Oaktree Specialty Lending Corporation (OCSL) Earnings Call Transcript
February 4, 2026
Earnings Call Speaker Segments
The earnings release for our first quarter of 2026 came out this morning, and you can find it, together with the slide presentation that goes with it, in the Investors area of our site, oaktreespecialtylending.com. Ahead of getting started, please let me note that remarks made during today's call contain forward-looking statements that reflect our present views regarding, among other things, how we'll operate and perform financially going forward. What actually happens may diverge materially from what those forward-looking statements imply or express. For a more detailed discussion of these factors, please see the applicable SEC filings. No obligation is assumed by Oaktree to update or revise any forward-looking statement. Let me also note that nothing said on this call amounts to an offer to sell, or the solicitation of an offer to buy, any interest in a fund managed by Oaktree. Investors and others ought to know that OCSL announces material information through the Investors area of its corporate website. The company urges investors, the media and others to look at the information it posts on its website. With that, I'll hand things over to Matt Pendo, OCSL's President. Matt?
Appreciate that, Alison, and good morning to all of you. I'd like to kick off this call by walking through how our first quarter turned out. Armen Panossian, who serves as our CEO and Co-CIO, is going to follow with his thoughts regarding conditions in the market right now, and Raghav Khanna, our Co-CIO, will walk through specifics on the portfolio and what we've been investing in. After that, Chris McKown, our CFO and Treasurer, will take everyone through the financials, and then we'll take your questions. We're pleased with how this year has started, and the first fiscal quarter of 2026 brought us solid results. Adjusted net investment income came in at $36.1 million, equal to $0.41 per share, which is a modest increase versus the quarter before. Yet again, our quarterly dividend was entirely covered by earnings. These figures speak to how disciplined our team has been in putting capital to work in assets that generate income, along with the steps taken during the last year to make the liability side of our balance sheet more efficient. Notably, this marked the initial full quarter that reflects what the September rate cut did, and even with base rates lower, earnings have held steady. In line with our dividend policy and the earnings from the first quarter, the Board has declared a quarterly cash dividend of $0.40 per share, which will be paid on March 31, 2026, to stockholders of record as of March 16, 2026. As we talked about on the fiscal 2025 year end call, there are a number of levers available to us that can help counter lower base rates and bolster net investment income. A major lever is our capacity to deploy capital carefully into appealing investment opportunities. Along those lines, new fund investments, which includes drawdowns on commitments already in place, reached $314 million, an increase from $220 million during the prior quarter. New private investments carried an average all-in spread of 525 basis points and an average yield of 9%. We retain plenty of financial flexibility to keep deploying capital, since we closed the quarter with more than $576 million in available liquidity. Another important lever for boosting earnings power is our sharp focus on bringing down nonaccruals and equity positions. During the first quarter, nonaccruals were fairly flat compared to the previous quarter and declined by almost 85 basis points versus a year ago. When the quarter ended, nonaccruals made up 3.1% of the total debt portfolio at fair value. We hold optimistic views regarding what several of our nonaccrual positions could ultimately yield, and we're working diligently to get the most recovery value possible. In this quarter, we restructured what we hold in Avery and returned a portion of that loan to accrual status, which fits with the wider goal of turning assets that aren't earning into ones that produce income. Avery is still selling units, and that seems to be occurring more quickly. Whatever proceeds come from monetizing nonaccruals or equity positions will go back into investments that generate income. We'll keep assessing these levers and how much they might add to our earnings and dividends. As we always have, we stay dedicated to maintaining strong alignment with shareholders while we work through a credit landscape that keeps changing. I'll now hand the call to Armen for an update on the market environment.
