at all is that short-term valuation gaps arise between the spot digital assets we actually hold and the market price assigned to our XBT certificate obligations — which means segment EBITDA is always adjusted for this item in either direction, regardless of whether it lands as a gain or a loss. Moving on to how we deploy capital: over the opening six months of the year, we completed a repayment of 100% of our long-term debt totaling $28.3 million, distributed roughly $21.5 million as dividends, and absorbed about $18.7 million in cash costs to settle part of our historic share option plan; that is the very settlement mentioned earlier that produced a $6.1 million charge to the P&L. Even after those outlays, we closed June holding $413.9 million of available capital, which includes the accrued XBT fees, naturally, plus roughly $453 million of net assets and zero long-term debt. The first-half financial story is fairly simple. Weaker digital asset prices pulled down our AUM, and thus our revenue. The operating leverage built into our model magnified the effect on profitability, yet client flows stayed in positive territory. Both operating segments stayed profitable, and we finished the period with an exceptionally strong balance sheet; that gives us substantial flexibility heading into the second half of the year. All right, at this point I would like to take a moment to frame our flow performance, since I regard it as among the most telling measures of the business's underlying health. Although the net inflow figure of about $28 million might not appear especially large on its own, context obviously matters in this case. As the chart shows, the bulk of our major peers saw substantial redemptions over that same stretch. Among the group depicted here, net outflows exceeded $7 billion, which works out to roughly 6% of these peers' combined opening assets. CoinShares, in contrast, stayed in positive territory. While declining digital asset prices hurt everyone in the industry, our clients behaved in a materially different way. And beneath that group figure, another key development stands out. CoinShares Physical pulled in approximately $156 million of net inflows over the first half of the year, even given how severe the market correction was. And that more than compensated for a large share of the outflows coming from our legacy XBT platform. Inside Europe, capital keeps flowing toward a platform we have spent years building for the future. From where we sit, what this chart shows isn't just outperforming competitors when it comes to flows — it demonstrates that client capital stayed with the business throughout a brutal market downturn, and our strategic physical platform continued attracting fresh assets. Let's now go a bit further into what actually caused that decline in AUM, because losing assets due to market moves is very different from losing them due to client decisions. On the left side of the chart, Bitcoin was down around 33% across the first half of the year, whereas Ethereum declined roughly 47%. Obviously, that market weakness has fed directly into the value of a large portion of our AUM. From there, we split the portfolio into two wide buckets: our products that generate high fees, and our access products. Within the high fee generating group, net flows came in roughly flat — just shy of negative 1% — whereas market movements cut AUM by around 42%. So virtually all of the shrinkage in that segment of the business stemmed from asset prices, not from redemptions. Things look a bit different once more when we turn to the access products. There, we brought in net flows of about positive 2%, and the market impact was far smaller, near 10%. The main driver behind that resilience was the Block Index. Although our digital asset ETPs took a direct hit from declining Bitcoin and Ethereum prices, Block gained from how its underlying equities performed, which helped counterbalance part of the wider softness throughout digital assets. That diversification is important, though it comes with a trade-off. Access products typically have lower management fees compared with our legacy products that carry higher fees; therefore, as the mix of our AUM moves toward access away from physical products, some pressure builds on our blended fee yield.
