Home / Transcripts / Bending Spoons S.p.A. (BSP) · November 20, 2026

Bending Spoons S.p.A. (BSP) Earnings Call Transcript

November 20, 2026

NASDAQ US Information Technology Software earnings 65 min

Earnings Call Speaker Segments

James Coldwell executive
#1

Thanks, and good day to everyone. This is Bending Spoons' Q3 2026 earnings call, and we're glad you could join us. Here to walk through the results are our co-founder and CEO, Luca Ferrari, along with co-CFO Enrico Martinelli; joining us for the Q&A part of the call will be Davide Scarpazza, also a co-CFO, and Francesco Patarnello, co-founder and head of M&A. First, a word on the safe harbor statement. Certain information you'll hear on this call constitutes forward-looking statements, among them those about our outlook, objectives, initiatives, and pending transactions; such statements reflect how we currently understand and expect things to unfold, and they carry a range of risks and uncertainties. Actual events and results could differ materially; for further detail, please see our registration statement on Form F-1, including the risk factors set out in it. We undertake no obligation to update any forward-looking statements. On this call we'll address both GAAP and non-GAAP financial measures. Definitions of our non-GAAP financial measures, along with reconciliations to the most directly comparable GAAP financial measures, appear in our Q3 2026 earnings release, which you can find on the Bending Spoons Investor Relations website at investors.bendingspoons.com. Except where we state otherwise, every comparison is on a year-over-year basis. Luca, over to you.

Luca Ferrari executive
#2

Thanks, James. During the third quarter, revenue increased 125%, reaching $780 million. Operating income was up 34%, at $172 million — a 22% margin. Adjusted operating income rose 130%, hitting $424 million, which represents a 54% margin. Organic revenue growth was 3%. Across most of our businesses, growth trends were broadly in line with what we saw in Q2. At AOL, the shift to our advertising stack reduced its contribution to organic growth by about 1 percentage point compared with Q2. WeTransfer continued to grow strongly, both year over year and quarter over quarter, though a tougher comparable meant it contributed less to organic growth than it had the previous quarter. Next, I'll go through the progress we've made across the three stages of our playbook: acquire, transform and optimize, and reinvest. Stage one is acquire. In the quarter, we said we would acquire Airtable and Miro, with a combined enterprise value of $2.65 billion. Those deals are now closed, and Spooner teams have been deployed to both companies to build on what the pre-acquisition teams did. At Miro, our focus right now is on getting a deeper grasp of the business and formulating our roadmap. At Airtable, we have laid out our first set of priorities and started putting them into action. Those priorities are enhancing the core offering, investing in AI, and letting people and agents work together with suitable controls. Since the acquisition, 60 product improvements have already been shipped. We just rolled out an upgrade to Omni, the AI assistant built into Airtable, and we also introduced Canvas, a feature that lets people create custom apps using their own data. As of yesterday, we announced we've agreed to buy Mailchimp from Intuit, with an enterprise value of $3.68 billion. Over the 12 months ending October 31st, Mailchimp brought in $1.27 billion in revenue by helping customers plan, run, and refine their email marketing efforts. We believe there are chances to enhance the tech, the product, and how it makes money through our platform, and what draws us is the scale of this business along with how predictable its revenue is. Transform and optimize is the second phase of our playbook, and on today's call I'll be concentrating on AOL, Eventbrite, and Vimeo. Thanks to what was accomplished during Q3 and earlier periods, each of the three is set up to speed up expansion in Q4. Over at AOL, the planned changes to subscription pricing and packaging had largely wrapped up before Q3 ended. At that stage, the bulk of the technical split from Yahoo was likewise finished. Every desktop property had been moved onto a fresh instance of the ad stack, and mobile traffic has transitioned since then. The hit to advertising performance came in broadly as anticipated, and the impression pricing gap versus Yahoo's stack was mostly eliminated by the middle of September. During October, we finished rewriting the iOS and Android apps, which let us begin pursuing more substantial product enhancements. Because we run on our own technology, we can test both advertising and user experience, and a number of experiments have produced gains in engagement as well as advertising yield. Since buying Eventbrite, we've released over 70 product enhancements during the seven months that followed, and we're still modernizing that business's technology infrastructure. Revenue in October also returned to growth versus the same month a year prior. Our core focus has been helping creators reach bigger audiences and earn more from them, simplifying how events are managed, and improving technical reliability. ChatGPT can now be used to discover Eventbrite events, and creators are able to automate changes to ticket pricing through predefined rules; we have also reinforced waiting rooms so they can cope with spikes in ticket demand and added further checks aimed at countering bot purchases. Together with these enhancements, we have rolled out new ways to monetize, among them post-checkout advertising and a dedicated step for ticket add-ons. Moving to Vimeo, during Q3, bookings from customers who were new as well as those renewing rose year-over-year in both the self-serve and enterprise segments. The OTT segment has seen tougher trends, yet a revamped checkout flow has raised conversion for customers in early testing. On the whole, technical performance continues to improve — median video transcoding time dropped 40% between the start and finish of the quarter. In Q3, new bookings per sales representative reached a record high, helped by changes we made to team structure and by money we directed toward operations-supporting technology. Most recently, we launched a free tier giving unlimited storage for public videos and removed the previous 1 gigabyte limit. Along with our pledges to avoid running ads against uploaded videos and to refrain from using them to train AI models, the aim of this offering is to make Vimeo a more attractive venue for filmmakers to share their work. AOL, Eventbrite, and Vimeo are still in the early stages of their turnarounds, though our efforts to strengthen these companies continue long after the first year of ownership. To illustrate, Meetup's revenue in Q3 grew by over 20%, driven in part by Meetup+, the subscription product designed for attendees. Komoot saw revenue increase by more than 30%, supported by fresh subscription tiers and product enhancements such as live tracking features and a revamped mobile route planner. WeTransfer also posted revenue growth above 30% and attracted its highest-ever count of new paying subscribers in September. That expansion was supported by upgrades to expired transfer recovery features and to previews, which let recipients inspect files prior to downloading them. Across all three of our businesses, third-quarter revenue growth came from increases in both customer counts and revenue per customer. That said, these growth rates don't apply to every business we own. Revenue at Brightcove and Remini, for example, continues to fall. Our goal is to grow per-share earnings and free cash flow as fast as we can over the long run. So we judge each acquired business primarily by the return expectations we set when we made the deal. On that basis, Remini has done exceptionally well. Brightcove got off to a somewhat disappointing start but has lately made encouraging progress. Even looking back with the benefit of hindsight, we would do both acquisitions again. We steer Spooners toward the places where we expect the best prospective returns, and because those opportunities shift over time, our platform allows us to move them around on a regular basis. In the quarter, we added more than 80 net new Spooners, which lifted our core team to 753 full-time equivalents at the close of Q3. We have also continued to expand our use of AI as a productivity booster. At present, 98% of the pull requests we submit are authored fully or in part by AI. Since the beginning of the year, the number of pull requests per Spooner software engineer has grown to more than four times what it was, while the inference cost for each pull request has been cut by roughly half. Those gains partly show what our investment in a proprietary harness delivers, since it picks models according to what each task needs and what inference costs. Outside of coding, we recently launched Diagram, a proprietary design tool powered by AI and built around our own workflows. Using Diagram, any Spooner can create a new user experience or a slide deck from just a handful of natural language prompts, which sharply lowers the design resources needed. In our setting, we see Diagram as plainly superior to the third-party tools we used before. Reinvestment is the third stage of our playbook. As we said last quarter, three possible constraints determine how fast we can reinvest and generate growth through acquisitions: whether targets are available, whether we can access capital, and what operational capacity we have. Hiring and AI are growing our operational capacity, even though Spooners remain the resource we have least of right now. Since Q3 began, we have raised $8.35 billion in financing via debt and equity transactions and enlarged our revolving credit facilities. Our first bond issuance created a new capital source, and the Berkshire Hathaway private placement, along with the placement we announced yesterday, has strengthened our financial position further. Once we deduct the funds we expect to spend on the Mailchimp acquisition and the placement closes, we will have over $4 billion in available liquidity to back additional acquisitions. Enrico will now go through our financial performance in greater detail.