Appreciate that, Matt. What we're seeing right now in private credit reflects the same split emerging across the wider economy. A mix of macro forces — stubborn inflation, tariffs, and continuous tech-driven disruption — is widening the gap between structurally strong and weak players, drawing a sharp line separating winners from losers. Businesses that have scale, profitability, and the financial wherewithal enjoy plentiful capital access, while those under pressure get little to none. Across the last 2 years, in a sluggish M&A backdrop, sponsors leaned toward recapitalizations rather than exits, which built up a pipeline of deals awaiting their moment in the market. As rate pressure has begun to subside, sponsors are gravitating more and more toward M&A to provide their LPs with the liquidity they badly need. Large cap dealmaking picked up during the December quarter, yet middle market volume stayed under its long-run averages. Even so, our confidence is growing that middle market M&A will strengthen as the year unfolds. Following the Fed's rate cut in September, pricing behavior in the market has shown more discipline, and we think private credit spreads have hit their floor at SOFR plus 450 to 475 basis points; elevated redemptions within the perpetual BDC space, which soften demand for new paper, may be reinforcing that view. Our stance for 2026 is one of cautious optimism — spreads should hold steady, with room to move wider. Notably, direct lending deals keep delivering roughly a 150 basis point spread premium versus broadly syndicated loans of comparable credit quality. PIK interest is still common across direct lending transactions, which highlights how much sponsors value flexible capital structures. Our own approach to PIK remains highly disciplined. PIK represented 6.3% of adjusted total investment income in the first quarter, which sits under the public BDC industry average. Despite spreads being tighter than usual and terms being looser, compelling opportunities remain, as our robust origination volume this quarter demonstrates. Given today's market conditions, we favor lending to companies with resilient business models, defensible market positions, and durable long-term outlooks — consistent with our bottoms-up, value-driven underwriting philosophy. One thing we're watching carefully is how AI affects private credit and the economy more broadly. Software and applications have long been the leading secular winners from major technology shifts. In our view, AI will expand software's total addressable market. That said, we anticipate uneven results, with growing dispersion among players, since success hinges largely on execution and how quickly adoption happens. Looking at 2026, we expect an active backdrop, fueled by strong hyperscale investment and a livelier software M&A landscape as incumbents pursue consolidation while public valuation multiples sit at multiyear lows. At the same time, we recognize that today's AI-related spending is a significant contributor to overall economic growth, so any letdown in realized returns or in the pace of adoption could trigger a retreat in AI investment. With dispersion widening and uncertainty on the rise, we think our global investment platform, given its scale, leaves us in a strong position. U.S. middle market direct lending is still the bedrock of Oaktree's global private credit platform, yet our know-how spanning numerous strategies, plus our capacity to underwrite complicated transactions, broadens what we can pursue and lets us stay very picky. To be specific, the strength and reach of the relationships we hold with sponsors, corporates and advisers give us entrée to proprietary deal flow in asset-backed finance, European direct lending, infrastructure lending and capital solutions. Over the long term, we continue to hold a positive view of private credit. Within this setting, rigorous underwriting, choosiness and hands-on portfolio management will keep serving as essential engines of long-term results. Raghav is going to share more on our portfolio and recent investments now. Raghav?
