Alstom SA (ALO) Earnings Call Transcript
November 17, 2026
Earnings Call Speaker Segments
Good evening, and thanks for being with us today as we go through Alstom's results for the first half of fiscal year '26-'27. My name is Martin Sion, and I serve as Chief Executive Officer. With me is Bernard Delpit, our Executive Vice President and CFO. I'll start by covering the first-half highlights tied to our priorities. After that, Bernard will walk you through the financial results, and then I'll come back to wrap up with this outlook. So if we turn to Page 5, here are the highlights for the first half. During the first half, orders booked by the group came to EUR 11 billion, which works out to a book-to-bill ratio of 1.2. Sales came in at EUR 9.3 billion, reflecting organic growth of 2.2%. Adjusted EBIT landed in negative territory, posting a loss of EUR 396 million, which reflects gross margin adjustments on certain rolling stock projects. Free cash flow was also negative, at EUR 1,248 million, largely a reflection of the seasonality inherent in the business. Clearly, these results are not satisfactory, and they fall short of what a global leader in the rail industry should deliver. The priority actions we launched soon after I stepped into my role in April are already underway and have begun producing results. That said, as we announced on the 2nd of November, we lowered our outlook for car production, sales, margin and cash for the current fiscal year. The first-half performance reinforces a single conviction: the present organizational structure requires urgent reshuffling, and over recent months we have been carrying out a comprehensive review of Alstom's operating model. Beyond that, we have announced a deleveraging objective of around EUR 2 billion. These will be central areas of focus in the months ahead as we get ready for our Capital Markets Day. Now to Slide 6. Across the last 6 months, I have devoted a significant amount of time to visiting Alstom's manufacturing sites and design offices. I've met with customers, employees, suppliers, public authorities and, naturally, investors. What I've observed, along with the feedback I've received, has reinforced the initial view I formed of the business. First, services. Alstom holds a strong leading franchise, which today accounts for 39% of the backlog. It is turning in solid operational and financial performance, with further room to grow. Part of that growth will come from the growing number of new rolling stock projects that carry long-term maintenance contracts, but there is also considerable potential to raise maintenance penetration across Alstom's installed base, including in markets where maintenance was traditionally carried out by legacy operators. Second, signaling. This is a crucial pillar of our portfolio, positioning us to capture opportunities from signaling upgrades across existing networks, particularly in Europe, as well as signaling greenfield opportunities everywhere. Signaling is also a key component of the turnkey business, combining rolling stock, signaling and systems integration to deliver end-to-end solutions for greenfield projects and major line extensions. Third, rolling stock. My site visits, together with the first-half performance, have reinforced my determination to tackle the uneven performance across projects. Importantly, the root causes of these execution challenges are well identified and are often shared across projects. Most often, these boil down to the complexity of operations, gaps in quality throughout design and development, and uneven compliance with project planning. Those are exactly the areas we're tackling via the priority actions we launched in April and the operational plan that's currently being put together. Moving to the next slide. Let's go to Slide 7 now and look at how far we've come with the priority actions started earlier this year. To begin, lean management, which is meant to reinforce operating discipline across projects and sites. That might sound elementary, yet it's still necessary. Project teams have put in place more consistent routines so they can spot problems sooner, grasp what's causing them and fix them more quickly. We've increased several times over the count of lean initiatives in the workshops, aiming to speed up execution and raise quality. Second, accountability. Project managers now hold clearer ownership of decisions over the whole project life cycle, from signing the bid all the way through to delivery. To make that work, it meant, for example, tying individual objectives tightly to project performance, plus clear criteria for choosing project managers based on how critical the project is. Third, the teams I refer to as tiger teams. These groups of Alstom experts give hands-on assistance to particular projects. Their focus is on solving technical problems, pushing back on the original risk assessment, reinforcing planning and establishing effective mitigation actions. Up to now, they have been deployed across more than 10 major projects and platforms. That covers projects needing particular attention, like those on the Coradia Max platform, and also projects in the early development phase, to help them start off on the right foot. Past these immediate steps, we're working to make the organization simpler and leaner. Efforts are already in motion to streamline processes and push decision-making earlier, strengthen our cost base and take fuller advantage of Alstom's purchasing scale. Let's move now to Slide 8 for a closer look at rolling stock. Out of the group's EUR 111 billion backlog at the end of September, roughly EUR 47 billion is tied to rolling stock, with projects sitting at various stages of execution. Projects still in a design and development phase make up the biggest portion of that backlog. Most of them were awarded during the last 2 to 3 years, at the point when the group tightened its bid selection process. Examples include Trenes del Norte in Mexico and the metros for MTA in New York. At the opposite end, about 25% of the rolling stock backlog has already reached serial production; commuter trains in the Paris region and