Commerce.com, Inc. (CMRC) Earnings Call Transcript
February 12, 2026
Earnings Call Speaker Segments
Hello, everyone, and thanks for joining us for Commerce's earnings call covering the fourth quarter and fiscal year 2025. The results we'll be going over were shared in the press release that went out before the market opened today. Joining me are Commerce's Chief Executive Officer, Travis Hess, along with our Chief Financial Officer and Chief Operating Officer, Daniel Lentz. Before we continue, I want to note that this call includes certain forward-looking statements, and those are provided under the safe harbor provisions of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995. When we talk about forward-looking statements, we mean things like financial and business trends, our anticipated future business and financial performance, our financial condition, and our guidance for the first quarter of 2026 as well as the full year 2026. You can spot these statements by terms like expect, anticipate, intend, plan, believe, seek, committed, will, or similar wording; they represent our views only as of today and shouldn't be treated as reflecting our views at any later date, and we take on no obligation to update them. By their very nature, forward-looking statements deal with matters subject to risks and uncertainties that may cause actual results to differ materially from what we expect. If you'd like a discussion of the material risks and other important factors that could impact our actual results, please see the risks and other disclosures in our filings with the Securities and Exchange Commission. In addition, we'll be discussing certain non-GAAP financial measures during this call, which aren't prepared in accordance with generally accepted accounting principles. A reconciliation of those non-GAAP financial measures to the most directly comparable GAAP financial measures, along with how we define these metrics and other metrics, appears in our earnings press release, which has been furnished to the SEC and can also be found on our website at investors.commerce.com; with that, I'll hand the call over to Travis.
Thanks, Tyler. For Commerce, 2025 mattered a great deal — during those twelve months we made solid gains in how we run the business and set ourselves up for growth that can last. Revenue came in at $342 million, roughly 3% higher than the prior year, while non-GAAP operating income ended at $28 million, alongside notable gains in producing cash. On top of that, Q4 brought our biggest quarter-over-quarter gain in subscription ARR in more than 1.5 years. Across the last 12 months, we carried out a long-range plan built on 3 priorities: making the business simpler, shifting investment toward the initiatives with the greatest value, and creating the infrastructure needed to scale while AI and agentic commerce change the way merchants connect with buyers. Efficiency went up, we put the savings back into product innovation, and both profitability and cash flow rose, which lets us run with more leverage and speed. We also presented ourselves anew to the market beneath one unified brand, Commerce, capturing the way we operate today — one connected platform spanning storefronts, product data, experience and payments. What matters is that 2025 wasn't merely a story of getting our own house in order. It was about moving faster on innovation and generating durable growth. Momentum in B2B remains strong, with B2B-focused customers making up most of our new platform ARR across the last 3 quarters. Among customers who use the BigCommerce B2B addition, subscription ARR climbed almost 20% during 2025 and produced the best retention figures anywhere in our product portfolio. In Q4 we brought on multiple new customers in industrial manufacturing and distribution, among them Build It Right, a top distributor of specialized drilling equipment; Premier Water Tanks, which makes water trucks; Hawk Research Labs, a supplier of high-performance refinishing coating systems; and KH Industries, a builder of electrical and AV components. Those wins, alongside what our current customer base keeps delivering, highlight how durable B2B demand is and how sticky our distinct B2B capabilities have proven. Leading consumer brands keep coming too. H&M, The RealReal and Petco have taken up Feedonomic's data optimization platform to boost product visibility and performance across digital channels, joining Grainger, one of North America's biggest industrial distributors; on the BigCommerce platform, we brought on European apparel brand Lascana and renewed successfully our long-standing relationship with luxury department store Harvey Nichols, which shows we can handle complex, global retail use cases for new and existing customers alike; at the same time, we pushed forward on product innovation and product-led growth with a late Q3 launch of Surface, our self-service edition of Feedonomics. With Surface, BigCommerce merchants can enrich and syndicate their product catalog across Google Shopping, Meta and, before long, additional agentic advertising and marketplace channels. Early results look compelling; during Q4, merchants on Surface recorded average GMV growth 24 points higher than those who weren't using it, an encouraging early sign that better data produces better discovery and conversion. Worth noting, that substantial gap in GMV growth came only from the advertising channels included in the first release. Over the next several months, our intention is to move fast in launching more advertising, marketplace, and agentic channels inside Surface, so that broader adoption and greater value reach our merchants, while monetization growth also accelerates across our customer base. Partnerships have also been broadened with OpenAI, Microsoft Copilot, Google Gemini, and Perplexity, which places Commerce as an infrastructure layer ready for AI. The purpose behind these integrations is to assist merchants in strengthening visibility and conversion, along with next-generation shopping and discovery flows, without any extra integration effort or technical burden on their end. One point worth highlighting: among only 2 commerce platforms included in Google's announcements about its new Universal Commerce Protocol, Commerce is one, which further strengthens our strategic alignment with top AI and discovery platforms. Together with PayPal, we