ZoomInfo Technologies Inc. (GTM) Earnings Call Transcript
May 11, 2026
Earnings Call Speaker Segments
Thank you, Josh. I'd like to welcome everyone to ZoomInfo's conference call covering our financial results for Q1 2026. Joining me today are Henry Schuck, our Founder and Chief Executive Officer, and Graham O'Brien, our Chief Financial Officer. Any forward-looking statements we make on this call fall under the safe harbor protections of U.S. securities laws. When we express future goals — things like business outlook, expectations regarding upcoming financial performance, and comparable items — including, without limitation, language using terms such as may, will, expect, anticipate, and believe, along with any statements reflecting anything beyond historical facts, those are meant to identify forward-looking statements. A variety of risks and uncertainties apply to forward-looking statements, among them those covered in the Risk Factors sections of our SEC filings. It's possible for actual results to differ materially from anything stated in forward-looking statements. Unless the law requires it, the company assumes no duty to revise or update any forward-looking statements so that they reflect events arising after this conference call. For additional details, please see the forward-looking statements included in the slides available on the Investor Relations website at ir.zoominfo.com. Unless we note otherwise, every metric discussed on this call is non-GAAP. You can find a reconciliation in the financial results press release or in the slides on our IR website. With that, I'll hand things over to Henry.
Thanks, Jerry, and hello, everyone. We kicked off 2026 by posting revenue and adjusted operating income that came in above the top end of what we guided to for Q1. First-quarter revenue reached $310 million, which is a 1.5% increase year-over-year, while our adjusted operating income margin landed at 35%, a gain of over 2 points compared with a year ago. Our non-seat-based operations along with Data-as-a-Service offerings — among the most profitable areas of the business and nearly entirely upmarket — once again climbed over 20% year-over-year during the quarter and now account for slightly less than 20% of our business. Although we exceeded our Q1 targets, the broader economic environment weakened as the quarter progressed, and growth trends in both our downmarket and upmarket segments reversed. As March came to a close and April began, a recurring theme showed up in our discussions with customers: widespread uncertainty around AI and agentic technology. Questions about what should be developed in-house versus purchased, which supplier or internal group is responsible for delivering which pieces, and where genuine competitive advantage actually resides — all of this caused buyers to hesitate, and the impact fell hardest on our software customers, many of whom face a muddled buying environment that is further complicated by fears that their own growth could be disrupted, creating a self-reinforcing challenge for our industry. As a result, we're bringing down our outlook for the entire year, and at the same time we're cutting costs substantially, which we think will give us operating margins that are higher on a structural basis and create a quicker route back to growth that lasts. This was hard because of how it affected a great many of our teammates, several of whom have been here a long time and did solid work that brought us to where we are now. Change is required, and it's a positive move for ZoomInfo's future. These adjustments were made with our attention on the chance to grow usage of our data as AI spreads, a chance we consider potentially bigger than anything encountered across the first 20 years of running this business. The way software gets created, purchased, and utilized has been fundamentally reshaped by AI. Go-to-market teams now have a much easier interface for interacting with data and constructing custom revenue workflows without needing extensive technical assistance, thanks to LLMs; these kinds of interfaces are going to multiply throughout the entire software landscape. As that multiplication happens, the conventional seats-based-on-application model we've relied on will face pressure, but simultaneously, our chance to plug into the expanding momentum of go-to-market activity that coding agents and LLMs make possible grows via what we offer in data. Making ZoomInfo's go-to-market data ubiquitous—accessible wherever go-to-market activity happens, which includes ChatGPT, Claude, Perplexity, Microsoft Copilot, Google Gemini, and applications built internally—is what our strategy aims for. As software becomes more headless, these workflows gain substantially more worth when our data and insights drive them. Uncertainty about AI's capabilities and limits, and about where our data is essential, won't last — though paired with some excess capacity in our seat-based pricing, it could produce a short-term drag on our business overall. Given how quickly AI agents and interfaces keep multiplying, our lasting edge over time comes from ensuring the strong go-to-market information we possess links into every one of those growing surfaces. That upside we might realize later is obvious when you look at two things: the results our operations segment delivers, and the value our largest customers continue to see in what they've bought from ZoomInfo. The company understands the complex account structures inside Global 2000 firms. It assembles its own contact information, operates an identity graph built around privacy first, adds context to 5.5 billion data attributes, and handles 1.05 trillion intent signals every month. Day in and day out, each individual raw data point has to be cleaned, standardized, and converted into output that's ready for go-to-market use. This data infrastructure from ZoomInfo is something go-to-market organizations need, regardless of whether AI is the force behind it. Capturing this shift demands that our approach to selling and running the business change. Earlier today, we made changes throughout the company to reshape ZoomInfo, allowing it to operate with greater efficiency, generate improved cash flow, and position our data assets, APIs, and MCPs as a larger and more sustainable share of the business. In our operations business, you can see the model we believe the market is moving toward: non-seat-based, driven by data, focused upmarket, with high retention and strong defensibility. We want a greater portion of ZoomInfo to transact and expand in that same way. As part of this shift, data is moving to the forefront. Beginning in Q3, customers will have the ability to turn their historical per seat spend into consumption spanning ZoomInfo data, insights, applications, and agents. Many of our users have been interacting with the platform in this manner for some time, so what we're doing now is a more structured effort to bring pricing and the value we deliver into line with the behaviors and results of our strongest customers. We are expanding the