d'Amico International Shipping S.A. (DIS) Earnings Call Transcript
November 5, 2026
Earnings Call Speaker Segments
Good afternoon, everyone. I'm the conference operator. Thanks for being here and welcome to the web call on d'Amico International Shipping's results for the third quarter and the 9 months of 2026. <<operator_script>> Right now, I'd like to hand things over to Federico Rosen, our CFO. Sir, the floor is yours.
Hi everyone, and thanks for joining our earnings call presentation. As we normally do, I’ll leave out the executive summary and move right to the overview of our fleet. At the close of September, we had 28 vessels. That figure is in fact 27 now, since we handed over to the buyers 1 vessel we sold, whose sale we announced during the year. The High Tide was delivered at the start of this week. So at present, we have 6 LR1 vessels and 16 MRs. At the end of September, that figure was 15, along with 16 Handys, and in addition we have 10 ships, 10 vessels under construction: 4 LR1s with expected delivery in the second half of 2027, and 4 LR2s and 2 Handys with expected deliveries in 2029. A young fleet: 10.2 years average age at the end of September. Also at the end of September, 96% of our fleet was eco. That figure is now 100% after the sale of the vessels I just mentioned. Turning to our bank debt situation, the usual graph we present: we’ve been quite active during the first 9 months of the year. We voluntarily prepaid $59.2 million of existing facilities, and we had new drawdowns and new financing totaling $75 million.
So the objectives we set out to hit were, first, pushing out the maturities on our bank debt. When last year wrapped up, we still had a fairly substantial chunk of debt coming due and maturing in 2027. As you can see, that is no longer the case. The gray portion of the bar indicates the debt that expires in each year. And in fact, as you can see, the next net maturity debt expiring -- the next maturity debt lands in 2028 at $3.8 million, a pretty small amount, and we are in fact already working on it. The other objective we had here was bringing down our average cost of debt, given our strong financial situation and our improved credit rating, and we have been doing that. In fact, we have been refinancing some facilities that carried a margin over SOFR of 200 basis points, 220 basis points, with new facilities at 140 basis points, 130 basis points over SOFR. Turning to the next slide. As usual here, we provide an outlook on the year's last quarter. As you can see, as we speak, these are figures stated as of last night actually. We had 59% of our days in Q4 fixed on time charter at $24,200 a day.
In Q4, 25% of our days are locked in on the spot market, averaging $62,129 per day. All told, combining these 2 pieces gives us a blended daily TCE of $35,500 a day, which equals 84% of our Q4 days. So the quarter ahead looks extremely profitable. We also ran a sensitivity on the free days — if those unfixed days earn $40,000 a day, our blended TCE would come to $36,258. At $45,000 a day, it would climb past $37,000. At $50,000 a day, blended daily TCE would reach almost $38,000 a day. Onto the next slide. Above, you can see the estimated evolution of our fleet, reflecting, as you know, the newbuilding plan we have with 4 vessels, which as I mentioned earlier are expected to be delivered in the second half of 2027, and the other 6, expected for delivery in 2029. One thing I reminded you of earlier is that we have also exercised the purchase options we held on 2 bareboat chartering vessels, High Explorer and Fidelity. One of these 2 vessels was already delivered at the start of this week, while the other will come to us in mid-January 2027.
So by the time this process wraps up—and you can see it in the figure here for 2027—our fleet will be fully owned. That's potential upside to earnings. Here's the sensitivity we have for each $1,000 a day we earn on the spot market. Naturally, that applies to the days that are unfixed right now, the days that are free at the moment. And that figure comes to $400,000 plus or minus on our bottom line for 2026. It's clearly larger for 2027, at $6.2 million, and larger still for 2028, given the lower coverage we currently have for that year, with the amount at $10.4 million for every $1,000 a day on the spot rate we achieve. At the bottom, you can see our estimated net results on our fixed contract days. What this means is that if we ran the remainder of the year on the unfixed days at a breakeven level, we would earn $152.4 million of estimated net profit in fiscal year 2026. If instead we averaged $20,000 a day on the unfixed days, our potential net result would climb to $154.4 million this year. If we earned $35,000 a day, we would exceed $160 million of net profit for this year.