intercity trains in South Africa, for instance. For those projects, execution meets the right standard, and we've seen efficiency gains. The remaining 35% sits at the end of development and in industrial ramp-up, which is typically the most critical phase. That's the point where we turn a design into an operational train, move toward homologation and ultimately serial production. Performance during this stage is uneven. Coradia Max in Germany is proving especially challenging, and in contrast, Avelia Horizon has now cleared the most critical milestone, with entry into commercial service in early November. When you're ramping up, development gaps can turn into operational and financial problems fast. To cut that risk, projects need to be done right from the outset, and that sits at the heart of what we're doing on the operating model. Let's move to Slide 9 now and take a closer look at Coradia Max for Germany. What you see here is an overview of the 6 different projects we have on Coradia Max. As of the end of September, the Coradia Max backlog was EUR 3 billion to EUR 4 billion, spread over 6 projects. Roughly 1,300 cars have been ordered so far under contracts awarded between 2021 and 2024. Optional tranches are also part of these contracts. Design and manufacturing arrangements differ from project to project, with development split between France and Germany. Production and train take place in either Poland or Germany. Next. Moving to Slide 10, on how the Coradia Max platform has developed recently. During the first quarter of this fiscal year, a team of experts was sent in to support the Coradia Max project after technical issues came up early in the fiscal year. Production was halted to reduce the risk of future retrofits while technical solutions were being worked out. Those solutions were completed by the end of the summer.
Later, in late summer, an additional review indicated the testing program required adjustment so that validation and homologation requirements could be met; this produced a fresh planning, which led to commercial service starting later. Because the different projects are linked, this change impacts the wider Coradia Max portfolio in Germany; with the revised schedule now in place and the necessary tests clearly identified, the teams are aiming for homologation of the first of the 6 projects by no later than March 2028. Commercial service should start shortly after that, depending on the customers. The revised timeline hit gross margin in the first half and cash generation for the full year. Bernard will cover the associated financial effect afterward; turning now to Slide 11, which concerns Avelia Horizon. This project is yet another illustration of an initiative progressing through industrial ramp-up. The Avelia Horizon is Alstom's double-deck high-speed platform, and its order book exceeds EUR 6 billion, distributed among multiple customers and regions. Today the platform is in service with SNCF in France, Eurostar, Velvet, and ONCF in Morocco. Several significant milestones have been achieved at this point. Commercial operation with the French operator SNCF got underway earlier this month. Following years of development and testing, this represents a key step for the platform. Meanwhile, we have expanded manufacturing capacity at La Rochelle and Valenciennes in France, and output levels are climbing consistently. What matters most at this point is converting those achievements into dependable, repeatable manufacturing throughout our full range. Turning now to car output: Alstom built 1,860 cars during the first half, which is about 150 below the figure for the same stretch a year earlier. The composition differed. We had, for one thing, a larger portion of regional and commuter trains alongside a smaller portion of metros — meaning larger trains this time versus smaller ones in the prior year. Conversely, we had a larger proportion of projects in early industrial stages—meaning they're just starting their learning curve—such as those in France, the U.S., and Spain, along with fewer projects in serial production than during the same period a year ago; even so, that mix accounts for only part of the gap relative to both last year and our original plan. As mentioned before, Coradia Max output was halted in the first half, and after the homologation schedule was extended, we adjusted this year's production plan. So the full-year outlook now sits at roughly 4,000 cars, and Coradia Max explains the bulk of that gap; turning to Slide 13, execution is the top near-term focus, but we're also keeping steady attention on the commercial side — staying disciplined about order intake and building a quality backlog for the future. It was a solid first half, with EUR 11 billion in orders. That figure includes a meaningful portion of bundled contracts that pair rolling stock with services, along with end-to-end turnkey solutions. One example: in Canada, Alstom booked a EUR 3 billion order from VIA Rail for 313 cars, plus 15 years of technical support and spare parts. Turning to the U.K., Alstom was selected by TransPennine Express for a EUR 1.2 billion deal covering 29 battery-electric trains plus maintenance. The Gautrain arrangement in South Africa combines new commuter trains, signaling, and long-term maintenance. In Saudi Arabia, a EUR 400 million order provides additional driverless metro trains serving 3 Riyadh lines, together with maintenance. We also picked up more business through options being exercised — additional trains in Australia and Sweden. Lastly, regarding signaling, we secured a sizable group of contracts in Egypt aimed at modernizing the network. Moving to Slide 14, let's review the backlog. By the close of September, it had risen to EUR 111 billion. At the close of September, backlog gross margin came in at 18.1%, essentially unchanged. The overall backlog margin continued to benefit from orders taken during the first half. However, that favorable effect was counterbalanced by gross margin adjustments on some rolling stock projects, which Bernard will cover later. With that, let me turn it over to Bernard for the financial results review.
