Bending Spoons S.p.A. (BSP) Earnings Call Transcript
August 13, 2026
Earnings Call Speaker Segments
Thanks. Hi, everybody. It's great to have you on the Bending Spoons Q2 2026 earnings conference call. Joining us today to go over our results are Luca Ferrari, our Co-founder and CEO, along with Enrico Martinelli, Co-CFO; for the Q&A part of this call, Davide Scarpazza, Co-CFO, Francesco Mancone, CTO, and Francesco Patarnello, Co-founder and Head of M&A, will also be with us. Prior to starting, I'd like to go through the safe harbor statement. A portion of what you'll hear today will be made up of forward-looking statements, among them ones concerning our objectives and outlook. Such statements represent our present expectations and carry various risks and uncertainties. Results and events that actually occur could be materially different; to learn more, please see our registration statement on the Form F-1, including the risk factors laid out in it; we undertake no duty to update any forward-looking statements. On this call, we'll address both GAAP and non-GAAP financial measures. Definitions of our non-GAAP financial measures, along with reconciliations to the most directly comparable GAAP financial measures, appear in today's earnings press release, which you can access on the Bending Spoons investor relations website, investors.bendingspoons.com. Except where we state otherwise, every comparison is to year-over-year results. Now, Luca, I'll hand it over to you.
Thanks, James, and I appreciate everyone being on Bending Spoons' first quarterly earnings call. To start, I'll describe what Bending Spoons is, after which I'll give a quick recap of the quarter. Last, I'll take on a question that matters greatly to our long-term outlook. What might limit our capacity to scale? Our approach is straightforward. We buy digital businesses, carry out extensive integration and transformation work to make them better, and plow the cash they produce, along with additional leverage, back into more acquisitions. Beneath that approach sits our long-term ambition of building what we view as the ideal operating machine; we've been honing this model since 2013. At its core is what we refer to as our platform, made up of three parts: our people, our proprietary technologies, and our proprietary data. As of today, that platform unites close to 700 carefully chosen core team members, known internally as Spooners. Strong in-house built technologies covering areas from A/B testing through AI model orchestration, plus valuable insights gathered via over 50 acquisitions and thousands of experiments. What we've accomplished so far shows what this platform makes possible. From the beginning of 2023 onward, we've put to work close to $6 billion over 15 acquisitions, applying our underwriting hurdles of 25% unlevered and 65% levered IRR on a consistent basis. Thanks to how we've been running things, revenue, operating income, and adjusted operating income all grew by more than three times over the two-year stretch that wrapped up in 2025. Turning to Q2 2026, our growth rate was similar. Revenue climbed 126%, reaching $704 million. Operating income was up 139%, hitting $240 million, which works out to a 34% margin. Adjusted operating income increased 150% to $381 million, a 54% margin. Diluted earnings per share reached $0.28, up 163%. Adjusted earnings per share hit $0.46, up 167%. Operationally, we made encouraging progress in reshaping AOL, Eventbrite, and Vimeo. During the quarter, more than 70 product improvements went out across those three businesses. We likewise made meaningful headway updating their underlying technologies, laying a sturdier groundwork for quicker product development and better monetization. We kept bolstering our proprietary technologies, brought dozens of Spooners onto the team, broadened our financing sources, closed the purchase of Tractive at an enterprise value of $759 million, and entered negotiations to buy Airtable, with the announcement coming last week that we'd agreed to acquire the business at an enterprise value of $1.29 billion. Though we're happy with our Q2 delivery, our attention stays fixed on the long term. Specifically, since our growth has been so rapid, it's fair to ask how far Bending Spoons can scale, and what might eventually cap that growth. We ponder this continuously and identify at least three possible constraints. The supply of appealing acquisition targets, our operational ability to integrate and transform the businesses we buy, and securing capital on reasonable terms. To grow our capacity and realize our ambitions for Bending Spoons, we keep working to loosen these constraints. I'll go through each of those in order and point out a few of the moves we've made lately. The availability of appealing acquisition targets is the first thing that could hold us back. In our IPO prospectus, we laid out a bottom-up analysis that turned up over 1,000 digital businesses that might make appealing targets across the coming several years. Those units combined should generate roughly $400 billion in revenue during 2025. As things stand right now, we don't view the supply of potential targets as a real limitation, certainly not across the coming couple of years, and the lineup of deals we're looking at has never been stronger. Even with that being true, maximizing our odds of delivering attractive returns well into the future means we believe it's important to keep expanding the market we can go after and to keep broadening the mix of companies within that market by way of acquisitions we feel confident enough to underwrite. Our method in this area is intentional. When we make a sizable purchase, we want the underlying financial model to be something we already understand, and whatever new skills the company offers should be able to be applied elsewhere across our platform. Tractive fits that description well. This business leads the market in tracking pets and monitoring their health, and our interest came from how much the sector could expand, plus the chances we identified to further improve what the product delivers, reach more customers, and sharpen our marketing approach. Subscriptions generate most of Tractive's revenue, and that is an area we know extremely well. But there's a hardware component too, and that opens the door for us to get stronger in things like designing devices, connecting them, running the supply chain, and serving customers who already own units. If things go well with Tractive, we'd feel ready to push into even more markets. Take Airtable as a second example. It's a platform built around no-code and low-code tools, letting teams structure their data and run essential