If we were bringing in $50,000 per day, our net result would land near $166 million, which is what we're presenting here. On the next slide, looking at costs: our daily OpEx came to $8,347. Compared with the same period in 2025, we saw higher crew and insurance expenses, a pattern we've observed throughout the year. On G&A, the total for the first 9 months of 2026 was $22.3 million, up from $19.2 million in the equivalent period of 2025. As I've said a number of times, this really mirrors a larger variable portion in our personnel costs, which clearly stems from the very strong financial performance we've delivered to date. Turning to financial results and the net financial position as of the end of September 2026: as you'll recall, we reached a net cash position for the first time at the end of June 2026. We've built on that position further still. So at the close of September, our net cash position stood at $56.6 million — or, in fact, $58.3 million once you exclude certain residual effects from applying IFRS 16 — with cash and cash equivalents of $265.4 million.
The ratio we consistently compute — net financial position against fleet market value — actually came out negative, since we hold a net cash position of 4.3%. And that number, as we frequently mention and like to recall, stood at nearly 73% by the close of 2018. On the P&L, the income statement, we posted net profit of $107.2 million across the first 9 months of 2026. Q3 net profit reached $27.8 million, a considerable improvement over the matching period in 2025. EBITDA totaled nearly $146 million during the year's first 9 months, with an EBITDA margin on total net revenue of 64.7%. The overall net result, as you can observe, also takes in a positive $5.3 million from vessel disposals, driven mostly by a gain on the sale of High Seas — the ship we divested in Q2 of 2026. Moving to the next slide, key operating measures: we averaged almost $41,100 per day on the spot market over the first 9 months of the year. Meanwhile, across those 9 months we fixed 63.2% of our days at an average rate of $23,400 per day.
All told, we posted a daily average TCE of $29,900 a day. As you can see, that's considerably better than what we made in the same period of 2025, when we earned $23,473 on the spot market. Our coverage was lower, at 48.4%, with an average of $23,700 a day, and our blended TCE came in at $23,583 a day. And with that, I'll pass it on to Carlos.
Thanks, Federico. So we'll carry on with a few strategic points and then give you an overview of the market. On our CapEx commitments, there's been no change since we reported the half year results. The commitments remain in place for the 10 newbuildings that will come to us in '27 and '29; 4 of them next year and the other 6 in '29. In total, the investment in these vessels comes to roughly $512 million, and outstanding commitments stand at $425 million. All the purchase options on our lease vessels have now been exercised. The Discovery was delivered to us on the 2nd of November. And the High Fidelity was exercised and is expected to be delivered to us around mid-January next year. Through these transactions, we succeeded in lowering our breakeven rate by cutting our financing costs substantially. As for the TC-IN vessels, we exercised all of those some time ago already. So there's nothing new there; it just shows that the gap in price between the market value of the vessels as of the end of September and their book value has increased to $90 million from $57 million when those options were exercised. The TC covered rates and the TC coverage percentage. Here, we present the annual figures on the left; and the quarterly figures on the right.
For next year, we're showing 38% of the fleet covered by fixed rate contracts, at an average rate of $24,600. On a quarterly basis, we show coverage here for Q4 of 59%; then Q1 of next year at 54%, and then it declines gradually over the course of 2027, ending at 21% in Q4 next year. Rates are a bit stronger in the first quarters of next year, then they decline, but they stay at very profitable levels for us also in the second half. As Federico mentioned, by now our fleet is 100% Eco following the sale of the High Tide. So a very competitive fleet, good contract coverage, leaving, however, quite a lot of space to benefit from the current exceptionally strong spot markets. Possibly, we would increase coverage a bit for '27 during the next few months. We will do that gradually and at very attractive rates, hopefully. Period rates, as we will see, are very strong now. And here we go. Here, we show the spot market rates, the yellow line on the left graph or MRs, which is again at record levels, in line with the levels reached at the beginning of the conflict in Iran.