introduced BigCommerce payments, and that remains on schedule to arrive around the close of Q1 2026. Our expectation is that this new offering will provide small and midsized merchants a quick, integrated path to activating payments, easier onboarding, and stronger monetization of GMV. At this point, numerous key pieces of our transformation are finished; our products have been integrated and placed under one unified brand, the leadership team needed to drive growth is in place, substantial efficiencies in our operations have been achieved to fund reinvestment in our products; and during 2026, R&D investment is rising by almost 30%, centered on 4 clear priorities meant to drive growth. The first priority: AI capabilities are being delivered straight into our core commerce platform for B2B as well as B2C customers, while Feedonomics is extended as the data enrichment and infrastructure layer for agentic commerce; this produces optimized product discovery and shopping experiences across branded storefronts, plus advertising, marketplace, and agentic channels, speeding time to value and retention throughout our installed base. The second: Feedonomics Surface is being expanded into additional channels for our BigCommerce merchant, which we see as a strong driver of both customer outcomes and monetization. The third: BigCommerce payments are being rolled out, beginning with integration of our PayPal-powered solution to ease merchant onboarding and improve monetization of GMV. And the fourth: Makeswift is being expanded, initially as a modern visual editor and page builder for our BigCommerce customers, followed by a stand-alone version launch that broadens our reach into third-party content and commerce ecosystems. What we plan to bring to market this year is represented by only a sample here. The design of these initiatives is to raise platform usage, boost attach rates across BigCommerce, Feedonomics, and Makeswift, and unlock fresh monetization through payments, data, and bundling. All of this is happening within a commerce environment that is fragmenting quickly across AI services. More and more, buyers begin their journey inside AI interfaces rather than on a brand site. Our job is to ensure our merchants can be discovered, trusted, and transacted with wherever that journey starts or finishes. To reflect this evolution more accurately, 2 new key metrics are being introduced. The first is Gross Merchandise Volume, also referred to as GMV, which offers a clear measure of our platform's scale. In 2025, our platform generated GMV of just about $32 billion, and we've seen steady double-digit expansion for multiple years now. Next, there's Net Revenue Retention, or NRR for short — it captures how well we expand within our existing customer base, spanning product lines and services throughout the whole company, rather than only some customers or products. Daniel is going to walk through these metrics in greater depth in a moment, but I'd like to share my own take on why they matter and what they say about our business. Commerce runs one of the biggest installed bases in e-commerce when it comes to GMV footprints, with GMV up 12% in 2025 and 11% in 2024. Looking at GMV growth alongside NRR at the total business level gives a sharper view of our scale, our health and the opportunity for growth that lies ahead. Making progress on both of these metrics ranks as a top priority for us in 2026. The opportunities in front of us — spanning AI-driven discovery and checkout, first-party payments and product data infrastructure — are substantial and growing. I'm happy with the strong foundation we've established through gains in efficiency, profitability and product innovation in 2025, yet we still haven't realized this business's full growth potential for our shareholders. That will change in 2026, when we move from building the foundation to executing and monetizing. With that, I'll hand things over to Daniel.
Appreciate that, Travis. Worldwide, tens of thousands of merchants rely on the BigCommerce platform, which processes roughly $32 billion in annual GMV across both B2C and B2B segments. Feedonomics remains central to how we handle data, powering discovery, performance and monetization through traditional channels and AI-based ones alike. Q4 revenue reached $89.5 million, up 3% from the same period last year; for the full year, our non-GAAP operating margin improved by 230 basis points versus 2024 and by 990 basis points versus 2023, reflecting gains in efficiency and a simpler organizational structure. We closed out the year at $359 million in ARR while continuing to strengthen the fundamentals of our underlying business. When it came to cash generated by operations, we posted $3 million in Q4 and $27 million across all of 2025. That shows we've been running leaner and doing a better job managing working capital. At year's end, our cash, cash equivalents and marketable securities totaled $143 million, and we don't face any significant debt coming due before 2028 — which leaves room to put money back into our products and speed up growth. Net debt fell from $33 million in 2024 to $11 million in 2025, which works out to a drop of almost 67% compared with the prior year. During the 3 months that ended December 31, 2025, our common shares outstanding numbered roughly 81.4 million, while fully diluted shares outstanding were about 82.0 million. Travis brought this up earlier, but we're tweaking how we disclose certain metrics so they line up better with actual business performance and reflect what investors have told us. Enterprise ARR closed out the year at $287 million. We ended with 6,648 Enterprise customers, which is a sequential gain of 897 accounts. Enterprise account ARPA — that's average revenue per account — was $43,200, a sequential decline of 8%. What drove the customer count up while ARPA came down? In part, it was a Q4 go-to-market initiative that moved certain customer accounts up from our Essentials plans to Enterprise plans. We took encouragement from the progress, and from the healthy engagement and retention we saw across Enterprise accounts last quarter. That said, our view is that dollarized expansion throughout the whole business, across customers of every size, tells us more about underlying performance than growth in just one select group of customers. Beginning with the current quarter, we're