places where people can find and purchase ZoomInfo data — that now includes ChatGPT, Claude, Gemini, Copilot, along with tools companies build for their own internal use. At the same time, we're redirecting spending away from building out the front-end application and toward data, engineering that leans on AI, product-led growth, interfaces powered by LLMs, and customer segments that carry better margins. I'd like to briefly walk through just how resilient our data asset really is. What gives ZoomInfo its advantage is not any one data set on its own — rather, it's a multi-layered framework: proprietary B2B data, inputs from our contributory network, intelligence gathered from public sources and partners, live business signals, entity resolution, an identity graph designed with privacy at the forefront, governance infrastructure, and activation workflows. ZoomInfo's intelligence layer forms the foundation here, containing billions of data points. That includes over 140 million records for company entities, greater than 580 million IP-to-organization pairings, and more than 500 million professional profiles and associated data — spanning intent, hierarchy, location, financials, personnel changes, technology adoption, funding information, org charts, news, and additional commercial signals. The real worth comes not just from collecting all this, but from the process of resolving it. Corporate names get updated, mergers and acquisitions take place, individuals switch positions, job titles differ, subsidiaries get absorbed into parent companies, and one individual may show up in varying ways across many different sources. ZoomInfo converts all that messiness into a dynamic, well-governed graph with commercial utility that customers are able to put to work inside their own workflows. Sitting on top of that is the signal and context data we provide, which pinpoints who is actively buying and the reasons behind it. Even though foundation models are excellent at reasoning, writing, summarizing, and automating tasks, on their own they cannot determine which companies are real opportunities, which contacts are still valid, which intent signals are recent, which corporate structures are relevant, which installed technologies exist, which buyers are presently shopping, or which patterns inside a CRM foretell a closed deal. The benefits of GTM AI materialize only when the model is connected to business context that is precise, permitted, up to date, and resolved to specific entities. Tying our signal and context layer together are our contributory network and our proprietary identity graph — two data assets that are exclusive and not publicly accessible, and that produce authentic value for go-to-market efforts. The final component is trust, governance, accuracy, privacy, and compliance. We collect, confirm, and distribute superior business data obtained through ethical means, backed by a privacy initiative built to comply with international privacy regulations including the CCPA, PIPEDA, and GDPR. Under our notice and choice framework, we inform individuals the moment their professional profiles initially show up on the platform, offer several ways to opt out, comply with requests for removal, and take action to prevent deleted profiles from being reinstated. Our governance structure conforms to leading regulatory frameworks, and we maintain the industry's strongest collection of privacy, security, and compliance certifications. As go-to-market operations become more driven by agents, each AI-based seller, marketer, revenue operations process, and customer expansion initiative is going to need a dependable intelligence foundation that identifies the right prospects, explains why the timing is right, highlights what has shifted, and recommends the next action. That view is being validated by our clients, the analysts who track our sector, and our partners. In 142 G2 Spring 2026 reports covering sales intelligence, buyer intent data, and lead capture, customers placed us at number one.
In its latest wave covering marketing and sales data providers, Forrester described ZoomInfo as "entrenched," the go-to default provider of data for B2B sales, and said it sets a technology standard for collecting data and resolving identity. During Q1, Salesforce brought out its prospecting agent, with ZoomInfo serving as the first and primary outside data source. Recommendations across Salesforce's customer base of more than 150,000 are powered by our contact company intent and Scoops data. HubSpot likewise shipped its prospecting agent featuring a native ZoomInfo integration. When the 2 biggest CRM platforms pick ZoomInfo to power AI prospecting agents, that underscores how durable and relevant our data asset is. We additionally rolled out connectors for ChatGPT, Claude, Microsoft Copilot and Perplexity, and we're moving forward on our Google Gemini integration. Data integrations are up twofold compared with a year earlier, and MCP connections keep growing organically with no dedicated sales or marketing effort; we broadened go-to-market studio trials to over 1/4 of existing customers, which helps customers build automated workflows triggered by ZoomInfo signals. Moving ahead, our application layers will act as engines for data engagement and consumption instead of stand-alone application fee products. As customers renew during the back half of the year, we're rolling out more flexible pricing and packaging centered on data access and usage. This cuts how much we depend on fees from the platform and charges for each seat, reduces the problem created when seats get compressed, and ties what we charge more directly to what the customer gets out of it. Our expectation is that the majority of customers will move over at price points that are similar, though a few will pay less and a few will pay more. Even though that might create a near-term hit to revenue, it gives us a model that's cleaner and a stronger shot at growing as customers make greater use of ZoomInfo data. Turning now to customer wins. During Q1, we closed deals with Sierra, Lyft and Wyndham Hotels & Resorts. We additionally secured a strategic victory involving the Unicorn Cloud Software company that serves MSPs. We replaced the incumbent and outperformed over six other options — among them an AI tool built in-house — to become its primary data and enrichment platform spanning go-to-market studio and workspace. A security and compliance platform that is AI native likewise broadened its use across Studio, Copilot and DaaS through a multiyear deal with a 7-figure TCV, fueling its go-to-market efforts. Regarding the $1 billion additional share repurchase authorization we announced during the prior quarter, we remain opportunistic. We feel sure we can produce robust cash flow and run operations efficiently as we carry out this strategic change; we're still dedicated to giving capital back to shareholders in whatever manner creates the most value, all while making sure we keep flexibility for the long term; having said that, I'll hand things over to Graham.