Thanks, Martin. Starting with orders on Slide 16: during the first half, orders came in at EUR 11 billion, a slight increase over EUR 10.5 billion in the same period a year earlier. The book-to-bill for the first half was 1.1. As anticipated, orders strengthened in the second quarter, hitting EUR 8.4 billion. For the second quarter on its own, the book-to-bill ratio was 1.8. Viewed by product line, rolling stock orders came to EUR 5.7 billion in the first half, with 2 large contracts contributing, VIA Rail in Canada and TPE in the U.K. During the first half, service orders reached EUR 2.9 billion, partly because so many new rolling stock orders included maintenance agreements. In select countries—Italy stands out—we increased services penetration within Alstom's installed base. Systems orders for the first half were EUR 1.3 billion, producing a book-to-bill of 1.5, reflecting contracts in South Africa and the Middle East. Signaling orders totaled EUR 1.1 billion, among them major contracts in Egypt plus several in Ireland. As for regions, the sizable VIA Rail contract in Canada propelled orders in the Americas. For the half-year, the Africa, Middle East and Central Asia region achieved record orders, driven by sizable turnkey solutions and locomotive contracts. As we look toward the second half, we already have 2 large orders locked in — one involving metros in Vietnam and another covering maintenance of an Aventra fleet in the U.K.; for the full year, our expectation is a book-to-bill ratio above 1. Turning to Slide 17 on sales: first-half sales came in at EUR 9.3 billion, a 3% increase compared with the same period last year. Currency movements gave us a positive lift. Strip that out, and organic growth stood at 2.2%. That growth was slower than in prior periods and fell short of our guidance; 2 factors were behind this. To begin with, rolling stock output came in below what we had planned, falling 8% compared with a year earlier. Next, signaling had a tough comparison because organic growth in the first half of last year reached 17%. Those two things hit us harder during the second quarter. Consequently, organic sales in Q2 were essentially flat. If we go product line by product line, rolling stock organic sales were up 3% in the first half, helped by mix that raised value per car. Services put in a strong showing, posting 5% organic sales growth in the first half. Signaling and systems each recorded low single-digit organic sales declines, reflecting high comparison bases. I'll now move to the P&L on Slide 18. For the first half, gross margin was 3.6%, a drop of 10 percentage points compared with the same period a year earlier. The entire decline came from gross margin adjustments on projects. Industrial efficiencies were largely flat versus last year. Cost of sales was up 15%. That reflected stronger activity across the group, but the biggest driver was higher provisions for loss-making contracts than we had in the first half of last year. R&D expenses climbed 25% compared with the first half of last year, reflecting the group's strategy of increasing off-cycle investment in developing solutions and advancing technology ahead of project execution to reduce risks. There's also EUR 22 million in amortization of capitalized R&D tied to the regional train platform, stemming from the revised profitability of Coradia Max. Selling and administrative costs remain under good control, down 3% compared with the first half of last year. Finally, net income from joint ventures, as anticipated, amounted to EUR 65 million for the first half. The main reason was weaker contributions from two Chinese joint ventures. Overall, adjusted EBIT came in negative at a loss of EUR 396 million, which mirrors the effect of the gross margin deviation. Let's move to Slide 19 now and look at the key drivers behind the adjusted EBIT margin in the first half. As discussed, gross margin adjustments on projects for and from Germany lowered adjusted EBIT margin by 10 percentage points. About 2/3 of that impact was tied to the 6 German Coradia Max contracts, with the remainder for other contracts developed in Germany. Higher R&D expenses and the lower contribution from joint ventures also weighed on the margin. Those headwinds were partly offset by continued control of SG&A, which contributed 40 basis points. All in all, adjusted EBIT margin fell by 10.6 percentage points to negative 4.2%. Let's now go to Slide 20 and examine net profit. Non-operating expenses came to EUR 87 million in the first half. Most of those were tied to rightsizing our footprint in Europe, plus transformation programs in Germany and certain legal expenses. Net financial expenses stayed roughly flat, at EUR 77 million. Reduced interest costs were counterbalanced by increased costs for currency hedging. On income taxes, the first-half charge rose to EUR 223 million, compared with EUR 104 million a year earlier. That increase came from write-downs of deferred tax assets. Given the pre-tax loss, our effective tax rate came in at negative 35.5%. And finally, net profit was negative as well, at a loss of EUR 554 million for the first half. Moving on, let's turn to Slide 21 and take a look at free cash flow. EBITDA plus dividends from joint ventures came in negative, at a loss of EUR 162 million, driven by the Coradia Max and other contracts carried out from Germany. First-half CapEx and capitalized development costs reached EUR 286 million, equal to 3.1% of sales, versus 2.5% a year earlier. Those figures reflected the planned step-up in R&D spending along with increased CapEx, particularly for the expanding services footprint. Financial expenses and tax produced cash outflows of EUR 122 million, compared with EUR 152 million in the same period last year. Funds from operations landed at negative EUR 628 million, and after EUR 620 million went out through working capital, free cash flow finished at negative EUR 1,248 million. Slide 22 lays out