Ellington Credit Company (EARN) Earnings Call Transcript
March 5, 2026
Earnings Call Speaker Segments
Thank you. Before we get started, I want to remind everybody that this conference call might contain forward-looking statements as defined under the Safe Harbor Provisions of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995. Such statements aren't historical by nature and carry risks and uncertainties that are described in detail in our registration statement on Form N-2. Actual results could differ materially from what is stated here, so these remarks shouldn't be viewed as forecasts of future events. The fund assumes no duty to update any of these forward-looking statements. With me on the call today are Larry Penn, Chief Executive Officer of Ellington Credit Company, Greg Borenstein, Portfolio Manager, and Chris Merna, Chief Financial Officer. The presentation for our earnings conference call can be found on our website, ellingtoncredit.com. Today's call will follow along with that presentation, and every statement and reference to figures is qualified by the important notice in the endnotes located at the back of the presentation; with that, I'll hand things over to Larry.
Thanks, Alain. Good morning, everyone. We appreciate the time you're spending with us and your interest in Ellington Credit Company, which we frequently call by its New York Stock Exchange ticker, E-A-R-N or EARN. Please go to slide 3. The fourth calendar quarter represented the toughest market backdrop for CLO equity since mid-2022. Before that, the only comparable period was the COVID crisis. Thanks to how actively and carefully we manage the portfolio, Ellington Credit limited fund losses to about 9% of NAV, which again topped the broader peer group. A number of the same forces that struck the leveraged loan market likewise hit the CLO equity market, particularly wide credit dispersion and continuous coupon spread compression. Those are exactly the factors behind performance in prior quarters. Put plainly, weaker credits trailed while stronger borrowers continued refinancing and repricing at narrower yield spreads; these forces kept weighing on leveraged loan prices and reducing excess interest throughout most of the CLO market. Taken together, those forces put serious pressure on CLO equity results—projected cash flows came in lower and mark-to-market values weakened—and technical selling at year-end compounded the decline. Nomura Research estimates put the median CLO equity return at negative 9% for the quarter and negative 14% for the entire year. At Ellington Credit Company, our credit-focused relative value approach and active trading style helped blunt those headwinds. CLO mezzanine debt tranches, which we have concentrated on lately, performed relatively well. Opportunistic trades contributed positively. As slide 3 shows, yield spreads on CLO debt tranches did widen, but that widening was much more limited than the disruption experienced in CLO equity. Following our April 1 conversion into a CLO closed-end fund, and through the fourth quarter of the calendar year, we steadily increased the share of assets we held in CLO mezzanine debt tranches. We saw those tranches as delivering an appealing mix of income and protection on the downside, thanks to the credit enhancement built into their structure. Consistent with that shift in strategy, mezzanine debt tranches accounted for about 70% of the CLO purchases we completed during that nine-month stretch. We also identified a few attractive CLO equity opportunities in the secondary market, and we generally avoided CLO equity in the new issue market, because pricing there was largely unattractive. In Q4, we benefited again — something that was true for a good portion of last year too — from a number of mezzanine positions purchased at discounts that got redeemed at par, generating realized gains. Those redemptions, along with opportunistic trading, partly offset the portfolio growth that came from new mezzanine investment activity. Despite that, debt as a percentage of our CLO portfolio grew considerably, ending the year at slightly below 50%, compared with about one-third at the time of our April 1st conversion. Once again, active trading played a major role in our relative outperformance. We executed 47 distinct CLO trades during the quarter, not counting deal liquidations, and we actively managed our credit hedges. Our October interest payments and equity distributions were deployed into better-quality mezzanine debt positions aimed at deleveraging, and at the same time we reduced exposure to mezzanine debt profiles carrying higher dollar prices and longer spread duration, where the risk-reward equation struck us as less attractive. We also capitalized on meaningful spread concessions available in the new issue debt market, adding double B-rated tranches at notably higher yields; when it comes to equity, we continue to be selective and steer clear of profiles that are more levered and of lower quality. Through this active stance, we were able to soften downside pressure, capture gains when opportunities arose, and reposition the portfolio toward improved risk-adjusted returns. Having this much trading going on gives us up-to-the-minute data, which is particularly useful when markets are swinging as wildly as they are now. Slide six shows that, in fact, every sub-sector posted positive realized gains during the quarter. That being said, as we noted