Appreciate it, Henry. For the first quarter, GAAP revenue landed at $310 million, which is a 1.5% increase compared with the same period last year, while adjusted operating income came to $110 million — a 35% margin — and both revenue and AOI finished above the top end of the guidance ranges we'd given. Unlevered free cash flow reached $120 million, and we paid $21 million of interest in cash during the quarter. In what's a seasonally slower quarter, upmarket ACV rose 5% versus a year earlier, which is a step down from the 6% growth we posted in Q4, though still better than the 3% upmarket ACV growth from the year ago period. Downmarket ACV fell 11% year-over-year in Q1, compared with a 10% decline in Q4 and also in the year ago period. Upmarket now represents 75% of our business. The count of customers with more than $100,000 in ACV rose by 32 year-over-year, even as it dropped 21 sequentially, and ACV from that cohort was up 10% year-over-year. As Henry pointed out, operations delivered another strong quarter, with ACV growth above 20% year-over-year. Net revenue retention came in at 90% for Q1, marking the third consecutive quarter at 90% net revenue retention. All in all, it was a solid quarter, but we did observe a shift in buyer behavior as we exited the quarter and moved into Q2. Gross retention held up well on the whole, but customers in our software vertical saw elevated downsell and churn rates relative to the improving trends we'd been seeing in 2025. During March, the market showed us growing bewilderment among customers regarding AI's capabilities and limits, alongside heightened macro instability. Once the favorable patterns from 2025 began to ease, it grew clear our anticipated expansion path had slipped behind plan. This makes now the appropriate point to take initiative and accelerate when our strategic programs occur. We believe it's possible to trim the downmarket segment further, shift to a pricing structure better suited to our clientele, and reduce the risk of lingering exposure tied to seat reductions as we bring global operations together — all while keeping profitability mostly intact throughout. Even with the short-term hit to revenue, we can return to more robust growth sooner than if we had simply maintained the existing course. As a result, our forecast for FY 2026 revenue now falls in the range of $1.185 billion to $1.205 billion. This step reflects a deliberate effort to strengthen our position amid a time of considerable change. The guidance we issued at the start of the year neither included gains from new product efforts nor assumed conditions would deteriorate. With this revision, we've built in a bit more caution on the top line to reflect an uneven macroeconomic backdrop and the chance of short-term pressures while we carry out our strategic initiatives. We revised our outlook for the entire year, and we think this will lay the groundwork over the coming 12 to 18 months that we can eventually build on, while also staying dedicated to delivering stronger profitability results. For the full year, our AOI guidance is now $437 million to $447 million, which implies an AOI margin of 37% at the midpoint — an improvement of 130 basis points compared with last year and 30 basis points above our earlier full-year forecast. As we aim to run things more efficiently, keeping a long-term eye on data and consumption, the adjustments we announced today touch 20% of our workforce, or 600 team members, and include shutting down our facilities in Israel. Israel has played a significant role in our company. Though every one of these choices was hard, they demonstrate how dedicated we are to running this business as efficiently and strategically as we can. Certain positions affected will be filled in other regions, while others simply won't be backfilled, since we're moving forward as a leaner, more focused organization. Throughout all of ZoomInfo, we're accomplishing more with fewer resources; more than 85% of employees are actively using our internal AI operating system, which means AI-assisted work has become standard practice rather than something unusual — whether that's delivering more code per engineer, achieving multiples more in R&D with fewer bugs, creating custom apps in finance that swap out manual processes and outside spend, or generating intelligent campaigns on demand in sales and marketing. AI is driving productivity forward at a speed we've never seen. As I mentioned last quarter, the mix contributed by seat-based pricing hit its high point in 2022, and we've steadily reduced that share each year since; we anticipate speeding up this shift even more. About one-third of our ACV has nothing to do with seats, and over the coming 18 to 24 months we want to shift that to a 50-50 split. In the latter part of Q3, we plan to introduce a hybrid pricing approach — a small yearly platform fee paired with prepurchased credits — which takes the place of the seat-based bundles we normally offer. On the consumption side, it will function a lot like our operating model in DaaS, where customers buy packages of data credits that are drawn down over time across any platform and count toward ACV. This is the next step in our push past seat-based pricing, letting us build on the good momentum we're seeing as enterprise license agreements expand among our largest customers. Two long-term advantages emerge here regarding net revenue retention: reduced downsell pressure stemming from seat compression, while simultaneously, data consumption patterns rise over time, creating upsell opportunities that lead to better NRR results. This move toward consumption brings some variability in revenue recognition, caused by the timing of credit consumption versus credit allowances. That dynamic shows up in our updated revenue guidance. As part of this evolution, we're cutting more downmarket sales resources, handing down market almost entirely to product-led growth, which lets us speed up our shift upmarket even more while broadening our emphasis on data. So because of what we've done, we're looking at restructuring charges somewhere between $45 million and $60 million, and most of that will be cash costs, which we anticipate hitting in Q2 and Q3 2026. Through these moves, we're expecting to bring down annual run rate operating expenses by roughly $60 million, and that includes restructuring all of our Israeli operations, with the bulk of it done by Q1 of 2027. On top of that, most of the transitionary compensation costs spanning from the notification date until operations in Israel are fully discontinued will be added back when we calculate our non-GAAP metrics. Even while taking on these restructuring costs, our cash position and the cash we generate at the underlying level stay solid. Now onto cash for the period. GAAP operating cash flow came to $115 million in Q1. Unlevered free cash flow in the quarter reached $120 million, which is 109% conversion from adjusted operating income and works out to a margin of 39%. GAAP stock-based compensation expense totaled $25.5 million, a 14% decline year-over-year and equal to 8% of revenue. Measured as a percentage of revenue, adjusted expenses plus stock-based compensation got 5 points better year-over-year, which shows a meaningful gain in the quality of our earnings. Our focus remains on pay tied to results — both cash and equity awards that require hitting tough free cash flow goals. In the first quarter, we repurchased 13.1 million shares of common stock, paying an average of $6.91 per share, for a total of $90 million.