the trade working capital specifics. Trade working capital stood at 36 days of sales when September closed, higher than the 29 days recorded at the close of March 2026, but below the 43 days seen in September of the prior year. That shift produced a EUR 483 million cash outflow across the first half. By the close of September, inventory had risen to 88 days of sales, up from 81 days at the end of March and roughly unchanged from September a year earlier. The increase reflected seasonality as well as the impact of revised Coradia Max planning and preparations for greater car output in the second half. At the end of September, payables were lower than at the end of March 2026, both in euro terms and in days of sales. Slide 23 offers additional detail on contract working capital. Contract working capital remained favorable at 81 days of sales at the end of September, versus 86 days at the end of March 2026, and stood at negative EUR 4.3 billion. By the close of September, contract assets had climbed to 135 days of sales, compared with 124 days at the end of March. The increase came from the industrial ramp-up of rolling stock projects — among them TGV high-speed trains — along with growth in services.
Contract liabilities stayed pretty much flat at 179 days of sales, which reflects solid down payments in the first half. Current provisions went up by roughly EUR 460 million in the first half. That came from higher provisions for projects for and from Germany. On Slide 24 you can see how net debt rose to EUR 1.1 billion at the end of September, versus EUR 404 million at the end of March. Beyond negative free cash flow, leases and dividends to minorities, together with a hybrid bond coupon, added up to a further EUR 150 million of total cash outflow in the first half of the year. The net debt bridge also includes the hybrid bond that was issued in June 2026, which generated cash proceeds of roughly EUR 700 million. An updated calculation of the bridge from EV to equity value that accounts for these developments can be found in the appendix of this presentation. Moving on to Slide 25, let's examine liquidity and debt maturities. At the close of September 2026, cash and cash equivalents stood at EUR 1.6 billion, compared with EUR 2.3 billion at the end of March. As of the end of September, the group has access to a EUR 2.5 billion revolving credit facility and a EUR 2.5 billion commercial paper program, and neither has been drawn. Back in November, we added a EUR 2 billion revolving credit facility as an extra layer, which fits with our cautious approach to liquidity and the revised guidance on free cash flow. Now on debt maturities: the EUR 700 million bond was repaid during October. A further EUR 500 million tranche of senior debt comes due in July of next year. On Slide 26 you can see how the operational issues we went through earlier feed into the first half gross margin adjustment and will shape the cash trajectory over the near to medium term. As we said, the longer timelines for homologation and commercial service on certain rolling stock projects carry financial consequences across the entire life of those contracts. Extended schedules mean it now costs more to finish the projects, and we are also assuming greater customer compensation. With these updated assumptions, margin at completion drops by EUR 1 billion to EUR 1.5 billion, and the cash effect across the life of the contracts is comparable. The 10 percentage point gross margin headwind booked in this first half shows how these adjustments land under IFRS accounting, yet for the period it is mostly non-cash. On the lower section of the slide, the EUR 1.5 billion cash outflow projected for this year is tied primarily to milestone payments now expected later than originally planned. As those projects move closer to homologation and delivery, we anticipate that at least EUR 1 billion out of the EUR 1.5 billion shortfall will reverse over the coming few years. That reflects when milestone payments fall due rather than any permanent cash impact. When it comes to the remaining EUR 0.5 billion, one portion involves contract awards that had been anticipated but will no longer come through, and for the rest we are reviewing the timing and the potential for recovery. The main takeaway is that the lower margins we recorded in the first half affect cash throughout the whole project life, while most of this year's cash shortfall is really a matter of timing. That wraps up what I wanted to say about Slide 27, so I'll pass it to Martin now for the outlook and closing remarks. Alstom had its investment-grade rating reaffirmed recently. Given the revised outlook, this demonstrates how firmly the company is committed to preserving that investment-grade rating in order to protect its business model, because delivering long-term contracts requires issuing and rolling over bonds and guarantees that depend on a solid rating. It also, I believe, reflects the credibility the company has earned by delivering the 2024 deleveraging plan and through the leadership transition, since returning to execution excellence is clearly at the top of the agenda, with new plans in motion alongside strong commercial momentum. With that context in mind, Alstom's already-strong liquidity gets an added lift from a fresh EUR 2 billion revolving credit facility that comes with no financial covenant. In Moody's view, a 12- to 18-month window exists for carrying out the EUR 2 billion plan introduced alongside the board, with the goal of bringing credit metrics back in line with a Baa3 rating. That sets up the conditions for serving the interests of all stakeholders in the best possible way and gives the necessary and sufficient time to establish the deleveraging plan. Significantly, the schedule dovetails with the company's intention to announce and carry out concrete changes in how it runs its operations. Martin, I'll hand it over to you for the outlook and the wrap-up.