doing away with Enterprise ARR and the metrics tied to it. The reason is that our expansion now comes more from selling additional products, data services, payments, and combined capabilities that don't line up with how our older plans were defined. Instead of those figures, we'll start reporting two new quarterly metrics that give a clearer picture of our scale and how efficiently we monetize. The first of these is total GMV, which we're sharing as of this quarter. It came in at close to $32 billion for 2025, with growth of 11% in 2024 and 12% in 2025. There's a major opening for us to scale ARR growth more effectively at a pace comparable to GMV. Several things explain why our top line hasn't climbed as fast as GMV, and the biggest one is how much B2B has taken off. Within those B2B transactions, cards account for a thinner slice of the payments blend and bring in a smaller revenue share than what we see on the B2C side. Let me be clear about our expectations: ARR won't move in perfect tandem with GMV. That said, we believe that spread will shrink as time goes on, thanks to a richer payments monetization mix, more cross-selling of products, and fresh monetization models led by product. Turning to the next item, we'll begin disclosing net revenue retention for the entire company, which ought to give all of you a sharper view of how expansion is pacing across the business. For Q4, that figure landed at 95.2%, up against 95.0% for Q4 2024. Making this metric better sits at the heart of what we're trying to do as a company, and it supports a number of the areas where we're investing. More specifically, we're focused on shortening the time it takes customers to see value, getting them to adopt more products, and keeping them around by integrating Feedonomics payments and storefront capabilities more tightly — those are the things that move expansion and churn the most. We think changing how we report this gives a better match to the way we're actually building and running the business, and it offers investors clearer transparency and comparability. Now I'll take you through guidance. Looking ahead to the first quarter of 2026, we anticipate revenue in the range of $82.5 million to $83.5 million, alongside non-GAAP operating income of $9.3 million to $10.3 million. Turning to the complete 2026 fiscal year, our expectation is revenue of $347.5 million to $369.5 million, paired with non-GAAP operating income of $34 million to $53 million. This translates to full-year growth of 2% to 8%, and non-GAAP operating margins between 10% and 14% when measured at the midpoint of our revenue guidance. On both revenue and profitability, our guidance sits ahead of what the Street currently consensus expects, which reflects the strides we achieved during 2025. The key point here is that after we factor in the operational restructuring payments we've already planned for, our cash and cash equivalents should exceed our total long-term debt sometime around the middle of 2026. On top of that, we're projecting GAAP profitability across all of 2026 — a first in Commerce's history. Getting there reflects how carefully we've executed, a product model that keeps broadening, and real operating leverage. If you look at it through a Rule of 40 lens, the non-GAAP guidance we've given points to growth plus margin somewhere between about 11% and 22%, with the exact figure hinging on how well we perform inside our stated ranges. Before I close, I want to touch on several factors that lead us to believe Commerce is positioned to build value over the long term. We hit roughly $360 million in ARR, and gross margins came in around 80%. We're generating solid profit and cash flow, and we expect to continue that through this year — at the midpoint, non-GAAP operating income is up 57% compared to a year ago. The annual GMV we support is close to $32 billion, and it's been expanding at a steady double-digit pace. There's still a lot of untapped potential here. We see real chances to accelerate growth while maintaining the discipline that's delivered significant profitability gains over the past 2 to 3 years; structurally, this business is in better shape than it was twelve months ago. Execution is where our attention is focused — pushing for stronger growth and margin expansion that lasts. With that, operator, let's take some questions.
This is <<inaudible>> here, filling in for Raimo. I'd like to discuss your view of the agentic commerce space now that we've seen those <<inaudible>> agentic commerce integrations. As it keeps developing, where's the largest opportunity in your view for your platform? Also, how do you anticipate — how do you anticipate seizing it in both the near term and the long term?
Appreciate the question. That's a solid one. Look, momentum is strong right now. Like others in the market, we're clearly lining up with the big names — Stripe and PayPal are certainly two enormous partners, and valuable ones for us. We've matched their standards and schemas. We're doing the same thing with the answer engines, and each one has its own quirks. I believe we've been fairly open about our status with a number of them. We're in a spot where we've mapped to schemas across every answer engine. In the end, many of these things are gated, especially when it comes to checkout; so for instance, with Perplexity, we've demoed agentic checkout and have been live on that surface for a while now; regarding OpenAI, we've mapped to their schema, but once again, that's currently gated by OpenAI. They aren't openly accepting merchants; so we're subject to their thresholds and their timetable when it comes to sequencing. Same with Google. We're mapped to their schema; we're testing right now to get BC merchants on there. But UCP only works with data and checkout, and checkout is gated too, that's happening case by case; we're well positioned to capitalize on that, and we'll be testing with Google during the next quarter.
Travis, seeing GMV up 12% was encouraging. It demonstrates that you folks are building some durability into the business. But when I run the numbers, the take rate seems to be slipping slightly. And given your comments about the shift from foundation to monetization, what should we expect to happen with take rate? Could you perhaps discuss the PayPal partnership and your in-house payment offering? Where does that path lead from here?
