People Incorporated (PPLI) Earnings Call Transcript
December 8, 2022
Earnings Call Speaker Segments
All right. We're going to get started. Thank you, everybody, for attending this session. My name is Ross Sandler. I run the Internet team here at Barclays. Super excited to have the guys from IAC back again in person after a nice 2-year hiatus.
Chris, maybe we could just dive right in. Start with macro, you guys released the November metrics this morning. Maybe just on the advertising side. So DDM down 16%, a slight downtick on a 2-year stack. Just walk us through kind of what you're seeing on that business.
Sure, and great to be here. Thanks for having us. There's 3 main trends underlying the down 16% in digital revenues at Dotdash Meredith. The first is overall advertising market, classic display, both premium and programmatic, video, et cetera. That was soft in October. I think we've seen material or real weakening of that across the month of November. And like anything, it's -- like it's been, since May, different trends across different sectors. But you saw real softness and pullbacks across CPG, some pharma, a few other sort of discretionary ad budgets where both on the premium side -- well, let's start with the premium side. They're not -- they're just pulling back on campaigns or not executing. So you have a slowdown there. And then on programmatic, we have pretty good data from October that programmatic ad rates from a major platform were down about 10% in October. We'd expect that to probably be a little more in November based on what we're seeing. Against that e-commerce, and this is -- was sort of an interesting pattern, I think, for all of you as investors. E-commerce looked -- this is where we hand off hot leads for conversion to buy goods on third-party sites: Amazon, Walmart, et cetera. That was actually pretty strong. What we've seen though is a real shift where the beginning of November was weaker year-over-year than we expected, and people are buying later. But if you look at it versus 2020, it was wholly consistent. So thinking about it now, and we've seen strength -- real strength in December year-over-year. So probably what happened was, last year, the news was banging away on consumers because of supply chain, none of the things you want to buy for Christmas or Hanukkah is going to be in, buy it early, a lot of it got pulled up. Now it's been -- it's having a lag. What we call the Turkey 5 from Thanksgiving through Cyber Monday was solid. It was not mind-blowing, but solid across platforms, I think, high single digits, low double digits -- very low double digits up, but beginning in November was challenging. I think we'll see that normalize over the 2-month period. And we also had some orders that didn't ship until December due to procurement or execution challenges -- fulfillment challenges at partners make November look worse, it doesn't matter between the 2 months. We've already seen that come through. Where we have seen weakness would be the third element, which is performance marketing on services, broader decline, not -- we expected it, but when you look at the year-over-year numbers in brokerage sign-ups, mortgages. These aren't gigantic businesses for us, but we got there. The insurance industry broadly is struggling on sign-ups. So just a decline in those activities. But from an e-commerce perspective, it was a solid holiday period, but it's definitely shifted into this year.
Okay. And so just to be clear, like the Meredith that you had a chart last quarter about some of the like where we are in terms of transition and traffic improvement. So there's not really a traffic thing going on in November. It's really just the brand advertising you started with that stepped down a bit?
You'd have some traffic -- and we're trying to figure out what is -- or get detail on, we'd be down slightly on traffic year-over-year across the portfolio. We said we were down 5% as of October, kind of moving along there. Some of that is probably high numbers in the base in certain categories, but this isn't -- the down 16%, even if you adjusted for e-commerce shifts and things falling into December, it's not a traffic challenge as much as it's just advertiser demand.
Premium advertising. Yes. Got it. Okay. And then Angi's 5%, pretty solid 2-year stack was fine. Just a quick summary on what you saw there?
Yes. I mean you can see up -- okay on Ads and Leads. Services, we got to think -- Services were 7 -- up 7%. We've got to think about the right way to communicate that because with Joey in there as CEO, we're actively deemphasizing and shrinking certain areas of services, while continuing to invest behind others. We've talked about it before, but there are certain categories we were in products where low gross margin and negative contribution margin that we're moving out of things that just don't scale. Others, like Book Now, we feel very good about and continuing to invest behind. But there will be noise on the revenue line in Angi, particularly in Services, over the coming months and quarters. We view it as really what's important from a gross profit side and overall profitability. We will demonstrate that to you. This is a bit where monthly metrics, which we're sunsetting, are kind of a distraction, but we need to come up with a better framework for conveying progress in Services and the balance in the portfolio across Ads and Leads and Services, and we'll look to do that with the February earnings call.
Got it. And I think just stepping back from the metrics, my take coming out of the last call was there was a little bit of a kind of shift in tone to Joey is getting reengaged kind of at the company level. You had a string of kind of underperforming metrics to date, some of that macro, some of that company specific. And we're kind of moving into like a little bit more of a let's just get back to the basics, take no prisoners type of vibe. And maybe the numbers, assuming we don't have like some crazy change in direction from macro next year, numbers are in the right place, and you'll give us the update on '23, next call. Is that the right kind of feel right now? Is that back to business?
