ZIM Integrated Shipping Services Ltd. (ZIM) Earnings Call Transcript
March 12, 2025
Earnings Call Speaker Segments
Thanks, operator, and welcome everyone to the conference call covering ZIM's financial results for the fourth quarter and the full year of 2024. With me today are Eli Glickman, our President and CEO, along with Xavier Destriau, who serves as ZIM's CFO. Before diving in, I want to note that throughout this call, forward-looking statements will be made concerning expectations, predictions, projections, or upcoming events or results. We consider our expectations and assumptions to be reasonable; however, we must warn you that these statements represent only the company's present expectations and that actual events or results could differ, possibly materially. Please take into account the risk factors and cautionary language outlined in the documents the company has filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission, including our 2024 annual report on Form 20-F, which was filed with the SEC today, March 12. We assume no obligation to update these forward-looking statements. Now, I'd like to hand the call over to ZIM's CEO, Eli Glickman. Eli?
Thanks, Elana, and good morning to all of you. For ZIM, 2024 was an outstanding year on both the financial and operational fronts. Our results this time around are the strongest we have ever posted, apart from the remarkable earnings seen during the COVID era. On the operational side, staying true to our strategic aim of expanding volume, we recorded in Q4 a third straight quarter of record carried use, and for the full year we delivered volume growth in the double digits. That matches the initial guidance we gave at this point last year. This accomplishment contributed to our excellent financial results, which featured 2024 net income of $2.2 billion along with revenue of $8.4 billion. Adjusted EBITDA came in at $3.7 billion, and adjusted EBIT reached $2.5 billion, with an adjusted EBITDA margin of 44% and an adjusted EBIT margin of 30%. Total liquidity stood at $3.14 billion when the year closed. Slide #5. Since we keep producing robust cash flows, we are likewise fulfilling our pledge to give substantial capital back to shareholders. Today, a dividend of $3.17 per share was declared by our Board of Directors — I'll say that again, $3.17 per share — amounting to a total of $382 million. If you include that special dividend from December '24, the total payout we've made against 2024 results comes to $7.98 a share — that's $961 million — and it works out to about 45% of our annual net income for '24. We're proud of that record, and it's a pleasure to hand back part of our success to shareholders by paying dividends regularly, backed by the strength of what we earn. Now let's turn to Slide 6. Looking toward 2025, we feel good about both our strategy and where we stand competitively in the industry. Across the whole of '25, we're guiding to adjusted EBITDA between $1.6 billion and $2.2 billion, with adjusted EBIT between $350 million and $950 million. Our business environment has always been shaped by outside forces, including geopolitics, political developments both internationally and within the United States, and economic, monetary, and fiscal policies. As a result, a great deal of unpredictability has consistently defined it. Even so, the level of unpredictability we face now exceeds anything seen before, and the set of forces — several of which are connected to one another — that might influence supply as well as demand is broader and more diverse than usual. These forces include, without being restricted to, the recent proposal from the office of the U.S. A proposed new port fee from the Trade Representative could reach as much as $1.5 million per call for vessels built in China. On top of that, we're looking at a trade conflict pitting the U.S. against a number of its trading partners, which would bring tariffs on goods from Mexico, Canada and China. There's also the question of when traffic might resume through the Suez Canal, which remains uncertain. Another thing worth noting: freight rates have dropped sharply over the past few weeks. We don't yet know if that's just normal seasonal softness, or if these lower prices will stick around in the coming months as overcapacity keeps building. Our CFO, Xavier, will walk through more detail, including the assumptions behind our '25 guidance, a bit later in the call. That's Slide #7. Before we get into our priorities for '25, I want to point out how much meaningful headway we achieved during '24, scaling up our capacity while improving our cost structure. Of the 46 newbuild container ships we had lined up, the final 4 came in, and those include 28 vessels powered by LNG. Once we handed back every one of the pricier capacity arrangements, we head into '25 with half of our capacity consisting of newbuilds, which leaves us with a fleet that's more fuel-efficient and more cost-efficient overall. Once more, it's worth stressing that LNG now powers 40% of our capacity. ZIM moved early on LNG adoption, and today we're still the sole carrier running LNG capacity between Asia and the U.S. East Coast. On that trade we run 2 services, which is a major commercial edge for us, letting ZIM expand market share as our capacity grew. On top of what we've put into the fleet, our forward-looking approach to ZIM's commercial strategy helped produce the robust '24 results — specifically, our choice