Ellington Credit Company (EARN) Earnings Call Transcript
November 20, 2025
Earnings Call Speaker Segments
Thanks. Prior to getting started, I want to remind all of you that forward-looking statements might be part of this conference call, as defined under the safe harbor provisions in the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995; such statements aren't historical by nature and carry risks plus uncertainties that are described in our registration statement on Form N-2. Since actual results could differ materially from those statements, you shouldn't view them as forecasts of future events. No obligation is assumed by the company to revise these forward-looking statements. With me on the call are Larry Penn, who serves as Chief Executive Officer of Ellington Credit Company; Greg Borenstein, Portfolio Manager; and Chris Smernoff, Chief Financial Officer. A presentation for our earnings conference call can be found on our website, ellingtoncredit.com. That presentation will be followed during today's call, and any statements or references to figures are subject to the important notice and end notes located at the back of the presentation. Having said that, I'll hand things over to Larry.
Appreciate it, Alaael-Deen, and hello everybody on this call; thank you for taking the time to focus on Ellington Credit Company, known on the New York Stock Exchange under ticker E-A-R-N, or just EARN. Let's move to Slide 3. Across the third calendar quarter, credit markets mostly gained ground, helped along by the Federal Reserve turning more dovish and issuing its initial rate reduction of the year during September. As you can see on Slide 3, spreads on most corporate credit and CLOs narrowed on balance, and this happened even with some conspicuous patches of poor credit results in the high-yield corporate bond space and among leveraged loans. Big equity benchmarks likewise moved higher amid anticipation of additional monetary loosening. Now over to Slide 4. Against that background, Ellington Credit posted yet another solid quarter. We kept scaling up our CLO portfolio at a consistent clip, and net investment income grew in step. Several CLO note redemptions at par on discounted purchases gave our results a lift, along with strong trading, as we completed over 90 separate CLO trades in the quarter. Last but not least, I'm delighted to report that in September, Ellington Credit Company reached full coverage of its dividend from net investment income, which highlights the earnings capacity of our holdings as we approach being fully invested. Trading actively stays central to how we invest. We think it lets us exploit mispricing, handle risk in a better way, and keep repositioning the portfolio toward the best relative value; during the past quarter, yield compression appeared between the CLO debt tranche markets and the leveraged loan markets, and that prompted us to adjust our portfolio in 2 key respects: First, because of that yield compression, we raised our portfolio allocation toward mezzanine debt, capturing more appealing yields from a relative value standpoint, particularly given the downside protection such debt provides. Second, that same yield compression caused us to trim our exposure to new issue equity. Rather than holding it, we obtained comparable exposures, yet secured superior pricing through secondary market purchases of longer duration equity. One more benefit of trading frequently is that it delivers more precise and more actionable insight into real-time market conditions and sharpens our valuation work, which Greg will cover afterward. Our bias toward active trading also spotlights a benefit of EARN's comparatively small size: with $225 million of equity to invest instead of, for instance, $1 billion or more, we stay nimble, shift the portfolio boldly, and pick our investments with great care, without any obligation to own the market. The portfolio adjustments we made this past quarter mirrored a number of the moves from the quarter before. If you look back across the last 2 quarters, meaning since our April 1 conversion to a closed-end fund, roughly 70% of our net CLO purchases consisted of mezzanine debt tranches, which shows our intentional shift up in credit quality. In our view, mezzanine debt tranches right now provide an attractive mix of yield plus protection on the downside, which pairs well with the equity holdings we have; we've also shifted more weight toward the secondary market, since relative value chances there tend to be stronger than what a new issue offers. As I noted earlier, with CLO equity in particular, we've been favoring purchases in the secondary market. Slide 7 shows that at September 30, our CLO portfolio of $380 million was divided almost equally between mezzanine debt and equity tranches, with roughly 14% of total investments in Europe. With that, I'll pass things to Chris so he can walk through our financial results in more detail. Chris?