Yes, I think it's fair. We actually just had our strategic offsite last week with all our companies. And you've got great insight because the motto of it was back to basics. And that in the age of negative real returns on cash and capital, there were a lot of initiatives, programs, et cetera, across businesses that were potentially ill-conceived or definitely ill-conceived with hindsight, really focused on ruthless prioritization for each business and what are the major needle movers, clear-out distractions. And it's things as marketing optimization, SEO, SEM, the product improvements that are going to really move the needle and take share and overall management team quality across a number of companies, really productive session. But we think with rising opportunity cost on capital, with a tightening fiscal and monetary environment and with a lot of competitors that had overfunded business plans retrenching in the environment, it's focused on basics. You will take share and you will create value.
Yes. The one thing that the investment community, including myself, struggle with sometimes is we like to try to put IAC into these different eras where from maybe 2014 to right before the pandemic, you had like the Match IPO, then the spin and the Vimeo spin. So you kind of attached like a certain narrative to that time period. Before that, you had the 5 to 1 -- or the 1 to 5 split and kind of a little bit more of a back to basics then, then you're buying back a lot of stock. So how would you characterize what era we're going into for IAC? Is it more like that right after the 1 to 5 when you guys were buying back a lot of stock and doing a little bit of M&A and just kind of building the foundation for then, the big move in '14 with Match? Or how -- where would you put where we are right now?
Yes. We just -- this is one of the themes we were talking about at the offsite, where there is -- there have been 3 different prior periods where we went from -- well, this is way back. But when IAC started, it had $16 million of EBITDA, but where it's kind of gone low to $1 billion down to $100 million to $200 million back to $1 billion and kept doing that. We are right now in a rebuild phase post-spinning Vimeo and Match. And it's definitely -- coming into it as a CFO, there were things in the portfolio that were subscale or had business plans that seemed compelling in early '21 when people were giving you money for free. We've looked to clean up elements of that portfolio. Obviously, the merger of Bluecrew into EmployBridge, which we're excited about that combination, but also eliminated $26 million of EBITDA burn from the P&L. Other things like that where we're saying, okay, if there's capital that's not going to meet our hurdle rates that's tied up in something, let's free it up to be able to deploy. So one is optimizing where we are, but the second is we do believe this is a good IAC environment coming, where it's the old -- I guess, Warren Buffettism, of when the tide goes out, you see who's swimming naked. As capital gets dearer, if you've got conviction, you've got capital and you've got a long-term profile. We do believe, in terms of capital allocation, there will be true value opportunities. But we're looking to rebuild. It's been a tough year on the Meredith integration, both operationally, I think the collective view is too bullish, too optimistic on how easy it would be on the integration and migration and then layer on a total reversal in the ad market. The former is really done in the sands of time to 60, 75 days longer on migration doesn't really matter, but now let's go forward and execute. The ad market is going to be with us and challenges for a while, which we can talk about, but we feel very good about that combination. And that business will be a free cash flow machine. And is essentially valued, we think, at nothing in our current sum of the parts, but we feel very good about where that business will be. We feel good about Care and the opportunities there. Joey is fully focused on turning Angi around, and we actually think we're already on the path. We always said it was going to be a V and a V backup quarterly this year and see real opportunity there, and then look to add another tentpole to the portfolio.
On that latter point, before we get to Meredith, what are the kinds of things -- if we get into this target-rich environment for IAC, what are the kinds of businesses that you guys would be -- I mean, it's usually a marketplace model that you're looking at, but I think everything is on sale and increasingly so as we get into '23. So what should investors think about as far as targets?
Yes. I mean there's a few different sort of genres of focus. One would be public, what would now be small-cap companies that were just perceived at inflated multiples whether they came public through SPAC or through an IPO, where their shareholder base is a little bit lost, they're now at that share price level where kind of nobody cares. And the Board will go through the 5 stages of grief and management for accepting that it just doesn't make sense to be a public company at this scale and positioning. The second are businesses that have good underlying core economics, gross margins, operating leverage, where they've obscured it with a lot of bad initiatives and money-losing activities, which there's a host of, so you can buy a cleanup and ideally uses a platform. And the third are roll-up opportunities, both public and private. On the private side, the large cap stuff is -- tends to be heavily well capitalized. They raised a ton of money, and it's going to take a long time for that to reset on a value basis. But medium and small cap, you can sort of hone in on a mid-23 point where a lot of these will -- even if they are decreasing burn, we'll run out of money and that there will be need for price discovery, either sales or capital raises and we think there's going to be some very interesting roll-up opportunities. There's a number of sectors, we're talking about this earlier, where there's a ton of look-alike companies that all have the same -- we all do $70 million of revenue and lose $15 million of EBITDA, and they're all subscale. A bunch of them aren't going to make it, but you can cobble together a few with a platform, and we think create real value in markets like this just as you could in 2002.