Appreciate that, Armen. Before we get into the usual review of portfolio activity, I'd like to expand on what Armen said about software and take a few minutes to walk through how we think about putting money to work in that area. Our basic philosophy on software investing hasn't shifted because of AI, though we've grown pickier. Basically, the way we frame it is to seek out software vendors that are deeply woven into the daily workflows and business processes of their customers, demand meaningful purchasing from multiple stakeholders, and come with substantial switching costs. The bar for quality in software investments has been raised by AI. As a result, we've added more criteria to how we underwrite both new deals and the companies we already hold. For our part, we want software businesses that possess multiple control points, data gravity, business context, high mission criticality, and an AI road map that's both coherent and credible. That's why we've been turning down a bigger portion of new opportunities than was the case in prior years. On top of that, about 18% of our software positions have been repaid over the past 12 months, which shows just how strong our underwriting calls have been. Additional detail on the software portfolio is available on Page 8 of the earnings presentation. As of December 31, software made up roughly 23% of investments at fair value, spanning 28 issuers; first lien term loans account for 94% of our software positions, and only 2 of our loans are ARR-based, representing about 2% of fair value. Now on to the broader portfolio. As December 31 came to a close, first lien senior secured debt made up 85% of the entire portfolio, and debt investments had a weighted average yield of 9.3%; our commitment to a diversified portfolio is unchanged. Typically, a single position represents less than 1%, and by fair value, our largest position is no more than 2% of the portfolio. Weighted average leverage and interest coverage for portfolio companies were stable at 5.2x and 2.2x, respectively. Our team delivered a notable increase in investment activity, growing the portfolio by about $100 million and bringing it to $2.95 billion. Newly funded investment activity totaled $314 million, up 42% sequentially. Repayments and realizations during the quarter were steady at $179 million, leaving us with $135 million in net new investments. The rise in deal activity reflects how broad Oaktree's private credit platform is, and it also shows the effect of the targeted money we've recently directed toward global sourcing and origination as well as specialized investment talent — all of which has considerably widened the top of our funnel even as U.S. middle market direct lending volume has been softer. First lien senior secured investments in resilient, market-leading businesses backed by disciplined underwriting remain our priority. First lien loans accounted for 92% of our new originations, and the all-in weighted average spread on new originations for the quarter was approximately 500 basis points. One deal worth highlighting from this quarter is the stake we took in Premier Inc. at $6.50. This particular company operates within health care services, where it runs a fairly large group purchasing organization with a national footprint, serving a network made up of hospitals and care providers. Beyond that primary operation, it provides a number of connected offerings, such as health care software, management of the supply chain, and data and analytics together with consulting. The Take-Private transaction for Premier was wrapped up by Patient Square Capital during November, with the total enterprise value reaching $2.6 billion. Our ties with this sponsor have kept expanding, and throughout the intricate underwriting and negotiation work, Oaktree was heavily engaged. Acting as joint lead arranger, funds from Oaktree provided approximately 40% of the first lien term loan as well as 30% of the revolving credit facility. The term loan carries an all-cash coupon of SOFR plus 650, and it also comes with 2 points of original issue discount; the factors that attracted us to this deal were Premier's strong competitive position, the secular tailwinds supporting health care spending, and the significant expenses customers would incur by switching. During the quarter, one additional name was added to our nonaccrual list; a second out term loan tied to Pluralsight was put on nonaccrual. Back in August of 2024, our prior position went through restructuring, and during this quarter we placed a restructured loan onto nonaccrual, pointing to ongoing tough industry conditions and the company's outlook coming in softer than expected. When the quarter closed, 11 investments were on nonaccrual and, as Matt noted, at fair value they represented 3.1% of the total debt portfolio. We continue to work these positions diligently, with the goal of eventually converting nonearning assets into investments that produce income. At this point I'll turn the call over to Chris so he can take everyone through our financial results, including the $6.50 figure.