Enrico Martinelli executive
#3

Thanks, Luca, and good morning everyone. For the third quarter, we posted total revenue of $780 million, which represents 125% growth. Within that figure, $38 million came from Airtable, consolidated into our financials starting September 4. Organic revenue growth stood at 3%. As in Q2, the biggest contributors to organic growth were WeTransfer and Tractive. To give you a bit more granularity, the 2026 and 2025 acquisition cohorts each posted revenue growth of 6% year-over-year, the 2024 cohort came in at 8%, and the 2023 cohort at 10%. Those numbers are revenue-weighted and, where relevant, include comparisons against pre-acquisition periods; this growth was partly offset by softness at Remini, which shaved 2 percentage points off organic growth. We anticipate Remini will keep facing revenue pressure given its historically relatively low retention rates, its reliance on viral spikes for user acquisition, and tougher competition in the AI image generation market, though the drag on overall organic growth will be cushioned by its shrinking share of our overall portfolio. Q3 operating income came to $172 million, up 34%, while adjusted operating income hit $424 million, up 130%. Airtable added $10 million to adjusted operating income. Operating income as a share of revenue was 22%, versus 37% in Q3 2025. The adjusted operating income margin was 54%, up 1 percentage point from Q3 2025. Even though adjusted operating income margin improved, operating income measured against revenue declined, largely driven by a $149 million increase in amortization of intangible assets. That increase came from businesses acquired during the past year as well as from completing purchase price allocations for AOL, Eventbrite, Tractive, and Vimeo. Completing those allocations resulted in a $65 million catch-up charge related to earlier periods. Operating income as a share of revenue was also pressured by transaction-related expense and by other items that don't reflect ongoing operating performance — the former stemming from the Airtable and Miro acquisitions, and the latter from IPO-related costs. The main reason our adjusted operating income margin went up was that advertising expense as a share of revenue fell 275 basis points. Two things produced that decrease: our approach of choosing acquisition targets that don't depend heavily on paid advertising to bring in users, and our work to trim spending that wasn't efficient. Partly offsetting this improvement was the effect that shifts in portfolio mix had on some items within cost of revenue. IT infrastructure expense and other cost of revenue each increased, whereas distribution and payment processing expense declined — all measured as a percentage of revenue. On balance, these cost of revenue items reduced adjusted operating income margin by 125 basis points. We saw interest expense of $107 million, which is a 163% increase compared with a year ago, though it stayed roughly level from the prior quarter because the debt we had outstanding during the period was the same as in Q2. Other expense totaled $17 million, driven mainly by foreign currency losses, and we had an income tax benefit of $43 million; within that benefit was a partial release of a valuation allowance related to the completed purchase price allocation for Vimeo. On a diluted basis, earnings per share were 13 cents, down 3%, and adjusted earnings per share were 42 cents, an increase of 98%. Turning to cash flow and where we stand financially: in Q3, our operating activities produced net cash of $261 million. We generated $1.09 billion in net proceeds from our IPO, and we spent $1.21 billion on acquisitions, net of cash acquired. Capital expenditure came to $5 million. Beyond that, we paid down $297 million on our revolving credit facilities and made scheduled principal repayments totaling $206 million on long-term debt. When the quarter ended, long-term debt carried a value of $4.91 billion. Net debt fell by $187 million during the quarter, finishing Q3 at $4 billion. Our leverage ratio stood at 2.1 times. Available liquidity totaled $3.36 billion, comprising cash as well as amounts available under committed term loan and revolving credit facilities. After the quarter closed, we spent $1.36 billion on Miro, and we brought in $4.46 billion via term loan add-ons, our inaugural bond sale, the Berkshire Hathaway private placement, reinvestment from some Miro shareholders, and additional borrowings. Those transaction figures are before fees and related costs. Giving effect to these deals, liquidity available at quarter end would have totaled $6.46 billion. The private placement we announced yesterday will contribute $1.3 billion upon closing. The Mailchimp acquisition would reduce liquidity by $3.31 billion, net of Intuit's reinvestment. If both pending transactions had also closed by quarter end, available liquidity would have stood at $4.45 billion. Moving now to guidance. Looking ahead to Q4, our revenue guidance is $984 million to $1 billion, and at the midpoint that's 5% organic growth. Adjusted operating income should land between $470 million and $490 million, giving us a 48% adjusted operating income margin at the midpoint. The sequential dip this margin implies comes from folding the Airtable and Miro cost bases into our numbers; leaving those businesses out, we expect margins to expand on both a year-over-year and quarter-over-quarter basis. For the full 2026 financial year, this outlook points to revenue between $3.07 billion and $3.09 billion, up from the $2.78 billion to $2.82 billion we guided previously. That also suggests adjusted operating income for all of 2026 will land between $1.58 billion and $1.6 billion, which is up from the $1.46 billion to $1.51 billion range we gave earlier. Both of those bumps come from a better outlook for the businesses covered by our previous guidance plus what Airtable and Miro add. The guidance rests on the portfolio we hold as of now and leaves out anything future acquisitions might bring. To be specific, it counts a full quarter of Airtable plus Miro starting October 26, while the Mailchimp deal still pending adds nothing; with that covered, we can begin taking your questions.