to raise our spot exposure on the Transpacific trade to roughly 65% trade-off; that lets ZIM capture the favorable spot rate environment more directly and stay dominant in this trade through most of the year. The money we put into ZIM's fleet has also made us a more attractive partner for collaboration deals. Back in September we announced operational cooperation with MSC on the Asia to U.S. East Coast trade, and that service has just started running and is doing what we expected. That tie-up, along with the other ones we have with MSC and other carriers, demonstrates our dedication to offering customers more choices and improving how efficiently our network runs. On volumes, ZIM grew 14%, far ahead of the roughly under 6% growth seen in the wider market. The main reason is that we picked up share, thanks to the new capacity we deployed on Asia to U.S. On the East Coast, the expedited services running to the U.S. West Coast that have gone well, plus our expanded presence in Latin America. Generally put, the benefits of reworking our fleet became visible throughout 2024 and are reflected in the solid results we delivered. By operating larger ships and a fleet far better suited to the trades we cover, together with improved unit costs, we achieved our target of double-digit volume growth and posted robust margins. Moving to Slide #8. With 2025 now underway, we intend to continue strengthening ZIM's strategic position as an agile container shipping company with cost competitiveness and a modern, fuel-efficient fleet. Our commercial approach, paired with continuing sensible spending on our ships, gear and tech, should keep making ZIM's operations more resilient down the road. We enter '25 with a fleet that's very competitive — more modern, more environmentally friendly and better suited to how we go to market. That game-changing step up is done now, since the core capacity we need, namely the 28 LNG vessels, is secured under long-term charters; moving forward, we'll remain disciplined about protecting and further enhancing this strong competitive standing, all while financing our attractive chances to continue updating our fleet. What's true in the market now might not hold true down the road, and when ZIM thinks about where our fleet goes next, we're ready to play the long game. Alongside that, we want to keep the flexibility around the capacity we operate, and that flexibility comes back to us in '25. Roughly 94,000 TEU and 80,000 TEU are the amounts we could hand back to the vessel owner in '25 and '26, respectively, should we decide that's the right move given market conditions or a change in our commercial strategy. On the commercial side, our footprint in the Transpacific trade is solid and expanding. We've also managed to make sure ZIM participates in trade moving from China to a range of end markets, and not only the U.S. Amid all the uncertainty surrounding tariffs and how they affect global trade, we've grown ZIM's footprint in other growth markets and in Asia, for instance Vietnam, Thailand and India, plus Asia to South America; our view is that these trades will expand further going forward and that ZIM is positioned to gain from them. Putting customers at the center stays a core piece of our strategy. We're dedicated to delivering a best-in-class customer experience and we keep searching for fresh ways to meet customers' changing needs. It makes us happy that our recent annual customer survey has confirmed how well we've done on this goal. The survey results point to a consistently high standard of service across every customer interaction. The survey also confirms gains in customer satisfaction, customer loyalty and what ZIM offers compared with competitors. As part of this customer-first mindset, ZIM keeps putting money into technology and digital tools so our offering stands apart and our operational excellence gets stronger. Take, for instance, the recent speeding up of the rollout of an advanced tracker on our dry containers, turning them into smart containers. In this area, ZIM holds a leading position by utilizing Hoopo's dry container tracker, the most technologically sophisticated available, which provides customers with access to essential real-time information, enables tracking visibility during cargo transit, and supports improved decision-making across supply chains. For our reefer fleet, we provide ZIMonitor, a top-tier motorized offering that safeguards sensitive, high-value cargo. Additionally, we continue to believe that allocating capital to growth engines holds substantial worth. Our strategy involves making selective investments in businesses creating disruptive technologies connected to our core shipping operations within a wider logistics ecosystem, along with technology pertaining to sustainability. ZutaCore, in which ZIM recently invested, falls into that second category. ZutaCore has come up with a distinctive, greener substitute for the standard air and water cooling that data centers rely on. Their waterless, direct-to-chip liquid cooling approach can assist data centers in shrinking their carbon footprint while also advancing the creation of AI data centers that use less energy and are kinder to the environment. Having said that, I'll now turn things over to Xavier, our CFO, who will walk through our financial results in greater depth, provide an update on '25 guidance, and share a few more remarks about the market environment. Xavier, go ahead.