Appreciate that, Raghav. Turning to the quarter we just wrapped up on December 31, 2025 — our first fiscal quarter — adjusted net investment income landed at $36.1 million, equal to $0.41 per share. By comparison, the preceding quarter produced $35.4 million, or $0.40 per share. The improvement was driven by a drop in Part I incentive fee expense, and that reduction was large enough to outweigh a quarter-over-quarter decline in total investment income. On the NAV front, we finished at $16.30 per share, down from $16.64 in Q4, with unrealized depreciation on certain debt and equity investments accounting for the decrease. Within the portfolio, Pluralsight represented the heaviest weight — Raghav walked through that situation earlier. We took the equity stake down to 0, and we also reduced the valuation on the second out term loan to mirror the pressures facing that position. On an adjusted basis, total investment income declined to $74.5 million, compared with $76.9 million during the fourth quarter. The main driver was a drop in interest income tied to lower reference rates along with less acceleration of original issue discount, though this was partially offset by stronger fee income, driven largely by increases in prepayment and exit fees. Net expenses decreased slightly from the fourth quarter, primarily due to a $4 million decline in Part I incentive fees, which mainly resulted from our total return hurdle. OCSL continues to take a cautious stance regarding the use of payment and guidance, and PIK represented 6.3% of adjusted total investment income for the quarter. Approximately two-thirds of our PIK income is linked to investments that were able to PIK at origination. For the quarter, our net leverage ratio came in at 1.07x, up from 0.97x in the previous quarter, while total debt outstanding stood at $1.6 billion. That rise in leverage was a result of the strong deployments we made during the quarter, and our long-term target range for leverage, 0.9x to 1.25x, remains the same. The weighted average interest rate on debt outstanding as of December 31 was 6.1%, compared with 6.5% in the prior quarter, mainly because reference rates moved lower. At quarter end, unsecured debt accounted for 59% of total debt, a modest decline from the previous quarter. We retain plenty of dry powder to fund investment commitments, with roughly $576 million of liquidity, which includes $81 million in cash along with $495 million of undrawn capacity under our credit facility. When you leave out the ones tied to the joint ventures, unfunded commitments came to $247 million. Now for our two JVs. Between them, those JVs hold $511 million in investments right now, mostly broadly syndicated loans, and those are spread across 135 portfolio companies. In the first fiscal quarter, the JVs produced ROEs of 12% in aggregate. Leverage at the JV was 1.7x, unchanged from last quarter. We also got a $525,000 dividend from the Kemper JV. With that, I'll hand the call back to the operator for Q&A.
Morning, everybody. On the portfolio — I don't know if you gave us a category-by-category breakdown, something like a performance 1 through 5. Either way, can you tell us roughly what portion of the portfolio today is falling short of its current security or underwrite, and where we are as we move past the legacy-type problems?
Hey, Fin, Raghav here. Let me point you to Page 13 — actually, sorry, that's not in there. When we look at the assets that aren't performing, you've got the nonaccruals, and you can see the restructured equities there. Then there's a third category we keep an eye on: positions trading, or that have been marked, significantly under par — clearly a sign of stress. Within that group, the majority of loans and positions sitting well below par are in fact public positions. Some of those we purchased in the high 80s to 90s, and they've since fallen a few points beneath that. For most of them, we anticipate a recovery. A few companies in the tech sector are, as you can probably tell from the market, under some pressure. On that note, actually, when we check in with our trading desk, many of those tech names are moving lower on trades of roughly $2 million to $3 million, largely driven by CLO sellers attempting to handle their WARF tests and rating tests. We aren't seeing significant selling in those positions, so we're keeping an eye on those names specifically — the tech names that are broadly syndicated loans and have drifted downward. But in reality, not much trading is taking place. There isn't much selling. It's mostly small selling from CLO sellers.
Okay, that helps. And I guess a follow-up on that same topic. You gave us some useful framing around the threat AI represents to software. Suppose there is trading happening — do any names stand out as compelling? It looked like you had a fair amount of liquidity this quarter. Is that something we should expect to continue?
Yes. One thing that works in our favor is that we obviously operate a large public markets business inside our high-yield group and our senior notes group; so we are actually going through every software and technology name while, naturally, monitoring our private positions very closely, by putting together AI scorecards as well as other types of scorecards, again, in order to sort. Because I think your read is right that there's somewhat of a baby thrown out with the bathwater dynamic, and that's something we're watching. Again, when we gauge the right time to act, it doesn't feel like that time is now, simply because, again, the trading volume we've seen is either small ticket sales out of CLOs or dealers trying to make a market; and those roughly $2 million, $3 million order trades are basically used to mark positions down 2, 3 points. So it looks quite attractive when you're staring at a screen, at least for a handful of these names where AI risk is low, yet there isn't enough volume to really want to step in and try to be a buyer. And just to put some scale on it, we're talking about roughly $23 million.