workflows. We chose to buy the company because of how strong the brand and product are, the upward direction of its revenue, and the fact that the category still holds plenty of room to grow. A big chunk of Airtable's money comes in through self-serve, which is another space we know really well. That said, if this deal goes through, it would give us a chance to get better at serving big companies via direct sales. Enterprise SaaS falls inside the $400 billion market we've sized up, and Brightcove plus Vimeo already give us a foothold there. On top of that, making our platform stronger alongside direct enterprise selling will sharpen our capacity to keep funding more deals like this down the road. The other thing that could hold us back is the operational bandwidth you need for the heavy integration and transformation work that's usually required if we're going to hit our return targets. Artificial intelligence is playing a bigger and bigger role in helping us grow that capacity. In the second quarter, we took more steps to weave AI into the work we do each day. Take Alt-Spooner as one illustration — a personal AI agent built by our team over the quarter and rolled out to all Spooners at the start of July. It operates within the permissions a user already holds, and it can pull from that person's authorized history as well as connected accounts. The models behind Alt-Spooner are open-weight and hosted by us internally, and since its design doesn't depend on any one model, we're free to launch and test various models — including closed-weight ones — as their abilities and pricing evolve. Over its initial 3 weeks of general availability, Alt-Spooner handled over 100 billion tokens. How quickly it's been taken up, and how well it performs, has been heartening. I've had a few wow moments myself with Alt-Spooner. In Q2, we likewise brought AI-enabled interactive tasks into certain portions of our recruiting process. What our testing shows is that these tasks deliver a predictive signal for assessing candidates. They additionally allow our recruiting process to scale more readily. Such efforts rest on the wider, more advanced, and long-established application of AI throughout our platform, and the strides we've made in growing operational capacity show up in our productivity metrics; during Q2, annualized revenue per Spooner came in above $4 million. Beyond that, we're carrying out transformations of growing size without a matching rise in how many Spooners we assign. Take Vimeo in Q2, where roughly 60 Spooners contributed, which is largely consistent with the headcount behind the Evernote transformation back in 2023.
Even though Vimeo's revenue is approximately 4x Evernote's, and the business is more complex on both a technical and an operational level. Despite these efficiency improvements, Spooners will probably still be the resource we have least of. So we will keep putting money into our capacity to bring in, pick out, keep, and grow outstanding people at scale; we will also keep making bold trade-offs as we allocate resources toward what we believe gives the best return. Usually that means integrating and transforming businesses we've bought recently. Last, we can't dismiss the chance that now and then we'll need to reduce the pace of our acquisition efforts because of limits on operational capacity. The third possible limitation involves being able to obtain capital. Thanks to steps we took in Q2 and following the quarter's close, both how large the pool of resources we can draw on is and how many financing choices we have widened. In Q2, we signed new euro-denominated term loan facilities amounting to EUR 255 million and raised our euro-denominated revolving credit facility by EUR 460 million, reaching a total of $1.58 billion at the quarter-end exchange rate. Following the quarter's close, we obtained an additional EUR 590 million in term loan financing, lifted our revolving credit facility by a further EUR 30 million, and got net proceeds of $1.10 billion from our IPO; together with the cash we already hold and the cash we anticipate our businesses will keep producing, these moves give us enough funding for the pending Airtable acquisition while keeping room to chase other acquisitions that clear our return thresholds. We plan to use that room while leaving substantial headroom under our debt covenants and enough liquidity to satisfy our obligations across a variety of downside scenarios. Now that we're public, we can tap a wider set of financing sources. We'll pick from those sources with care, staying concentrated on the goals of maximizing long-term shareholder returns while keeping a sensible risk profile. With that, I'll pass the call to Enrico so he can go over our financial results in more detail.
Thanks, Luca, and good morning, everyone. During the second quarter, we achieved triple-digit top-line expansion and grew our profitability, with contributions coming from throughout our diversified collection of businesses. Our cash generation and financial standing are still solid. I'll go through all of these areas before I talk about our outlook. For Q2, total revenue came to $704 million, which is a 126% increase. Organic revenue growth stood at 3%. Supporting that organic revenue growth, the biggest contributions came from WeTransfer and Tractive, partially offset by lower Remini and Splice revenue. Compared with what we had expected, we mainly saw stronger performance than anticipated in AOL Advertising. Q2 operating income was $240 million, up 139%, while adjusted operating income hit $381 million, up 150%. When figuring adjusted operating income, we take out amortization and impairment of acquired intangible assets, transaction-related expense, reorganization-related expense, and other items we don't view as indicative of core or ongoing operating performance. Operating income margin came in at 34%, and adjusted operating income margin was 54%, expanding 2 percentage points and 5 percentage points, respectively. That margin expansion came from scale economies as well as operational efficiencies unlocked as we keep improving our platform. On top of that, we continue redeploying Spooners into areas that offer the highest return, which we view as an advantage of our approach. Turning to the major components of our cost base, cost of revenue rose to $ 241 million, which represents 34% of revenue, unchanged from the same period a year earlier. The rise in cost of revenue was mainly driven by three factors. First, higher amortization of acquired intangible assets reflecting continued acquisition activity. Second, higher IT infrastructure expense reflecting greater cloud infrastructure utilization, largely