I'll return to that shortly, but looking at it through the lens of AUM and the business, the takeaway is unambiguous: the $1.9 billion drop in AUM did not stem from clients pulling out $1.9 billion. Our net flows were positive. That difference is just as significant during a recovery as it is during a downturn. Assets that leave through redemptions must be earned back. Assets that shrink because of market prices, on the other hand, come right back when those markets rebound. We're seeing that happen already. By the end of August, group AUM had climbed back to roughly $6.9 billion, up from $5.5 billion on the 30th of June. The drop in AUM during the first half really reflects what happened with digital asset prices across the market, not anything specific to CoinShares. Since I mentioned Block on the previous slide, it makes sense to go deeper there, because it shows nicely how diversification functions inside the asset management platform. If you're not familiar with it, the CoinShares Blockchain Global Equity Index — which we refer to as Block — provides exposure to publicly listed firms involved in the blockchain and digital asset space. Invesco takes care of distribution, product wrapping, and maintenance, and we handle portfolio management. Invesco and CoinShares share a management fee of 65 basis points on this product, and CoinShares' portion of that management fee revenue comes to roughly 32.5 basis points. What happened during the first six months of the year is the genuinely compelling piece. Looking at the left side, you can see Block's results moved in a very different direction than the digital asset markets underneath. When June ended, Block was up around 18%, while Bitcoin and Ethereum obviously moved the other way. Our total AUM composition was meaningfully shaped by that relative performance. Block represented about 18% of overall AUM at the close of December 2025, and that figure reached 28% by the close of June. In dollar terms, AUM went from $1.3 billion-$1.56 billion, even with approximately $24 million of net outflows on the product. So the entire increase came from appreciation in the underlying equities. This highlights something important about how CoinShares is structured. Our business isn't built around one product, one digital asset, or even one type of exposure. Clients can reach the asset class directly via products like our physical platform, or through listed equities tied to the wider digital asset ecosystem via Block; those exposures have distinct return drivers, and during the first half, that diversification substantially boosted the resilience of our overall AUM. There is a fee mix consequence, though, as I noted earlier. Block delivers a lower fee yield to CoinShares than certain of our legacy products do. From a strategic standpoint, this is precisely the reason we've been expanding the platform; our goal is to offer investors several routes to take part in the digital asset ecosystem, since various segments of that system will behave differently at various moments in the cycle. Because of the shift in product mix we just covered, I'd like to take a moment to discuss our asset management fee yield, as the difference between pricing and mix matters a great deal. On the call, we noted that our blended fee yield dropped to 128 basis points in the first half of 2026, down from about 156 basis points in 2025. That decline doesn't mean fees are being squeezed broadly across everything we offer. If you look at the left-hand side, you'll see that. When you examine each product category on its own, yields have actually remained quite stable. For our high fee generating products, the range has largely held between 255 and 284 basis points, and for our access products, it's been roughly 22 to 27 basis points. We haven't seen any meaningful deterioration in pricing on the underlying products themselves. What's different is how much weight each category carries within total AUM, and the bridge on the right illustrates that point. Starting from a 156 basis point average fee yield in 2025, roughly 25 basis points of the shift as we move into 2026 come from Block carrying more weight, and another seven basis points come from the evolving mix between the CoinShares Physical Bitcoin product and CoinShares US. Only about four basis points stem from actual product-level fee rate changes. The clearest way to see this, I think, is through the constant mix calculation. Had our product mix remained the same, our fee yield would have landed at roughly 163 basis points. That conclusion is pretty simple. What's driving our blended fee yield lower is mostly how the portfolio is put together, rather than any sign that pricing is under structural strain. If you want to gauge pricing power in asset management, my suggestion is to examine yields at the individual product level as well as how our AUM mix has shifted over time, instead of reading changes in that blended yield as if they were price moves. All right, let's move on to capital markets. Clearly, this segment matters a great deal to the CoinShares model, since it opens up several avenues for earning returns on digital assets that go beyond plain management fees. Through the first half, we chose to run this business in a cautious manner while market conditions worsened, especially when it came to putting our balance sheet to work. Even with those conditions, our capital markets operating segment brought in $14.9 million in revenue and gains, down from $26.5 million during the same period last year. We call this segment revenue and gains because the number has been adjusted to strip out the effect of changes in the XBT Pricing Differential, something we set aside when looking at our operating segments given its character, as discussed earlier. For anyone seeking more information on that, our MD&A and the notes to our unaudited interim financials contain considerably greater detail. Let me walk through the components behind that $14.9 million total. Staking contributed $6.6 million, compared with $9.8 million the year before. What's behind that drop is mostly the falling value of the assets that were being staked over the period, not any real shift in how the economics of that activity work. On the lending side, we earned $2.4 million, compared with $4.9 million a year earlier, and here the pullback was far more intentional. Once market conditions stopped being as appealing, we cut back how much capital we were willing to put into lending, putting priority instead on preservation and on managing counterparty risk. We also brought in about $7.6 million from other revenue and trading gains, compared with $11.7 million during the first half of 2025. Those gains came from liquidity provisioning on the group's XBT product line, along with a range of delta neutral trading activities. Overall, that total moved in roughly the same direction as the wider pullback in capital markets activity during this period. Taking everything together, the capital markets segment generated $14.9 million in revenue and gains. In my view, the key point isn't simply that this figure landed under the prior year's. While we were deliberately reducing risk and deploying less balance sheet, the capital market segment remained profitable — and that says a lot about how we think about this business. We have no revenue target that would push us to put capital to work no matter what the market conditions are.