When you add in the buyback program we announced in February, we still had over $1 billion of repurchase capacity left when the quarter closed. Our weighted average diluted shares outstanding for the quarter, which we use to calculate non-GAAP diluted EPS, came to 318 million, while the non-GAAP share count at quarter end stood at 310 million. We finished the quarter holding $175 million across cash, cash equivalents and investments, and our gross debt totaled $1.3 billion. That puts our net leverage ratio at 2.4x trailing 12 months adjusted EBITDA and also 2.4x trailing 12 months cash EBITDA — cash EBITDA being consolidated EBITDA as defined in our credit agreements — versus 2.5x and 2.3x a year ago. On maturities, the $650 million of senior notes come due in 2029, and the $581 million first lien term loan comes due in 2030. We're comfortable with that maturity profile, and the liquidity and cash generation we have are enough to handle our obligations as they come due. During the quarter we put interest rate swaps in place to lock in a portion of our variable rate debt. We executed $425 million of notional interest rate swaps at a blended fixed rate of 3.28%, which lowers our exposure to SOFR volatility and gives us better visibility into interest expense and free cash flow. After the quarter ended, we amended our revolving credit facility, raising total commitments from $250 million to $276 million, with U.S. Bank joining the lender group via an incremental commitment of $26 million. We made no additional borrowings tied to that amendment. The upsizing broadens and diversifies the lending group and adds liquidity capacity. Turning to liabilities and future performance obligations, unearned revenue at quarter end was $479 million, and remaining performance obligations, or RPO, totaled $1.18 billion, with $861 million of that expected to be recognized over the next 12 months. Now to guidance. For Q2, we expect GAAP revenue between $300 million and $303 million, adjusted operating income between $103 million and $106 million, and non-GAAP net income of $0.26 to $0.28 per share. For the full year 2026, we now expect GAAP revenue between $1.185 billion and $1.205 billion, which at the midpoint of guidance represents a 4% year-over-year decline, along with adjusted operating income between $437 million and $447 million, a 37% margin at the midpoint, up 130 basis points year-over-year. We expect non-GAAP net income of $1.10 to $1.12 per share, in line with our prior guidance and based on 315 million weighted average diluted shares outstanding, and we expect unlevered free cash flow between $400 million and $420 million. For 2026, I'd expect a non-GAAP tax rate closer to 10%, and cash interest expense between $60 million and $62 million. In our view, the steps and programs we've unveiled today should position us to achieve a run rate of no less than $1.25 in adjusted levered free cash flow per share by the time we begin 2027, under various scenarios for revenue growth and share repurchases. At this point, I'll hand things to the operator so we can take questions on the call.
Henry, I'm curious — when you compare the software vertical with traditional industries that perhaps aren't facing as much of a terminal value debate right now, how wide a gap do you notice in demand patterns? I also have one quick follow-up.
Sure, Mark, I can handle that. What we're observing — retention in software improved sequentially for close to 2 years, and in Q1 that was flat; that's a significant data point as we factor it into the outlook for the guidance revision. As for other verticals that may not be dealing with the terminal question, I think of finance, insurance, real estate, manufacturing, telecom — we enjoyed really strong quarters in those areas, where we keep seeing genuinely encouraging growth potential.
All right. So it sounds like a situation that leans heavily on software. I'm also wondering how much of this AI muddle you're observing would you tie to Claude Code's surge in March — my understanding is that's when you noticed a bit of a change, and that appeared to be the moment Claude Code took off. And relatedly, do you have any view on how long this stretch of AI muddle could persist?
Yeah. The major change I'd point to is that even among our most advanced software customers, we're watching them move away from a ZoomInfo seat license and toward much greater consumption of our data within Claude, using our MCPs via our APIs; we've got quite a few instances of AI native firms that have moved off seats yet are paying us considerably more by consuming our data in the internal applications they've built, using our MCPs, our APIs, and bulk credit consumption. So we're quite confident there's this juncture where businesses feel unsure about what they truly require in order to build their own internal applications and their own revenue workflows, while the most advanced AI native businesses are drawing on our data across that whole workflow, and businesses running quick AI projects haven't reached that understanding yet. That's why we're positioning the company on pricing and packaging to capitalize on that set of circumstances. So when a customer tells us they no longer need seats since they've built their own application, we can be very flexible and respond that their application will require contact information, company information, hierarchy information, and signal information, and that we can be very flexible as they transition to that while building their own internal application.
The first thing is about those accounts whose deal values exceeded $100,000 and which dropped from one quarter to the next. You said earlier that customers are hitting the pause button given all this, but could you speak to what's happening among these bigger customers on that KPI, and likewise on CRPO coming down quarter-over-quarter? Perhaps you could just describe what you're actually observing within this larger group of accounts.
Happy to. Regarding the $100,000 figure, the way those logos behaved was a nice miniature of how the whole quarter went for the business overall. Logos have 4 possible paths into or out of that group. A brand-new one can come in from nothing, or an existing one can arrive through an upsell. They can also leave by way of a downsell, or depart entirely through churn. Comparing Q1 of this year against Q1 of last year, we either got better or stayed level on 3 of those entry and exit points. We brought in a larger number of new logos. Downsells out dropped substantially, and the count that churned entirely stayed roughly the same, which is quite a small figure. It's the upsell-in side where the big year-over-year drop showed up, and that reflects the difficulties we encountered with add-on purchases toward the close of the quarter. As for CRPO, it rose 3% year-over-year during a slower Q1. In my view, that result wasn't truly beyond what we had anticipated.
Great. Then perhaps we can return to the pricing model change you mentioned earlier — I believe the remark was that under the new model, you anticipate customers renewing at a deal size comparable to what they had with the old one. Could you share a few proof points? If some customers have already gone through that transition under operations, what have you observed that gives you confidence in this roughly net neutral position as we shift to the new model?
Yes. We've put this to the test with quite a few of our customers. What we're finding comes down to 2 things. For certain customers, price points look fairly similar once they move off seats. You're going to see certain customers move up. You'll see certain customers move down, and that's mainly driven by how much of our data they consume. For downmarket users, we're going to remove the access friction by stepping away from term platform fees and seed floors, which ties price far more closely to value. And then larger customers ought to expect simpler pricing and a product experience with less siloing, where their credits get purchased and then consumed really anywhere inside of ZoomInfo applications or outside of ZoomInfo applications. So we're seeing some up, some down, and we believe it lands sort of net positively.