driven by acquisitions; and third, higher distribution and payment processing expense reflecting the revenue increase. Operating expenses rose to $223 million, representing 32% of revenue, versus 33% in the same period a year earlier. The rise in operating expenses mainly reflects personnel costs tied to the ongoing operation of newly acquired businesses and separation packages offered to team members in connection with the reorganization of AOL, Eventbrite, Tractive, and Vimeo. After adjusting for the items excluded in our calculation of adjusted operating income, cost of revenue rose to $155 million. That represents 22% of revenue, unchanged from the same period a year earlier. The increase was mainly driven by IT infrastructure expense and distribution and payment processing expense. Adjusted to exclude those same cost items, operating expenses rose to $168 million, representing 24% of revenue, compared to 29% in the same period a year earlier. We keep driving productivity throughout the organization and stay disciplined in how we approach sales and marketing activities. The development and adoption of cutting-edge technological tools has been, and should remain, a key driver of efficiency gains. Equity compensation expense came to $14 million in Q2. We do not exclude this expense when calculating our non-GAAP financial measures. Now back to our GAAP numbers. Interest expense came in at $109 million, which is a 205% jump compared with the same period last year. That increase stems mainly from higher absolute debt levels, and to a far smaller degree from a higher effective interest rate. Other income totaled $90 million, and we booked an income tax benefit of $26 million. Diluted earnings per share worked out to $ 0.28, while adjusted earnings per share reached $ 0.46 — gains of 163% and 167%, respectively. As we laid out in the earnings release, we have changed how we define adjusted net income and adjusted earnings per share so that two more items are now excluded. Foreign exchange gains and losses on assets and liabilities denominated in a currency other than the functional one are excluded going forward, and so are gains and losses tied to fair value movements in interest rate swaps. Both of these show up in other expense income in our GAAP financial statements, and we have removed them from our non-GAAP financial measures because we think these adjustments make comparisons across periods better. You can find complete information on these changes, along with restated historical results, in our earnings release. Let's move on to cash flow and where we stand financially. Net cash from operating activities for the first half of 2026 came to $254 million, while capital expenditure was only $4 million; that cash flow figure was net of cash payments tied to transaction-related expense and reorganization-related expense. On the cash usage side, during the first half we spent $2.29 billion on acquisitions, net of cash received, and we also made $204 million in principal repayments on long-term debt. We closed Q2 with $4.88 billion in total long-term debt, $793 million in cash and cash equivalents, giving us net debt of $4.09 billion. Our leverage ratio was 2.4x . Definitions for net debt and leverage ratio are available in the earnings release. In the quarter, we signed new euro-denominated term loan facilities with an aggregate principal amount of EUR 255 million, and we secured a EUR 460 million increase to our existing euro-denominated revolving credit facility. Altogether, we drew $581 million across a mix of these new term loan facilities plus existing term loan and revolving credit facilities. Out of that total, $296 million was drawn under the revolving credit facilities on May 6th, 2026, was still outstanding when the quarter ended, and has been repaid since. Following the close of Q2 2026, we signed additional euro-denominated term loan facilities adding up to EUR 590 million, and we obtained increases to euro-denominated revolving credit facilities totaling EUR 30 million. In addition, we sold 39.6 million primary shares at $29 per share in our initial public offering in July. After underwriting discounts and commissions, this brought in a total of $1.10 billion. The primary shares issued in our initial public offering will show up in our basic and diluted shares outstanding as of Q3 2026; now on to guidance. Looking ahead to Q3, our projection puts revenue somewhere between $733 million and $745 million, while adjusted operating income should land in the $380 million to $400 million band. Turning to the whole year, we're forecasting revenue of $2.78 billion to $2.82 billion, with adjusted operating income coming in between $1.46 billion and $1.51 billion. These figures rest on the portfolio of businesses we currently hold, and they leave out anything that might come from acquisitions we haven't made yet. To be specific, no contribution is baked in from the Airtable deal that's still pending, which we anticipate wrapping up before this year ends. With all of that covered, let's move into the Q&A part of the call.
Thank you very much for fielding my question, and congratulations on your first earnings call as a public company. Turning to the Airtable deal, I have a handful of sub-questions, perhaps. Is there a date you expect the transaction to close? And as a second piece, if you look at Airtable's financial history, where would you say the largest openings lie for pushing ARR higher and/or lifting the company's operating margin once the deal is done? Many thanks.
Thank you, Eric. This is Luca, one of the co-founders and the CEO of Bending Spoons. Hello, everyone. On the timing of the close, we cannot say. Our expectation is that it happens during this year, though pinning it down more tightly is hard. As for what we see in Airtable, let me begin with what is strong. In our view, the brand and the product are excellent, and crucially, they address a mission-critical use case for organizations. People rely on Airtable to gather and manage data and to construct applications that get used by teams and departments alike. For many companies that decide to adopt Airtable, it frequently sits at the heart of their operations. Because of that, we see a solid basis for ongoing growth and the creation of value. To address your specific question, we are enthusiastic about two things: our capacity to keep the top line expanding, and more. We think a substantial untapped opportunity exists to grow further inside current accounts and to bring in new customers. We are eager to collaborate with the Airtable team to help supercharge that effort; beyond this, we also see room to gain operational efficiency.
Great. Thank you.