We put money to work when we think the opportunity, adjusted for risk, is appealing, and when it isn't, we hold on to it. As market conditions, liquidity, and the set of opportunities change, we've got the balance sheet and the infrastructure to ramp that deployment back up. Capital markets, just as it always has, gives us a complementary earnings engine alongside asset management while allowing us discretion over how much capital we expose to risk across different points in the cycle. All right, let me move now to our cost base, since as I said earlier, the expenses reported in the first half don't capture the whole picture of the business's underlying operating cost base. If we look at things on an adjusted basis—so excluding depreciation, amortization, and share-based compensation—our operating expenses for the first half were about $25.6 million. Within that amount, roughly $4.9 million relates primarily to costs associated with becoming listed in the U.S. as well as other items that don't recur. While these are non-recurring in nature, we still consider them meaningful investments that we made in order to complete our transition to Nasdaq and to establish CoinShares as a U.S.-listed public company. If you set those items aside, adjusted operating expenses for the first half would have been approximately $20.7 million. For context, if you simply annualized that first-half number, it would come to around $41.3 million for the full year. Even so, let me make it plain: the only reason we're putting that in front of you is to show what the business's H1 cost base actually looks like right now — it is not meant as guidance on costs going forward. A big chunk of what we spend is more or less locked in for the near term, while asset management revenue moves up and down alongside AUM. That worked against us during the first half, when digital prices and AUM both declined, yet the flip side is that we won't need to build the operating platform back up in order for revenue to benefit when AUM grows. The key takeaway here is that the cost base we reported for the first half was heavily weighted toward expenses related to finishing our U.S. listing and transitioning our financial reporting — it didn't represent what you'd call a comparable underlying operating run rate. Looking ahead, we'll continue to watch our costs closely and hunt for ways to gain further efficiency. Along those lines, we've already made the call to close several product lines that weren't performing well during the second half of the year. That kind of thing is just business as usual when you're running a product suite the size of ours today, and it helps ensure our cost base stays in line with where we're actually seeing client demand. The purpose of this slide is simply to demonstrate how operating leverage is embedded within our business model. Let me state clearly from the outset: what you're seeing is not a projection or formal guidance—these are illustrative scenarios only. They're designed to show how shifts in digital asset prices might move through AUM revenue and eventually translate into profitability, based on the assumptions laid out on the slide. Starting on the left-hand side, we take our AUM figure from June 30th and ask a pretty simple question: if all the other model assumptions were held constant, what would that AUM look like had asset prices returned to prior reference levels? As already noted, at June 2026 pricing the group AUM stood at roughly $5.5 billion, made up of about $2.1 billion in high fee generating products and $3.5 billion in access products. Using December 2025 reference prices, that illustrative AUM rises to roughly $7.4 billion, and if we go back to June 2025, it would climb to $8.1 billion. Importantly, though, this recovery does not happen evenly across the portfolio. Because our high fee generating products are much more sensitive to Bitcoin and Ethereum prices, under those scenarios they rise far faster than the access products, and that creates two effects. Sure, when AUM increases, that part is straightforward, but the composition of those assets also shifts back toward products that carry higher fees. What you see on the right side illustrates how that could affect revenue given the assumptions shown there. If we annualize the first half, the model produces about $113 million in revenue and gains, which combines asset management fees with revenue and gains from the capital market segment. Using December 2025 reference pricing, that figure climbs to approximately $162.2 million, and it goes even higher—to $185.6 million—when June 2025 reference pricing is applied. Our goal here isn't to provide guidance; we're merely showing the two ways operating leverage can work in the model. To start with the straightforward part: when asset values climb, our AUM goes up. The second point is subtler, though no less significant: because the products carrying higher fees react more strongly to crypto pricing, an upturn can improve the composition of our AUM as well, which in turn lifts the blended economics for the asset management segment. Once more, these scenarios serve only as illustrations rather than predictions. They exist solely to demonstrate how responsive the model is across varying market conditions. Factor in the underlying business's fairly stable cost structure, and should that hold true, then a considerable share of the gains produced by a market rebound lands straight in our segment EBITDA. The scenarios we walked through were only meant as examples. But you can already see the first piece of how that works — the link between digital asset values and our AUM — showing up in the data after the period closed. Digital asset markets bounced back quite a bit from June 30 through August 31. Solana was up roughly 57%, Ethereum around 40%, and Bitcoin about 34%, and that rebound fed straight into our AUM. We went from $5.5 billion on June 30 to about $6.9 billion by the end of August. That works out to roughly a 25% gain across two months. On top of that, by August 31 we had recovered most of the treasury loss we recorded in the first half of the year. What matters here is that over this stretch, our clients kept putting money to work as well — roughly $74 million in positive net flows all the way through the end of August. That mix effect we showed you on the earlier slides is starting to show up. At June 30th, products generating higher fees made up 37% of total AUM, and by the close of August that figure had risen to 43%, which speaks to how much more sensitive those products are to the rebound in digital asset prices. Everything we have observed since June lines up with the mechanics we just walked through. Rising digital asset prices are pushing AUM higher, the mix is starting to move back toward the higher fee products, and clients keep adding net new capital. One thing I want to stress, though: a good deal of this market recovery came fairly late in the period. So please don't take the August 31 AUM position as a picture of how the whole quarter will look. It does give you a helpful signal of just how fast the economics of this business can shift when market conditions shift. We went into the second half at $5.5 billion. Today we sit at $6.9 billion, and we haven't needed to replace any assets we lost to client redemptions. That takes us right back to the core point from the first half of the year, correct? The market pulled back hard. Our financials have felt that.