I'm calling in from <<inaudible>>. Given that demand got weaker as we moved out of March and into April, particularly for software, is it fair to view Q2 as the bottom for growth? And beyond that, what has to get better before you folks feel confident about the second half of the year?
Yeah. My way of looking at this is through a few of the — perhaps a few of those forward-looking signals. It's true that our Q2 revenue guidance has it declining compared with the same period last year; however, what I'd say matters most to us right now is establishing a bar that will let us push harder on these strategic initiatives during the latter half of the year; so as we move increasingly toward consumption, and as we get our downmarket business sized correctly so it leans more on PLG — or really becomes almost entirely PLG driven — we will pass through a handful of quarters in which we swing to negative before regaining greater room for positive growth versus the prior year in the second half of 2027.
Another point I'd say deserves a mention: most of that reduction is intentional, aimed at the lower end of the market. We're pushing ahead and speeding up this shift because the chance to drive usage is plainly visible across several areas of our business — specifically, accounts using go-to-market studio are using far more than those that aren't. Customers on our MCP application, which really only launched across the past 8 weeks, are substantial consumers of our data via the LLM platforms our MCPs connect to. So the major milestones, I'd say, are that we have to move a greater share of our customers onto these high-consumption interfaces, and that's where our strategy is focused at the moment.
Understood. If I could squeeze in one final question. As inference expenses continue rising, how should we think about profitability? Specifically, as you scale up and customers keep using more, what will the profit picture look like over the next few years?
Yeah. So, looking at how the business shapes up on a pro forma basis as we exit this year, my view is that once growth comes back more steadily, we'll have a chance to be a company at 40% margins rather than 35%. Breaking that down, cost of service, I'd expect, remains roughly 13% to 14% of revenue. Sales and marketing sits nearer 27%, with a route down to 25%. R&D holds steady at about 10%, with a route lower, and G&A is at 10%, also with a route lower. With that renewed growth, the business will be positioned to produce 40% margins, and the moves we unveiled today played a major role in getting there.
So my question is this, Graham: in the new guidance, how much of it reflects the caution and the downsell you observed in Q1 carrying on through the rest of the year, and how much reflects the effect of shifting 2 deals of the consumption type? Also, could you remind us what the rev rec looks like on those consumption deals?
Yes. Since we are deliberately altering the way the business is organized and the way we set prices and deliver, all of that is factored into our accounting. The down market restructuring is factored in, along with the movement either toward or away from seats in the pricing model; my philosophy on guidance is changing as part of that as well, meaning we must lean more heavily on future assumptions regarding the evolving pricing model and depend less on past performance when informing our models. We have built in conservative assumptions regarding the macro environment, the software vertical and the pricing model's move away from seats. And it is fair to say that our guidance for Q2 and the remainder of the year adopts a more cautious stance than was the case in Q1. All of the current conditions and the planned timing of our strategic initiatives are fully reflected in our updated guidance. You should view this as a revision of the full measure. This is very much a proactive plan that we have had a lot — that we hold a great deal of confidence will bring us to a position of more durable, efficient growth sooner than the status quo would. Then, regarding the revenue accounting implications of this shift, first, it is customers who are pulling us in this direction. We are already a big part of the way there, but new revenue accounting dynamics will accompany it. ACV scope, I do not expect, will change, but customers on plans that are more variable and consumption-focused will still roll up into that ACV number. Technically speaking, with pre-committed consumption, an assumption around breakage will be needed, and then we will have to predict and monitor how customers use the product so as to match the satisfaction of performance obligation. What that means is that some quarter-to-quarter noise in revenue recognition could be introduced, which, once again, we have accounted for in the updated guidance.
That was an extremely thorough response. Perhaps only one quick follow-up for you, Henry. From the earliest days of my covering ZoomInfo after the IPO, it seems to me that the single element which has remained constant is how good your data asset is, and honestly, that sets itself apart from everything else available in the marketplace. Could you do that for us once more — I realize you've already discussed this at length, but as the saying goes, repeating a prayer does no harm. I'd really like to hear additional detail on the reason that, despite your data asset being so distinctive and thorough, you perhaps can't do better at this particular juncture. Anything you might share to truly drive that idea home would be quite useful.
What matters most for us right now, I believe, is that historically our data asset has been stuck beneath a SaaS application, which clearly, throughout the first 18, 19 years of our operating history, was precisely the place our customers preferred to use it. And truly, across the last 12 months, customers have leaned more toward wanting our data asset to be adaptable and accessible across a variety of other interfaces. An API has always existed on our side, yet it was typically — it was mostly rolled out among the truly advanced, most sophisticated strategic customers of ours; and that might have required plenty of handholding; in the present environment, the agent Claude simply has to grasp our API documentation and connect it smoothly with no need to ever speak with a person. So we've devoted really the last 18 months to rebuilding the data infrastructure that sends that data to any place a customer chooses. Had you wanted intent data, 12 months ago, obtaining that intent data would have required going through the SaaS interface within Copilot or SalesOS. Now, it's available via an API, and you could obtain it via the MCPs. Thus it's genuinely just the adaptability of rendering that data far more accessible for our customers wherever they prefer to work, which has shifted where they prefer to work, has shifted, clearly, far more dramatically than the need for our data and the precision of our data.
I suppose, sort of trying to summon my own version of Brad, I'll pose a few comparable questions. On this call, though, it seems like you're addressing a few separate matters at once — sales cycles running longer, especially within software, plus a faster move on your part toward transformation and away from the lower end of the market, along with speeding up the switch from seat to consumption. So given your guidance of finishing the year with roughly negative 8% growth and your statement that growth comes back in fiscal '27, how much of that headwind stems from each of those pieces, and which one is baked into the guide? And where would you say there's somewhat less risk, since in that case it's your own pushing rather than something pulling you?