Thanks, Bernard. Turning to Slide 29, I want to revisit the outlook for this fiscal year that we gave on 2 November, when the preliminary results were released and the targets for fiscal year '26-'27 were refreshed. At the group level, we expect a book-to-bill ratio above 1. Organic sales growth is anticipated in the low- to mid-single-digit range, which reflects in part car production coming in below our original plan, at approximately 4,000 cars for the full year. The adjusted EBIT margin should rebound to around 6.5% in the second half, bringing the adjusted EBIT margin for the entire year to approximately 1%. For the fiscal year, free cash flow is expected to come in at negative EUR 1.5 billion, in part due to the timing effect that Bernard mentioned a moment ago. In addition, the review we launched with the expert teams to identify risks and opportunities throughout the project portfolio is anticipated to be finished by the end of this fiscal year. And beginning in the next fiscal year, we anticipate performance will return to normal. Let's turn to Slide 30, which covers the next steps. Our priorities are clear: enhance execution and reinforce the balance sheet. To enhance execution, we are assembling a comprehensive plan focused on 3 areas. First, a new operating model designed to clarify accountability, streamline decision-making and strengthen project management. Next is operational excellence, particularly across development, manufacturing, and procurement. That effort extends work already kicked off during this year, and we're applying artificial intelligence both in our products and solutions and through the whole of project delivery, all the way from engineering through to manufacturing. The third area is products and footprint: we'll direct more and more resources toward core activities, while staying disciplined and selective when it comes to new business; at the same time, cutting debt is a top priority, with a target of EUR 2 billion, as Bernard just laid out. Decisions on the organization will be made shortly and shared once they take effect. During our Capital Markets Day in the second quarter, we'll lay out the full plan along with the new medium-term financial trajectory in greater detail. We're aiming to improve how we execute, generate more cash, and strengthen our balance sheet. That wraps up our presentation, and we'll now take questions from the floor.
Could I begin by asking about the first question, namely the root causes behind the technical problems on the Coradia Max? I mean, are there particular components or processes that you would want to highlight? I mean, it appears that 1/3 of the project charge you booked in H1 actually relates to other projects outside the Coradia Max. So I am wondering what the risk is that these issues you are seeing on the Coradia Max will in fact show up even more widely, perhaps in other projects that do not necessarily come from Germany? So that is question number one.
Okay, thank you. Coradia Max is something we've gone over very closely, aiming to grasp — well, to resolve the problem, and in resolving it, to get at what's really behind it. To sum up those underlying causes: first, project management wasn't where it needed to be, and strong project management mattered even more here since this project's setup depends on multiple regions cooperating — France, Germany, Poland. That made the arrangement complex. Within that complexity, certain engineering errors that occurred went undetected for too long, and the fallout was significant. When we review what took place, Coradia Max had two distinct phases during H1. The first of those phases landed around Q1. The problems were technical ones concerning the car body shell, and a solution to get past that difficulty was identified by our experts, which is when we halted production, and we reached a point where production could have restarted; but at that stage we found a further issue, one that relates more to development logic and engineering, specifically that the test and validation plan in place lacked sufficient robustness; and if final homologation by the German authority was to be achieved — our experts, the group I refer to as the tiger team, advised rebuilding the baseline together with the team, and a new plan was put together in September, which produced the consequences we have described; so looking at this, it is evident that in developing the new operating model for Alstom, we are emphasizing ways to strengthen engineering so that mistakes are prevented, ways to strengthen project management, and the separation of project management from engineering so that proper checks and balances exist. I won't get into specifics, but rest assured: the setup we're building—set to be shared with our teams by the end of 2026 and something we'll be able to talk about publicly—will build in what we learned from Coradia Max so the same problem doesn't crop up somewhere else.
Got it. My second question concerns the deleveraging program. I believe you said earlier today that you see room to grow the service business further, and that signaling was a key pillar of the portfolio. So should we take it that these 2 segments are off the table and won't form part of the divestment program?
Services and rolling stock are strongly linked. As we've said, we're already growing services by selling rolling stock and services together as a bundle. So for my part, I consider that the strong link between the 2 businesses makes the services business not the best candidate for sale, to put it mildly.