There are certain below-the-line items that are affecting our bottom line, yet our AUM has brought in net inflows. Segment EBITDA is positive, and keeping that AUM really counts once markets start turning around. To wrap up the financial portion, let me examine our capital position—specifically what we have available—a bit more closely; we opened the year with roughly $453 million in available capital. That figure is after accounting for the liability tied to our long-term borrowings, which we have since repaid. By the end of June, we were at approximately $414 million. The key thing to ask is: what transpired with the capital over that stretch to bring about this reduction? We finished our U.S. listing, bringing in about $3.9 million of proceeds, but several outflows occurred during this stretch. We paid back the long-term debt—already referenced—totaling $28.3 million; we gave back roughly $21.5 million to shareholders via the 2025 dividend before the transaction closed. We took on about $18.7 million in cash costs from settling part of our historic share option plan, which the listing had triggered. Falling digital asset prices produced around $15.4 million of unrealized losses on the treasury digital assets we hold, which, as noted, has rebounded since the period ended; we also paid out roughly $4.3 million in bonuses tied to 2025 during the period, and net finance costs added another $4.2 million, plus a number of smaller items. Following all those changes, we closed June with about $413.9 million of available capital, together with roughly $453 million in net assets and zero long-term debt. That, I believe, is the key point from this bridge. We went into an exceptionally tough market, got our U.S. listing done, cleared all our long-term debt, gave capital back to shareholders, settled a major chunk of our historic option obligations, and still came out of the half with a very robust available capital position. That puts us in a great spot going forward and shows how adaptable we are and how we can deploy capital as we proceed. I will now turn things back to JM.
Okay, thank you, Richard. That covered most of the presentation, but I'd like to keep going for a few minutes on some additional investor relations points. Let me take a moment to talk about valuation, since how the board approaches capital allocation depends heavily on it. Using the pro forma share count of roughly 138.1 million shares and our closing price of $5.60 on September 2nd, CoinShares carried a market capitalization of about $738 million. Set against that, we finished June with around $413.9 million in available capital. If you treat that available capital position as an adjustment to market capitalization, it suggests a value of roughly $324.1 million for the operating business. As of June, the capital we have available comes to roughly $3.14 for each share, and on September 2nd the stock was trading at $5.60. So a considerable portion of what the equity is worth today stems from funds already held on the balance sheet, whereas the return potential for shareholders depends on what the operating side of the business can generate. That matters for how we think about valuation, and it matters for how we allocate capital. Our balance sheet is in solid shape, we have no long-term debt on the books, and we're holding a sizable amount of available capital. Even so, the board believes the current share price doesn't fully capture the value of the business or its earnings potential. So for the board, the thinking is this: when you can repurchase stock at favorable prices and moments, that can serve as one good illustration of putting capital to work in a way that benefits shareholders — and that's an item we'll be putting to a shareholder vote at the AGM taking place tomorrow. One more thing I want to touch on quickly, which stems from our listing on the U.S. public market: the possibility of getting into an index. Based on our present reading of the criteria that apply, CoinShares could become eligible for addition to some Russell indices when a future reconstitution happens — naturally that depends on meeting the applicable eligibility, ranking, and free float thresholds. Whether CoinShares actually gets added is not guaranteed, and the index provider would have the final say on any weighting or the passive demand that might come with it. Even so, according to analysis from outside investment banks, getting added could result in a sizable rise in passive institutional ownership compared with how much our stock currently trades. To my mind, the bigger takeaway here carries more weight than any particular projection. One factor behind bringing CoinShares to Nasdaq was making the company easier for U.S. institutional investors to reach. Joining an index would be yet another possible move along that path. In the long run, we think that more analyst coverage—KBW is already on board and we're pursuing additional firms—combined with better institutional access, possible index membership, and stronger liquidity can widen and diversify who owns our shares while fostering more robust price discovery. These things won't happen overnight. That's something we're pursuing right now. Even so, our attention stays on strengthening the core business instead of trying to forecast where the stock will move in the near term. With that said, let's turn things over to the analysts for their questions.