Thanks. If I could, two questions. First, returning to Airtable — in what way is this a notable change, given that its growth rate as you bring it in is much higher than what we saw with earlier acquisitions? With the current climate, where numerous software companies backed by private funding need a place to land — still solid operations, yet having difficulty securing capital — is there genuinely a chance to locate highly appealing businesses such as this one? Would this count as a pioneering illustration of the conditions we now face? Second question: looking at the enterprise value you folks have picked up so far this year, roughly $3.5 million, my sense is that matches what we saw across all twelve months previously. Could additional deals still happen before the year closes, or is it fair to think the major transactions are mostly done at this point regarding M&A going forward? Appreciate it.
Regarding Airtable's expansion, a misconception seems to exist that the businesses we've acquired tend to be slower growing. No specific growth trajectory guides our acquisition choices. Of course, when a business is expanding, we'll typically pay a higher price. That said, we're happy to buy companies that have been growing, and we expect they might continue to grow faster, grow more slowly, stay flat, or in some cases even shrink. Several of the businesses we've acquired so far were growing well. WeTransfer, komoot, Remini back in the day, Tractive recently. So this isn't particularly new for us. But yes, it's obviously great news when we can buy a business with plenty of growth ahead if the price is reasonable. As for our ability to keep making acquisitions moving forward, I think only time will tell. Our view of the current landscape is positive. The IPO and our recent debt financings, along with the cash we keep generating, give us money available to put to work. We also have room operationally, though if Airtable comes through as expected within the next couple of months, that would mean five companies bought over the past year — which, I'd say, sits near the upper limit of what we typically consider best for us. Should the right chance come along, we still have some additional room to do a bit more. Honestly, our pipeline appears about as strong as it has ever been, we're confident in that. Yes; we'll find out. M&A remains an opportunistic endeavor, so it is impossible to be 100% certain what will happen.
Okay. Thanks.
I appreciate you taking my question. I wanted to inquire about the Tractive deal that happened recently, and the reality that it's among your earliest transactions involving a hardware element. I'm just wondering how you view businesses with hardware components and what role they play in your approach to M&A moving forward. Thanks.
Thanks for asking. Broadly speaking, virtually all of what we do at Bending Spoons is designed to increase the odds that we can completely achieve the goals we hold for this company — an enormous aspiration for growth across a very extended horizon; keeping that in mind, growing our addressable market well before it turns into a limitation matters; we mentioned in our perspectives that we identified roughly 1,000 digital businesses that we believe might make appealing acquisition targets across the coming several years. Together they amount to around $400 billion in projected revenue for 2025. Incidentally, this sample is growing as a whole, so presumably, the figure will be somewhat larger in 2026. We consider that a tremendous addressable market, and all of that is purely digital. Getting truly elite at nearly any challenging endeavor requires time. When we came across Tractive, where in our view success comes mainly via the digital experience and where making money happens mainly through subscriptions — areas we grasp, I'd say quite well — but where hardware formed one piece of the broader picture, we seized the opportunity. We perceived a fantastic company with a strong opportunity in front of it, and simultaneously, an extra benefit of building our capabilities regarding, in this instance, consumer hardware. That's what drove the decision. We're very pleased with the purchase thus far, and we're discovering that even though our hardware experience is obviously limited, we're already identifying methods to deliver value. We're gaining plenty of knowledge from the team. The market for companies combining hardware and software is enormous, no doubt. Perhaps eventually we'll manage to accomplish more in this, shall we say, neighboring space; things are going well so far, though naturally the final verdict hasn't arrived.
Thanks.
Yes, thank you, and let me add my congratulations on the first quarter as well. I wanted to ask about the 3% organic growth in the quarter. I believe that was lower than the 6% we saw in Q1. I'm just wondering if the underlying business is performing in line with your expectations; then my follow-up would be whether you're noticing any growing AI impact on the portfolio at this point, whether that shows up as disruption in those markets or as opportunity from a product perspective or a pricing perspective. Thank you.