earlier in our monthly NAV updates, CLO equity valuations fell broadly across the market, which pushed the fund's NAV down and produced an overall net loss for the quarter. Still, losses aren't all the same. Although drops in value caused by loan losses underneath, plus refinancings and repricings of premium loans, can't be undone, part of the quarterly NAV decrease came from credit spreads widening rather than actual credit impairment or a weakening of fundamentals. So some of those mark-to-market losses may be recovered should market conditions return to normal. Kindly refer to slide 10, which summarizes our credit hedges—we added substantially to these in the fourth quarter. Because corporate credit spreads stayed narrow compared with CLO spreads, we could obtain this protection cost-effectively and on favorable terms. On slide 10 you’ll see that by year-end our credit hedge portfolio had grown to about $175 million in high-yield CDX bond equivalents — roughly 90% of NAV, which means the protection these hedges provide is quite substantial. There has been plenty for credit markets to absorb in the way of headlines, ranging from the Tricolor and First Brands collapses to mounting worries about software-sector borrowers confronting AI-driven disruption. To put it briefly, although the 4th quarter proved difficult across the CLO space generally, the disciplined, active way we manage the portfolio softened the blow, produced EARN's relative outperformance, and put us in a position to play offense in what we see as an investment environment growing richer in opportunity as we head into 2026. At this point I'll hand things over to Chris, who will walk through the financial results in greater detail. Chris?
Thanks, Larry, and good morning to all of you. Please direct your attention to slide 4. GAAP net loss came in at $0.56 per share for the fourth calendar quarter; slide 6 provides a breakdown of portfolio net income across CLO sub-sectors. Our quarterly loss was primarily caused by substantial mark-to-market losses on CLO equity, whereas CLO mezzanine debt performed comparatively well; within the U.S. leveraged loan market, results varied dramatically according to credit quality over the quarter. CCC loans, which are lower-rated, faced considerable strain stemming from heightened CLO reset and liquidation activity as well as increasing defaults, even as premium priced loans kept refinancing at par. In that environment, spreads on CLO debt widened, and CLO equity absorbed the worst of the weakness, since tighter spreads and deteriorating credit among weaker loans pushed excess interest and underlying asset values down at the same time. Seasoned mezzanine tranches of higher quality held up better. Europe presented a more mixed picture: loans there lagged those in the U.S., while CLO debt tranche spreads largely proved more stable in comparison. In our CLO mezzanine debt portfolio, net interest income and trading gains, along with the favorable effect of calling deals on positions we held at discounts to par, made up for most of the mark-to-market write-downs. Results were further weighed down by credit hedges, which mirrored robust gains across credit and equity markets over the period. Sequentially, net interest income fell $0.02, landing at $0.21 per share for the quarter, as lower asset yields and portfolio turnover took their toll. On a GAAP basis, our CLO portfolio posted a weighted average yield of 13.7% for the quarter, compared with 15.5% the quarter before. A modest quarter-over-quarter decrease in the overall size of our CLO portfolio is shown on Slide 7. New purchases during the quarter reached $66 million — 60% CLO debt and 40% CLO equity — while we sold $19 million of CLOs, in line with our active trading approach. As of December 31st, CLO equity made up 52% of total CLO holdings, about the same as the previous quarter, while European CLO investments were 12%, compared with 14% at September 30th. On Slide 8, you can see an overview of the corporate loans that underlie our CLO investments. The collateral is still mostly first lien, floating rate leverage loans, which represent about 95% of the underlying assets. Our industry exposure is well diversified, led by technology, financial services, and healthcare, and no single sector is above 11%. Loan maturities are spread across several years, with the biggest concentrations in 2028 and 2031 and few near-term maturities, giving a weighted average loan maturity of 4.3 years. Looking at facility sizes, they lean toward bigger borrowers — 44% are in facilities above $1.5 billion, and the weighted average comes to $1.6 billion, which is supportive for liquidity. More detail on the loan collateral underlying our portfolio appears on slide nine. On slide 10 you'll find a snapshot of our credit hedges as of year-end. As Larry noted, we added to our corporate credit hedges during the quarter, and by December 31st that portfolio was at roughly 90% of net asset value. We also maintained a foreign currency hedge portfolio designed to manage the exposure arising from our European CLO investments. Let's move to slide 11. At December 31st, net asset value stood at $5.19 per share, and cash plus cash equivalents totaled $24.3 million. For the quarter, total return measured on a net asset value basis was negative 9.1%. I'll now turn it over to Greg, who will discuss the CLO market backdrop, the positioning of our portfolio, and our outlook. Greg?