And what about signaling, or a portion of the signaling operations?
Signaling isn't up for sale. Still, to be completely clear, what we're doing is carrying out a full review of all the activities that we are — those that aren't part of our core business, that are profitable, that can be separated out. We already conducted a review over the summer, simply because, as a new CEO, I wanted to see which business could potentially be divested. Some months ago we gave the board a presentation on this topic, so at present we're working on these matters. There might be some niche of activities within signaling that could appear on the list, but as signaling's main business, given our strategy, signaling is not for sale.
There are a couple of things I'd like to ask about, and I'll go through them separately. First off, I wanted to get your thoughts on how the JVs have been performing. Clearly, their earnings are somewhat lower compared with a year earlier. Could you say a little about what you see ahead for them? And beyond the purely financial mechanics, what does each of them give you from a strategic standpoint? I'm curious about which parts of those operations are truly core and which perhaps are less so.
Sure, Daniela, let me handle the JV question first. What you've observed with the JVs during the first half is really consistent with the guidance we gave at the start of the year. So the guidance stays the same. We were aware that in the prior year there was a particularly large contribution from 2 of those JVs, and by their nature those cannot repeat this year. On top of that, we keep seeing a strong dividend payout from the JVs. So there's nothing specific tied to the warning situation affecting the Chinese JVs.
And regarding the second part of that…
Right. What precisely was it — would you mind repeating the second half of your question? Did that part also have to do with the Chinese JVs?
Yeah, so that was essentially about what you strategically gain from them, right? Clearly there's a financial impact. Should we view those purely as financial investments, or does the JV deliver other benefits to the group that you'd regard as strategically significant?
Right. Well, certain JVs are more strategic compared with others, and some contribute more to our operations and our financials than others do. What I'd say is you shouldn't treat that as one strategic asset; it's more like a list of assets, and that's how we look at them from an investment standpoint. So there are no particular views; we haven't specifically factored them into the deleveraging program, and we keep regarding those JVs as genuinely strategic, both when it comes to signaling and rolling stock.
My apologies. One limited part of this question is that the JV also gives us a window into China's railway industry, where we operate within the JV; and I think having the ability to benchmark is always valuable, so we can challenge how we work and our operational excellence.
And then I have just one more follow-up question, since you've brought up several times this idea of trying to strengthen project management and operations. What I'm wondering is whether you also have any particular hard stop criteria in place regarding the commercial bidding process, so that while you're still working out how you want operations and project management to run, you're not at the same time filling your backlog with things you may not be able to handle in the ideal way? Or is that happening at all, or not? And if it is happening, would you be comfortable going below a book-to-bill of 1 for a period of time to make sure you get exactly the right backlog? How are you thinking about this?
Well, it's clear that selectivity is a key element of our strategy. I mean, compared to last year — I think last year we had a 1.4 book-to-bill ratio. Our ambition this year is much more limited. It's clear that we want to be very selective. There are projects where we — a significant project where we decided not to bid because the development time was too short and the level of risk was too high. And that's something which is very well understood inside the company. And by the way, the tender process which was in place before I joined, and which has been reinforced 3 years ago, is a tender process which I believe is really strong; so we may always make a mistake, because if the inputs are not perfect. But I think we've got a strong process, a strong understanding from everyone in the company that the quality of the backlog is the best asset of the company. And so I think that today we are doing the right thing when we decide to bid.
Let me just add something here. The 6 Coradia Max contracts were awarded across 2021, 2022, and in some cases 2023 for the final ones. So what we're dealing with here is more a matter of execution rather than admitting that from the start, because we didn't see the risk, it was a risky undertaking. I mean, this was certainly on our radar, given the size, given the product, given that it was 6 contracts arriving very close together when it came to homologation and deliveries. But this definitely was not a bidding problem; it's an execution problem.
This is Martin at Citi. My first question is really just going back to the timing of the deleveraging. You're referring to EUR 2 billion by next September, and I think some investors could view that stretch of time as a possible overhang on the shares, especially if you plan to raise equity near the end of that window. You've made some comments about why the timing is what it is, but just to be clear, is it that you want the Capital Markets Day done and the early part of the review finished so investors get a better sense of the future outlook, rather than the time you might need to identify and carve out disposals, for example? So I just want to understand that timing.
Okay. Perhaps I'll begin, and Bernard can add. I mean, as of today we are working on disposing of businesses, as I mentioned earlier. I mean, we already have a list, and we need to work through it. We're also working on organic measures. You remember that we were specific about the fact that the EUR 2 billion could come from organic measures and inorganic measures; on the organic side, it's mainly negotiations with our customer, so that's more near term. And separately, what we're working on is the new operating model, the improvement actions, and we believe we need to be able to present a comprehensive plan in order to attract new shareholders. And obviously, it's clear that the updated financial trajectory for the coming years, including the improvement that we're putting in place, will be a key element. And so all of that leads us to something around the Capital Markets Day that we have planned in Q2.