Thanks. Regarding the 3%, it landed slightly ahead of what we had expected. We ended up slightly ahead of our forecast. As we noted in our disclosures, WeTransfer and Tractive drove the largest gains. On the flip side, Remini and Splice pulled results down. And because we brought AOL, Eventbrite, and Vimeo on board not long ago — together they posted low single digit growth — that weighed on the company's overall growth rate too. That's the quick version of why we landed at 3%. Naturally, the blended growth rate will shift depending on which businesses make up our portfolio at any given moment, and on how each one performed twelve months earlier. There are cases where a business is performing well but happened to have a particularly strong quarter the year before. The timing of when we roll out monetization enhancements matters, and that timing can significantly sway the blended organic growth figure as well. In any case, that number sits at 3%. Stepping back for a moment, I see a good opening here to restate something — we discuss this within our perspective, yet I want to restate how we think about organic revenue growth. What we're aiming for, and I brought this up a few minutes ago, is to maximize shareholder value and the success of this company 10 years out; that goal means attempting to compound revenue along with operating income and earnings per share on a per-share basis, revenue and operating income included, as fast as possible; regarding the underlying characteristics, we're essentially indifferent. We have no issue operating with whatever organic growth rate or, within sensible limits, whatever margin profile. In our view, that's the mathematically defensible method for building shareholder value. When we pursue M&A with that goal in mind, we sometimes discover that the strongest return lies in a business growing slowly — AOL being a case in point, a deal we couldn't be happier about. As I mentioned, it's expanding at a low single-digit pace. In our estimation, it's a far better operation than most people give it credit for. There are even instances of businesses that are contracting. Provided the IRR meets our threshold, we're glad to acquire them. By the same token, we're equally open when attractive returns appear available through rapidly expanding companies. Someone other than you brought up Airtable earlier, and I also named Tractive and komoot as further instances of quickly expanding companies that we bought fairly recently. Getting those deals closed makes us happy as well. Growth in organic revenue will just emerge from how we put capital to work, and the result could be either higher or lower; we don't focus on it in any particular way, and we certainly don't adjust anything to hit it. Turning to AI, we have not seen what I would call any significant disruption in any of our businesses, honestly, because of AI, or at least not in any of the large ones from what I can tell. One could argue — I'm not fully sold on it, yet one could argue — that Remini's downturn might tie back to advances in AI. Honestly, what we observe is that Remini's current users and customers keep acting just the way they always did. No shift in behavior has come to our attention; the issue is simply that bringing in new users and customers proved especially tough for that business over the last several quarters. Our sense is that it's largely a matter of market saturation. Honestly, this whole category is only a few years old — machines creating pictures and movies on their own — and both our team and plenty of other players have pushed it forward a great deal. These days it's tougher to land on something genuinely new, and a lot of what drove Remini's growth traced back to, well, sudden viral moments or major breakthroughs, which let us bring in users in huge waves every so often. One odd thing worth noting: among all the businesses we hold, I'd argue Remini is the only one whose customer acquisition arrived in bursts. Every other business of ours that matters is maybe far duller, yet also far more forecastable, in that acquisition arrives via word of mouth and stays fairly consistent as time passes. My read is it's mainly saturation, though I think a reasonable case can be made that since content generation — particularly images, and video too — via AI has grown more commoditized, competition has heated up, and so, while our current users' and customers' behavior apparently hasn't been affected, drawing in new users and customers has grown harder or pricier; that's therefore the single part of our business where I'd say AI may have done damage. Beyond that, we've observed nothing at all. On the plus side, I'm likely not telling you anything surprising, but a huge opportunity is showing up around operational efficiency. We brought up our recent internal launch of a tool named Alt-Spooner, as in Alternative Spooner. In my opinion it's rather remarkable technology, letting people reach superhuman levels of productivity. Here's an example. Not long ago, I was in a Slack channel alongside one of our general managers. She heads up Evernote, to be specific; that channel exists so we can give feedback on ways the product might get better. She made a post, and what she did was ask Alt-Spooner — since you engage with Alt-Spooner like it's somebody you work with on any of the company's channels. She requested that her Alt-Spooner dig into a bug she'd spotted and also check with our in-house technologies. One of them is called Moros, which lets you keep tabs on customer support tickets to get product insights. Her ask to Alt-Spooner was to search for this bug, to see whether other customers had flagged it. Could we determine whether it's a widespread bug, or simply an incredibly uncommon thing that happened to her? If the answer came back that others had indeed reported it, she then had Alt-Spooner dig into the code to find the root cause, write a fix, and then get in touch with Evernote's tech leader, requesting that he go over it and ideally give the pull request his approval, so the bug could be corrected and sent out to production. I saw this happen. It was my first time witnessing Alt-Spooner at full force; within maybe, I'm not sure, 5 minutes or so, 5 or 10 minutes, every one of those tasks was done. The sole reason the bug got fixed the following day comes down to the technology leader not looking at his Slack at that specific moment, and perhaps that's something we could make better as well.
The fact that this now takes roughly thirty minutes is astonishing, because historically you'd have been looking at a week at best, plus likely several tens of person-hours — and that work got done by actual people at Spooners. That's one illustration of how much our operations have gained in efficiency because of AI. There are plenty of other cases, but hopefully this one makes the point. Now, thinking about the more obvious ways AI can deliver value, naturally it lets you serve customers better. When it comes to our product work, saying most is probably fair. Over roughly the last six months or so, a substantial share of what we've built across the portfolio has centered on AI-related or even AI-centric features. Take Brightcove, for instance — we rolled out auto-translations, audio track dubbing, and live captions across 50+ languages. AI essentially powers all of it. For our enterprise customers, this feature proved transformative; we also launched a content multiplier, letting content organizations and media companies take their high-quality material and generate every kind of alternative format — shorter cuts, highlights — that they can then post. All it takes is a few clicks, which leaves them far leaner, quicker, and more successful. Then there's recommendations: if you're a media company on Brightcove, once someone in your audience finishes watching one of your videos, you can switch on recommendations, somewhat like YouTube. These have become quite sophisticated, and among our customers we observed viewership gains falling between 20% and 40%, which for a media company is clearly a game changer. Staying with Brightcove again — I'd rather dig a bit deeper into one or two businesses than give you a fast, shallow touchpoint on every single one — on the back end, meaning the portion of the product that administrators and actual users on the customer side rely on to reach their audience and viewership, we added every manner of agentic capability. An agent can now handle what used to be menial, cumbersome work, like reordering videos, organizing things, or locating videos; and we built a far more advanced layer for developers, so rather than necessarily going through the pretty good API we already had, you can use an MCP to essentially bypass it and let your AI agents work with Brightcove effectively. The list goes on, but broadly, what I've just described for Brightcove would hold, with the appropriate adjustments, for probably 80% of our businesses. It's exciting. That said, it remains unclear — and I don't think this is specific to Bending Spoons, I think it applies to almost any company — precisely how far these AI-enabled features convert into incremental revenue. Sure, we do notice some improvement in certain areas, though I wouldn't describe it as a huge jump where a customer who previously paid, let's say, $100 suddenly agrees to pay $200. Perhaps they'll agree to pay $110, and that's positive, but it isn't a game-changer. The encouraging part is that not one of our strategies depends in any way on that happening, yet we'll continue watching it closely and will update you should anything shift.