Thanks, Larry, and good morning, everyone. Please turn back to Slide 4, where for the third calendar quarter we reported GAAP net income per share of $0.11, together with net investment income per share of $0.23. The weighted average GAAP yield on our CLO portfolio came in at 15.5% for that quarter. Moving to Slide 6, you'll find a breakdown of portfolio net income by CLO subsector: U.S. CLO debt contributed $0.13, European CLO debt added $0.03, U.S. CLO equity accounted for $0.08, and European CLO equity produced a small net loss. Strong net investment income across subsectors was complemented by net realized and unrealized gains on CLO debt, and partially offset by net realized and unrealized losses on CLO equity as well as credit hedges. In the U.S. leveraged loan market, index prices were broadly flat overall, but outcomes diverged sharply by credit quality. Lower triple — sorry, lower quality, CCC-rated loans fell several points on scattered default concerns, while B-rated loans advanced on sustained CLO demand, reinforcing the credit dispersion theme once more. Callable higher-quality loans continue to be repriced at lower rates, as price premiums on those loans give way to new issuance at par with tighter spreads. In Europe, leveraged loan prices lagged the U.S., mainly because repricing activity was more prevalent there. Even with a mixed loan backdrop, U.S. and European CLO debt spreads largely tightened, supported by steady capital inflows and limited new CLO issuance. Seasoned mezzanine debt led the way as loan prepayment and repricing activity remained elevated. CLO equity also benefited from narrowing debt spreads, enabling equity investors to refinance or reset liabilities and lower coupons, though ongoing loan repricing and scattered default concerns partly offset this in both the U.S. and Europe. Slide 7 provides details on our CLO portfolio, reflecting continued sequential growth. In total, our CLO portfolio expanded 20% to $380 million. During the quarter, we made new purchases totaling $160 million, with 62% directed to CLO debt and 38% to CLO equity, and we sold $29 million of CLOs, consistent with our active trading approach. As of September 30, CLO equity represented 51% of total CLO holdings, down from 53% at the quarter's start, while European CLO investments made up 14%, essentially unchanged from the prior quarter. Slide 8 summarizes the corporate loans underlying our CLO investments. The collateral remains predominantly first lien floating rate leveraged loans, representing roughly 95% of underlying assets. Industry exposure is well diversified, led by tech, financial services and health care, with no single sector exceeding 11%. Maturities span multiple years, with the largest concentrations in 2028 and 2031 and few maturities near term, producing a weighted average loan maturity of 4.2 years. Facility sizes skewed toward lower borrowers, with 42% in facilities above $1.5 billion and a weighted average size of $1.6 billion, which aids liquidity. This was also reflected in $116 million of total portfolio activity. Slide 9 gives you a closer look at the collateral behind our loans. On Slide 10, you can see where our credit hedges stood on September 30. During the quarter, because the loan portfolio expanded, we increased our corporate credit hedges. At quarter-end, we also maintained a foreign currency hedge portfolio designed to address exposure from our European CLO investments. Turning to Slide 11: on September 30, NAV was $5.99 per share, and cash plus cash equivalents totaled $20.1 million. For the quarter, total return based on NAV came in at 9.6% annualized. With that, I'll pass it to Greg, who will discuss how the portfolio market performed, how we positioned our CLO portfolio, and what lies ahead in the market.
Appreciate that, Chris. It's great to be here with everybody today. The third calendar quarter unfolded much like a reflection of the second; July came in strong, yet things lost steam as the period progressed. Heightened worry over specific credit names, plus ongoing pressure on loan coupon spreads, dragged down CLO equity and even weighed on certain mezzanine tranches that are more sensitive to credit. Despite all of that, our mezzanine and equity holdings both added positively to results. As we've said previously, throughout this year we've been uneasy about the growing divide between healthier and weaker credits across both CLOs and the wider corporate credit space. Be it the lingering effect of high rates on floating rate borrowers, or the swings between winners and losers driven by AI, tariffs and shifting trade patterns, we've stayed intentional and careful when it comes to holding first loss credit risk. CLO equity keeps delivering subdued returns, driven not just by defaults, distressed exchanges and certain weaker credits, but also by prepayments and stronger credits, which lowers returns at both ends of the underlying loan portfolios. For CLO equity, those 2 forces together have outweighed the benefit of tighter liability costs and deals. At the margin, we tend to still prefer CLO mezzanine tranches as a better mix of risk and reward within the portfolio. The subordination and structural safeguards they provide help shield us from the dispersion and idiosyncratic worries I mentioned; that being said, nearly any investment looks appealing at the right price, and we keep seeing opportunities on both sides of the capital structure when they come at the right level. We continue to find secondary markets much more attractive than primary markets, which has been true for most of this year; we took part in just one new issue equity transaction during