Yes, Ken, excellent question. I'll handle the first portion and then hand things over to Daniel briefly. Monetization will arrive through a few distinct avenues. First, clearly, we're delivering additional product and placing real emphasis on the current installed base in order to monetize it, as Daniel described in a few of his opening comments. A piece of that is BigCommerce payment. Clearly, I believe this represents a substantially different strategy from where the company stood a year ago, when we truly didn't discuss this at all. We've adopted a stance that's more opinionated. You should expect that to keep developing as time goes on, as one would anticipate for monetization purposes. We're additionally exploring approaches to monetize the B2B installed base more effectively. As Daniel likewise explained, by definition it carries a somewhat different nuance, which shows up in those figures. But my expectation is that monetization will really arrive in two ways. Growth from current customers via delivery of new products, whether that's product-led growth or enhancements or fresh AI SKUs, certainly, plus clearly monetizing payment. I'll pass it to Daniel when it comes to take rate and matters of that kind.
Yes. Ken, I believe that's an excellent question, since it captures why we thought it made so much sense to roll out the new metrics we rolled out. Broadly speaking, I'd say our platform is bigger than what the market probably believed it to be. As you pointed out with the GMV metric, it's also expanding more quickly than what was likely widely understood. What I don't think was as widely understood, and what we truly aimed to bring some transparency to, is some of the reasons behind what we're doing here inside the company. Take rate isn't where it could be, and that's partly due to the fact that B2B customers simply conduct fewer credit card transactions, so we earn less payments rev share. Beyond that, though, we also have a chance to retain and expand the base more effectively. You can see that in the NRR number, which isn't where it needs to be, but we wanted transparency about where it stands. I don't think these metrics should come as a surprise compared with earlier NRR disclosures we've provided. I think it's quite consistent with those. But what it truly reveals is a compelling story of opportunity inside the business, where we have a large, growing and stable platform. We simply haven't focused enough, or succeeded enough, in getting our growth rates to track alongside the growth rate of the underlying GMV on the platform. That leads into why we're taking a different perspective on how we approach payments; we're beginning with a sort of white labeled version, with PayPal as our first partner, which we consider great. But that isn't the endpoint of where this is headed. And when you consider many of the product launches and initiatives coming our way, they carry embedded new monetization models that drive better NRR and expansion of our existing base, which also means a lower customer acquisition cost, letting the business not only grow faster but grow more profitably along the way. So we simply felt it was really important to add transparency around that, mainly because we believe it reflects the opportunity that has Travis and me so excited. We have plenty of work ahead. I think that's clear in the numbers too. But there are plenty of really strong opportunities beneath that, which we're excited about.
Got it, that's really useful. And Daniel, my second question is about the outlook range for fiscal '26. That spread is over $20 million in revenue, which is way bigger than the $8 million band you had when '25 began. I'd say there's likely more uncertainty heading into '25 than the groundwork you've established for '26. Could you walk me through what's factored into the guidance that produces such a wide gap?
Yeah, good question, and honestly I figured this one was coming. So let me walk through both ends of it. If you look at our Q1 guide, it seems somewhat cautious, and that's simply because we applied some caution coming out of the holiday GMV we observed during that stretch, which came in somewhat differently — somewhat below what we'd anticipated, and you can see that reflected in the Q4 results, though it wasn't a major issue. But we sort of brought that into a bit of caution for Q1 and extended it forward in case we begin to see. Some kind of macroeconomic problems. There's simply been plenty of uncertainty, I'd say, around the labor market and tech, especially. So the bottom end of that range reflects that. But the reason our spread is wider than usual is that we also anticipate much more upside this year compared to where we've been in prior years, since we have so much innovation on the road map arriving this year. Take payments, for instance. We won't have gross accounting; it'll be net. We anticipate seeing solid incremental growth on that as time goes on, but that's just one of maybe 5 or 6 different items on the way that make us optimistic about how the year could unfold. We still have to execute on that, and we believe the midpoint reasonably captures where the business stands right now, but we thought investors should grasp the variety of outcomes and what we're seeing in the business. We have far more happening right now at the start of the year in terms of innovation and what we're attempting to ship than at any other point during the 7 years I've been here, but we must deliver on those items, and we felt that offering a wider range than before accurately captures that.
David, we'll begin with you, then we have one for Travis afterward. So to kick off on those figures, if we set aside the initiative that moves certain customers up from Essentials to Enterprise, how much did core Enterprise ARR grow during the quarter? Daniel, over to you: Other than that, it rose somewhat; that initiative was a major reason behind the shift we witnessed. The performance matched, or perhaps slightly exceeded, what we delivered in earlier quarters. We didn't implement that adjustment in order to be vague regarding the fundamentals of the business. Our sense was that on the whole, it made more sense to redirect our attention toward the area where, honestly, Travis and I actually operate the company — namely, examining how we generate revenue from underlying GMV. Consider, specifically, DJ, what we introduced on Surface, the self-service edition of Feedonomics, for instance; that offering mainly targets smaller customers rather than our bigger ones. Consequently, as we've said across the past few quarters, we care about expansion in dollar terms, not the specific number of a particular customer subset — that count matters and serves as a signal, yet it isn't the top priority, nor was it ever how we managed the business; therefore, we believed this redirection was necessary.
Right. Just to clarify something about the metrics going forward — my understanding is that enterprise ARR won't be discussed anymore. Does that mean ARR won't be discussed at all?