And one more thing from me about the backlog, if that's alright. Bernard, I believe you said the fresh orders we're bringing in helped support the gross margin. Should we take it that the new orders you've booked carry a gross margin meaningfully above the prior gross margin in the backlog? Just to get a sense of, obviously, the gross margin in the backlog has risen only modestly, but I want to understand what has shifted in the period that keeps that backlog gross margin still fairly elevated. Was the profitability on those new orders meaningfully better than what you've been seeing in the current backlog?
Okay. In terms of gross margin on order intake now, I'd say there isn't a major difference over the last 2 years. But there's perhaps a technical point I should explain here, which is that the gross margin in the backlog is floored at 0%. Anything that comes in negative gets booked as a loss at completion through the provisions. Okay? That's what explains, given this significant provision we took in H1, why the gross margin in the backlog keeps growing. It's 18.1% versus 18%; so it's not major because, of course, part of the degradation of the Coradia program was taken in the gross margin for their residual value, I would say, in terms of margin. But the rest of it was taken as a new provision. Is that clear?
Yes, that's right.
I have a couple too. The first one concerns organic measures, and Martin, you referred to this in the last question as well; so it has been 2 weeks since the profit warning came out; and once again, the share price reaction has drawn considerable media attention. And I'm just wondering what kind of conversation you've had with customers over the last couple of weeks. Given your size, you must matter quite a lot to several customers; so just to hear some thoughts on when you now see potential for these organic measures compared with 2 weeks ago, has your thinking shifted at all on the basis of your conversations with customers during the past 2 weeks? So that's the first one.
But as you can imagine, we have been talking with our customers over the last 2 weeks. I think our customers understand the situation. And I can't be more specific. I think you sum up perfectly the situation we're in with some customers in a genuine partnership relationship, and we'll see how we can potentially improve some position we have with them in order to lower the amount of money we have to put toward the deleveraging plan of the EUR 2 billion; but I can't be more specific about the discussions we are having with the various customers. But I think you captured it well.
My second question concerns the rolling stock business. Looking at these Coradia Max orders, a lot of them come with frameworks attached. I'm just curious: if a customer later exercises those options, would margins differ because of this extra cost, or would those remaining framework orders still be profitable?
Thanks for asking, since it lets me make one point very clear. I'd had questions from customers or potential customers of Coradia Max who were somewhat worried about this train. Right? The way I put it now is straightforward. Development hurts — it hurts because we're late. It hurts us because of the cost. But the product is good. The product is good, and the fact that development has taken longer and cost more than expected doesn't mean it isn't a good product for new customers or new options. It's a good product that will benefit from all the know-how we have at Alstom. So if any option were exercised, it would be accretive in terms of margin. And if you look at a big industrial project in commercial aviation, et cetera, having a complicated development followed by a very good product isn't unique. I think that's the situation we're in.
Finally, there's an arbitration proceeding pending against Bombardier, and I believe your annual report referenced certain dates in the first half related to that case; so I was just wondering whether there's any update on it and any timeline we ought to know about for something new on the Bombardier arbitration in the near future?
No, I — all right, thanks for your question, but there's nothing I can say about this arbitration.
Let me just double-check on Coradia Max. You very helpfully described the process in H1, with the first issue coming up and being resolved, and then your tiger teams took a closer look and found something a bit more fundamental. Have they now finished working through this project? And so how should we think about the milestones on the way to homologation over the next sort of 15 months?
Yes, the team, working together with the Coradia Max team and the tiger teams, worked in September and at the beginning of October to put together a comprehensive plan. We know precisely what we have to do when it comes to documentation and to tests. Two weeks ago we succeeded in a critical test that had to be carried out with the body that analyzes the safety of the trains; so now we have a great many tests ahead, hundreds of tests to be made over the coming months, but we know exactly what needs doing. We have the tests, and the trains are in the right configuration to make the test. Now, we will obviously come across some topics during the test, as in any project, but that's normal life, okay? Because now we have a plan that goes from A to B, with B being the homologation. And we've had high-level reviews since the beginning of September to make sure that this project stays the priority of all the regions involved. And I can tell you that adherence to the planning is good. So on my side, and I always know that these complex projects always have some difficulty, but I think I said it because I had the question at the last call, I consider that this is the last rescheduling of the Coradia Max.
Understood, understood. I was also wondering about the timing of your Capital Markets Day for Q2 2027, and I believe there are 2 key questions, 2 issues to address. One is Coradia Max, and the other is the EUR 2 billion deleveraging. So I just wanted to ask whether that timing means you expect to have a good line of sight on both of these by then?