Thanks, Eli, and once more, on my own behalf, I’d like to welcome all of you. This slide lays out the main financial and operational points we want to highlight. Our solid results for the full year reflect a healthy market, with freight rates running high and demand holding up well. In 2024, ZIM brought in $8.4 billion of revenue, which is 63% more than the prior year. Across the year, the average freight rate we earned per TEU came to $1,888, up 57% versus 2023, since we gained from firm freight rates all year long. When it came to Q4, we saw an average freight rate of $1,886 per TEU. That's up 71% compared to the same period last year, though it represents a 24% drop from the Q3 average of $2,480. Turning to non-containerized cargo freight revenue, which mainly comes from our car carrier operations, the full year 2024 figure was $497 million. In 2023, that number stood at $535 million. The decline is tied to a partial reclassification that happened within revenue types during 2024. I should also note that we delivered one of our car carriers back in November, so we're currently operating 15 vessels. Looking ahead to 2025, we may decide to hand over additional ships, and that will depend on market conditions. In Q4, our free cash flow reached $1.1 billion, up from $128 million during the same period in 2023. For the full year 2024, free cash flow totaled $3.6 billion, versus $919 million in 2023. Turning now to the balance sheet: total debt is up $1 billion from where it stood at the close of last year, driven largely by the net effect of bringing in bigger vessels that carry longer charter terms. The added newbuild capacity, especially the LNG ships, is locked into charters running 8 to 12 years, giving us cost predictability for this core capacity. On top of that, for 25 of our 28 LNG carriers we have extension options on the charter period, as well as purchase options, so in practical terms we decide what happens to those ships, essentially the same as if we truly owned them. Now for the fleet: at present we operate 143 vessels — 128 boxships whose combined capacity comes to about 784,000 TEUs, along with 15 car carriers. Back in November 2024 the figure was 145 vessels, because we handed over 7 container ships and 1 car carrier while bringing in 6 vessels, among them the final 4 newbuilds still outstanding — specifically the 3 LNG-powered 8,000 TEU ships and 1 widebeam unit of 5,300 TEU. All 46 of the newbuilds we arranged for in 2021 and 2022 have now been delivered, which brings this chapter of our fleet transformation to a close. Looking at 2025 and 2026, we once again have room to maneuver when it comes to the tonnage we operate. Across the remainder of 2025, charter renewals come due for 26 vessels overall, while 23 more are set to renew during 2026. Our intention is to hold operating capacity steady in 2025 compared with 2024, though we retain the option of pulling back. That kind of flexibility is important, and it will allow ZIM to right-size its fleet in response to the operating environment and in line with our commercial strategy. When we look at the chance to renew this capacity, the usual charter lengths we'd expect run from 1 to 5 years, so they're considerably shorter than the 8- to 12-year charter term attached to our core LNG capacity. Looking ahead, our aim is to keep and further strengthen how competitively positioned our fleet is, which is what we just did by locking in four more 8,000 TEU vessels set for delivery in late 2026 and 2027. We likewise just took advantage of a compelling opening to buy 2 8,500 TEU vessels that we had already been chartering. Now for our fourth quarter < > against $190 million in Q4 2023. For the full year, we recorded net income of $2.2 billion, compared with a net loss of $2.7 billion during 2023. Keep in mind that the 2023 full-year net loss included a noncash impairment charge of $2.1 billion taken in the third quarter. Adjusted EBITDA for 2024 was $3.7 billion, compared with $1.1 billion in 2023. In 2024, adjusted EBITDA and EBIT margins were 44% and 30%, respectively, both well ahead of last year. Turning to Slide 12, during the fourth quarter we moved 980,000 TEUs, compared with 786,000 TEUs in the prior-year period, an increase of 25% versus market growth of 5.3% for the quarter. For the full year, our TEU volume reached 3.8 million, representing a 14% increase compared to 2023, while the market as a whole grew just 5.6%. Notably, in 2024 our Transpacific volumes climbed 27%, and given the additional capacity we've brought on, we anticipate retaining those market share gains in 2025. We introduced new services serving Latin America, and in that region we achieved 77% year-over-year volume growth during 2024. Now let's turn to our cash flow bridge. For the entire year, adjusted EBITDA came in at $3.69 billion, which converted into $3.75 billion in cash generated from operating activities. Other cash flow items in 2024 include $579 million in dividend payments and $2.55 billion for debt service, primarily consisting of repayments on our lease liability. Now for what we're projecting in 2025. Eli already noted that adjusted EBITDA should land somewhere between $1.6 billion and $2.2 billion. For adjusted EBIT, we're looking at a range of $350 million to $950 million, and we anticipate the first half will outperform the second. A lot of uncertainty is baked into these figures — global trade, geopolitical tensions, and above all, when the Red Sea situation will resolve. Broadly speaking, we're working on the assumption that freight rates will drop considerably in 2025 relative to 2024. Under our base case, the Red Sea won't reopen any sooner than the second half of the year — which again means we see a stronger first half of 2025, since rerouting will keep soaking up substantial capacity. When we put together our guidance, we assumed our operating capacity would stay level with what we had in 2024. That's because we're renewing a portion of the capacity we already have—or at minimum, bringing in a similar amount of tonnage—even though the rates attached to it will be lower than what we paid