Eric Sheridan analyst
#4

Much appreciated for the chance to ask. Maybe I could squeeze in two; on the organic revenue side, with certain assets you've acquired, if one of those starts hitting operational headwinds or slowing in growth terms, what's your philosophical stance — putting more money back in to spark organic revenue growth, or tuning it for margin or cash flow? And maybe a quick follow-up right after that.

Luca Ferrari executive
#5

Hello, Luca here, Co-Founder and CEO. Appreciate the question. How we spend on things like R&D or sales and marketing doesn't hinge at all on how much our existing business is growing. At any given moment, we're asking where those people and those dollars can generate the greatest return, and that's where we put them. Say a business is shrinking — putting more money into it might still produce meaningful improvements in free cash flow down the road. As long as we've got the resources, we'd go ahead with that investment. But if we conclude we can't do anything about the decline, then we wouldn't. The same logic holds for a business that's expanding quickly. Some fast-growing operations exist where, from what we can tell, putting in more money wouldn't necessarily speed things up—or at least not in a way that pays off—and the reverse holds too. More broadly, all of our efforts—whether within a single business or, even more so, across Bending Spoons overall—target making earnings and free cash flows per share compound as quickly as we can, with a horizon spanning many decades. Organic revenue growth simply isn't a metric that factors into that thinking.

Eric Sheridan analyst
#6

Great, thanks. Given where capital markets stand right now, how has your thinking kept shifting when it comes to using debt versus using equity — whether as a source of capital or issued alongside to help facilitate certain M&A transactions? Thanks so much.

Luca Ferrari executive
#7

Thank you. It's still me, still Luca. Essentially, we begin with the same goal of creating as much value in earnings and free cash flows per share over the coming 10 or 20 years, and then we work backward. The same principle applies to how we fund the business. Historically, our track record shows we've earned very strong returns—I'd even call them exceptional—on the investments and acquisitions we've made, and right now we have no reason to question that we'll continue producing outstanding returns going forward. Those returns have typically come in well above the cost of our debt, so from our standpoint it has always made sense to lean on debt, provided we held our exposure at quite conservative levels—think of that as a ceiling on the leverage ratio, for instance. Internally we look at this in a more detailed way, but generally speaking, we think keeping the leverage ratio usually between 2 and 3 gives a very careful stance. Naturally, we put all our free cash flows back into acquisitions, since that offers the best return opportunity—at least it always has up to now, and we expect that to hold given how deep our acquisition pipeline is. Stock issuance remains a highly practical funding route provided that one of two conditions holds. First, naturally, the price has to be reasonable enough that the expense of equity capital is not excessive and stays below our expected returns; but if the valuation falls within an acceptable band, then the question becomes whether it helps us hold the leverage ratio down. Our leverage typically comes down on its own fairly fast, yet there are occasions when we want to reduce it more swiftly than running the business alone would achieve. Put another way — and these are really just two sides of one coin — it lets us go after a bigger target that would otherwise be out of reach, at least near term, if all we had were reinvested free cash flow plus a bit of incremental debt. Free cash flow always gets redeployed; we consistently add incremental debt while holding leverage at sensible levels; and every so often we may come back to the equity markets when we believe that step either sharpens our risk profile further or speeds up growth on a per-share basis — which is exactly what you have witnessed lately. Naturally, completing the IPO required us to issue equity, which also improves our access to debt markets. After that, we brought in some capital from Berkshire Hathaway. Yesterday we announced a PIPE that adds another $1.3 billion, and with a couple of acquisitions recently closed, the seller reinvested a small percentage of the total consideration by accepting newly issued Bending Spoons stock. We are not at all reluctant to use equity, as long as we believe it will help us compound shareholder value even faster.