Thanks, Chris; it's good to be able to talk with all of you today. All in all, calendar Q4 proved difficult for junior CLO tranches, and for CLO equity in particular. A lot of the forces that pressured CLO equity throughout 2025 carried on and actually intensified during Q4, which hurt performance further. CLO mezzanine tranches likewise posted subdued returns, yet they did better than CLO equity, and EARN's larger allocation to mezz worked in the fund's favor and helped cushion part of the losses. On top of that, the softness in CLO equity showed up more sharply in new issue than in the secondary market. Once again, EARN refrained from taking part in new issue equity transactions over the quarter. Across the 11 months since our conversion, we have taken part in just one new issue equity transaction. Calendar Q4 ranked among the hardest quarters for CLO equity in recent memory. Persistent dispersion put heavy pressure on performance, since fundamental problems and lower quality credits, combined with ongoing coupon spread compression and better quality credits, weighed on both interest cash flows and NAV valuations. Beyond that, since CLO liabilities typically carry longer non-call periods than the loans underneath them, CLO managers could only refinance or reset debt tranches at cheaper financing costs to a limited degree. Consequently, CLOs were mostly unable to reap the advantage of lower rates at the liability level, which might otherwise have softened the impact of coupon spread compression on equity cash flows. Even so, as we head into 2026, over 40% of EARN's US CLO portfolio is made up of deals whose non-call periods are set to end before year-end. As those deals turn refinanceable, refinancing liabilities and resetting them at tighter spreads might help reduce the drag caused by coupon spread compression, provided market conditions allow it; during the fourth quarter, weak arbitrage held back CLO new issue volumes. As mentioned, the fund kept steering clear of new issue equity. People are paying more attention to the way manager-controlled captive funds shape pricing on new issues. That discussion is worthwhile, but we believe structural and technical forces also warrant a careful stance on new-issue equity; secondary trading has offered us more attractive opportunities, and it continues to suit Ellington's strengths as an active trader. Subordination levels and structural protections remain critical for defense against persistent idiosyncratic and sector-specific credit troubles. We continue to favor defensive CLO mezzanine positions, which outperformed equity by a wide margin during the quarter. Compared with equity, mezzanine debt carries far less exposure to coupon spread compression. Following the recent drop in loan prices, just about 15% of the universe was priced above par at the end of February. It's clear that prepayment risk on CLO equity has diminished. That 15% level is below the 57% recorded at the start of the year and marks the weakest reading since the tariff shocks of last April. Given our active trading approach and relative value framework, we continue to reassess our mezz to equity weighting as the opportunity set evolves. In Europe, debt tranche spreads widened less than they did in the U.S. As you can see on slide 3, we were able to monetize gains and rotate capital, which brought down our overall European exposure as a result. Although comparable credit dispersion patterns showed up, European CLO equity during Q4 avoided the level of spread tightening that occurred in the U.S. As we move deep into 2026, CLO equity—and mezzanine, though less so—has continued to lag, and that softness has been spreading into wider markets on worries about software and AI-linked credits. Now more than ever, I think EARN's active trading, emphasis on liquidity, rigorous risk management, and tail hedges position us well to capitalize on dislocations and produce alpha during volatile stretches. I'll hand it back to Larry.