All right. Now we're moving on to the Q&A portion. For the first set of questions, we'd like to bring in Joe Vafi of Canaccord. Go ahead, Joe.
Hello there. Good afternoon to all of you. I appreciate you including me on this call, your inaugural earnings call, and congratulations on reaching this milestone. Much congratulations on that. Could we perhaps begin at a broad level regarding a few of the developments taking place within the industry? There's a widespread movement toward tokenizing real-world assets. I'm just curious about how CoinShares perceives this growth of the digital asset ecosystem and how it might view that as a chance for expansion, and then I'll have a brief follow-up.
Hello, Joe. We appreciate you being with us. Tokenization was not overlooked by us; it's a trend that has been advancing rather forcefully across the past 6 months, particularly given all the legislation progressing in the U.S. Regarding CoinShares, as is typical, we have our 2 segments. We have capital market along with asset management. Capital market consistently leads in that regard compared to asset management since we're able to experiment far more. Capital market has been leading the way on tokenization in the sense that we traded more RWA overall during H1 than we traded in Bitcoin or Ethereum, for instance; so we've been deeply engaged, or getting our hands dirty with it, and seizing various opportunities that exist, and those opportunities keep existing at present and for the foreseeable future. That's somewhat a component of our, I'd say, capital management exposure to it. So you might observe us being exposed to Hyperliquid, being exposed to various protocols, regarding tokenization. On the asset management side, we aren't a tokenizer, so we won't enter an activity such as Securitize, an activity such as Superstate, or what DTCC and Ondo Finance are engaged in. Nevertheless, we are strongly intending to discover methods to capitalize on this tokenization movement, which is occurring, so that we can develop new products. And that's very much the spirit of the partnership we talked about, in one of our releases, during H1 with Kiln and Railnet, which is to enable us to effectively begin, establish composability, and I'd say a new product built upon the tokenization trend. So rather than being confined within one ecosystem, which is like, for example, Morpho, individuals will come via CoinShares to be able to have a composability of asset management product. So we're strongly examining it and ensuring we are bringing to the market an offering.
Joe, did you have a follow-up question?
Okay, a quick additional question, if I may. Thanks. Given you're now listed publicly, I'd guess that M&A might feature somewhat more within your strategy. I'm aware you're also considering repurchasing some shares. How do you weigh M&A against buying back some of the CoinShares shares currently outstanding? Thanks.
Yes. Capital allocation is something the board discusses. How this capital gets deployed is a major focus for the board. Given where the stock is priced at this moment, clearly a buyback stands out as an evident sort of tool, which is why the board is requesting authorization from shareholders at tomorrow's AGM. We'll see, based on what comes out of that AGM, whether we can proceed, how we'd proceed, and in what form we'd conduct a buyback — that addresses the second half of your question. As for the first half, this needs to be weighed against M&A activity. M&A is certainly an area where we're intensely focused, and I personally devote considerable time to examining many opportunities. We simply want to ensure we're pulling the trigger on the correct, let's say, opportunity, recognizing that it consumes an enormous amount of time, so a minor deal or a poor deal could harm our results. Thus we're genuinely working to ensure we're heading the right way on this, particularly since many of these companies currently available have been, let's say, structured with considerable preferred stock, and so forth. As a result, the capital is seldom clean, which means the conversation tends to be somewhat more intricate than a plain M&A transaction.
Appreciate that, JM. Joe, many thanks for those questions. At this point we'll turn things to Alex Bond with KBW. Alex, come on in and join us.
Hey everybody. Appreciate you fielding our questions, and congratulations on solid numbers during a tough market stretch. There are clearly many pieces moving around in the first-half figures, but I was hoping you might give us a broad view of how you see the back half shaping up, plus how appetite for certain asset management offerings has shifted now that digital asset prices have firmed up, over the months following the first half. And then perhaps a wider-angle item too. It would also be useful if you could take us through whatever you folks right now consider top priority when it comes to expansion and fresh products. Thank you.