What's also interesting is that period rates—the blue line—are actually sitting at a level even higher than where they stood when the conflict in Iran began, which shows market players have a lot of confidence that the spot market is going to remain at very high levels all through next year. And that's because no matter when the conflict in Iran ends—and that conflict, of course, is the fact that has been generating these exceptional markets, layered on top of many other factors that were already supporting the market—no matter what happens there, there is going to be a phase of stock rebuilding, and analysts estimate it will be pretty long, lasting at least between 12 and 18 months, which should give support to the market. Naturally, the longer the situation with Iran goes on, the longer we will benefit from these inefficiencies that exist in the market right now, and we will still then have the stock build phase afterward, which will support the market as well. So a very strong outlook. The fundamentals have gotten better over the course of this year. And that explains why period rates moved up and are at a higher level today than they were when the conflict started, and also why asset values are reaching record levels.
What we're looking at now is values for vessels that are 5 years old, and those are pretty much sitting at about $50 million — so that's above what a newbuilding costs, or roughly equal to newbuilding costs in Korea. And it's also higher than newbuilding costs at good Chinese shipyards. For an Eco MR vessel, the 1-year TC rate stands at $43,000, and for an Eco LR1 it's $60,000, maybe even above that. Turning to inventories, they dropped considerably at the start of the war. Now, as you can see at the bottom — the chart in the bottom left — volumes moving through Hormuz have been climbing steadily since August. Over the last 4 weeks, the average works out to 15 million barrels per day. And in the top-right chart, we're attempting to set volumes that passed through Hormuz before the war against the flows that have gone through over the last 4 weeks, plus our estimate of flows that got redirected — the extra flows shown here. That's the delta. And those additional flows, measured against the volumes exported via these ports before the war — Yanbu, Fujairah and Ceyhan — show another 3 million barrels coming out of those ports. So taking it all together, we estimate that flows lost because of the conflict in Iran currently amount to roughly 2 million barrels per day.
With extra flows reaching the market from elsewhere—especially the Americas—plus some demand disruption, we believe the market right now is fairly balanced, and if we keep seeing volumes like these coming out of Hormuz, additional inventory drawdowns may not happen. So why have the Persian Gulf countries done so well at exporting more? Actually, they haven't—it's thanks to a more peaceful stance from the Iranians. The Iranians have kept up attacks on vessels. Based on estimates given to us, roughly 5% of ships transiting Hormuz get hit in some way, with some taking more serious damage than others. But the key driver has been that the national oil companies of the Persian Gulf countries have been assembling their own fleets. They went into the market and purchased very aggressively, particularly older tonnage, which they then crewed themselves. There are rumors these were crewed with militaries and coast cards—something those countries have not confirmed. Still, it would explain how they manage to persuade crews to make such risky crossings, which has made possible the shuttle volumes we see here.
Those shuttle tankers are vessels largely under the control of the national oil companies, and they've been carrying a substantial share of the oil that moves through Hormuz. On the crude side, we're at 52% in September. Here you can see how it has evolved. The UAE was the first country to become active on this front, then Kuwait joined in, followed by Iraq in August, and more recently Saudi Arabia as well — this red bar here has seen more shuttle transits. Naturally, some private owners with a larger appetite for risk are also transiting Hormuz. We are not among them, and those owners are paying hefty premiums to their crews to persuade them to make such hazardous voyages. And then, well, another disruption that has of course mattered a great deal to the market has been the Houthis. Conditions got better over the course of the last few years. But once again, the Houthis have grown more aggressive. This time, though, they have been targeting Saudi Arabian interests more specifically. So other shipowners have felt at ease going back through Bab al-Mandab, since the Houthis are not targeting them. But vessels carrying Saudi cargo or run by Saudi Arabian companies are steering clear of that transit, which means part of the product — which would normally have sailed to Asia, not from the Red Sea — is now finding a home elsewhere in the Mediterranean so it can avoid transiting the strait.