Thank you, Greg. To start, I want to pull back from the quarter and look at the whole 2025 calendar year, since I believe the larger picture gives useful context for our current position. For Ellington Credit, 2025 was a year of transformation; our conversion into a CLO closed-end fund wrapped up on April 1st, and right after that we sold off every remaining mortgage-related asset efficiently, with barely any effect on NAV, even amid the market upheaval caused by the tariff announcements. With that much volatility, we take particular pride in how smoothly it all went. The transition was clean and well executed, and it put us in a position to concentrate solely on the CLO opportunity set from here on. Once the conversion was done, we went about constructing our CLO portfolio in a deliberate way, growing it to $370 million by the end of the calendar year—an increase of almost 50%—and we added credit hedges right alongside that growth. Over that nine-month stretch, we completed 218 CLO trades. That figure includes $272 million in purchases and $63 million in sales, leaving out redemptions. Compared with other closed-end funds focused on CLOs, the earnings stream we produced was both considerably stronger and far less volatile, which directly mirrors how disciplined and intensely active we are in building the portfolio and managing risk. Next, I'll discuss what we've done so far in 2026. Through January and February, we kept seeing much of the same challenging market conditions. CLO equity stayed under considerable strain, as the credit worries we described earlier kept dragging on sentiment. Mezzanine debt, by contrast, held up relatively well; for January, I'm happy to say EARN again beat its peer group, finishing the month with an NAV per share of $5.04. February proved an even harder month for the sector, which we believe has opened up many additional opportunities. On portfolio activity, our overall portfolio shrank because of the NAV decline; we've kept adding mezzanine debt positions, especially in deleveraging double B tranches. We've also been busy lately exercising CLO call options, which produced real-life gains on debt tranches bought at discounts to par. Beyond that, we recently wound down some CLOs in which we held discount positions, and that has done more to bolster the credit quality of what remains in EARN's portfolio while also helping us accumulate liquidity during a period of significant market turbulence. Mezzanine debt has made up more than three-quarters of our purchases in 2026. In select instances where the value appeared compelling, we have also modestly increased our CLO equity holdings — for example, in deals featuring mispriced call optionality, where we believe the sell-off was excessive and the entry points look appealing. We have likewise remained disciplined in maintaining very sizable credit hedges. Because of the dispersion we've witnessed in the corporate credit market, those credit hedges have not yet been able to offset the declines in CLO equity prices, and we still regard them as an indispensable element of how we manage the portfolio. That holds even more true at present, since overall yield spreads in the corporate credit markets remain relatively tight on a historical view. Going forward, our focus is on rebuilding net investment income and net asset value as we put capital to work in what increasingly resembles a distressed market. For a more passive strategy, such an environment merely generates headwinds. For us, that's productive territory—it generates the kind of relative value and trading setups where active trading paired with disciplined risk management can contribute real value. As noted before, we continue to think a significant share of the recent price drops is reversible, since what drove them was widening yield spreads, not fundamental credit impairment. Equally significant is the fact that, as a closed-end fund issuer, we have not drawn on the capital markets so far; we are exploring the possibility of issuing long-term unsecured debt in the weeks ahead, which could provide us with a substantial amount of extra dry powder at what may prove an ideal moment; in our view, today's conditions — characterized by dislocations and growing relative value opportunities — are particularly well suited to our active investing and trading approach, and we look forward to bringing you an update on our progress next quarter. With that said, let's begin the Q&A session. Operator, please go ahead.
Hello, Benjamin Graham here, sitting in for Crispin Love. Appreciate you taking my question. You said before that the portfolio is quite diversified across industries, and that no sector makes up more than 11% of exposure in it. Clearly, there's plenty of negative headline focus on software and so on. I'm just curious about your view on sentiment in that area, and then whether there are other sectors you're especially enthusiastic about. Thank you.
Go ahead, Greg.
Absolutely. The way I see it, a big part of what makes CLOs attractive is diversification. You get diversification across sectors, and you also get it across individual names. You'll see some headlines about what may be happening in certain parts of private credit, but in some of those vehicles, positions can be quite chunky. That's also true in certain segments of the middle market and even the private credit CLO market. When you carry large exposure to a single name, you simply take on far more idiosyncratic risk. In our experience, that's much harder to keep in check. With the risk management framework and process we have in place, we generally take more comfort in the fact that so long as our portfolio mirrors the broader market—whether by percentage of sectors, percentage of names, and so forth—the risk becomes more statistical in nature for us to manage. As for our views on particular sectors, software has certainly taken damage, and that sector has sold off considerably. Based on how we analyze the credits and how we talk with the managers who are examining those credits, there will be winners and losers, which has been the pattern for many things over the last year. In certain instances, you may have names showing genuine warning signs that should concern us, while others might get pushed down in sympathy as managers cut back overall sector exposure. I wouldn't say we hold a strong view; if loan prices are particularly weak or cheap on a name-by-name basis within that sector, I think the key is simply to keep those exposures appropriately aligned.
Great. Thanks so much for the detail there.
Sure.
Hey, everyone. Good morning. Thanks for taking my question. First, I was wondering if you could help us quantify what proportion of the loans underlying the portfolio are rated triple C or lower.
Greg, would you happen to have that handy?