Thank you, Alex. Plenty to get through there. Without straying too deep into territory I can or can't address, like you mentioned, conditions have gotten better, during Q3. Consequently, our AUM has bounced back. Volatility has also ticked up somewhat, handing us fresh chances to trade. Overall, I'd characterize the climate as favorable for CoinShares. We experienced certain appetite in H1 even while the market declined; that appetite remains present, during Q3. Though somewhat softer over the summer, which was, for whatever reason, an extraordinarily lengthy summer, possibly because of the FIFA World Cup, which pulled a great deal of attention elsewhere along with other sporting occasions. Still, we noticed appetite returning at the CoinShares level. Regarding our priorities, our focus, we continue rolling out ETFs; we continue rolling out inventive offerings. We introduced our initial UCITS platform, which is publicly known, in July, or I believe that's July, yes; that forms part of our European growth narrative. I'd add that capital markets continues its work around tokenization, how tokenization affects our business. We remain engaged on that tokenization side of delivering a tokenization product to market. I'll speak with Joe ahead of your question. Overall, we're incredibly occupied on the organic front. And we're hopeful the market will keep supporting that push through price movement that's constructive for people's demand.
Thanks, JM. Alex, I think you had a second question.
Yes. Yeah. Thanks, JM; that helped. Perhaps one additional item. Every one of you has mentioned wanting to keep growing the platform so it becomes more of a diversified digital asset business and, really, an asset manager overall. Given that, could you take a few moments to walk through the Bastion Asset Management deal and what you see as the opportunity for actively managed strategies within the broader product lineup?
Yeah. Bastion is a deal we made. Well, we signed it last year in September. We only wrapped it up this September since a regulatory obstacle had to be resolved first. Even so, we moved ahead right away with bringing that group together, and as things stand, those people are now completely woven into what CoinShares does. In my view, this adds a new kind of product line for CoinShares. Our roots were in hedge funds, and around 2015 and 2016 we began moving into ETFs, though we didn't know much about that space at the time. Because of the chances the market presented, we picked up how to operate an ETF asset management business very fast. Yet in essence, that only serves the beta portion of the market. With the way the market keeps shifting, clients increasingly want a little alpha layered on top. Beta is clearly the dominant piece—across asset management as a whole, passive vehicles dwarf what's available on the alpha side. Even so, requests keep growing, and investors are coming to us looking for beta exposure paired with an alpha overlay. That's why having both types of solution inside the CoinShares ecosystem matters so much to us, and it has also widened our distribution reach. Our beta business consists of listed products, whereas our alpha business today is non-listed, which means it opens up a different distribution channel. Another market that's open is one where movement is somewhat simpler. So, to give an example, we could apply somewhat more force in Asia, as I'd put it. You could even picture making a push in the U.S. as well. Some new CFTC regulations governing derivatives in the U.S. have to be studied first, though, before anything can get a firmer grip there. Still, the notion definitely exists that Bastion could become a globally spread product suite, rather than the European or American variety seen on the ETF side.
Understood. All right. No, that's useful. I appreciate you answering our questions.
Happy to do it. Jeri, I believe there's one more analyst waiting to ask something — that's Kevin Dee — so could we simply get him on the line, since he isn't showing up in the app for me?
Thank you. Jean, are you able to hear me?
Yes, Kevin, I hear you. How are you doing?
Okay, thank you. I appreciate being given the chance to speak. Jean, at this point I've honestly lost count of how many years I've been participating in your calls. It's certainly greater than 3. I'm just a little curious, I guess, about where things are headed strategically. I know you talked about markets that are growing, and in your press release you discussed expanding your core presence in Europe further, and also brought up the active blockchain investment capabilities. I was wondering whether you'd be open to going into more detail on that first, and then carry on saying a bit more regarding expanding into new markets. You just mentioned Asia. Could you perhaps shed a bit more light on that, please.
Alright, and thanks, Kevin, for hanging in there with us over this long stretch. To kick things off, I believe this marks the 25th earning call Richard and I have done together; it's definitely been quite a journey. Now, on the question of how we see our positioning: our origins are European. We started out essentially as a hedge fund, then noticed the opening in the broader ETF space, and from 2015 onward that's where we put our focus. Things keep shifting, the market keeps transforming, and CoinShares has always aimed at being a worldwide asset management firm, rather than merely a European operation. So what's the way to create a worldwide franchise that sits at the leading edge of our thinking? That's exactly why being able to get our product out across Europe, Asia and the U.S. puts us in a far stronger spot than if we only had offerings for America. Bastion goes some way toward—not entirely, but partly—addressing that story. As for the range of products we bring to market, we continue to have our older offerings in Europe, and we also have our growth platform there, which is CoinShares Physical. On top of that, we brought in a UCITS offering over in Europe, and that gives us the ability to get product out to a broader set of investors worldwide. The matter of continuing to grow our footprint in the U.S. remains open, and it's a strategic item we're weighing and talking through. Is that responsive to what you were asking, Kevin?