Kirk Materne analyst
#8

Thank you so much for taking the question. So with Airtable, Miro, and now Mailchimp, you folks are clearly moving further into businesses that are oriented toward enterprise. I'm curious to discuss how applying the Bending Spoons playbook might shift somewhat when you go into enterprise as opposed to what has worked in consumer. Those customers have longer relationships, implementations, and sales motions. I'm just curious how you think about that. It may be more of a nuance than something more dramatic, but I would love to hear your thoughts on it, now that you've done three in a row in that area.

Luca Ferrari executive
#9

Thank you. Mailchimp, honestly, I wouldn't call it enterprise — it serves roughly a million customers, I believe, so there's a mix of everything in there, but it's mostly SMEs, let's say, and it's almost entirely self-serve. The sales motion is fairly limited, nearly nonexistent relative to the size of the whole business. In fact, it's nearer to our more usual historical acquisitions than Airtable and Miro, and those two mainly have enterprise customers along with a sales-led go-to-market motion. Over time, we've discovered that the biggest variations in how customers behave—and in the best tactics and approaches—come down mostly to whether a company is mainly self-serve or sales-led, rather than whether it's consumer or B2B. Self-serve consumer businesses, we find, actually act a lot like self-serve SMEs, to take one example, while the major differences show up once you move from self-serve to having to engage customers through people, negotiations, and procurement departments. Either model can be optimized extremely well, but each calls for a distinct skill set, distinct approaches, and to some degree distinct underlying technologies. That's why, incidentally, exactly for the sake of getting as close as possible to perfection in sales-led enterprise, we've put money in rather aggressively—especially during this year—toward building not only insights and expertise but also the proprietary tooling underneath. We set up a devoted group of engineers and product managers, and we've been laboring hard on tools that boost our salespeople's efficiency. The results were excellent—better, at least, than what I personally had expected. At Vimeo, for instance, we reached the greatest volume of new bookings per salesperson ever recorded in Vimeo's history; that matters since Vimeo plainly isn't in a rising, explosive-growth sort of stage where such a thing would occur on its own—in fact, it's the reverse, correct? We hit our highest-ever level of absolute new bookings while doing that, and this didn't come from cutting the sales team down to just the top performers. Of course, our proprietary technologies aren't the sole factor. There's substantial effort going into organization, processes, and approach, but it's reassuring and encouraging as we continue working to get truly excellent at this, which I believe we've shown we are on the self-serve side.

Kirk Materne analyst
#10

Thanks.

Alec Brondolo analyst
#11

Hi there, thank you very much. I appreciate you taking the question. I've got maybe two things. First, on AOL, as you mentioned in the prepared remarks, a price increase was implemented during the quarter. Could you talk about how the user base reacted to that increase, and what the churn level was, if any, compared with what you expected? Second, regarding the guidance of 5% organic revenue growth for the fourth quarter, could you unpack that a bit for us? I believe Airtable and Miro will be included in that. They're clearly growing somewhat faster. How much of that sequential acceleration comes from including Airtable and Miro versus the rest of the portfolio improving? Thanks.

Luca Ferrari executive
#12

Thank you. Yes, AOL, like all of our businesses, we tested extensively every kind of monetization change, far beyond just pricing, though pricing is one of them. We've been doing this the whole time since the acquisition closed in January, and we've found several changes and configurations that, according to our testing, produce meaningful gains in the revenue trajectory. We recently started rolling out one of these configurations at scale, with high expectations given our extensive testing showing nice revenue uplift, modest one-time churn, and no effect on, shall we say, longer-term ongoing churn levels. The anticipated outcome is improved revenue levels with no cost to revenue quality after a brief transitional period in which, naturally, churn rises somewhat. We deployed that at scale only very recently, so its impact barely shows up in Q3, though very slightly it does, and it will apply from Q4 onward through most of 2027 as well. That's what we expect; now, on the 5 percentage points of organic growth in Q4 at the midpoint of the range, we expect most of our businesses to keep performing along similar lines. The main sequential changes versus Q3 would be that we expect AOL, Eventbrite, and Vimeo each to do better than their prior trajectories, which would give a nice impact there. I'd say more so AOL and Vimeo. At Eventbrite, we've hardly touched prices or monetization at all, apart from a little advertising work, so we expect growth to be somewhat slower, but still positive, which is new after a couple of years of declines for Eventbrite, and I believe that's an excellent result. We'll be able to report more on that over the next couple of quarters as all the numbers come in, but we're quite positively impressed. Again, AOL and Vimeo will probably do most of the heavy lifting versus Q3, and then of course, having both Airtable and Miro accounted for across the full quarter will help. We think they'll add roughly 1 percentage point to guidance.