I don't have it handy, but generally speaking, a lot of these do operate that way. In a CLO, 7.5% is a typical CCC bucket. I could get you the exact percentage by taking a look at the underlying. Obviously, the percentage exposure — I'm getting some feedback on a deal-by-deal basis.
Got it.
Because, take a well-supported mezzanine tranche that we hold, for instance—when a deal carries a particular level of CCC exposure, our risk isn't necessarily as great as it would be if we held an equity tranche instead.
Yes. Yes, absolutely.
Take the CLO loan index, for instance — it sits at roughly 4.4%. Given the diversification we just discussed, in terms of equity to mezz across a number of deals, with plenty of underlying loans beneath all of these, my guess is that we're tracking not too far off from that 4.4% figure you see in the CLO market overall.
Understood. Okay. Appreciate it.
Yeah, sorry — I was just about to say that we'll look at putting that onto our monthly tear sheet.
Great. All right, I'm receiving a bit of feedback. Going back to the credit hedges: I believe the January update mentioned that you had reduced the $175 million position slightly. Could you help us get a sense of how much negative carry those positions generate? At current high yield levels, you know, I'm calculating roughly $0.04 per quarter, though perhaps you put those on at much tighter levels.
I think first, maybe, Greg, you can speak to the carry question. When it comes to trimming the size of the credit portfolio, the loan portfolio also declined. You know, both declines are modest, 12/31 to 1/31. It was, you know, a smaller credit hedge portfolio, in lockstep with a slightly smaller loan portfolio.
Okay. Thanks.
Greg, would you like to say something about the kind of drag you're seeing from the credit hedges, on a go-forward basis?
Sure. I think overall, there's what we've been through, and then there's what we've had up to now. I think if you look at when you talk about what's happened this year, for instance, it's been a fairly minimal drag simply because you've actually seen, at least year-to-date, some widening in high-yield, right? Also, you have to keep in mind that we really target these hedges at larger drawdown scenarios. We're very conscious of the drag. I think the protection we have is much more in sort of these bigger shocks if you take a look at the holdings that we have in there, versus what the drag is on a run rate. I can get you the exact as of today, 'cause obviously this number moves around—
Yeah.
It really depends on how far spreads widen. I should note that amid all this volatility, we've done a fair amount of repositioning and rotating. When we look at it, we're aware that some of these shorts could be in a high yield index that's more liquid. Some could be in loan form, since we've seen very specific loan issues there. And also on the out of the money side, various kinds of puts and pairs. Off the top of my head, roughly speaking, what you're probably seeing is an overall drag of about 1%-2% of fund NAV per annum. Given the current environment and risk, we think that's a small — or very reasonable — price for the protection we'd get if volatility or some kind of drawdown were to really persist through the year.
Yeah, even 2% would come to under $0.01 a month — well worth it.
To say it again: by keeping the protection tilted toward options that sit further out of the money, the expense of that protection drops quite a lot, in our view. If you try to protect yourself more aggressively closer to home, I think a couple of problems crop up. First, the cost is clearly going to hit hard. Second, you've got basis risk, correct? The trouble you actually face with those really tail-end loan names down the capital structure isn't something you can easily keep in check when the tools you're using are more liquid indices, right? Take loans, for instance — you'd have noticed them lagging behind instruments such as high yield, or trailing just about any of the equities. So we also stay careful about how accurate and how effective the hedge we pick will be, right? Basis risks come in many forms, so we keep that in mind.
Understood, that helps. Breaking it down would be interesting to see, you know. As you're aware, we're only looking at high yield CDX, which is what you cited as the equivalent. Clearly, using individual positions involves far more basis. No, I appreciate the insight.
Of course. My view is that it's still going to come out, you know?
Right.
Right. It isn't really about positions in individual names, though. That's not our approach; it's more broad-based CDX, you know, and instruments like that.
It's a lot of, you know, as Larry was saying, you'll come across various kinds of indices, maybe ETFs, correct? The CLO market—we hold a big number of tranches backed by, you know, every one of these deals might contain hundreds of loans; that genuinely generates quite a bit of diversification, and it lets us be somewhat more statistical. Through using indices too, that permits us to represent the same thing in a similar way, right? We're not here. Making single name bets isn't our strength, like we were mentioning. Unless we believe there's an outsized exposure to one name that exists for some reason, and perhaps we want to take that on—generally, we aim to steer clear of single name bets on the long side as well as single name bets on the short side. When you examine what we typically hold, just to give you a sense of what we usually deploy in our arsenal: CDX high yield index out of the money, IWM puts, loan ETF shorts, credit index tranches, loan ETF puts, right? I think it's simply all within that segment of the market that we believe presents differing values in how we wish to protect, and some mixture of those, you know, we'll pivot around and tweak depending on how our portfolio and our loans shift, right? The way we view things and the way we believe that that assists in sort of protecting and managing our risk.