the third calendar quarter. At the same time, we saw CLO trades for EARN rise from 79 in Q2 to 92 in Q3, highlighting our trading-focused flexible approach. In our view, this is something that sets us apart considerably from our competitors and ought to give investors comfort. Credit troubles like First Brands have shaken the credit markets, and that has created selling pressure on shares of CLO closed ends funds including EARN. Much like what we've observed with BDC stock prices, I think this often stems from investor uncertainty regarding the true condition of the underlying portfolio, including the portfolio marks. By trading our portfolio so actively, we hold a great deal of confidence in our underlying portfolio marks. Not only do we have a strong sense of where the market transacts, but valuing our positions has been relatively straightforward because many of them trade frequently, which leaves us highly confident in the accuracy of our reported NAV. Even though mezzanine tranches remain our preference, EARN has managed to capitalize on some intriguing chances within the CLO equity market. We anticipate that attractive special situations will keep appearing, particularly in the secondary market, where our solid relationships and standing as an active trading counterparty frequently grant us early and differentiated access. That said, certain CLO managers and dealers are prepared to provide incentives aimed at drawing investors into committing funds for new issue CLO equity investments. In our view, it's essential to assess such incentives against the manager's quality, the deal's structure and the underlying collateral, and to deploy capital only when the total opportunity meets our risk/reward threshold. Now I'll hand it back to Larry.
Thanks, Greg. I'm quite happy with what EARN delivered this quarter. Because our net investment income grew steadily, we were able to reach full dividend coverage in September — a key milestone that speaks to the earnings power of our portfolio. Our net investment income may move around from month to month, depending on deals getting called, distributions being reinvested, or profits being realized through trading, yet we remain confident in our capacity to keep dividend coverage intact over the long haul. Stepping back, volatility and credit dispersion have stayed defining traits of the corporate credit markets broadly this year, and of the CLO market especially. Uneven effects from AI and tariffs have certainly played a big role in that volatility and credit dispersion, but the recent Tricolor and First Brands bankruptcies — First Brands being a widely held CLO credit, by the way — highlight that the corporate credit markets are also exposed to idiosyncratic volatility and credit dispersion. Since corporate credit spreads overall stayed relatively tight during the quarter, we kept growing our credit hedging portfolio as we ramped our investment portfolio. As Slide 10 shows, we grew our credit hedge portfolio to approximately $90 million of high-yield CDX bond equivalents by quarter end. For context, that $90 million works out to roughly 40% of our NAV as of September 30; so it's a very significant position; and after quarter end, we've kept adding to our credit hedges. This synthetic short position hit more than $150 million in high-yield equivalent as of October 31, as laid out in our October tear sheet that we released last night. While these hedges, like most hedge, can be costly to carry, the downside protection they deliver is well worth the expense from our standpoint, particularly given where overall corporate credit spreads sit right now. Should credit spreads widen, these corporate credit hedges ought to produce substantial gains that help offset any declines in our long CLO portfolio. Last, I'll point out that while high-profile defaults such as First Brands tend to capture plenty of headlines, they also offer a real-world view of how CLO structures are built to function and how our approach is intended to protect investors. At EARN, the effect from First Brands on our portfolio was fairly modest. Our mezzanine debt tranches were mostly shielded by their equity buffers. And although certain of our equity positions took a hit, the overall fundamental impact for us was fairly limited and was felt more in shorter-dated deals rather than the longer reinvestment period CLOs, where the bulk of our equity exposure sits. And that's really the whole point of the diversification that the CLO market gives investors. You steer clear of taking outsized exposure to any single borrower; that principle, together with our recent emphasis on CLO debt tranches, served us well through the third calendar quarter. Looking ahead, if corporate defaults were to spread more broadly, our credit hedges will matter even more as an additional layer of downside protection. As we look forward, I think our balanced combination of mezzanine debt and equity tranches, along with strong credit hedging, leaves us nicely set up to capture upside while staying resilient as market conditions shift. Elevated repricing activity and continued credit dispersion should keep generating chances to outperform via active portfolio management, which only strengthens our confidence in producing solid total returns for shareholders. And with us now nearing a fully invested position, the probable next move is to issue long-term unsecured notes, something we aim to wrap up within the next few weeks, assuming market conditions allow. We anticipate that this extra capital will be accretive to net investment income as well as GAAP earnings. Now, let's turn it over to Q&A. Operator, please go ahead.