Alec Brondolo analyst
#13

Thanks a lot.

Omar Dessouky analyst
#14

Hello, Luca. Appreciate you taking my question, and Davide as well. I believe a lot of folks have come across those videos online showing Meta's new AI agents and Gemini going through your inbox looking for subscriptions you're paying for yet not using, and historically you haven't really made the effort to cancel them since either you're unaware of them or you don't want to go through the hassle of logging in and canceling the unused subscriptions. I'm curious whether you've come across those videos. Clearly, the scale of this isn’t well understood, but has Bending Spoons figured out what portion of payers keep paying despite not opening the portfolio’s apps at least once a month? If so, what were your findings? For example, what share of payers go a month without using the apps? Have you observed any recent pick-up in the pace of cancellations? Second, would you say consumer subscriptions will be unaffected or only mildly affected since AI agents tell consumers what subscriptions they hold?

Luca Ferrari executive
#15

Thanks for the question. I haven't seen the videos, but of course I understand the idea you're describing. An investor being worried about this strikes me as reasonable. My general advice would be to set aside some cushion for bad surprises, and this situation may turn out to be one of them. That said, I want to offer several facts that I think show there's only minimal cause for worry. Consumer subscriptions account for just about a third of our revenue. Second, we looked into this matter in detail only last week—we had expected the question—going product by product, and we found no detectable effect, not even a tiny one, on any key metric, including gross retention, net retention, or any other measure of business health throughout the whole portfolio. As of now, we are comfortable saying there has been no impact at all. Another point I want to mention is that there have been products built to assist customers with managing their subscriptions, and that includes helping them cancel ones they probably aren't using. As I remember it, at least two such products from startups have come to market in the last five or six years. I didn't track them closely, but as far as I know, none of them ever found commercial success, and that, I think, points to consumers broadly not believing this is a problem they have. Sure, with 10 billion people on the planet, surely somebody does, but to me that suggests people don't feel they need help with this. One more thing to keep in mind: my comments here can only cover our own products, but we've made notifications and cancellations really simple. Customers get alerted about their payments, and credit card providers do that too, plus it shows up on your bank statement. Cancelling is very easy with us—usually just a click or two for the majority of our products. That applies once someone has been with us for a while, at least. Sometimes, right after we acquire them, the previous owners weren't all that thoughtful or customer-friendly, but within about the first year we make sure to shift over to cancellation processes that are quite user-friendly. For our product in particular, the idea that cancellation would be hard for people is pretty tough to accept; reaching customer support is also an option for them. Saying "I want to cancel" is all it takes, and we basically cancel right away without asking any questions. One more point I find fairly reassuring: across our portfolio, subscribers have typically held their subscriptions for about eight years on average, an extraordinarily long tenure that we think signals unusually strong loyalty and a limited tendency to switch — something, naturally, that not every company can say about itself. Whether that's good or bad, it clearly means that in plenty of instances our offerings are somewhat duller, have existed for quite a while, and serve a long-standing group of users—yet on the positive side, we think that user group is also steadier and more devoted. Finally, we work quite diligently to ensure our offerings are excellent and merit being used and purchased; they are definitely not flawless, but I think in nearly all instances they are extremely, extremely solid, and we strive to improve them daily. Could this be a possible danger? I would answer that saying it can never affect Bending Spoons would make me irresponsible. From everything we're observing and these factual factors, it's difficult for us to imagine this becoming a significant headwind down the road, though it's fair to anticipate that eventually, at least in certain instances, we might notice some slight deterioration. If and when that occurs, we'll let you know—but once again, up to this point, there's been no indication at all.

Omar Dessouky analyst
#16

Great, Luca. I appreciate that. Thanks.

Brian Smilek analyst
#17

Thanks for taking my question. Luca, I'm curious—could you help us get a clearer picture of the ad roadmap at Eventbrite, both around post-checkout and first-party ad revenue more generally? I suppose, how are you thinking about adjusting ad load as time goes on, and about the subscription opportunity at Eventbrite in a more substantial way? Thank you.