Operationally, I think we will be in a position where we can present in detail what our new organization and our new operating model are. What we plan is to have also demonstrated significant improvement in what we do day by day. And it's not only about Coradia Max that we want to communicate at the Capital Markets Day. As for the deleveraging plan, as was said before, all options are on the table, depending on the size of the organic part, depending on the size of the asset disposal. We'll see where we are at that time, but it's too early today to tell you what the part of the deleveraging plan will be, which will be fully clear at that time.
One final item from my side, if I may, regarding those other projects — I'd like to follow up on that. How would you assess the risk that additional margin tweaks could become necessary there?
Our focus is on locking in the entire backlog; that's simply how we operate day to day. As this presentation shows, we try to review the backlog methodically; and we see that risks do exist in services and signaling, though on the whole they're under control, and we've demonstrated in recent years that we're capable of handling them. And when it comes to rolling stock, that breaks into 3 parts. Serial trains — and where serial trains are concerned, we perform very well. On early development trains, what I've observed—for example, even in Germany, on new trains like S-Bahn Rheinland or DT6—those are projects that began well, with substantial management oversight to ensure a proper start. Then a portion of the rolling stock backlog consists of trains in development, nearing the end of development, or entering ramp-up. That phase is critical. It's a critical phase—but it isn't the whole backlog. As for some of those trains, the Coradia has been thoroughly examined across various situations. The high-speed train in France, TGV, is making good progress. Like I mentioned, it's now in service. So with this TGV version, many of the risks are now behind us. The tiger team is reviewing the other projects — not to grade them or make an assessment, but mainly to help them. Still, when you assist a team in de-risking, you might uncover an unexpected issue. The goal is more about finding ways to offset the risk, and if that doesn't work, to surface the risk, and then we make a decision. And I can assure you, by the close of this fiscal year, I believe the entire portfolio will have been reviewed thoroughly.
Sure, that's a simple thing to ask about, and to answer and handle, yes.
I've got 2, and I'll ask them one by one. Regarding the contracts in your backlog that have a gross margin under 10%, so on Slide 14, how many contracts fall into this category? And did your tiger team review each one of them?
That figure I don't have, and I don't believe it's meaningful, since we have 2,500 projects, and I don't know how many sit below 10%. And the tiger team isn't necessarily focused on the ones with the lowest margin. What tiger teams look at is the projects where we've identified that some risk exists — it could be technical risk, homologation risk, it could be industrial risk, where we aren't sure those risks are properly mastered. So it could be a project with a good gross margin, but if it faces a risk that isn't properly addressed, that gross margin may be degraded; so I'd rather talk about the tiger team in terms of the critical phase of the project, which is end of development, beginning of ramp-up, whatever the gross margin of that project is at this stage.
All right. My next question concerns Avelia Horizon. On the slide, you said the margin is accretive, but could you be a little more specific? Accretive to what, exactly?
That was on the options — no, it was on the description.
The Avelia Horizon.
Regarding the Avelia Horizon, when we describe it as accretive, that refers to P&L. Right? That refers to P&L, to the P&L as it stands today.
There aren't many questions remaining. I've got 2 about the operating model. So you're planning to communicate the new operating model by year 2026. How fast do you expect to roll it out across the organization, and where would implementation begin?
Thanks for asking; in a number of countries such as France, Germany, Spain, and Sweden, we have certain regulations concerning social consultations with unions, and those create some delays; so we'll need to comply with them. Usually, that can take 3 months, which would bring us to the beginning of April. But my intention is that as soon as possible, we begin to have some portion of the company operating in a project mode, as in the future organization. It won't be perfect. But I believe that in the regions where we don't face this kind of constraint, whatever can be done ahead of time should be done. So we'll be pragmatic. But it's true that given the size of Italy, Germany, Spain, France, and Sweden, a significant portion will need to be carried out in line with the regulation. So I think I've explained. As you understand, I want to move as fast as possible, pragmatically. And at the same time, obviously, we'll comply with the rules and regulations of each country.
So in light of the problems you've pointed out, do you still think a region-led model is the correct structure for Alstom, or do you feel project execution needs to be centralized more?
On rolling stock and services, I'd say being very close to our operators matters. When you consider homologation rules and so on, they differ a lot from one region to another. That's no scoop, but I won't completely call into question Alstom's model when it comes to regions. For rolling stock, the key thing is greater efficiency, particularly when we're working across 2 regions, and that's a major topic. But no, I won't push back much on the fact that rolling stock and services are organized by region.
Thank you, everyone, for taking part and for your questions. That brings the live event to a close. You're free to disconnect now.
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