That's genuinely appreciated. Thanks.
Yes, many thanks, and I appreciate you fielding the question. So here's what I'd like to ask: now that Airtable is bringing an enterprise sales motion into a portfolio that historically has leaned somewhat more heavily toward consumer and self-service subscription operations, ought we to interpret this as something of a pivot in how you approach M&A, moving in a more enterprise-oriented direction? Or is it merely a single instance, and you clearly have an enormous M&A pipeline? I'm simply wondering whether there's some sort of longer-horizon change we should anticipate, where you'd lean somewhat further toward enterprise, particularly given how the M&A market seems to be behaving at the moment. Thanks.
Thanks. Excellent question. Well before Airtable came along, we already serve far more businesses than most people would assume. Drawing an exact boundary is tough, in our view, yet our belief is that roughly 50% of revenue is generated by consumers, with something like 50% coming from professional businesses and enterprises. Once again, figuring out how large a given company is can be tricky. Precise figures aren't always at your disposal, but I'd say that characterization is broadly right. The thing is, a number of the better-recognized brands in our portfolio happen to be consumer brands. For evident reasons, consumer brands generally enjoy greater visibility in the market. That, I believe, explains why Bending Spoons gets thought of as mainly consumer, even though the reality is that our tilt toward consumer isn't as pronounced as assumed. That said, a shift has occurred as time has passed. Brightcove was acquired by us in early 2025. Then in late 2025 we acquired Vimeo, which carries a substantial enterprise element. We signed the deal to acquire Airtable, which is chiefly enterprise. Enterprise hasn't become our direction owing to some thematic conviction. What guides us is deploying every dollar at our disposal — be it free cash flow, sensible amounts of debt, or, when the opportunity arises, possibly equity, which we've used on occasion — in whatever manner is most efficient, aiming to create the greatest possible shareholder value across a horizon of perhaps 10 years, truly long-term. Our focus is on excelling as much as we can, being that flawless operating machine when it comes to operating these companies, since that's what lets us offer appealing prices — prices that appeal to sellers — while simultaneously producing the strong returns that I believe we've delivered consistently. That, then, is the element within our control and the way we approach it. Beyond that, it truly comes down to what the market is willing to give you. From where we sit, a large number of enterprise SaaS companies carried absurdly inflated valuations right up until fairly recently. And in those cases we didn't — and yes, this is only our perspective, but when you examine such a company the way somebody does who intends to generate free cash flow over the long haul instead of gambling on flipping it later at an equivalent or superior multiple — we simply could never make those price tags add up. For whatever cause, now that the market has moved and valuations have come down to something saner — though at times they're still elevated, in my opinion, yet on balance I'd call them saner — we are spotting additional chances to pick up some of these companies, and they can frequently turn out to be fantastic. Take Airtable: we hold a great deal of admiration for Airtable, we regard it as a truly fantastic company, and a highly capable group is in place there, at valuation levels that look attractive. So should the surrounding circumstances stay the same — meaning valuations stay the same — you will likely witness us pursuing more deals along these lines, yet not because our appetite has grown compared with 2 years ago, but purely because at today's price, it becomes more sensible for us to earn genuinely strong returns.
Thanks, that's useful.
Hello, and many thanks. I'm grateful for this question. My understanding is that toward the close of June, you started charging AOL subscribers more. Might you put a figure on the size of that increase, and also explain what the reaction from customers has been like up to now? Thanks very much.
Thank you, and thanks for asking. Testing is something we do constantly — not only around pricing, but on dozens of other variables, and this applies across every one of our properties. During the prior year, my recollection is that we conducted somewhere in the range of 3,000 to 3,500 tests, and over the entire lifespan of the company, that figure is likely around 10,000. Take virtually any product or business we own, and at just about any moment, you'd likely find us testing something with someone—whether that's different price points, fresh feature bundles, new ways to interact, or varying splits between what's free and what's paid, among other things. That's just some background for anyone who isn't deeply familiar with Bending Spoons. Our approach is to operate the way a scientist would, and experimentation sits at the heart of that. As for AOL, yes, we've been trying things out across several areas, pricing included, but it's still too soon to reach firm conclusions. Whenever we do arrive at any, we'll be sure to share them. Even so, the results we've gotten from testing various setups have been encouraging up to this point. More details are coming.
Thanks.
Great. Glad to be included here. It would be helpful to hear about how things have been going at Eventbrite. I'm wondering which particular adjustments you've implemented after picking up that asset, and what effect those have had on things such as usage, revenue, and profitability. Thanks.
Yes, apologies, I'm here now. I had myself muted.
That's fine.