However, the cargoes still headed for Asia are choosing to take a far longer path around the Cape of Good Hope, and that's quite beneficial for ton miles. Exports of refined products from Russia fell sharply in recent times, after a much gentler drop during the first few years of the Ukrainian war, and the reason is the attacks — drone strikes by Ukraine on Russian refineries — which have done far more to cut Russia's exports than the sanctions that Europe and the U.S. put in place. In more recent news, this deal between the U.S. and Russia that would let Russia ship a certain volume of diesel to the U.S. via a sanctions waiver might produce a modest rise in those exports, yet questions are being raised — the legality of that waiver is under question since it conflicts with legislation passed by the U.S. Congress that bans such exports. As a result, some vessels that had loaded in Russia and were bound for the U.S. have already reversed course and will not be delivering their cargoes to the U.S. So regardless, should this agreement succeed, it isn't expected to make a meaningful impact on the market unless it gets expanded.
Margins from refining some products remain at all-time highs. Diesel especially, and jet fuel, are what you can see here. Yet oddly, those are the commodities getting the most discussion. As a result, most people know that we're beginning to confront serious shortages of these commodities, and prices, naturally, have climbed considerably too, which is why refining markets for these products look so appealing. In the case of gasoline, the trend has actually been different, with refining margins having come down of late. Inventories of diesel and jet fuel in the Atlantic Basin sit at quite low levels. On the chart in the middle, we see they are well under where they stood a year ago and below any point across the previous 3 years. What this means is a really wide gap in gasoline prices pitting the East of Suez against the West. Consequently, we observe that this price delta pitting the West against the East has climbed to extremely elevated levels, creating a very appealing arbitrage: purchase products in the East, sell them in the West, even when -- even if very high freight rates have to be paid. That is quite bullish for the market, and it implies the West ought to import more from Asia, across very long distances.
This is quite encouraging for ton miles. Another factor that has supported product markets in recent months is that China resumed exports after restrictions it had put in place when the war in Iran began. As crude availability got better thanks to higher prices moving through Hormuz, China eased those restrictions, and the volume of CPP exported from China climbed to more than 1 million barrels per day above where it stood before the war started. Some worry emerged that these volumes might fall off during the final part of the year. Just recently, though, Chinese authorities gave their refineries — mainly the state-owned ones — a fourth batch of export quotas. So absent any new restrictive steps, and with refining margins so high, we expect to keep seeing fairly healthy exports out of China through the remaining 2 years of '26 as well. As for sanctioned oil on the water, that has come down very quickly. Waivers were granted at the start of the war allowing Russian and Iranian oil to be sold. Iran especially — partly because of the embargo, which is preventing it from exporting more oil today — has been drawing down its stocks very rapidly.
Yet once these inventories clear out the effect of those sanctions, those embargoes on Iranian exports are going to hit the country harder. And I think that's likely the plan, naturally, of the U.S. administration in following this approach, which they're hoping will let it get to a more favorable peace deal with Iran down the road. Just how much additional pain must be imposed on Iran before a peace agreement that the U.S. finds more acceptable can be achieved? I don't know. That's an open question, but there's this possibility that, particularly since the alternative of strikes doesn't appear very viable, this will be the route that gets pursued. And if that happens, and this situation were to go on for some additional months, that could be extremely positive for the product tanker market. The count of vessels sanctioned kept climbing over the last few years, largely owing to extra sanctions from the U.S. Naturally, as we know, the U.S. position has been more volatile and unpredictable. But these vessels, which have been sanctioned -- sanctions enforced by the EU as well grew stricter over the last few years, which makes it harder for them to trade, cutting their productivity and restricting them to trade, when they can do so, only within the sanctions cargo.
And so — naturally, for those nations willing to bring in cargo that is under sanctions. Now — the market has likewise benefited greatly from what has been happening in Venezuela. A substantial share of that oil is going out to U.S. refineries, which were designed to handle this heavy Venezuelan crude. And the production increase anticipated over the next few years in Venezuela will also help the market, in that this oil will move on tonnage that is not sanctioned, whereas before it was carried on sanctioned tonnage, and it will be shipped across long distances. So the extra output that will hopefully emerge from Venezuela ought to generate a great deal of ton miles, and also if some of it winds up in Asia. At present, it isn't especially rich in ton miles, since a lot of it is being taken up by the U.S. refining industry. But it is also a good thing that Venezuela is bringing in more naphtha from the U.S., because this is a very heavy crude that has to be diluted before it can be moved on ships. Going back to the point I raised earlier, even if this oil were to end up in the U.S., given the additional production we are going to see down the road, this would still benefit the market, because it would free up the U.S.