Luca Ferrari executive
#18

Thanks for the question. I'm a bit wary of stealing the team's thunder here, because we like giving our teams plenty of autonomy so they can share and announce their own plans and achievements. What I can tell you is that we see a significant opportunity at Eventbrite in monetization through both advertising and subscriptions. For instance, we recently rolled out post-checkout ads—and for anyone who hasn't used Eventbrite or isn't so familiar with this kind of thing, that means once a potential attendee buys a ticket, there's naturally a summary page there. We now show advertising on it, and that has produced a nice uplift in advertising revenue with absolutely no impact on engagement, retention, or any other metric you'd want to keep healthy; we've also helped—and this falls under advertising, though it's slightly different—we've also helped event organizers advertise more, and more effectively, on Eventbrite, since as an event organizer you might want to spend a little money to ensure your event appears more prominently on the platform. We have 80 million people coming to Eventbrite each month to look for things to do, so appearing more prominently can make a huge difference in how many tickets you sell and often leads to a good return on investment; we made some changes to the user experience there for our event organizers, and that produced a very noticeable uplift in how much they spend. We believe it's good for them too, based on what we've seen so far. That has also been successful so far, and we believe it's only the beginning of what we can do to improve that offering—not just how it's presented, but substantially the value it can deliver, including by adding sophistication in how we decide which events to show to whom. We want to make that advertising investment increasingly accretive for our event organizers. On subscriptions, we've introduced two different subscription—well, really multiple versions, because we tested a huge variety of things, but to keep it relatively simple, we tested two types of subscriptions: one for consumers, for attendees, and one for the organizers themselves. For attendees, they now have the option of buying an ongoing subscription so that all fees charged by Eventbrite are waived on their ticket purchases. For those who buy tickets on Eventbrite often, this is an appealing option; we have users attending several events every month, each month, and it works well for them. It is demonstrating solid, solid uptake and retention. Once more, across all our experiments so far it has produced no negative effect on anything you care about, including engagement, retention, and attendee satisfaction. The offering aimed at organizers, by contrast, provides sophisticated marketing capabilities. Specifically, it includes email marketing automations, which is which is amusing since we we just announced the Mailchimp acquisition, but I assure you we began this before we were aware that could happen. It also makes SMS campaigns possible, something that had not been offered previously. Organizer response has been extremely favorable, because these are not essential tools; the subscription is seen as in no way intrusive or restrictive of what organizers can do on the platform if they prefer to be, say, less advanced or or less ambitious with with their events, but but for those who wish to to push a bit further, then, it can represent strong value for money judging by what we have observed thus far. Across all these areas, we believe we are only scratching the surface, and we hope that over the coming multiple years we can take our offerings to the next level.

Brian Smilek analyst
#19

Great. Thanks, Luca.

Stefan Slowinski analyst
#20

Hi there. Luca, appreciate you taking my question. I have two. The first concerns Mailchimp specifically. I just wanted to dig into that acquisition. Over the last few years we've watched Intuit first put a lot into the product and try to get the product right, and then more recently do significant cost cutting to shift toward more of a kind of cash strategy for the company. It's a business that's already seen a lot of product investment and cost cutting, so I'm just wondering, kind of what gives you the confidence that you can get the returns that you need from that business? What's the opportunity you're seeing, and what's behind paying a bit more than the roughly 2.5 times revenue figure that may have been paid for earlier acquisitions? That's my first question.

Luca Ferrari executive
#21

Thanks; that's a perceptive point. Let me offer a quick correction on accuracy. In most cases, our historical acquisition prices have ranged from 1 to 6 times revenue, so it's genuinely quite a broad span. Yes, I think averaging the acquisitions from 2023 through 2025 comes out at 2.5 times, though moving that window could shift things by about a point either way. That's accurate. That figure is near that average, though somewhat higher than the range we've seen more recently. One reason is that, as we've said several times already, when we grow larger it makes sense for returns to come down somewhat. They have been truly enormous historically, and we see no basis for expecting anything other than excellent results ahead, yet even so, some narrowing is reasonable to anticipate. It's difficult to say if that reflects a pattern or merely a single transaction, but for this particular deal we do anticipate somewhat lower returns than on certain others—while still being phenomenal, to be clear, returns that I believe most companies would be thrilled to have. Turning to product investment and cost cutting, you could make comparable observations about many of our earlier acquisitions. Take Evernote: enormous sums had already gone into the product, yet I believe we clearly took it to another level, as our work over the last few years shows. Even those who resent us for raising prices would, I think, mostly concede that the product has improved enormously. I could keep talking about this, and nearly all of the companies we've bought were involved in both phases or at least one of them, and that hasn't stopped us from achieving better results. We see no reason to doubt that we can meaningfully enhance Mailchimp's performance down the road—if we didn't believe that, we never would have proposed this price. The acquisition has us genuinely enthusiastic. We believe there's a substantial opportunity to grow revenue and to improve cost, and a few other elements appeal to us as well. The first, clearly, is scale—something we've covered previously. There's a downside to how we operate: those integrations—which are about as deep as you can go, both technologically and in terms of people—and those transformations, which sometimes can be quite dramatic too, demand a huge amount of operational effort, and our people are finite. Luckily, we've found that the count of Spooners we must allocate to deal with these things doesn't grow anywhere near proportionally to what an acquisition could bring in revenue. Bigger acquisitions are much better, naturally, and Mailchimp fits that bill exactly; we believe its earnings will be predictable, given how long this business has been around. We hold a couple of decades of data. We have had the chance to study how cohorts behave under all sorts of conditions — COVID, naturally, which matters a great deal for a digital business, and periods when competition grew far more fierce. The market has been reasonably steady for a number of years now, though there was a stretch after Mailchimp truly pioneered email marketing automation when a large number of rivals arrived, and plenty of them had generous funding and marketed themselves aggressively. Having lived through each of those phases and analyzed the way users and customers acted, we now feel quite confident that we can foresee what lies ahead. We've likewise observed that customer gross retention has held up remarkably well through all such events over a ten-year span, which, based on what we've seen, is also a solid indicator that a company will remain resilient moving forward. A handful of additional points, and I'll be concise, and on the subject of improvements, we think that thanks to our platform, our talent access, our proprietary technologies, our expertise, and our data, we'll be in a position to, as I mentioned before, considerably accelerate both revenue and cost trajectories, generating a favorable increase in earnings. Taking everything into account, once again, we anticipate excellent returns, and we look forward to this acquisition closing at some point during the first part of 2027.

Stefan Slowinski analyst
#22

Thanks a lot for that. I guess my question follows up on how quickly M&A will proceed as we move into next year. You've just closed three deals here, and Mailchimp is still pending. What I'm wondering is whether this comes down to getting access to talent and bringing on Spooners, or just the need to digest those deals — and should we expect the M&A pace to slow in the first half of next year?