back in 2021 and 2022. Given that, we expect our cost structure to keep improving. As for volumes, we're aiming for single-digit growth in 2025, which is slightly better than what the broader market is projected to deliver. On the bunker side, we're anticipating a per-ton cost for 2025 that looks a lot like 2024. Before we open things up for questions, I'd like to share a few thoughts on the market. The risk that an oversupply shows up before long is still with us. As things stand, the order book relative to the fleet comes in at about 27%, which works out to 8.5 million TEUs, and roughly 2 million of that total is scheduled for delivery across 2025, while the remainder is spread out over the years through 2029. A substantial share of capacity got absorbed in 2024 thanks to the turmoil caused by the Red Sea closure, and that remains a big unknown going into 2025. Nothing suggests the canal will reopen anytime soon, yet once it does, every bit of capacity now tied up by routing around the Cape of Good Hope will come back into play, and that will likely pile additional pressure onto freight rates. The outside situation, which Eli has already covered, is generating an exceptionally elevated level of uncertainty for those in the industry. Still, it's worth keeping in mind that carriers possess instruments they can use to handle excess capacity when necessary. Over the near term, carriers are able to return to slow steaming, something that saw heavy use during 2023 and which brings both cost and environmental advantages. Another option for carriers is to carry out blank sailings or leave vessels idle. Scrapping is one more important lever that hasn't gotten much use lately, and sooner or later it ought to make up ground — particularly now that aging vessels chartered during COVID are finally being returned to their owners. The sector's push toward decarbonization, plus the need to meet the IMO's carbon targets or satisfy what customers expect, will also call for faster fleet replacement and could push more scrapping. That said, we're ready to take your questions now. Thanks.
First, regarding your guidance, I just want to clarify something. It's evident you've stated that the earliest Red Sea reopening would be in the second half, but does the top end of that range presume no reopening at all during this year, while the bottom end presumes an early second-half reopening? So if you could help us understand what timeline you've baked into that range, that would be useful. Second, about the USTR matter you brought up, was I correct in understanding that you'd contemplate relocating capacity to different trade lanes if that scenario gets implemented? And could you share your exposure to vessels built in China? Sources in the industry indicate 34%. Is that accurate? And if I can squeeze in a third question, an article in the press this past week mentioned a possible management-led buyout. Could you address that?
Thanks, Muneeba. Let me perhaps take your questions in the sequence you asked them. On the first one, when we talk about our guidance range, as of today, meaning right now, we still believe it's more probable that the Red Sea will reopen at some point during this year. Therefore, both extremes of our guidance figures incorporate the scenario in which the Red Sea reopens, though the guidance's lower end corresponds to an early reopening, and the guidance's upper end corresponds to a later reopening toward the close of 2025, which of course we'll have to wait and see about. Your second question concerns the possible additional levy that might be placed on Chinese-built tonnage calling at U.S. ports; this is obviously something we're watching very carefully. I'd say we're still in the early stages today. The consultation period is still ongoing, and as you're aware, it runs until March 24, so it's somewhat premature to reach any conclusion about whether these measures will actually be enforced. But obviously, we're examining it. You're right. Looking at the capacity we run, we operate a blend of Chinese-built and non-Chinese-built tonnage, mainly Korean, and our Chinese-built capacity falls within the 25% to 50% bracket that's also mentioned as a possible threshold for the extra levy on U.S. port calls; so as I said, it's very early to determine what the impact on ZIM and the broader industry would be, should these measures be enforced. I believe it would be quite substantial. The first thing we'd want to do is try to limit as much as possible our exposure to those extra costs, which would potentially involve shifting, as you mentioned, vessels from certain trades to others; it might also involve rearranging somewhat the lines and networks we currently operate. Take one instance: right now, one of the services we run carrying freight from Asia over to the U.S. East Coast — the ZXB line — makes 4 port calls in the U.S., at Boston, Baltimore, New York, and I'm forgetting the final one, which is — those are Boston, New York, Baltimore, and Norfolk. So it's possible we'd want to cut down how many calls we make and consolidate more freight into fewer ports, which would then require us to reorganize inland cargo movement or set up a filtering service. A great many possible approaches would have to be weighed, yet it's clear that at a certain point, after doing everything we can to minimize the impact, we'd still be stuck with some added expense; and the unresolved issue becomes who ends up bearing that added expense. We'll have to identify methods for recouping this incremental impact. Finally, on your final question about the NBO rumor: ever since our 2021 IPO, our practice has been to say nothing about market rumors. So we won't begin doing so today. What I can tell you is that management plainly remains focused on carrying out the strategy we set for ourselves quite a while ago, one aimed at making sure we create resilience inside the company over the longer term, that we free up shareholder value, and that we keep hopefully rewarding or giving back substantial capital to shareholders, as we announced just today through the extra dividend of $3.17 per share.