I want to ask about the hedges and what's happened with them lately. Like you mentioned, there was a fairly significant shift in credit hedges between the close of September and the close of October. Could you walk through what you're observing? What caused that rise compared with the end of September? Do you believe spreads are too narrow right now? And then, naturally, we've all been picking up on the — all the macro chatter around credit, private credit; so I'm just wondering what your take is on that, what you're seeing inside your portfolio, and just in a wider sense?
Absolutely. I'll give it the first shot. Greg, if that's alright with you. The growth in the credit hedges' size came largely from growth in the portfolio's size plus growth in leverage, purely measured in absolute dollar terms, meaning how much debt we carry via repo; so one big piece of how we determine the sizing of our credit hedges is ensuring that during a severe market downturn, we'll have sufficient liquidity from the gains on those credit hedges to handle any liquidity problems stemming from our repo. So that's genuinely the main source of it. But — and as for market timing, I'll hand that over to Greg. Clearly we do possess the capability, and we also prefer to modify the credit hedge portfolio's size based on how tight credit spreads happen to be historically. Greg?
Yes. To build on what Larry said, it's key to keep in mind that these hedges exist mainly to guard against a drawdown; they aren't a short position that we're deliberately putting on. So in the early days, when we weren't financing our positions to the same degree, or when we were weighted more heavily toward CLO equity — which we don't finance the same way we would finance CLO mezzanine positions — those hedges weren't as essential. As we've ramped up financing on CLO mezzanine positions, since we've leaned toward favoring those, we've had to build in additional protection for drawdown scenarios from a liquidity standpoint. That being said, we're always trading these hedges as positions rise and fall. If we're exiting something, we might scale them back so we're careful not to end up running shorter than we'd want. But you're correct — as we watch some of these sales expand in parts of the corporate credit market, we continue to view tail risk as attractively priced. So putting on certain hedges at these levels, compared with where we might make long investments using some financing, that trade-off, in our view, works out favorably for EARN overall.
Also, let me mention that our NCSR will be submitted before long, and it provides an in-depth view of the whole portfolio, hedges included; once those documents are available, you'll notice that they are largely what we'd describe as tail hedges, correct, intended as protection against tail scenarios.
All right, that's clear. Larry, I understand what you're saying about adding to the hedges as the portfolio grew in the third calendar quarter. However, when I look at just October, there was clearly a sizable rise in hedges, yet the CLO portfolio shrank, if I'm reading that correctly. Did that reflect a more careful stance on credit?
Greg, any thoughts on this? Honestly, I would need to examine that more closely before I could respond.
I'd have to check on that. We haven't been trying to deliberately paint a picture that's shorter or more defensive. Broadly speaking, what you're probably picking up on is some rotation. Like I mentioned, the hedges come into play when we're providing financing to mezz physicians — since we're layering on leverage there, the drawdown tied to that financing tends to get more of our attention. Another factor is that in earlier periods, our ability to hedge was narrower than what's available now, both in terms of the bank agreements we could put in place and what instruments we could actually trade. We participate in many different — we access many different kinds of markets for various tail hedges. So from a notional perspective, it's quite possible you'll spot positions with lower beta or delta that carry a bigger notional for that reason. That means we'd need to dig into how the notional is sized. That said, on the whole, this isn't really an increase in what we regard as the true risk, or risk-equivalent, of those hedges. It may simply appear different on a notional basis because we've shifted from one product into another.
All right. Then this will be my final inquiry. Do you have any details — I'm simply reviewing the October tear sheet here. Is there anything you can share regarding the CLO portfolio, which declined somewhat, landing at $371 million compared with $380 million, as you're approaching complete deployment? What's behind that drop?
During October, you mean?
Yes.
Right, so October also happens to be one of the quarterly distribution dates. As a result, the equity portfolio is going to generate payouts, and on top of that, prices typically get marked down somewhat; so once those distributions came through, I believe part of that was reflected. On top of that, CLO equity experienced a modest selloff during October. That, in my view, is what showed up in the market; consequently, you witnessed the NAV shift to account for that somewhat.