Luca Ferrari executive
#23

Thank you. In 20 2026, we should see five deals completed for Bending Spoons. Last year we did six. The year before that, I think, was five again; in '23, it was one. It fluctuates a bit. The rate we've seen during this year is pretty much what we've averaged historically, I'd say. Even so, I'd characterize 2027 as heavier than usual when you look at how much complexity we've already worked through or are currently working through — and that's less about the size of these companies, though size does matter somewhat, and more about the fact that names such as Airtable and Miro, along with Vimeo, come with sizable go-to-market teams, which introduce an extra layer of difficulty and more employees. Operationally, as I've mentioned previously, this year has definitely been a demanding one. That said, we're fully pleased with what we've delivered to this point and quite assured about the way things will unfold from here. You're right to ask about how we're performing operationally. I believe we still have a considerable cushion for acquisitions and integration. We've also managed to significantly enhance our capacity to scale operations by using levers that we plan to keep using moving forward. As an example, this year we've put a lot into our proprietary technologies, and AI has been a major tailwind for improving scalability. You may have noticed in the earnings release a graph showing that productivity for Spooner software engineers has roughly quadrupled. Other roles saw similar gains as well. We think there's ample room left there, and we plan to continue. Earlier I noted the efforts involving in-house tech that aids our Vimeo sales staff, where productivity gains were significant too. We plan to keep spending heavily on our technology platform so we can keep opening up fresh productivity. We continue to benefit from scale economies that become available at every successive revenue tier. Those are fairly considerable. We have the chance to pull resources out of operations that have grown too small to matter, in light of the sizable new acquisitions and expansion across many of our current operations. Even if those resources might be worth a lot at those individual businesses in a perfect world, when they don't meaningfully change results for the group overall, we'll redirect them so they can pursue bigger acquisitions or more compelling opportunities. We've put significant effort into broadening our talent pipeline. October was our best year ever for both applications and new hires. This year we opened offices in Spain and Poland. We expanded our UK office. We plan to keep extending our footprint, and there's a chance we'll open offices in the US next year. Some early work on that is already in progress. There are lots of factors, lots of tailwinds, when it comes to pushing our operational leverage higher and higher. On the whole, I would say we feel fairly good about 2027. Whether that allows for six acquisitions, or three, or eight, is genuinely difficult to say, since it also hinges on the specific deals. With certain deals, like Mailchimp, it is somewhat easier for us to digest than deals such as Airtable, which has a massive sales force. On the whole, every investor should keep in mind that operational capacity can be a bottleneck, and it definitely surfaces repeatedly as a bottleneck. At this moment, I would say we feel reasonably good about it.

Stefan Slowinski analyst
#24

Good, that helps a lot. Thank you, Luca.

Mark Shmulik analyst
#25

Yes, I appreciate you fielding my question. Focusing narrowly on advertising — I understand that during this quarter you partly rebuilt and moved over a portion of the AOL ad tech stack. Are there any lessons you've drawn from bringing that playbook to an ad-style business? I know we briefly discussed Eventbrite as well, but I'd welcome any further detail on how the playbook is performing on the advertising side. Thank you.

Luca Ferrari executive
#26

Thank you. The broad takeaway is encouraging. Let me start with the difficulties we needed to work through, and then I'll cover a few encouraging indicators. During the prior quarter, we mentioned our intention to shift AOL's assorted properties onto a fresh version of the ad tech platform—one completely under our control and powered entirely by in-house tools—and we cautioned that this would likely create some turbulence. Part of that, I suppose, is that a bug can always creep in, but another part is that you must build new arrangements with what in this instance is more than 50 ad networks, and simply allow their individual algorithms to adjust to what is fundamentally the identical product, though from their perspective it is in some sense an entirely unfamiliar entity. It is a different instance, and they do not perceive it as merely more of the same. Based on our experience, we anticipated that this might lead to some disruption, and indeed we did encounter some, which incidentally affected our organic revenue growth rate for the quarter. If there had been no disruption at all, we would have reported perhaps 1 percentage point higher, or one to two. The disruption proved brief. We have now returned to the pre-transition impression pricing. Everything is proceeding as planned. Incidentally, credit goes to the team, since handling that level of complexity and executing such a transition within only a few months is, in my view, truly remarkable. It represents an outstanding achievement in both engineering and business management. As we proceeded with that, we also began rolling out a series of tests involving ad placement and frequency—and ideally, beginning next year, new formats too. Previously these things weren't impossible, but they were far more unwieldy; since we now have full control over the entire operation, we're able to apply our A/B testing tools and, naturally, extend and refine them so that advertising-related experiments are managed more effectively. We've already identified a number of adjustments that seem to be boosting ad yields fairly significantly. Again, it's still early and I don't want to overpromise, but we're feeling quite confident in our capacity to meaningfully raise AOL's advertising revenue, and the same approach would extend to other businesses that generate programmatic advertising revenue. Naturally, if impression pricing stays at current market levels—since with any ad business, one portion is within your control through better displays and technological optimization, while another portion simply hinges on market performance—then should market conditions remain unchanged, we think AOL is well positioned to grow its advertising revenue going forward.