My first one follows up on the outlook. You said you anticipate the opening six months being significantly better than the closing six months, contingent on the Red Sea reopening. Does that mean — my rough back-of-the-envelope math leads me to presume a reopening early in the first half, essentially producing positive EBIT in that first half, followed by negative EBIT in the second half, at the bottom of the range. Would you concur? My second one concerns CapEx. Could you elaborate a bit further on how the renewals are phased? Are those renewals weighted toward the back end, or spread evenly across the year? Also, what is the CapEx range, lease included, for 2025, if we assume either none of those charter agreements get renewed or every one of them does?
Thanks for those questions. Regarding the first part about the guidance, we don't typically give quarterly guidance. What we aimed to convey on this occasion is that 2025 carries plenty of uncertainty, plainly, as we attempted to enumerate several of them. Yet we have, based on where we stand now, mid-March, fairly solid visibility into Q1, clearly, and to a degree also into Q2; therefore we can state that the first half will, per the outlook, outperform the second half. That largely stems from the fact that favorable market conditions that held through 2024 and continued as we moved into the initial months or weeks of 2025 remain exceptionally robust. We saw very strong volumes before Chinese New Year, alongside very resilient rates, which indeed fueled a very strong beginning to 2025. Right now, as we speak, we are just past Chinese New Year. So following that slow stretch around Chinese New Year, we observe volumes recovering, though perhaps not as rapidly as would have occurred in earlier years. I believe considerable anxiety persists in the market regarding what the final impact will be from tariff policies between the U.S. and China. Everyone remains somewhat in wait-and-see mode. So we'll see how things unfold. But I think that's why we felt confident stating that the start of the year looks good. Afterward, so many uncertainty factors exist that we chose to stay more cautious regarding the year's second half. Regarding your second question — assuming I've got it right, you're asking about the company's approach to fleet management and what we're doing with the tonnage we currently run. Let me restate a handful of figures: entering 2025, the 128 boxships in our fleet add up to 780,000 TEUs of capacity. It's worth noting that two-thirds of that figure — 520,000 TEUs — is tied up either in long-term charters or in vessels we own outright. That leaves our short-term charter exposure at one-third of the capacity in operation today. Roughly 260,000 TEU, more or less. Within that 260,000 TEU, slightly under 100,000 TEUs of capacity will be up for renewal over the months ahead in what remains of 2025. At present, our plan is to extend some and surrender others — approximately a 50% split between renewals and releases is probably the right working assumption for our base case. That said, we retain the flexibility to adjust as things develop should a better option emerge. So in a sense, this isn't truly CapEx. It's simply a return to the charter market on a short-term basis for the noncore, less strategic capacity we currently operate — particularly now that, since the close of 2024, we've wrapped up our fleet transformation program and locked in for the longer haul the core strategic tonnage we plan to deploy for the foreseeable future.
One more item, if I may — could you provide us with a range covering CapEx and debt service, mainly for 2025, based on whether that expiring capacity gets renewed or not?