You brought up UCITS. My understanding is that a Bitcoin mining ETF has come out.
That's right.
What's your read on how that leaves you placed with the regulators when it comes to rolling out more of those kinds of funds down the line, and in what way does it maybe build a moat versus competing ETF providers?
On the regulatory side, this is a UCITS platform sitting with the CBI, meaning the Central Bank of Ireland. There's a straightforward pass-through that lets us keep layering new product onto the platform while staying inside what the CBI allows. Each regulator across Europe keeps its own set of dos and don'ts, and the CBI are the ought. Provided we stick to the CBI's rules, we can certainly keep expanding the product lineup in that story. It simply comes down to locating more prospectives and having the right ideas to locate those prospectives. On the moat question, essentially, what you were getting at is that our moat really concerns our ability to produce new product that the market finds interesting, rather than just new product for the sake of new product. Broadly, you won't tend to see us flooding the market with untouched launches of new product. We'll be far more tactical regarding what we bring out and how we might craft something the market finds considerably more interesting. We'll carry on adding CoinShares' value by having our analyst team alongside our research team operating hand-in-hand with the distribution team to work out what the market finds interesting and how we can layer CoinShares knowledge and CoinShares know-how on top of it, so we push a bit further than a plain basket an AI could put together for you.
I understand WGMI was just rebranded from Bitcoin Mining to Bitcoin Mining and Digital Power. I'm curious whether you've noticed any market response to that shift, particularly in the U.S., and if
Two factors really drove the name change. First, the Bitcoin mining sector is evolving quickly, and many of these firms are increasingly adding substantial HPC power, or HPC capacity, onto their own balance sheets. We need to reflect that as well. Second, WGMI's mandate had become quite restrictive too, since originally it was solely Bitcoin; we need to modernize it so we can effectively maintain a sufficiently broad universe. As for how the market responded, people tell us they're happy you're effectively clarifying the positioning, because plenty of investors kept asking us what WGMI's positioning was relative to more and more of these companies moving into HPC and AI.
That raises a further point, JM. What's your perspective, and CoinShares' perspective, on Bitcoin mining in the near term and the long term?
Right, Bitcoin mining provides the network's security, so there's no way around having it. Will today's Bitcoin miner still be the Bitcoin miner of tomorrow? Possibly not. Since, as we've witnessed in each and every cycle, you find players who are enormous in Bitcoin mining gradually fading away, getting replaced by another firm or transforming into different firms. The universe continues to grow, and the universe continues to shift. There are very tiny ones, and there are incredible mining firms in the U.S. that folks haven't heard of yet, such as Cormint. There are incredible mining firms in Europe that folks don't know about, like a certain firm in Italy's Northern Alps; they aren't large yet, but someday they definitely will be. So it comes down to the universe being in flux, and we simply have to ensure we can seize this changing universe. As for whether Bitcoin mining matters for Bitcoin? Well, it's essential, so the necessity of Bitcoin mining isn't up for debate. Bitcoin mining will persist regardless, so long as Bitcoin stays a proof-of-work protocol.
I've got one final question for you, JM.
Kevin, our time is just about up.
Yeah, my apologies for that. This one might be for Richard.
I could tell from your tone that we'd be in for a rough time. Come on, hit me with the final one.
All right, thanks. According to the press release, accrued XBT fees came to roughly $285 million. I'd just like to know what would be required for those to flow through the P&L.
That's something I can address.
Hand that over to Richard. Thanks, Richard.
Yeah, absolutely. That's fine; regarding those accrued fees, Kevin, they've already been run through the P&L. This represents revenue XBT Provider has brought in over a period of time. On the balance sheet it appears under accrued fee, since we choose to hold those accrued fees in digital asset until such point as people redeem them; therefore it contributes to our available capital position. In our MD&A, you'll find our available capital position. It's divided between our liquid assets and the accrued fee component. This is revenue that has already passed through the P&L. If what you're asking is when they'll be turned into cash, that happens at our discretion; however, we generally stick with the pattern that upon redemption of the notes, we turn them into cash.