Let me clear that up. Every quarter, we'll keep reporting ARR. That isn't changing at all; we'll also keep discussing subscription ARR, which is just total ARR minus partner and services revenue over the trailing 12 months. So nothing changes there. What we're doing is purely additive, I'd say — starting next quarter, we'll begin reporting GMV each quarter. That way, you can compare quarter over quarter against the prior year moving forward. On top of that, we'll share total NRR at the whole-business level every quarter, and by definition that figure is a rolling prior 12-month measure; so investors will find it very easy to see how we're performing when it comes to total platform growth and stability on the GMV side. Whether our initiatives are making progress or not based on how results come in, and driving improved monetization and capturing the chance to better monitor overall top line ARR growth beneath it. The sole change is that enterprise-specific metrics are going away. If anything, I believe this actually brings better transparency into what's happening in the business — to be really clear, that's the intent.
Yes. Okay. That's very clear. Then a follow-up for Travis: it sounds like Shopify's agentic plan, the one I mentioned yesterday, competes directly with Feedonomics, correct? They discussed using it for customers outside Shopify, roughly the same way you described Feedonomics. Right? And if that's the case, could you go a bit further into what lets Commerce and Feedonomics win against what Shopify is doing?
Yes. There is some overlap, but by definition, first, the cohort those products have historically served is entirely different. With Feedonomics, I'd say it served mainly what I'd call Enterprise — you're discussing the biggest branded manufacturers and retailers globally; a large subset of those clients actually run on Shopify as their platform yet use Feedonomics. There's a reason for that, and it isn't a lower cost. It's that they cannot extract the value from data enrichment that Shopify provides, or the way Shopify does it, the way they get it from Feedonomics, since that product data gets enriched bespokely for the surfaces where they appear in syndication, which will ultimately become commoditized. All these protocols will become open, they'll be standardized, enabling agents to interact with them; so syndication carries no value proposition. The value proposition sits in data enrichment and orchestration; and it's not only orchestrating the data, it's also orchestrating, for instance, inventory availability. So when people engage in contextualized conversations, and you want something for next weekend, that contextualized input must be matched against available inventory, exactly as Google ads do now regarding what's available near you within a particular time frame. So behind the scenes it performs many things that are by definition different. It's platform-agnostic. So we accept that plenty of merchants are content with their existing platform, cannot switch platforms, yet still have a real need to appear relevantly and valuably across the services their customers want to meet them on. Our job is to enrich and syndicate that agnostically and at scale — that's the largest difference. We aren't attempting to monetize this via a checkout; we're attempting to drive merchant value to the degree that it also overlaps with BigCommerce. And as Daniel said earlier, the self-service version of Feedonomics — one thing we hadn't done yet here since acquiring Feedonomics — is having a self-service version to make it available to smaller merchants. That's what excites us most. It will probably overlap the most with what Shopify is doing, and the overlap really is that we're offering it to a similar cohort on our platform as they're offering on theirs. I'm not claiming either option is superior. It's simply, by definition, something built into the platform natively, and we've only just started running — having rolled that out during the past quarter, if that helps.
The first thing I want to ask about is the payments offering. Can you take us through how PSR contributions will be paced across 2026? And I suppose, can you also explain how margins would be affected by that?
Sure. So the plan as it stands right now is for BigCommerce payments to go live at about the close of Q1, and we remain on track for that. Around that same period, we'll also introduce certain adjustments to the pricing and packaging underneath our platform plans, timed to align with bringing BigCommerce payments into our core offerings. A key reason we're glad to be working with PayPal is that an enormous installed base of our current customers already use PayPal, and that makes it much simpler for us to move as many of those existing customers as possible onto BigCommerce payments once it launches, then begin growing it step by step afterward. Our effort, I'd describe it, will run along two tracks. The first is getting as many newly signed merchants as we can onto that solution, and at the beginning that will mainly target small business and mid-market customers, I'd say. Additional features coming later, with more rolled out through the second half of the year, should, in my view, make it more compelling for large corporate and enterprise customers. But — so track one is about bringing in as many new customers as we can, while we'll also pursue plenty of avenues for examining other customers already in our base to determine where switching them over makes sense and doesn't clash with existing arrangements, obviously, involving other partners, since we enjoy great relationships with quite a few payment partners, among them Stripe and Adyen and others, and we're not. Disrupting any of that is not something we intend to do. So looking at it from a margin standpoint, our expectation is that it will be additive over the course of the year. It substitutes for other agreements with PayPal that are already in place. So it isn't entirely 100% greenfield on top of where we already stood, something we built into the guidance and took into account within the range; but we view this as really — Maddie, I think this matters. This marks the beginning of how we're approaching the strategy in this area. It's a very clear pivot away from our past way of thinking about this; being both open and opinionated strikes us as quite possible and quite good. Previously, from a fintech standpoint or a payments standpoint, the message was essentially, look, go with whoever you like, and we'll keep giving customers enormous latitude in choosing whom they work with on the payment side. However, we want to concentrate our efforts on fewer partners, and that includes the branded offering, allowing us to achieve stronger technical connections and improved outcomes for customers by working with maybe a reduced set of partners moving forward. Then, as time passes, could we broaden this out and begin exploring if we wish to move ahead with additional measures toward the PSP or similar options. Those are definitely matters we continue to assess. We simply believed it made sense as an initial move. Let's begin here. Observe how we can encourage uptake on this, secure margin gains over time, and afterward enlarge this even more as we proceed to more effectively connect our general growth rate to the GMV growth rate on the platform, which, as we mentioned, has remained very robust and consistent across multiple years.