Where CapEx is concerned, the amount we recorded in '24 was modest. Containers and equipment make up most of it, along with certain IT-related capital spending. Regarding vessels, we recently announced 2 ships of 8,500 TEU, and the total price to acquire them would come in below $100 million. Also, when you look at the fleet side, the key variable is whether we decide to extend the contracts on some of the ships whose charters are expiring, or let them go. On the topic of servicing debt or paying down lease obligations, if you go back to how things stood, or check the cash flow statements we filed for 2024, the combined figure was roughly $2.5 billion to $2.6 billion. Within that number you had the initial payment on the newbuild tonnage that was handed over to us — 29 vessels in total during 2024 — plus the option we took on 5 ships earlier that same year. Combined, those items came to $440 million in single-time payments, shown on our cash flow statement as repayment of lease liabilities, since that is genuinely how accounting treats them. Clearly, none of that will recur in 2025, except for the $90 million or $100 million tied to the 2 vessels we've said we'll buy from the owner currently chartering those ships to us. So what you should expect going into 2025 is that the figure comes down from the $2.5 billion to $2.6 billion we spent in 2024. There are two reasons for that. First, the one-off item won't be repeated. Second, we'll get extra incremental cash savings on the cash flow, or cash outflow, side because we're essentially releasing the pricier tonnage. And should we bring in replacements for any of the 28 vessels whose renewals come up in 2025, odds are we'd lock in a rate below what we're paying now, since the bulk of those charters were signed in 2021 and '22, at the peak of the COVID period and the peak of the charter market. Basically, when you look at 2025 next to 2024, there are two things driving a decrease in what we pay down on lease liabilities. First, the one-time items from '24 won't come back around in '25. Second, we keep getting the advantage of cheaper charter rates on our new vessels—and maybe on vessels we re-charter during that stretch too.
Eli and Xavier, I just wanted to circle back on a few things. Let me ask a couple of questions here. And perhaps starting with that final item, Xavier, that you were bringing up regarding what we'll owe on leases for '25. So if the figure was $2.5 billion to $2.6 billion in the prior year, would that work out to roughly $1.7 billion, $1.8 billion in the current year, if we assume around half of those vessels come off contract, and you renew them at the market rate we see today? Is that roughly right?
One thing is certain — it's going to sit well under the $2 billion threshold. Whether we land near $1.8 billion or $1.7 billion, we still have to wait and find out, but it's definitely going to be under $2 billion, yes.
Okay. All right. Then during your opening remarks, you noted that you're getting close to that 4 million TEU annual run rate; regarding — and you said you could keep that up. What's driving that when it comes to the vessels up for renewal? Does that assume that among those 26 ships rolling off this year, half get extended while the other half go back?
Yes. Perhaps, Omar, to make that clearer, let's review what took place in 2024. So during 2024, we grew our operated tonnage from 640,000 TEUs when the year began to finish at 780,000 TEU when the year ended. And capacity was added by us month after month across 2024, since we took on more tonnage than the existing tonnage we redelivered. So that's 140,000 TEUs of additional tonnage between the start of — operating capacity between the start of 2024 and the close of 2024. And that let us deliver on the volume story you correctly point to. That let us — let the company move 14% more boxes in 2024 versus the prior year 2023. So now, looking at 2025, we begin from 780,000 TEUs worth of capacity, along with those 90, give or take, 1,000 TEUs of tonnage due for renewal. If all that tonnage were released by us, we'd finish the year with operated capacity near 700,000 TEUs. So that's still considerably above what we had when 2024 started. So that's the reason we say we're confident that we can keep growing our carried quantities using the capacity we plan to operate in 2025, even though so far, we might still not have reached final decisions about renewing all or some of these 28 ships up for renewal in 2025.
That's genuinely useful, thanks. So one last thing, and maybe it's more of a strategic, big-picture question about the business itself. You were talking about the USTR proposal, and it's still early days in terms of working out what it all adds up to. But you did bring up some of the complexity that's now in play, should it actually go through, when it comes to serving different ports and different customers across various regions. So how are you thinking about ZIM going forward, I suppose? You've obviously operated for a long time as an independent ocean shipping company. With the size of your cash reserves in mind, are you considering branching out into adjacent sectors or other areas of logistics?