Yes. Totally agree. Okay. If we drill in on the Meredith -- Dotdash Meredith side, so maybe first just starting with like what kind of played out this year? So I can't fault you guys at all for what happened with digital advertising. That's just macro. We're seeing that with all of our companies. But if we look at the micro in the transition, you mentioned the 6, 7 months delayed. I don't know, on a scale of 1 to 10, how would you rank the team's execution? And why was it more complicated with Meredith than, say, some of the little tuck-ins that you had done at Dotdash over prior years where it seemed like you plug it in and boom, you're off and running?
Yes. Well, I'll start with that, which is we bought something that was at least 100% larger than Dotdash. So that is -- it's not really the minnow swallowing the whale, but it's sort of the shark swallowing the whale, which is actually a good food chain analogy, too, probably or aggressiveness analogy. But the -- on the integrations, there were 2 key assumptions that we got one very wrong and one mostly wrong enough that it hurt. Very wrong was we have a very good technical team at Dotdash. If you think about the migrations, it is a core platform that you bring the sites over, plug them in, set them up. And the one assumption was we would be able to hire technical resources to increase the bandwidth of the pipe we had to migrate sites. And you can look back in hindsight and say that was very flawed because the job market was insanely tight and who would want to go work on a short-term project at a digital publisher, but that was an assumption. We really were never able to flex up that capacity, and we were stuck with the pipe this wide to move a fixed number of properties over. The second that we got somewhat wrong was once -- because it was a common platform at Meredith, once we integrated or migrated one, it would be very formulaic thereafter to move the other sites. So we started with Health.com, reasonably sized site, but we didn't -- it didn't have that many integrations to others. So if we screwed it up, it wasn't going to be the end of the world. That went extremely well, technically migration learning. And the view was, based on prior migrations where we either bought a single, but more importantly, bought say 3 different sites at one time, that would be formulaic. The 2 big migrations we got, we were surprised to the downside on. One was on the Lifestyle sites, people in style where -- because of how people scroll -- and lower case, people scroll in a totally different way on lifestyle where they scroll really quickly, whereas Dotdash and Meredith sites, they tend to read very smoothly. We had to reverse the ad serving logic in order to get the ads out that punted those to the end. The second was on recipes. We actually had to build a whole new module to move the recipes over partly due to just challenges of how they were stored and indexed at Meredith. That pushed people and our recipe sites or food sites, which are huge, to the end of the line and because the bandwidth of the pipe didn't increase, that's why it all back ended. Where that manifested itself was whereas we thought we could run the playbook and have the initial step down in traffic and be able to realize growth in '22. All these are back ended and we won't see growth until '23 from improving the site speed content reduced ads. But also it didn't allow us to run the e-commerce and performance marketing integrations, which is just the biggest opportunity that exists on the Meredith sites. And in many ways, we missed the holiday period, forget, we hope to do them in September. So it hurts '22. But in terms of the thesis, we are as big believers in that now as we were previously.
Yes. And I think if we look forward, to your point, the whole portfolio, if you look at the stop light chart, we'll hit that 6-month threshold where your traffic is up 10, somewhere in like 1Q, 2Q of '23. You're saying revenue should be flat first half and then grow second half is kind of your focus. So that implication would be like kind of a little bit more macro, like CPM weakness first half.
Yes.
And then additional stabilization, if not strength and easy comp second half. Can you walk us through like how you bridge next year from traffic and price perspective?
Yes. What we said is we expect to get to flat year-over-year at some point in the first quarter -- first half. So we don't expect the first half to be flat year-over-year, partly because Q1 last year, especially January, February, was actually very strong. Still Omicron, people being at home. I hate to blame things, but it's reality when you look at the traffic patterns in advertising. But -- so -- and we expect the ad mark -- digital ad market and ad market overall to be weak, definitely first quarter, and then soft second quarter. This year, the comps get easier. You could go right around the May 15 when the market just hit a wall, especially retail, CPG, everything after the Walmart, Target earnings and strategy reversals this year. But up until there, there's not much reason to think the ad market will look anything but weak, I think, digitally. But because of the migration timing -- and look, we put that chart out, we still feel good about it. A bunch of those sites were 1 to 2 months. It's kind of a good, but you can't declare victory at that point in the migration, but we feel good about what's happening. But we expect to take share because of just what's specific to us on Meredith and the opportunities that we have there both on a traffic perspective from the migrations and e-commerce. We expect to take share next year. So how we get to even or flat at some point is weak CPMs, weak programmatic, increases in quantity or traffic and e-commerce improvements, and then very much expect to return to growth in the second half, where we've also just got some easy comps, and we're growing.