Yes. I believe your read is correct, in that we're examining the software vertical and a portion of the weakness emerging from the quarter. The down market rightsizing — that's likely the biggest chunk of this year's guidance revision, since we can state fairly scientifically that we remove X resources down market, which generates Y of an ACV headwind this year. The largest item we're modeling, I'd say, is the pricing transformation; and as we speed that up this year, it turns into the bigger piece of the story next year. In modeling it, there could be cases involving lower entry points. And what we're modeling is the timing of when the upside arrives, be it intra-contract through upsell opportunity or upon renewal through reduced downsell pressure.
And I'd like to mention too, Alex — over the past 2 years, you've heard us discuss our effort to move upmarket, and both the retention profile and the growth profile among our upmarket customers are much stronger than what we see downmarket, which dilutes the upmarket results; we believe now is the time to rip the Band-Aid and truly commit to that motion. Consider our operations business, which currently represents just under 20% of our total ACV, that business is expanding 20% year-over-year; it's the most profitable portion of our business, and it ties directly to customers requiring more and more of our data as they keep building internal AI applications and need to get their data foundation right. This seems like the moment to lean into that more aggressively than we ever have; and regarding the guidance, we're being extremely conservative with it because we know there are a number of moving pieces for the remainder of the year.
Understood. And then perhaps — Henry, regarding what you mentioned before about certain initiatives, especially around really unlocking the data asset: it stood out that while you're pointing to some challenges across software generally and unease about AI, 2 of your standout wins that I believe you mentioned for the quarter involved Sierra and another AI Unicorn. So could you perhaps shed some light on how — my assumption is those 2 businesses aren't dramatically growing their number of seats. So in what way do those 2 standout wins specifically take advantage of some of that cutting-edge capability you're describing? And how do those either expansions or new logos compare with earlier groups?
Right. What I believe accounts for the major contrast we're observing is that customers — those AI native customers are creating their own in-house revenue processes. With software, there's a highly prescriptive interface that you give to your customers. That prescriptiveness stems from having product managers who grasp the domain deeply and who aim to create an interface flexible enough, or a general-purpose interface, so that customers spanning a wide range of categories and revenue processes can derive value from it. The AI natives are creating their own revenue processes; they're creating their own interfaces. They're supplying their own first-party data. They're creating their own distinctive processes. No two companies share an identical go-to-market process. Yet each company's go-to-market process needs data about companies, needs data about contacts, needs hierarchy and subsidiary mapping, so that territory segmentation and planning become possible. Consequently, these companies arrive and they say, we have a revenue process, we've created it. We've created a prospecting process, but we require data to feed into it. As a result, these deals lean far more heavily toward data usage and far less heavily toward seats. And we view that as a substantial opportunity and a chance to welcome AI and truly pursue a huge opportunity in this space. And we believe our position is unique for seizing it. Were we an ordinary SaaS company, seats can't be moved into an LLM. Broadening where your product can be monetized is extremely hard. However, beneath a lightweight SaaS interface sits our data asset, which is the single most critical element of our business; and we intend to make it genuinely accessible to anyone, anywhere a go-to-market process operates, and our position makes us uniquely capable of accomplishing that.
Quick question. Right now in software, are we watching vendors cut back on their sales headcount? Or are they instead actively constructing the front end the way the AI players are? Because the real question is whether this eventually spreads into other sectors once they grasp how the world is changing; and I have one follow-up for Graham.
I'd say it's partly one and partly the other. But at this stage, we're glad to watch it move into other sectors, since we believe the larger upside lies in consumption of our data wherever a go-to-market workflow operates. So yes, we're seeing it in software right now, and we're leaning in to grab that opportunity through much more flexible pricing and the capacity to shift seat prices over into consumption of our data. Yet if this continues into insurance and financial services or another segment, our APIs and MCPs and our customers' ability to treat our data as a reference data architecture for all their go-to-market workflows improves more and more each quarter; and it comes down to tailoring our pricing and packaging models to reach customers where they stand, since in software and among sophisticated customers, they're leaning into building their own solutions, and we'll arrive with the consumption they require for that; so I don't see this spreading past software as a bad thing. It's what we're getting the company ready for.
Yes. That's great. Right, that all adds up. What I mean is, from day one, since our first meeting with you, the data set you've had has always been really robust. And then Graham, when you look at guidance, how much of it — does the guidance suggest that software is shifting while other areas shift too? Do you view it in phases, where this year leans more toward software and that's baked into the guidance, and then the following year it's something different? Or is it that — this year, regardless, the entire model flips to consumption; so whatever other industries happen to be doing no longer matters?
Yes. I wouldn't say it's — I believe there is definitely an assumption tied to specific verticals when it comes to software. But listen, we continue to see solid results in our upmarket business as well as our operations business. And the revenue adjustment along with the cost reduction centers on our downmarket business, where our margin profile is the poorest. The emergence of uncertainty on several fronts is the main driver of the guidance revision, and we aim to reduce the chance of yet another downward revision.
So there are quite a few big-ticket, upmarket clients of yours who are dropping millions each year with the company. And the move toward consumption, I think, is logical. That said, what sort of input and indications have you received showing that these bigger accounts are ready to shell out an equal sum, or perhaps even more, under a consumption-based approach? And I have a brief follow-up after that.
Yes. If you consider the accounts that give us the largest yearly spend, many of them fall into the operations customer category. And at scale, operations is the segment of our business expanding quickest, up more than 20% versus the prior year. So what we've observed is not merely an absence of hesitation, but rising appetite among those accounts — ones that aren't on a seat-based plan and are mostly data access customers. And we've found that they don't just show stronger gross retention results; their net retention results are considerably better as well, since they start at an entry point and then keep purchasing more, growing their commitment to ZoomInfo as time goes on.