Mark Shmulik analyst
#27

So I suppose I have just one brief follow-up question on that. Drawing somewhat on what you have seen there and on the latest acquisition, Mailchimp, and on your roughly stated intentions regarding the addressable market in advertising-based businesses, would you say you feel better, worse, or about the same compared with before you entered into this one?

Luca Ferrari executive
#28

I would say better. In part, I think ours is a culture in which we are simultaneously sharply self-critical and conscious of our weaknesses and the gaps in our skill set, yet at the same time we are simply very competitive, and we hold a conviction that with excellent talent, a great deal of hard work, and a scientific approach to things, we are capable of becoming world-class at something, provided we are given sufficient time. We never had doubts about our ability to do well in advertising, and naturally, having gotten past a few early challenges, we feel even more positive about it. It stays an area in which we are confident we can excel. Now, we will not purchase businesses that rely on advertising merely in order to show off, or if anything we would apply a slight discount to such acquisitions, since we cannot be as sure of our capabilities as we would be for, let us say, a self-serve subscription business, but should the right opportunity arise, and at present we estimate that roughly 15% of our addressable market is advertising revenue, which is small yet meaningful, we would certainly pursue it; we will not back away merely because it is not our core expertise. In the end, everything we are good at today, at some point we were not. You have to do things in order to learn, and so we will keep watching those opportunities, and if we are able to buy them while applying assumptions that are even more conservative and delivering expected returns consistent with the other opportunities, we will pursue them, and then we will be discussing them with you folks.

Mark Shmulik analyst
#29

Great. Thanks a lot.

Lloyd Walmsley analyst
#30

Thank you. I'd like to pick up on the M&A question. It looks as though you're picking up the pace on acquisitions, the deals are larger, and you've brought in somewhat more equity. Do you see yourselves on a path where, over the coming few years, you could be putting more than roughly that $4 billion to $5 billion a year of fresh capital into M&A? And as a follow-up, if you could say a bit more about how things stand with Berkshire Hathaway — obviously they've turned into a major investor — but if there are other ways you're working together, or anything else you'd care to share on that relationship, that would be great. Thanks.

Luca Ferrari executive
#31

Thank you. I'll take the second question first. We've been acquainted with Berkshire for a few years now, and you'd have to ask them, but from my side, it's a wonderful partnership built on trust. I believe we're aligned on the essential core notion of compounding shareholder value as efficiently as we can, without getting pulled around by market fashions. Naturally, you want an open mind, to listen and to question, but not to go along with things just because everyone else is doing them, to be willing to go contrarian when we believe we know what we're doing, not to fixate on promotion, and to keep our attention on substance and execution. Naturally, we hold Berkshire in enormous admiration. In part, when we founded Bending Spoons, those who've followed us for a long while already know this, but plenty of companies have missions tied very specifically to a product, like solving a particular problem. For us, we simply wanted to attempt to build an all-time great company, among the best of our generation, and naturally you draw inspiration from companies that turn into institutions such as Berkshire Hathaway, so if we could build something even remotely at that caliber, it would be simply amazing. Having them as a partner can only be a help. There's no agreement between us and Berkshire under which they'll necessarily invest more or necessarily back any hypothetical new acquisition, but my belief is that, hopefully, both sides are in this because they see that as at least a possibility; it's good for us to have them on board, extending and strengthening our relationship. Then, should we find ourselves in a situation down the road needing a substantial equity injection at short notice, perhaps when the markets are paralyzed, Berkshire has a track record of moving quickly in those circumstances. If such a scenario arises, then naturally we'd call them, and the decision would be theirs, but it's good to know we have that line open. That's how I'd put it. As for capital deployment, look, it's very hard for me to know how much capital we'll deploy. What I feel surest about, honestly, is how we operate — the spread of operating profits over the coming couple of years from the portfolio we already hold strikes me as quite tight. Beyond that, it comes down to the debt markets: how open they are and what they cost, plus whether targets are available. That said, the pipeline in front of us is likely the fullest we have ever had, so within reason, locating targets probably won't be much of an obstacle to putting capital to work. Our ability to raise capital is stronger today than at any point before, since we are a public company now, and hopefully we will keep extending that record as a public company in a very successful manner. That part rests with us, but our confidence is high. We went to the bond markets recently, which may be the biggest pool of capital open to us; we have completed a couple of PIPEs, another handy instrument for us down the road, and we have deepened ties with most of the biggest public market investors globally; our credit ratings recently improved at both Moody's, to Ba3, and S&P, to BB-, and Fitch rated us for the first time at BB. Looking ahead, our access to capital is better than it has ever been, provided markets stay within normal or semi-normal conditions. As noted in our prepared remarks, on a pro forma basis we would have well over $4 billion available to deploy right now, and obviously that figure excludes any free cash flow we will generate from here. At run-rate, we are producing more than a billion dollars, and that is climbing pretty quickly. Naturally, that $4-plus billion leaves out any additional debt we could raise against our growing operating profits. In terms of capital on hand, we could put more than $4 billion to $5 billion to work next year. I would still urge investors to stay cautious. An average of $5 billion per year feels like a sensible assumption. Maybe you add a few mega deals on top. It seems fair to expect that now and then we will come across a larger target that would meaningfully distort the average measured across several years, but apart from those less typical transactions, deploying $5 billion a year looks like a fairly conservative yet realistic assumption.

Lloyd Walmsley analyst
#32

Great, thanks.

Luca Ferrari executive
#33

Thanks to all of you for joining us. We truly appreciate it. Have a wonderful day.

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