Yes, I appreciate it. So Eventbrite — we picked it up not long ago, with the deal wrapping in March. Couldn't be happier about how things stand right now. Honestly, it has met what we hoped for, and perhaps done slightly better than we hoped, all things considered. A thorough restructuring across the business was carried out by us. That announcement went out a couple of months back, and in our view it mattered a great deal for positioning everything toward success over the long haul. Our workforce is now slimmer, and we feel that puts us in a stronger spot to move quickly when it comes to both tech and our offerings. Moving on from that, turning to how we make money: roughly 40 product enhancements have been released by us. There's a blog entry that's worth a look, I think, where quite a few of those 40 upgrades get laid out in detail. Going through each one isn't something I'll do, since most folks listening probably aren't ticketing obsessives. Broadly speaking, the approach was this — we invested considerable time alongside clients and built up an extensive inventory of their frustrations. A few minor, others more substantial, and we simply began tackling those issues with real urgency. The whole platform's dependability got better. Bugs existed, along with problems around how long things took to load. Here's just one example out of many. Should you set up an event, speeds for loading come in at about 40% quicker. So for anyone putting together hundreds of events across 12 months, that represents a really solid gain. Tools for creators got better too. You now have every kind of new capability for managing things. For an organizer, checkout obviously represents a make-or-break point in the ticket-selling journey; we've also enhanced how events get discovered through various means. Among other things, the creator profile page has been fully redesigned by us. It goes on and on. Definitely worth checking out that blog entry, I'd say. Broadly, you're welcome to keep tabs on us; we aim to ensure every one of our operations, or at minimum the biggest ones, puts out news about key or notable product upgrades, so folks can watch what we're doing. Still, given how little time has passed since the acquisition, we're pretty thrilled by how much has been accomplished; that covers product; we also pulled off roughly a 20% boost in monetization through advertising. While advertising makes up a lesser share of Eventbrite's total revenue, that 20% gain nonetheless amounts to low single-digit growth. That's pleasant. Organizers benefit as well, since fundamentally the offering here is that we assist them in gaining greater exposure for their events. We also succeeded in cutting spending on paid user acquisition by about 30%, while no top-of-funnel metrics were affected, so to speak. Various areas of money-losing spending were identified by us and eliminated. After that, the back end was shifted onto newer infrastructure by us. Every one of the core underlying pieces, so to speak, is being rewritten. In our view this matters going forward as we aim to speed up product innovation, plus our capacity to iterate rapidly across various elements of user experience and monetization. Quite a promising beginning, I'd say. Time will tell. My sense is that in the coming quarters we'll be able to present something with more substance. It's still somewhat early, but things are going well up to this point.
Thanks.
Hello, and thank you. I want to dig deeper into AOL, especially what you said regarding advertising. You mentioned that advertising exceeded what you had expected, and I was hoping for a bit more detail on the reasons why. For instance, did the market play a role? Was it due to changes you made to the assets or to the technology? When you say it beat your expectations, did it increase, or was it lower, say? If you could shed a little more light on what took place there, we would appreciate it. Thanks.
Certainly. Thanks for asking. Yes, it did increase. I don't think we can claim, definitely not all of it, some of the credit, but not all of it. Part of it is likely just lucky swings in certain underlying factors. When it comes to advertising on AOL, we have a fairly ambitious strategy, and we think the first step involves building the right foundations, up-to-date foundations, so we can maximize advertising. That's a fairly lengthy topic, but I think it boils down to basically two areas. First, we must substantially enhance our capacity to deliver engaging content to our users, especially on the web portal. As for emailing, that really depends on all of us sending engaging emails, so please make more effort. With the web portal, we hold considerable advantage, and we want to ensure we better the content selection and the recommender system, so that users enjoy spending time on the portal more. There are tens of millions of people who are extremely loyal users of that portal. That point alone could keep us talking for ages. I think one of the intriguing possibilities is to apply up-to-date technology and AI to generate improved recommendations for users. We're engaged in that; we entirely rewrote the content management system, about 100% rewritten from scratch, and that will serve as one of the components for this future optimization. The other major area of maximizing advertising revenue, since what we just outlined, ideally, would deliver engagement and retention, and then the remaining part is to properly choose inventory, and that leans more toward ad tech. For that one, we likewise fully rebuilt the advertising technology stack from scratch. We are currently rolling it out gradually in stages since it's a risky change; we included some revenue disruption in our guidance exactly for this reason. Even if we execute it flawlessly, we think there will be some revenue disruption. Obviously, we think this is ultimately very net positive over the long term, but it might be slightly negative in the immediate short term. That's the overall strategy; we stay at least as enthusiastic about AOL as we were at the time we acquired it. It's a truly nice asset.
Thanks.
I appreciate everyone on the Bending Spoons leadership team for fielding my questions, and congratulations on such a robust debut as a publicly listed business. Luca, early in this discussion, you mentioned how sustainable the business model is, and I believe that's the main objection we hear from investors out there. Your response covered pipeline, talent, Spooners, and capital financing, correct? Management has delivered outstanding acquisition returns since 2023. What I'd like to ask Luca and the team is this: why are you confident Bending Spoons can keep producing comparable returns when operating at a much bigger scale? In preserving that edge over conventional players such as private equity firms and software acquirers, what part does the proprietary operating system play? You brought up Alt-Spooner earlier, but I just want your perspective and to dig deeper into this subject. Thanks.