You reported that the median EBITDA of the portfolio rose from $150 million to $190 million on a sequential basis. For a single quarter, that seems like quite a substantial shift. You mentioned that there might be somewhat more activity in the upper middle market relative to the core middle market. I'm curious about what actually caused that. Did it come about strategically, or was it more of a side effect of the deal environment and the growth of companies?
Yes, so — you're correct. What really drove it was the new originations we funded during the fourth quarter, and those were fairly large companies. All of them were large cap. Largely on the sponsor side, largely in the U.S.; there were a few non-sponsor situations, a few non-U.S., essentially European situations that we funded during the fourth quarter, but those typically had much larger EBITDA. So the bulk of the increase in the median EBITDA, I'd say, came from a mix shift tied to those fourth-quarter originations. That said, the EBITDA of the portfolio overall has been rising as well. That, I would say, accounted for a smaller share of the gain you're seeing in the median EBITDA.
Got it, that's excellent. Now, one additional item. I was hoping you might walk us through that unrealized depreciation of about $32 million. We talked about Pluralsight, and that appears to account for around 1/3 of the net amount, but could you explain whether any other themes or factors might have driven the markdowns in the quarter?
Chris here. I'll make a few comments and give whatever further detail I can. So you're right, Pluralsight was the largest single contributor, representing about 38% of the total mark. Beyond that, we took several smaller marks on a number of other private holdings. And certain quoted names did trade down, which affected some names we hold on the balance sheet, as well as a few of the JVs. That figure included $111 million.
Let me push a bit further on your view of software. At this stage, how would you describe top line growth and EBITDA trends in general terms? Has anything shifted in those growth rates — are you seeing renewed activity on deals? And how is that affecting the market, beyond the softness in certain secondary loan prices?
Appreciate the question. It's Armen here. From a high level, my view is that it's premature to observe any deterioration in performance at any software company, and it will likely require considerable time before any real dispersion shows up in results because of AI, or any disruption to results from AI. There's been plenty of dramatic press coverage, yet at a high level that hasn't become a broad-based problem across the companies. The basis for worry isn't really short-term softness in results. It's instead that anxiety about the long term casts doubt on whether these loans can be refinanced at maturity; and that's the reason everyone ought to examine their software exposure, since if a portion of software companies — whether held in your private equity portfolio or your private credit portfolio — if certain of them are more vulnerable to long-term dislocation from AI, then the greater the chance the private equity sponsor declines to stand behind them at maturity, even before any genuine performance problem appears. Another point I'd make is that should a number of these software businesses ultimately be disrupted by AI, their outcomes may prove to be binary. By that I mean if the business looks like it faces an AI threat, a serious AI competitor, then depending on how the contracts are structured and how the business operates, you might witness a fairly swift decline in performance at those businesses as time passes. As a result, from both an equity standpoint and a credit standpoint, recoveries might be very troubled. So there's a substantial basis for worry over the medium to long term, though it won't truly surface in the near term. Regarding that point, I should briefly touch on how covenants work in software transactions. The way covenants function in software deals mirrors the same dynamic you see when comparing large-cap to core or small-cap private credit. To clarify: certain software transactions include covenants tied to EBITDA, and generally those involve companies that are smaller or in the middle market. However, when a business gets big enough to be a large cap and could be funded through the broadly syndicated loan market, those software loans come with no covenants whatsoever. Consequently, as one would anticipate, this resembles cov-lite. If you look at another industry, not software, big-cap deals usually don't include covenants, but you'll often see them in smaller or midsize transactions. In software, those covenants tend to take 1 of 2 shapes. The first is based on EBITDA, the way you'd normally see for a company financed off a leverage multiple, and the second is ARR, or annual recurring revenue. When deals are built on recurring revenue, and they're middle market or lower middle market, there's normally an ARR covenant, which means a total debt to ARR cap, and after roughly 3 years that covenant usually goes away and becomes a more standard leverage-based covenant. Okay, so with ARR deals, covenants can become problematic once you're nearing that three-year mark, generally speaking. And for deals that do include a covenant like that — again, you'd see it less often with large cap than with small cap. But it's one more extra element that could trigger the alarm somewhat sooner, or ahead of maturity. And in our case, by the way, as far as OCSL goes, we've got just 2 ARR deals in the portfolio period, and one has already turned free cash flow positive and should be repaid very soon. The other one is a really big transaction — a really big company backed by a really big private equity sponsor. In our view, this area is fairly protected against competition from AI. At the same time, on the ARR front, we believe we've taken a forward-thinking approach — specifically, we've aimed to avoid scenarios where cash flow is negative, which would leave a company dependent on public market access or on financing being available. For a number of years now, steering clear of those kinds of situations has been our goal. As a result, that concern doesn't really come up within our portfolio.