Understood. So, Graham, when it comes to that 5% increase in upmarket ACV this quarter, how are the upmarket software and non-software ACV performing? Also, for the group of customers with ACV of $100,000 or more, could you tell us how many customers decreased? And what share of those are software businesses?
Yeah, when we look at upmarket within the software side of upmarket, software as a whole declined somewhat quarter over quarter in Q1, and that's what's mainly causing the drag, in the down market and also partly at the lower end of upmarket. Then, when looking at the $100,000 logo cohort, there simply aren't as many logos in general, but even software logos are downselling out of it. It was really a situation of having fewer opportunities for upsell during the quarter. We had improved net from 0 new sales into the cohort. Our downsell on the — or rather, the absence of downsell out of the cohort was much better, and churn out was about the same. It's essentially a sort of pause in incremental purchases that we observed at the close of Q3, and that was mostly concentrated in software.
With the move toward more adaptable pricing and packaging in the back half, aimed at getting monetization better lined up with what customers get, as we consider the guidance and how that works its way through the model, and given what you've said about certain customers possibly paying more while others possibly paying less, could you lay out the components for how we ought to frame this guidance for the back half? Then, if I may squeeze in a second question: With the Israel R&D center now closed, can you help us think through how ZoomInfo can manage investing for an AI era while operating from a smaller R&D base? And does that alter any R&D priorities you have for the rest of 2026?
Yes. Regarding how the guidance is composed, when I examine the reduction and split it into its components, roughly 1/4 of it, slightly above that, stems from the down market restructuring, where we are removing the most — the least efficient downmarket sales resources, and as a result, in certain cases, giving up or bringing in that inefficient downmarket ACV at lower price points via a PLG motion. Then slightly under 1/4 comes from more cautious assumptions regarding software. A little less than quarter comes from the pricing ins and outs along with the revenue recognition variability tied to the shift toward consumption. After that, the remainder is simply a layer of incremental conservatism. And then — yes, look, I believe the upside versus downside discussion, as we shift the model here, will really hinge on timing and opportunity within the customer base. During Q3 and Q4, we'll find out more about how those net new customer sales are shaping up and how the customer base migration is shaping up. And in certain cases, it will involve a mix of lower entry points that unlocks upside at renewal or even intercontract; and that's simply going to be a timing equation. On the engineering side, there are 2 things. First, our engineers, aided by coding agents, are shipping significantly multiple times more software into our platform than they ever have historically. So we are seeing a velocity boost. I mentioned all of the MCPs and integrations that we completed over the last 8 weeks. Just one of those would have taken us 8 weeks best case a year ago; and so we're seeing real engineering efficiency coming from our leveraging of AI internally at ZoomInfo. I think the second thing is there are a number of roles that we won't have as much necessity for. We don't need as many front-end developers as we did before. The way we can put together a front end is genuinely straightforward, and whereas in the past a great deal of attention went to the front end, these days the greater share of attention sits with the data infrastructure, the back end, plus how adaptable that data is so it can be connected into numerous destinations. As a result, there isn't the same need for us to carry as large a number of front-end application developers as we did in earlier times.
Thanks for the thorough breakdown on the guidance.
To build on what was asked before — regarding those positions, meaning the 600 job roles you cut — how do they break down across various functions, go-to-market versus R&D, or other back-office areas?
Certainly; the bulk will be in R&D. Roughly half falls under R&D; the remainder is largely downmarket sales and marketing resources; so figure it's probably 90% R&D plus downmarket sales and marketing. And then some G&A accounts for roughly another 10% of those roles.
All right. Then regarding NRR, it's held steady at 90% across the past 3 quarters. As you look further at this intentional move away from pricing based on seats, plus some churn you anticipate in software, what's the floor for NRR in 2026? And does it need to rebound for growth to pick up speed again?
Yeah. I'd say that recovery, following what could be some short-term pressure here, would definitely be the key piece of getting back to growth. That said, given the deliberate change in how we price, there might be a bit of decline in net revenue retention overall, and the guidance does account for that. And I believe we're quite confident we can make up for it soon after through gains from moving to a consumption-based model.
Henry, we have spent quite a bit of time discussing pricing that's more flexible. To me, that seems very logical. But do you also need to become more aggressive with lower pricing in order to get demand accelerating again?
DJ, what I believe we're considering isn't putting up artificial obstacles to entry and to using our data, especially in the down market, where there's a chance to onboard a customer at lower prices while tying that customer to value via consumption of our data, whether inside our platform or within an LLM. So we're aiming to make transactions with us really simple. A key premise behind this change is that our PLG motion generates additional down-market opportunity by eliminating platform fees and seat minimums and shifting toward consumption, which in our view matches better what the customer wants.
Alright, and Graham, here's a question that follows up for you. Going off the way you're projecting the business right now, at what point do you anticipate quarterly revenue turning back to sequential gains?
My answer would be that by the second half of 2027 at the latest, we anticipate growth will be sustainably positive, supported by stronger fundamentals and a consumption TAM where upside is nearly unconstrained.
If I understood correctly, you mentioned the platform fee alongside prepackaged credits would arrive in Q3. So let me make sure I have this right: for those customers who upgraded during 1Q and 2Q, or whose renewal carries them past the back half of this year, will you negotiate using the new pricing structure and perhaps move them onto a new model early? Or does that only occur when renewal comes around? Then, on my second point, do you expect less appetite to sign up for comparable duration? Might folks shorten their duration in reaction to the pace of change in the market?