I'd say that at present, the number one focus for this company continues to be ensuring that we stay positioned for the future as an ocean carrier that's extremely competitive. To that end, across the past 4 or 5 years, we've rolled out a number of decisions and implemented a number of measures. That started with fleet renewal, and it also started with the 2M collaboration back in 2018, alongside MSC now that the 2M has been dismantled. As a result, the position we hold is quite strong. On the main trade lane we decided to concentrate on, we have a substantial piece of the market. Let me stress that point again—when it comes to Asia to the U.S. East Coast, our share stands at roughly 12%. ZIM may account for just 2% to 2.5% of worldwide shipping overall, but on the routes where we actually operate, we're a formidable player and a major rival. As for our arrangement with MSC on the U.S. East Coast lane, that's strictly a slot-swap deal. Each side puts in an equal amount of capacity, and we both gain by exchanging space on one another's ships. We've also worked hard to set ourselves apart through what we offer with LNG. Looking back, we moved early and quite decisively—among the first carriers, in my view—to place orders for LNG-fueled newbuild vessels. During today's discussion, we went over how the fleet breaks down. Of the 780,000 TEU we have in operation, LNG-powered ships account for 40%. No other shipping line runs 2 services linking Asia with the U.S. East Coast. On that foundation, we've established what we regard as a powerful brand, and our customers acknowledge it—something reflected in our capacity to win extra cargo, which, as mentioned earlier, drove a volume gain exceeding 14% during 2024 compared with 2023. Looking forward, the challenges you're pointing to are going to hit everyone in this sector. We're confident that we've got the capabilities we need now, and that puts us in a solid spot to steer through whatever comes over the next several months and quarters. So when it comes to those considerations we have to keep in mind and factor in, I wouldn't say any of them are the kind of thing that would distract us or take our focus off the core work of running our shipping business. As we've stated, in addition to the central ocean liner shipping approach that we hold and carry out, we keep examining putting money into and branching out part of what we do toward digital efforts, and we mentioned several of those. That too is something we'll keep doing; yet the brief response, following what may have been a lengthy one, is that for the foreseeable future, our core shipping business ought to remain where the emphasis lies.
To start with, you mentioned the concern customers have right in the immediate future. Could you share more about the actual rates we're observing for activity in February? We've seen a fairly significant decline in spot rates during February, and it isn't very clear what's causing it, especially since the Red Sea is still closed; so any thoughts on that would be helpful. And with that in mind, could you provide a rough picture of how rates might develop over the next 12 months? Of course there's seasonality, and what are your assumptions on that basis? On the fleet mix question — I remember that when you first launched, agility was one of your key selling points, and you had very little tonnage tied up in longer-term charters. Obviously, COVID changed that balance in a big way, since everyone needed to secure capacity. So are you looking at going back to much shorter charter periods, to get some of that pre-COVID agility back? And can you walk us through what scenario would actually make you consider reducing your asset base? Because what you're clearly saying is that over the next 2 years, there's room for a 20% reduction, if none of the vessels coming up for renewal get renewed. Is that a possibility your team has on the table? Then, a really brief follow-up: it's nice to see you went ahead with some vessel purchases. But what kept you from buying additional ones, and opting instead to keep funding that dividend—which strikes me as pretty costly when I look at the yield it's trading at? I'm just hoping to get a clearer picture of how you're allocating capital there.
Alexia, there's a fair number of questions in there. With your permission, I'll work through them in order. Let's take the third one first, perhaps. You brought up the fleet and the agility—something that was among the points used to define ZIM back when it went public. You're correct that when we went public, a large share of our business sat in the spot charter segment. The ships we actually owned made up only a small portion of what we ran. Meanwhile, we had almost nothing tied up in longer-term charters. For ZIM, that stood out as a distinguishing feature. Yet the flexibility that served us back then rests on different foundations than the flexibility we need now and going forward. The landscape for our market and industry underwent a major shift during the COVID period of 2021 and '22. Depending on the short-term charter market was a strategy that could function—and function quite effectively, I should add, for ZIM—right up through '21, which includes, incidentally, both '21 and '22. Following that, we came to recognize that this approach required adjustment, and it became necessary to lock in our core capacity across a longer time frame—if we didn't, we might have found ourselves unable to obtain appropriate vessels. That is also the reason we altered our method for handling commercial affairs and our network, adopting cooperation with other carriers via the 2M, which was mentioned before. Our aim was to keep expanding and realize economies of scale, and the larger you get in terms of vessel size within the charter market, the fewer ships are actually available. So obviously, we made that change. That's what set off the fleet transformation initiative we launched back