Thanks. Yeah, this is an important subject. What we know is that our returns have not so far deteriorated, at least not in the last. Maybe acquisitions we did 10 years ago or tiny acquisitions did even better. But at least in the last three, four, maybe even five years, we haven't seen a deterioration of returns. From where I sit as an investor, my assumption would be that returns get worse going forward, even though nothing like that has shown up yet. The reason is simple: if we continue compounding at today's pace — and you all saw that we just delivered yet another quarter of triple-digit growth, which is now a lengthy stretch, a lengthy streak — that simply isn't sustainable. As far as we know, this is far quicker than any serial acquirer ever has been, and not by a small margin. So expecting some slowdown in the growth rate is only sensible, even if no evidence of one has appeared so far. The encouraging part is that even with much slower growth, by practically any yardstick it could still be remarkably fast. From where we sit—looking at how we allocate capital and where we invest—there's still a lot of upside left even if conditions get worse, and it stays really compelling. Naturally, we're doing whatever we can to get the biggest returns we can for the longest stretch we can. Honestly, our mindset isn't about steering clear of any decline. Our mindset is about how to push things to an even higher level. Nothing says that's impossible, and it's not as if we've run out of new areas to improve. We see the total addressable market as big, and so far we haven't discovered that bigger businesses present a weaker chance to optimize. What we've managed to enhance—in areas like the offering itself, the tech, the people, and how larger acquired companies generate revenue—matches what we accomplished with the smaller ones we bought. So far, the money we've made from these deals looks consistent with what those earlier purchases delivered. It doesn't really look like there's some rule where larger size automatically translates into a tougher or less successful outcome. More challenging, probably—yet our own capabilities in this area get better as well. We also have more resources available to us. That's a plus for us. In our view, there is no shortage of capital available, though naturally there's no assurance we'll manage to obtain it; still, our hope is that we keep serving our investors—lenders as well as shareholders—extremely well. A great many parties are eager to take part; our hope is that over the coming several years, capital won't turn into a constraint. A real possible constraint, without question, is operational capacity. Things are going well for us at present, yet as we said in our remarks, we can't dismiss the chance that now and then we might have to decelerate so we can bring on more staff and train more staff. Right now, our capacity to draw new talent is still climbing quite substantially; we're simply growing in London, launching in Madrid and Warsaw; other geographies could see us expand before long, and that opens the door to a talent pool that could be far, far bigger; there's still lots of headroom for paying people more. This quarter, on a run rate basis, revenue per Spooner has gone past $4 million. Our approach is to establish pay levels efficiently, yet if it allows us to bring in far more excellent people, lifting compensation substantially would be easy for us without seriously harming our overall economics, and that ought to make finding even more excellent people easier. Indeed, technology continues to be a central priority for us. My sense is that we've barely begun to realize what's achievable, especially with AI, which is rewriting the rules. From everything we can see, when it comes to applying AI in our operations, we're right at the leading edge. No company we've encountered does it better. Surely somebody, somewhere, does. Even so, we're quite sure that at the very least we rank among the top in this domain. Can we be sure no deterioration lies ahead? No. If an investor, a cautious investor, asked whether to presume our returns won't worsen, would I advise it? No—my advice would be: remain cautious, presume some worsening. Yet do we currently observe evidence that any such worsening is occurring? We do not, and our enthusiasm for pressing forward has never been greater.
Luca, suppose the market for deals takes a turn for the worse — turns less friendly, hypothetically. If you simply hold back and wait, in theory the portfolio ought to produce greater cash flow, and steady cash flow at that. Under those circumstances, would you take the patient route and bring down leverage on the balance sheet? That's all from me. Many thanks, Luca, and to the team.
Of course. Thanks; our aim is to fine-tune the capital structure so returns are maximized, while maintaining a risk profile we regard as highly prudent. At every point, we aim to carry the ideal level of leverage. Clearly, judgment does play some part there. We report that our leverage ratio stands at roughly 2.4x at the close of the quarter just reported. In our view, that level of leverage is suitable. Over time, it might rise somewhat or fall somewhat. Of course, were we to halt acquisitions for any reason, at a certain point you would likely observe our leverage ratio dropping fairly quickly. Should we come across especially compelling chances to deliver strong returns for our shareholders, you might see our leverage ratio rise somewhat. Yet I doubt you would see it climb sharply, that much is certain. Fundamentally, our approach is simply to be mathematical throughout in order to maximize the rate of compounding, and one major piece of that equation involves selecting the correct sources of capital. It's noteworthy that, now that we are publicly traded, there are intriguing possibilities with our equity that we will look into in due course when opportunities come up. Each decision you observe from us will target maximizing long-term returns while holding risks at a level we deem highly prudent. Many thanks.
Thanks, Luca, and to everyone on the team. Congratulations once more.
We appreciate you being with us. We're eager to talk with you once more when the next quarter comes around.
That brings us to the end of today's conference call. We appreciate everyone for joining in. You are free to disconnect your lines at this point. Thanks.
Read the full transcript via the API
You're viewing the first half of this call. Get the complete Bending Spoons S.p.A. transcript - plus 132,000+ transcripts from 7,000+ companies, speaker segments and full-text search - through the EarningsAPI REST API or hosted MCP server.
Get an API key View API docs →For developers and AI pipelines
Programmatic access to Bending Spoons S.p.A. earnings transcripts and 132,000+ others is available through the
EarningsAPI REST API and the hosted MCP server.
Quarterly plans from $162 - full transcripts, speaker segments, full-text search,
and the /api/v1/transcripts/recent polling endpoint for ETL pipelines.