Yes. Honestly, I believe there's a chance for us to collaborate with our clients to move them over to this pricing structure no matter when their renewal comes up. This won't be something imposed on them, but during Q3, when it comes to new business, we'll be introducing it as our lead approach for the first time; and as for our existing customer base, we're going to engage with them at the point where they see value, and there will be chances to transition them toward this more variable pricing and away from the more fixed approach. We think there's considerable benefit for both the customer and for us in making that change. Parker, what was your second question?
The subject was contract length. Should you notice any reduced readiness to commit to comparable terms, especially ones spanning several years.
Within the operations business, which carries a considerably longer duration than certain other offerings of ours, that hasn't shown up; and my expectation is there will be no headwind in that area.
Nate Ruoss here, filling in for Jackson Ader. So when it comes to Studio and Workspace, what kind of early reactions have customers had to these products so far — especially Workspace, given that it's the newer one? And going forward, how do you see these products tying into contracts?
Yeah. Early on — we put a lot more effort into go-to-market for Studio this quarter, and we brought it to roughly 1/4 of our customer base, who are now trialing Studio. They're doing hands-on trials alongside their account managers and solution consultants. Within Studio, they're using data. And from there, we're converting a large share of those customers into paying Studio customers. So the responses we're getting leave us feeling quite good. There are things people couldn't get done in the old ZoomInfo platform that they can now accomplish in Studio, which wasn't possible previously. We've also built AI into Studio. The whole point of that design is to encourage usage. Through that platform, we anticipate Studio becoming a significant driver of data usage. That's where our attention is; the model works the same way — rather than a platform fee, you pay based on usage coming into Studio, and what you pay upfront converts into usage data and AI credits. So the reactions have been truly favorable. It's still very early, but we're quite happy with what we're hearing, and beyond that, we keep putting substantial R&D money into that platform too.
Great. That's really useful. One additional question from my side. As you move toward a consumption-based approach down the road, what do you do to make customers at ease with variable pricing when they came in expecting fixed seat-based pricing?
Sure. Typically, we partner with customers to set up guardrails regarding how large that first purchase should be. For the most part, we still anticipate this being pre-committed consumption spend, meaning they pay upfront for a certain number of credits. Once those credits are used up, we're able to sell them additional ones. But we're very focused on ensuring customers feel at ease with that initial buy and, without question, at ease with the value we're assigning to it.
Let me dig a bit deeper into when all of this will happen. I believe you mentioned a transition window of somewhere between 12 and 18 months. Could you remind us: do you basically anticipate that every customer will have shifted onto this new consumption plan by Q2 of 2028? And is that also the quarter when ACV growth hits its low point, with revenue then trailing behind it? Please walk us through how that works, plus anything about revenue recognition we ought to bear in mind.
Yes. If we consider the sequence in which we'll do things, our plan is to have the new business motion led by this hybrid, non-seat-based model before Q3 of this year wraps up, and also to begin a more formal transition for those customers eager to make the switch and whom we think will gain from it. What we've stated, I believe, is that within 12 to 18 months, we want to be nearer to a 50 to 50 split between seats-based ACV and non-seat-based ACV. At present, seats make up 2/3 and non-seats roughly 1/3. So moving 15 to 17 points in that direction across the coming 12 to 18 months is what we intend; in our view, that isn't the timer for when growth returns. We have strong confidence about returning to revenue growth measured annually by the latter portion of 2027. That would likely land about a quarter after ACV growth is back on an upward path.
Understood. And with this new model, what's your thinking on GAAP operating margins over the long term, along with free cash flow margins? And clearly, historically, whenever the stock has been dislocated, you've increased buybacks. So given today's announcements, how are you weighing all of those elements?
The most important point, I'd say, is that no matter what conditions we face, we're dedicated to safeguarding cash flow per share and making it grow.
So Graham, you said the operations side of things takes longer to play out. Could you help us get a better handle on that unit — what end markets it touches, what the sales cycle looks like, and how much of it arrives as brand-new accounts rather than through cross-selling, given that it's becoming a bigger piece of the overall picture?
Absolutely; it remains the case that much of the expansion on the operations side comes from people we already serve, be they ZoomInfo accounts cross-selling into operations or current operations accounts growing what they spend there. That's the source of the bulk of it. When it comes to net retention and gross retention, the operations business outperforms every other part of ZoomInfo. What that tells us is there's still plenty of untapped logo potential, regardless of whether those are existing ZoomInfo logos or organizations we bring on as operations customers.
Graham, can we get a feel for what portion of that comes from tech or software, something to clarify the end market mix?
The mix is fairly broad; compared with our core offerings, it leans less on software. And a big share sits with large enterprises spanning a wide range of verticals.
I feel like Copilot hasn't gotten much airtime. In the prior quarter, it accounted for more than 20% of total ACV, if I remember right. So I'd like to know whether you can share anything new on that figure, or simply how renewals moved during the quarter, or perhaps whether this change is reshaping your broader vision for Copilot?
How we package and sell Copilot will definitely be shaped by the pricing model, I'd say. That said, Q1 proved to be yet another strong quarter where Copilot is concerned. As a share of the overall business, it keeps growing. Honestly, that stood out as one of the better developments for us this quarter. The way we price Copilot is what will shift going forward; rather than the seat-based approach we used in the past, you should anticipate pricing that leans more toward prepackaged credits.
Great. And then perhaps only as a rapid follow-up here. That AI confusion along with a few of the macro items you talked about earlier during this call — is there anything you're able to share regarding perhaps how that has simply trended thus far sort of in April and early May and whether such trends have persisted or how those have shifted more lately?
Yes, it's quite comparable to what we observed at the quarter's end. It's not necessarily not deteriorating, but it's — I believe we remain in that phase of pause.
Appreciate it — that wraps up our call. Thanks for taking part, everyone. You're free to hang up at this point.
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