Got it. Well, I really appreciate that color. Thanks for all the assistance.
Mm-hmm.
Hey, thanks. Good morning. All right. Clearly there's a lot of focus on redemptions for asset managers at the moment. What I'd like to know is how big a knock-on effect do you see between redemptions and conditions and, you know, spread widening in the CLO market?
Greg?
Well, one thing worth highlighting is perhaps the redemptions you've noticed in products such as JAAA, correct? That ETF actually tends to shift as money flows in and out, and it's simpler to monitor. Look, I believe the worries about loans, worries about where interest rates could be headed, right, have definitely contributed to, you know, what might be driving that. Floating rate funds, you know, there are other ETFs that I'd say resemble, you know, JAAA, which is the largest one in this category, and have gone through a comparable set of circumstances. I mean, this is roughly what we're watching for. For an active trader like us, it generates a fantastic chance, with capital shifting from one place to another, plenty of people reallocating their holdings. You know, a lot of repositioning happens even out of some of these ETFs, where it isn't strictly money coming in or going out, but perhaps they're reallocating, right? Since the market is far more active, as price discovery takes hold, it's genuinely advantageous when it comes to actually trading actively and adjusting positions. Honestly, it's something we've been eager for.
Okay. That's, that's fascinating. Thank you. The next question is perhaps more tied to the overall mechanics of handling possible defaults and how the schedule and framework for resolving those defaults appears. Would you describe it essentially as a binary result regarding recovering possible proceeds, or is the severity nearly always 100% in the CLO market?
No, no. If you looked at leveraged loans historically, those recoveries were considerably above zero. I mean, recovery levels have declined over time. I think that, you know, historically, I think plenty of data exists on this. You know, perhaps it was around 70; it's likely come down from that somewhat. I think that. Sorry, if you examine CLOs, for instance, if you look at par. We track something known as par burn, right? Which is simply the overall kind of loss on a deal. Just because now you must keep in mind that occasionally there's some loss not categorized as a default. For instance, if something is a distressed exchange, it isn't a technical default. And there's typically, you know, some reduction. If you examine CLOs, you know, with underlying leveraged loans, the typical par burn or loss rate, as we kind of view it from a practical standpoint, is roughly 75 basis points each year, which, you know, helps to somewhat explain that. When loans are defaulting, you are seeing genuine recoveries. Now, it differs. Some certainly have been near 0. You know, others have been far greater. Those are all extremely deal specific, right? This is where you get into, you know, do you have liability management exercises? How are the sponsors handling things? Are there in-groups and out-groups? You know, defaults and losses have risen, since I think we observed some of these problems. CLOs have experienced far less of that than private credit, correct? These broadly syndicated loans offer genuine transparency, and they do get actively priced each day, right? You typically have a good sense of where most of these sit in terms of bid and offer; we remain mindful of where losses might land. They ran above historical averages last year. When you see concerns specific to certain sectors, I think one reason we stay mindful and tepid about adding equity exposure is that, as a first loss CLO, you face direct exposure to any defaults that could happen. I'm not sure whether that squarely answers your question.
Yeah, no. That detail was really helpful. Thank you both so much. Appreciate it.
Sure.
That brings us to the last question for today. Thank you for joining us on the Ellington Credit Company conference call covering results for the fiscal quarter that ended December 31st, 2025. You are now free to disconnect your line, and we wish you a great day.
Read the full transcript via the API
You're viewing the first half of this call. Get the complete Ellington Credit Company transcript - plus 132,000+ transcripts from 7,000+ companies, speaker segments and full-text search - through the EarningsAPI REST API or hosted MCP server.
Get an API key View API docs →For developers and AI pipelines
Programmatic access to Ellington Credit Company earnings transcripts and 132,000+ others is available through the
EarningsAPI REST API and the hosted MCP server.
Quarterly plans from $162 - full transcripts, speaker segments, full-text search,
and the /api/v1/transcripts/recent polling endpoint for ETL pipelines.