Got it. So my follow-up kind of builds on that. As you get deeper into B2B, where credit card penetration is lower, how does that offset what take rates will do going forward?
I think that's what you're seeing, and it explains why our take rates — going back to the question we got earlier, take rates, if you simply divide total ARR by GMV — dipped a bit during the last quarter. A big part of that is B2B mix, which is the issue you just described. Some portion of it is basically unavoidable. What I mean is, I think the way we see it is this: we've got a lot of truly unique competitive differentiation in B2B, and we want to push merchants to offer every great service across all the different methods their customers need to pay us — whether that's ACH, POs and invoicing, or credit card transactions. Our plan is to shrink the aperture on how many partners we're truly concentrating on in B2B, so we can deliver stronger solution offerings for customers that bring expanded payments opportunities and monetization opportunities for us down the road too. It will always look somewhat different from the B2C side, given the credit card mix, but we still believe there's substantial opportunity to incrementally improve B2B monetization. Even if, on an apples-to-apples basis, it's inherently always going to be somewhat different from B2C. There are many ways we still see to improve that and make — and create upside there, even inside the B2B cohort.
I'd like to ask about the NRR metric sitting at 95. When you're below 100, that creates plenty of doubt regarding how durable growth really is. So how ought we to think about the main drivers that would push this metric up in the near term? And which NRR assumptions have been built into the 2026 guide?
Daniel here. I'll handle that question. The figure across the whole business stands at 95. Given that the number disclosed earlier for Enterprise accounts came in around 100, I don't think that should catch anyone off guard. I'd noted it was roughly within 99 to 100. My recollection is we ended last year at 98; so at the overall business level, sitting 300 basis points beneath that shouldn't really come as a shock. At the heart of what's being asked, clearly we don't view that figure as acceptable, and it's far from best-in-class and from where it ought to be. I think it mirrors the reality that we haven't placed the emphasis we need on delighting and expanding the customers we already have. And as for the reason — why did we make those changes on a restructuring basis in the announcement from last quarter, it's because, first, we can operate this business far more efficiently than we did previously. Nothing about this represents a turn in direction or a change in strategy. What we're carrying out is exactly the plan that has been on the table all year. The difference is that we can now deliver it while spending fewer dollars, particularly when it comes to go-to-market, which frees those funds to be moved over to R&D and to investments tightly focused on our efforts around NRR. And the fact that we're in a position to push R&D capital investment up by almost 30% in 2026, even as our midpoint guidance shows profit growth year-over-year that's close to 60% higher, strikes me as proof of how much success we've had in the business and of the way we run things in a manner that generates efficiency, releasing capital for reinvestment. Take a look at only the things Travis brought up in his prepared remarks. I'd say nearly all of them are aimed at pushing NRR up to where it ought to be. Surface is now out, which is great — among customers who use it, GMV growth came in 24 points above those who don't. And that happened even though the first release only had two advertising channels baked in; it improves retention and opens a monetization path that wasn't there previously. Then there's Makeswift, our new page builder, which should arrive in about a quarter or so. It's the same story: fresh monetization models are part of it. A significant portion of our spending is going toward enhancing how well our main offerings work, which keeps customers happy and supports both keeping them around and growing their usage.
Yeah. And I'd say, Koji, at the most basic level, what we've done across the past 12 months to 18 months is build the groundwork that lets us truly go out and do this. I realize many of the shifts we've made haven't been glamorous or all that thrilling, no question, but we made them on purpose — on purpose so we could reach this stage. Even so, as Daniel said, there's a great deal still ahead of us; by no means is this a case of mission accomplished, not even close. Yet the groundwork genuinely exists for us to capitalize on this. I believe the guide captures that, and of course it'll be judged through continuing capability and how well we perform on this front, but in our view net revenue retention is the definitive measure for the business and for the position we're in; and offering that visibility to The Street, we believe, is useful and creates less confusion than providing guidance on one specific kind of plan that could be misunderstood, which is exactly where we used to be with Enterprise.
And one final thing I'd add, Koji, responding to that particular question you raised at the end — basically, what we've assumed in the guidance. The guidance assumes gradual gains as the year goes on, yet nothing so extreme in terms of improvement that it becomes unrealistic, and something we believe is attainable over that 12-month stretch. If you simply consider how quickly new accounts have been added and how growth has proceeded across roughly the last 2 years, things have remained fairly steady. We'd like to see that move up a little at a time. Still, we have plenty of levers available to pull in order to make this better, and reaching the figures we've put into our guidance doesn't require some unrealistic, dramatic step up. We do need to improve, but we're confident it's definitely within reach.