Yes. We're going to jump into Angi's real quick. If anybody has a question, just go ahead and get your hand up, and we can get a mic to you. So I went back to the 2017 investor deck on the original Angi purchase, and you guys had a slide in there with like a huge TAM and 3% to 4% take rate being like a lot below other marketplace models. I think the outlook has always been like this is a 15% grower with the potential to expand margins. So if we kind of get through the services rightsizing, you're going to run that for gross profit Ads and Leads? Like any reason to think that the overall thesis and the framework you laid out back then is any different today now that you've kind of been through the up, the down?
Well, I mean that 2017 plan, I don't know a lot of familiarity with. Glenn was actually here, you could have asked him yesterday. The -- I think the transition of home services to greater online consumption is inarguable. I think it got pulled forward aggressively, like many things did in COVID, where people have massive home services demand and they were more willing to use it. That's a net beneficiary. The -- in terms of what would have been the prior Angi -- the old Angi plan and the combination with HomeAdvisor and those dynamics, that -- I don't -- we would still view a significant opportunity for -- to take share. And also because of the challenges of the rebranding, which Joey talked about in the investor letter, we actually view the opportunity to take a lot of profitable growth -- profitable share back that we essentially surrendered to the market in the rebranding. And just so people understand, when we consolidated the brands of HomeAdvisor and Angie's List to Angi, we were too aggressive in the assumption of HomeAdvisor's ability to maintain share even when we cut traffic -- basically eliminated advertising with it on SEO. We've also realized we got really hurt on SEM, which was not intuitive, but that the propensity of people to click on SEM for HomeAdvisor when they've seen the TV ads in parallel versus not is substantial. And also the rate, going from Angie's List to Angi, we're there now. So it's fine, but we did not have as much consumer growth as we would have wanted. We're now getting through it. The reality is we're now buying the traffic through affiliate and SEM that we used to get for free. I think Joey feels confident we can get a lot of that back. And also, there are things we can do in the funnel, in the consumer experience, et cetera, where we've really overemphasized services that we can get a lot back in Ads and Leads and at a much higher margin. So we will present more in more detail in February. Joey is in day 60 in the CEO seat. But I think the opportunity for Angi to better balance growth and profitability and take share in home services, we feel good about.
Okay. Question or -- I would just say the environment in '23 for Angi, from a service provider retention and overall demand perspective, like you've kind of had like a tough time with everybody being so busy. They didn't need to buy leads in 2020, a little bit in '21. So how would you characterize, yes, the retention and the propensity to then step up and buy leads from a service provider?
Yes. And the metrics last -- show SPs declining significantly. It's, again, something we got to get better data for you guys to understand what's going on. A lot of that is very low value SPs that were acquired a year ago when it was really hard to get pros to sign up for the platform. So the sales force, especially the telesales force, they're doing their job, they're getting who they can, but it's high attrition, low value. The clarity is there's way more value in larger pros, more sophisticated pros in medium-sized who have a digital marketing capability, and we need to improve our products for small pros to make it easier. So we want to get overall SPs numbers to stability and eventually growth, but we're not terribly -- we're not alarmed about the declines right now just because if you look at it as a weighted average size, it's very different. But the outlook next year, I think you'll start -- you should start to see stability in the home services. You're lapping such challenging comps midyear this year that, I'm not a macro expert, but if things are somewhat normalized, you'll start to see a return to demand. And 60% of our demand are nondiscretionary services. So that's been very stable.
Question?
Back to the Dotdash side. And you guys have done a good job of explaining the margin expansion story on the digital side. But if we look at some of the competitors, Ziff Davis, is the one that comes to mind, or other similar type of businesses, are there any differences either on the revenue or the cost side that would -- between that and then the Meredith Dotdash combination that we should be aware of with respect to the margin profile right now? So if I look at Ziff Davis and other whatever they are 30% or whatever, is their model different where they can earn a higher margin vis-a-vis the Dotdash Meredith? Or are those good comps to look at?
Yes. I think I mean Ziff Davis clearly has a ton of scale. I mean our digital revenues entirely are $900 million, just under $1 billion. And I don't want to get too much into it specifically on them. The -- we don't spend on marketing. We don't spend anything on marketing. We spend everything on content. We are at a point of really negative leverage, given the revenue declines. And so we've said -- we expect a marginal dollar of digital revenue to produce $0.50 to $0.60 on the dollar on EBITDA. We'd actually expect the next X amount of revenue to be at a much higher margin, given fixed cost and the nature of it. We've seen it in some of the private players, Red Ventures, others that would be comparable to certain things we're doing. But those -- we feel pretty good about getting to mid-30s margins on an EBITDA basis overall. It's hard to talk about the -- because you've also got different categories. And if we drive -- the more we drive e-commerce, the higher those margins will be.
All right. Chris, Mark, thank you.
Thank you.
Okay.
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