Richard, thanks for getting to the heart of what I actually wanted to ask. I'm grateful for that.
Yeah.
Thank you so much, JM. It's nice to speak with you once more.
That's fine; and a chat regarding the new position, Kevin.
Thanks, Kevin. So now I want to address a few things folks sent in through the portal. Marko Stanković sent us several questions. JM, the first one is directed at you. In today's materials, Richard Nash is referred to as interim CFO. But in the 20-F, where the 2025 financial year-end appears, he's shown as the CFO. Could you walk us through what changed and when we might expect a permanent hire?
Yeah, I'd say that's likely just something that got left out, since Richard was referred to as interim CFO throughout the prospectus. That call is his to make, but he's still here on the line with me for the 2025 call, and he figured 2025 was likely one too many. So nothing bad is going on here. It's simply that Richard would like to remain at CoinShares and take on something a little different from just joining me on earnings calls. We're keen to support him through this transition. Alongside that, we've wrapped up the hunt for our next CFO, and we'll be sure to let the market know once the timing is appropriate.
Appreciate that, JM. Richard, I've got a few things for you. Under the debt terms, BTC is categorized as an asset product, while the definition of products generating high fees covers XBT along with physical XBTI BITC. During 2025, XBT accounted for 73% of management fees, and over that six-month period, certificate liabilities dropped 44.9%. So what takes over from XBT as the driver of your fee revenue, and when should we expect that?
Appreciate that, Marko. When it comes to XBT, there's no one-for-one swap, and honestly we don't believe one is required. Diversification, not direct substitution, has always been the guiding idea behind this strategy. You're right that it dropped 44.9% across the half, though essentially every player in the sector experienced the same thing over those months. Looking at how our fees and our AUM break down across time shows how this has already been evolving — and frankly, it tells its own story. Back three or four years ago, XBT accounted for roughly the mid 90%, mid 90 percentage of both AUM and revenue. These days the picture is far more balanced, with CoinShares Physical, Block Index, and US each pitching in. Clearly, Physical represents the most obvious next phase of growth. For several years running it's been the platform expanding quickest; during the first half of 2026 it stood alone in pulling in meaningful inflows — more than 150 million. Other offerings are carrying weight too, of course. As the deck showed, Block Index's performance is solid evidence of why spreading exposure matters. We posted 17% AUM growth in that window even as digital asset prices declined. Truthfully, the response isn't "product X takes over from XBT by date Y." Rather, we're intentionally constructing a broader platform so that no individual product has to step in for XBT — and the ongoing mix shift is proof that this approach is delivering. Given that XBT remains such a massive product with a lengthy legacy, it's going to be a long road.
Alright, thanks Rich. I realize Jean touched briefly on the possibility of buying back shares, but could you address this? You're holding $116.7 million in liquid assets, and you're asking for authorization covering 32.9 million shares — at today's price that comes to about $184 million. Where would the money come from, and would any repurchases happen solely through the open market, or are you also considering privately negotiated block purchases from current shareholders?
All right, and I apologize in advance if I cover some ground Jean already went over. Let me just make the mechanics clear: what we're asking shareholders to approve at tomorrow's EGM is an authority, not a commitment to spend. Should it be approved, any actual buybacks stay completely up to the board's discretion, carried out across a window of multiple years. The 32.9 million figure — the size of that authority, as you mentioned — isn't necessarily a target we're trying to hit. It represents the cap we'd like to have in place, giving us room to move opportunistically throughout the program's life without needing to go back to shareholders for yet another EGM whenever market conditions shift. Regarding how any such purchases would be financed, and whether they'd happen through the open market or through private negotiation — those are precisely the sorts of calls the board will make at the relevant time, taking into account market conditions then, our financial position then, and other investment opportunities on the table. All of it, obviously, consistent with what the EGM materials for tomorrow's meeting have set out.
Thanks, Richard. JM, one more question for you. Zcash's volume and popularity have really taken off. Is the company exploring the possibility of adding Zcash to its offerings?
Ah, Zcash, the classic. See, what Zcash does isn't really pushing privacy forward. Anonymity is what pushes privacy forward, and that's a feature we ought to treat as significant. Now, getting Zcash listed in Europe isn't the easiest task, even though it's there in our prospectus; so once it becomes something APs, exchanges, clearers, and other counterparties can look at, we'll definitely take a look at whether it's worth pursuing.
All right, that's great. It looks like our time is up at this point. There are another 2 questions or so that we'll address on a separate basis, though thanks to all of you for being part of today's call.
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