Understood. Perhaps this one goes out to either of you. Travis, during your prepared remarks, you mentioned Commerce.com achieving success in that AI-ready infrastructure layer serving B2B and B2B Commerce — the B2B and B2C Commerce strategies. So if you all succeed there, what does that imply for how customers purchase across the three major products, BigCommerce, Feedonomics and Makeswift? Would the algorithm shift in any way at all?
I believe it — well, that shift will happen organically simply because those three offerings would become more readily accessible, especially for the installed base, and that was the goal. I think I've stated this openly a few times by now; honestly, we haven't placed enough emphasis on the current customer installed base. We weren't positioned to pull that off since the other products hadn't been installed. On top of that, there was considerable duplication in cost as well as mere distraction and the broader road map, and that was not deliberate.
Same thing, my mistake. It's still early, so forgive the repetition. In any case, we couldn't capitalize on it at that point. Part of the thinking, then, involved bringing those offerings together and getting them out there. As you mentioned, there's now a somewhat separate wedge approach too. Feedonomics operates in an agnostic way. Regarding Makeswift, we've discussed expanding it distribution-wise into additional ecosystems. At this point we have fresh, creative avenues for reaching business beyond our own 4 walls, along with a land-and-expand motion — and previously we lacked the systems, the infrastructure, and the motion for that. So my sense is that will have an effect. AI, clearly, is speeding up each of those areas; it lets us move at a far quicker, more efficient rate, meaning we can accomplish more with less; that's likely the largest effect when it comes to cadence and related matters; had you posed this question 2 years ago, whether we'd have gotten this done within that period — absent AI, I doubt that would be achievable. So the pace at which we'll ship product and are shipping product, the pace at which we're equipping our sales people and go-to-market teams, and the pace at which we can genuinely bring things to market and boost effectiveness has clearly gotten dramatically better.
I wanted to ask a follow-up about that '26 guidance range you addressed from a growth standpoint; regarding margins, the operating income range is broad as well. What I'm really asking is whether there's a framework for how growth and revenue should line up with margins. Is this a case where the revenue upside comes from payments, net recognition flowing down to the bottom line and producing those better margins? Or is it a case where slower growth means you push toward profitability?
Excellent question, Josh. This is Daniel, and I'll handle it. What I'd say is that in the way Travis and I are running this approach throughout the year, growth comes first; that's where the emphasis is. We're confident. I believe we've shown this across the past several years; we operate a disciplined business; we operate a disciplined P&L. Our growth needs to be faster. I have a lot of confidence that as we expand, we will produce strong margins along the way; and I think the fact that we gave guidance and profit that was so materially higher than I think the Street probably expected from us for 2026, while still reinvesting in growth, demonstrates that priority. Should we finish on the high end of the range, clearly, that will generate additional profit that would move us to the upper portion of the range. But if we're landing on the high side of what we discussed for the revenue guide, Travis and I will be seeking chances to put that money back into growth; we'll do so in ways we consider prudent. We won't chase high cost of acquisition, low ROI items — we need to become materially better at sales and marketing efficiency. That's among the reasons we carried out some of the redeployments and changes we made, because we see that in the numbers just as our investors have over the past year or 2; but wherever we have chances to reinvest, if we're arriving on the high side of the revenue range, we'll do that because we want to plow more back into growth as momentum builds further.
Alright, that's clear. So should revenue land at the top of the range, we'd put more money in, since the payoff is right there. And should revenue land at the bottom, that's going to hurt margins when it arrives at...
Let me be clear on that. Should we land toward the bottom of our revenue guidance range, we will cut costs wherever possible to ensure we hit the profit range we laid out, correct? Should we land toward the top of that revenue range, our business runs at an 80% gross margin. A large portion of that drops straight to the bottom line, and we won't plow every dollar back in. Much of what we'd deploy would likely go toward extra capital in R&D, plus you have standard capitalized software rules and similar items that we'd have to work through. So the result would be extra profit. So likely — the top of the revenue range means the top of the profit range even after reinvesting, though we'll do it in a manner we consider very, very prudent. We won't simply scatter money in every direction. I believe we've demonstrated quite clearly that this isn't how we operate the business.
Right, that makes sense. Very useful, thanks. Then, regarding the disclosures, I have one more question. Since the Enterprise-related metrics are being removed, will there still be a customer count disclosure moving forward? And I'm genuinely curious about what you consider the best way for us to monitor something important to the business — net new customers, market share, go-to-market efforts and progress.
Yeah. A specific customer count metric won't be part of what we provide going forward. It is something we'll address so that investors have a reasonable sense of where things stand. In our view, one of the strongest signals of how we're performing when it comes to market share is our GMV growth performance. And for quite a while, many investors asked us about precisely that, since that was also the way they sought to gauge overall market share growth, because the customer count metric we had been disclosing was itself a subset metric anyway. It never reflected the full breadth of customers on the platform to start with. I mean — alright, we're discussing the fact that we have 6,000 accounts that happen to purchase our enterprise plans, and tens of thousands of customers running on the platform. Looking at B2B by count, we believe we're likely among the largest B2B platforms globally, and that's on a subset basis; but what matters most, I think, is whether those customers are being retained and expanding; NRR reflects that. There's some positive signal in certain underlying parts, but we have to improve substantially. Yet if you look, crucially, at the overall GMV metric, the scale of this business and the health of the growth and what we observe in the underlying platform, it's good. We need to do a better job orienting the business to drive monetization of that growth down to our shareholders, and that's where we are focused and where we've been focused for the last year, we simply didn't think the metrics we have really provide a good enough why to connect the dots between where we were applying capital and where we see opportunity to drive monetization of the business.