Crispin, one more thing from me: on a net basis, our debt portfolio was up compared with the prior month, while equities came down, and the main factor there is the distribution Greg referred to.
You brought up that we might look at unsecured debt as an option. Could you discuss how much leverage you're comfortable with and what your thinking is on where that leverage would sit, given this conversation's context? To isolate that factor, we'll keep the asset mix unchanged.
Absolutely. As I mentioned, at present we're essentially at a fully invested position. I believe at 300 — somewhere in the range of $370 million to $380 million, let's say, we'd clearly have capacity to reach roughly $400 million, perhaps somewhat higher. The '40 Act's various limits do restrict us. Being a completely compliant derivative user does provide us slightly greater latitude; that works out to just under 2:1 leverage. Once more, that reflects our present 2:1 asset to equity leverage. It also reflects the makeup of our current portfolio, correct? Consequently, when we hold more mezzanine debt, we're able to employ more leverage, while holding more equity generally means less. And should we pursue an unsecured transaction, I believe you'd see that, right? For the sake of illustration, suppose it were a $50 million deal, right? That extra capital — I think a decent guideline, again, would be a bit under 2:1 assets relative to that added debt capital.
Do you have any views or forecasts regarding how much CLO supply we could see in the coming year? And how sensitive might the market be if issuance rises to higher levels, and perhaps what conditions do you think would shape the spread environment next year?
Sure. Honestly, my conviction on that is not very strong. I believe part of it will hinge on what happens with new issue loan supply. If you talk to many market participants, just about everyone acknowledges that the ARB has been challenging given how tight loans are. I think much like this year, you'll witness a great deal of reset and refinancing activity on existing deals rather than genuine new issue, simply given where the market stands today. That said, it's difficult to predict what could occur on both the asset and liability side. Depending on what happens with rates, that can push technicals inside the loan market, and potentially on the liability side too; and should you get a scenario where some loans end up selling off and perhaps widening on spread while AAAs and maybe some of the up the stack tranches stay in better shape, this could offer a favorable window for new issue — true new issue to come back. But at present, it seems we will stay in this environment as things are now, where people are getting creative with existing deals, trying to give them new life and extend them out versus newer — cleaner new issue deals; that's where demand is, at least today.
All right, that's pretty fascinating. When it comes to AI-linked credits appearing in the CLO space, particularly the middle market CLO segment, do you hold any broad views? Also, do you see a significant amount of indirect exposure tied to the broader AI story and how that connects to credit flows?
Absolutely. Taking the first portion of your question, the loan market is certainly going to feel an effect. My sense is that as AI works its way across many areas — and it's not purely a tech story. Many businesses stand to gain from AI when it comes to lowering expenses. That said, AI might also render certain businesses unable to compete. Consequently, when we talk with CLO managers and examine our own positions in certain of these credits, it becomes clear that some slice of the market is going to be impacted — at times favorably, at times unfavorably — by whatever AI eventually delivers. This ties into another element of our worry regarding dispersion. Should it sharply produce winners and losers, that situation isn't ideal for CLO equity. When the winners refinance and exit at tighter spreads while the losers suffer fundamental deterioration, that outcome isn't great for the portfolio's overall weighted average spread, nor for its default rate. So dispersion is among the things that concern us. Regarding the middle market segment, I'm not certain I'd offer a distinct take. Lately there's been reporting and articles concerning certain of those segments, perhaps within the private credit middle market, that have begun showing troubles among certain names. There could be parallels to how AI impacts the broadly syndicated loan market. These parts of the credit markets will be affected too. It might simply require time to surface, since marks don't shift as rapidly and the underlying loans there aren't traded as actively. That's something where, despite our willingness to enter those markets, we stay considerably smaller, because our heavily trading-oriented background makes it harder for us to gauge daily risk as things evolve when the underlying portfolio — or certain of those portfolios — aren't responding to current information. So it does make us cautious about certain of those areas, as you noted, regarding how fast we'd be able to spot it if AI causes a negative development in those portfolios.
Everyone, that brings us to the last question for this session. We appreciate your joining us on the conference call covering Ellington Credit Company's results for the second fiscal quarter that closed on September 30, 2025. At this point you're free to hang up, and enjoy the remainder of your day.
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