Paul, Matt here, I believe. We added a fresh slide to the deck, Page 8, which lays out our software exposure in OCSL — I think, if you have any thoughts on that, let us know. But when we present it there, it kind of addresses what you asked regarding how the business is performing. So, looking at EBITDA growth from the time we funded those deals, it's risen roughly 20%, which gives a sense that growth exists there. EBITDA margin sits at approximately 40%. So these companies are EBITDA positive. And roughly 18%, nearly 20%, of our software loans have been repaid across the past 12 months. So that reflects thoughtful and, we hope, successful underwriting. Anyway, we have those figures on Page 8, which is included in what we posted. Hopefully, that's useful too.
Yes, thank you for that. That's really useful context, and Armen, I also appreciate the helpful response there. If I may, one more question that's broader in scope, a bigger-picture one, related to this same subject. It's kind of a two-part question. But on that slide, you referenced a 47% weighted average LTV ratio. I'm just wondering, is that an LTV ratio at underwrite? Or is it more of a current LTV ratio, obviously based on today's valuations and leverage; that's the first part of my question; and then the second part is bigger picture. How much of a valuation reset do you think the software space broadly can absorb in terms of equity multiples before we start to see widespread restructurings and losses? And bigger trouble within the software industry, just given that, obviously, these are companies that are typically financed with lower LTV ratios at underwrite, and I'll turn it over there.
This is Armen. I'll take that one, Paul. I mean — so first of all, on that slide, that is the LTV at underwrite, not a current estimate.
That's the one as of 12/31, the present period.
You mean the present period as of 12/31?
Yes.
All right. So as of 12/31, that figure represents our LTV estimate on 12/31. Now, regarding how much the equity multiple could deteriorate before it becomes an issue. Broadly, once LTVs climb to 60%, you're reaching a level that puts the loan's refinanceability in doubt. In general, today, apart from software, when an LBO occurs, you tend to see roughly 50% to 55% LTV at the ceiling. Deals at 70% or 65% LTV aren't typically observed; so theoretically, what would happen, assuming these companies aren't burning through an excessive amount of cash and they approach maturity within a sensible window, is that when the sponsor goes to the market and says, hey, I'd like to refinance; the answer will be, well, you'll have to contribute additional equity to bring this back nearer to a 50 to 50 LTV. Sponsors must then determine whether doing so is sensible, based on the business's future risk factors and earnings potential, and also on how far along the fund holding those investments is in its deployment. If a fund is unable to call capital, well, that sponsor cannot back the business. If the fund is already a winner and has returned substantial capital, then it's more apt to abandon those laggard businesses requiring extra capital to push through a refinancing or a maturity; and so — in that scenario, the sponsor is less inclined to support the business. Thus, numerous economic and noneconomic considerations factor in when assessing a sponsor's readiness to support a business, if and when the loan's LTV surpasses, again, that 55% or 60% LTV threshold.
Thanks for that. I've got nothing else to ask. Really appreciate it, everyone.
Thanks, everybody, for being with us on the call today. If any questions come up, don't hesitate to contact me and the team. Enjoy the rest of your day.
That wraps up today's conference for everyone. We appreciate each of you being here. You're free to hang up at this point.
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