Travis, perhaps as a starting point, I'd like to hear your take on the ways agentic commerce could be affecting chances to replatform? Looking at it one way, I can picture it fueling plenty of innovation, with customers exploring new buys. At the same time, I can picture it possibly making purchase decisions take longer. Do you have any thoughts on what you're observing regarding agentic's effect, if there is one?
Yes, Brian, excellent question. Without a doubt, during 2025, it had an effect on the B2C side, and most significantly, I'd say across the latter half of the year. Clearly, we felt let down by what we produced in that latter half, and I believe we had anticipated more there. The positive side, I'd say, is that we enjoy strong product market fit for agentic. We're clearly in the middle of numerous favorable developments there, yet the negative side involves the collateral damages hitting brands and retailers, whose traffic has fallen off, clearly, and that has taken on greater importance rather than replatforming. It hasn't eliminated it. We definitely possess a robust pipeline. Still, yes, I don't believe it has assisted in accelerating platforms, especially in the upmarket segment on B2C. My expectation is that it will shift somewhat, though I think another thing occurring because of agentic is the creation of fresh commercial models, correct, where you're witnessing pieces from various areas, such as our agentic checkout product, for instance, which is a straightforward use case involving an existing Feedonomics client, where we enrich and syndicate that catalog either straightaway or via financial partners such as PayPal, where once more, that checkout might occur on our rails using our cart along with our order orchestration capabilities inside Feedo into an order management system belonging to someone else. Will you witness an increasing number of those types of things? So varied commercial models, varied components, with things and mixing converging. I believe our North Star in all of this is to stay agnostic regarding whatever serves our merchants best. So if we supply all of that infrastructure, wonderful, that's what makes the most sense; we supply a portion of it, and that's what makes the most sense. Regarding the earlier example, I believe Ken posed the question concerning Feedo. Among the largest differentiators for us on the Feedonomics side, and how it stands apart in the market, are the control mechanisms inside that product. Bigger brands, enterprise, branded manufacturers, and retailers require those controls. And they likewise require the agnosticism, since if they're transacting through agentic checkout irrespective of infrastructure, they want to be certain that it lines up with their back-office systems, meaning their point of sale and other channels through which people might transact. So if I purchase something agentically, via say ChatGPT, and I wish to return that product in store, that requires interconnectivity there. Plus, that tech isn’t neutral, so they’re stuck relying on separate rails, which means that sink gets disabled, leading to a poor experience for customers and higher expenses for the merchant. So yes, I realize these are odd scenarios nobody really considers, since buying simply occurs for the shopper, yet these become highly intricate, subtle, costly errors on the back end, and that’s exactly where a great deal of reluctance shows up among the bigger enterprise-focused branded producers and sellers. They understand how complex this is, they understand how tough it is, and they understand how pricey it is to introduce friction into those purchasing journeys. Thus, whenever they take this on, they aim to get it right and modify their approach as needed, and we enable them to accomplish that via certain elements and certain abilities we offer. And that is likely delaying more of the replatforming work than anything else, particularly in the upmarket segment, if that helps.
No, that's fantastic detail. And Daniel, perhaps this one is for you. I'm grateful for all the fresh disclosures. But could you share any insight into how GMV growth during 2025 broke down between B2B and B2C?
Sure. What I'd say is — well, we highlighted a year ago that for customers adopting B2B, ARR from those customers climbed nearly 20%. GMV was comparable. As a portion of GMV, B2B grows at a disproportionate rate, which explains why you observe a somewhat derived modest drop in net take rates when you examine ARR as a percentage of total GMV — again, that's a high-class problem. It's expanding extremely well. It's differentiated. It's performing great in market. It's somewhat enjoyable to be able to turn to our product leaders and say, look, we've got to get monetization up. You're doing a wonderful job driving growth on the platform; we need to narrow the gap in monetization between B2B and B2C. A portion of that spread is unavoidable; that's simply how it is, but there are plenty of opportunities for us to enhance that.
Thanks. Clearly, I appreciate all of you for being here. We're eager to put our outlined plan into action, and we can't wait to talk more with each of you next quarter. Many thanks.
That wraps up our call. We appreciate your participation in today's presentation. You're free to leave the line now.
Read the full transcript via the API
You're viewing the first half of this call. Get the complete Commerce.com, Inc. transcript - plus 132,000+ transcripts from 7,000+ companies, speaker segments and full-text search - through the EarningsAPI REST API or hosted MCP server.
Get an API key View API docs →For developers and AI pipelines
Programmatic access to Commerce.com, Inc. earnings transcripts and 132,000+ others is available through the
EarningsAPI REST API and the hosted MCP server.
Quarterly plans from $162 - full transcripts, speaker segments, full-text search,
and the /api/v1/transcripts/recent polling endpoint for ETL pipelines.