in 2021 and '22. As a result, we're now in a position where, as I said before, 2/3 of the capacity we run is secured either through long-term charter arrangements or because we own the tonnage. That's an improvement because, first, it guarantees us access to tonnage. We're no longer exposed to swings in the long-term charter market. Beyond that, it gives us cost visibility, since the expenses tied to this 2/3 of our fleet are fixed, predictable, and immune to any possible shifts. I'd also note that, timing-wise, we entered the market at the right moment, finalizing those orders earlier than would happen now, and we gained from highly favorable pricing in the newbuild market that existed then—something I doubt we could secure today. So obviously, we altered our fleet approach; we think this was the correct choice to pursue and will let us strengthen the resilience of our model moving ahead. Why didn't we purchase ships instead of committing to long-term charters? The rationale, I believe, was quite evident then, when we stated our intention to move toward greener technology at that point and even now, incidentally—there were 2 possibilities, LNG, perhaps methanol. In our view, LNG was the superior option. Yet we're unwilling to assume the residual value risk tied to the technology, which you'd bear if you owned the vessel; we're content to let the lessor or shipowner carry that residual value risk regarding the technology. Since we think that from now until the charter period concludes, an alternative technology could emerge that's greener and more efficient, enabling us to shift and transition to whatever technology dominates at that point with ease. So that was truly one of the factors behind the decision-making. Let me also point out that, when it comes to cash allocation, we directed a portion of our capital toward those deals. Additionally, this allowed us to make use of the solid profits we had produced during 2021 and '22. The advance payments we had been making on each vessel upon delivery—which, for certain ones, exceeded 10% or 15% of the newbuild's worth—represented a means for us to invest clearly, put our cash to work, and help lower the daily expense we are now incurring on those ships. Regarding your first 2 questions, I believe they relate more to the present trading climate, and you were mentioning the rate situation, which is unpredictable as of today. Obviously, I think we are just past the Chinese New Year stretch and, in a sense, running into the tail end of the slow season. We have the tariff ambiguity that will eventually have some impact; it remains very hard to predict what kind, but we are still watching how the market will evolve over the weeks ahead. Clearly, we observe volumes returning, though not as fast as one might have expected at first. Is that the start of a pattern? Or might it disappear over the next few weeks? We can't really say yet. One thing worth noting is that, as you're aware, we've started negotiations with customers we've worked with for years regarding the contract cargo we'd allocate to certain BCOs or freight-forwarders on the Transpacific trade. Those conversations kicked off in L.A. seven days back, and the feedback coming from our customers has been pretty encouraging. So far, we're seeing no signs of any significant softness in potential demand, and those discussions are still going on with hardly any pause. Naturally, everyone is discussing the tariff, but nobody appears to imply that volumes will be meaningfully impacted, at least within those negotiation talks that are just getting underway as we speak.
Could I quickly pose one brief follow-up? From what you said about guidance, it sounds like you're anticipating steady operating capacity. So that would mean every lease coming up for renewal gets renewed, in order to reach that steady operating capacity. Correct?
No. Perhaps we didn't express that clearly enough. What you ought to assume is this: the capacity we ran during the whole of 2024 is going to be more or less equal to what we run during the whole of 2025, possibly slightly lower. So, as I mentioned, and I believe Omar raised this point in a question earlier, we added 140,000 TEUs of capacity across the 12-month span of 2024. If we were to release every vessel we have available in 2025, those amount to just 98,000 TEU of tonnage, so in effect, we'd be running greater tonnage in '25 than we did in '24.
Thanks. To sum up, 2024 was a remarkable year for ZIM, marked by our strongest performance to date if you set aside the exceptional COVID stretch; we achieved meaningful operational strides in expanding capacity, delivering 3 straight quarters of record carried TEU along with 14% volume growth for the year, considerably ahead of the market. Thanks to our robust earnings in '24, we were able to pass along our success through dividends distributed to shareholders over the course of the year. Counting today's dividend, the total payout tied to '24 results comes to $7.98 per share, or $961 million, roughly 45% of our net income. I'd like to express gratitude to our employees worldwide for what they did to make this performance happen, and for their unwavering dedication to meeting the highest operational standards and providing an exceptional level of service to our customers. As we head into 2025, the business environment we face comes with the usual — an unusual degree of risks and unknowns. Still, with a transformed fleet of modern, cost and fuel-efficient capacity, 40% of which runs on LNG, we're confident that we'll keep leveraging our agility and executing our differentiated strategy; we hold a solid competitive position in our industry and are well placed to handle the external uncertainties. Thanks once more for being with us today. We're eager to update you all on our continued progress.
Thank you for attending today's call. You may now disconnect.
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