So, exporting more of its own oil to farther-away destinations, likely in Asia. That would still mean additional oil from the Americas heading to Asia. So the ramp-up — the anticipated ramp-up in Venezuelan production should be a positive. And this slide here matters a lot, because much of the strength in product tanker markets today is coming from the crude side. Freight rates in the product tanker markets, as we saw, again, are at record highs — period rates are like records. But what we're seeing in the crude market is unbelievable, as these rates really have skyrocketed. They went up vertically for the Suezmaxes, but also for the Aframaxes we see here, which are hovering at around $300,000 per day, which is far above the already very high rates that LR2 vessels can achieve, which explains why you've had this migration of LR2 vessels toward dirty trades — the yellow line on the graph on the left — with this decline in LR2 vessels trading clean. So despite the LR2 fleet having grown by 110 vessels between January '25 and October '26, the number of LR2s trading clean over that period has fallen by 120 vessels.
What that tells us is that, because these are the bigger product tankers as well, the clean-trading product tanker fleet shrank across this period as a whole, and that helps explain — it's among the reasons, together with the ones we discussed earlier, why the product tanker market has performed so strongly. And here, on the bottom left, this chart matters too, since it displays the extra crude that's going to come out of the Americas — that's the yellow line. So it's going to be shipped across very long distances. And the expectation is that exports from the Americas into Asia will rise by roughly 3 million barrels per day from 2025 to 2030. So that ought to be quite positive for the crude tanker market and ought to help soak up the extra tonnage that's going to arrive in the market, particularly in the VLCC and Suezmax segments, which otherwise would be a cause for worry. The refining picture — this only goes through '27. We see these capacity additions at refineries in China, the Middle East and the rest of Asia, which is mainly India, alongside the closures that we've witnessed in Europe and in the Americas.
Africa is therefore taking on a bigger role, and Angola recently unveiled a plan to double its current refinery's capacity before the decade is out, which would lift output from 750,000 barrels per day to 1.4 million barrels per day. They may also be constructing a second refinery of comparable size, roughly 600,000 to 700,000 barrels per day, in East Africa, most likely Kenya. So yes, these shifts in the refining landscape keep on underpinning ton miles in the product tanker segment. So they're favourable for our sector. Now, the fleet — a few statistics on the fleet. We present the share of the fleet that is over 20 years of age. On the left, for the MRs and LR1s, that's the blue line, and as you can see it has climbed from 16% at the close of '24 to 20% at the close of '25, and it hit 22.5% at the end of October this year. So when you examine the numbers at the close of '25, the growth in the proportion of vessels older than 20 has outpaced the growth in the order book, which went up from 14.4% to 16.2%.
Even with the fresh interest in ordering vessels that we've witnessed this year, it was outweighed by the fleet getting older, and that ought to be a good sign for the market over the next few years. Things look less bright when you consider all tankers, including crude tankers as well, since the order book there has grown more quickly, hitting 26% of the total fleet, with the order books for the Suezmaxes and VLCCs in particular standing above 30% and at the 33% mark, having climbed considerably and raising some worries about the future. On the positive side, vessels obviously don't vanish once they turn 20. They typically get demolished at around 25 years of age. That holds true for most product tankers. In fact, for the bigger crude tankers, the VLs and the Suezmaxes, the average demolition age has in fact been under 25 and at times nearer to 20 years of age. So there's plenty of room for ships to be demolished beginning in '28 and through 2035 to offset the vessels that have been delivered. And that's a very significant factor, one that should soften the pickup in deliveries we ought to see in the coming years for tankers, both because of vessels already ordered and because of vessels likely to be ordered going forward, and as we are also seeing, unfortunately, shipbuilding capacity in China expanding.
What we observe is that during the first 9 months, there was considerable appetite for ordering MRs and LR1s; yet the order book — the percentage order book — hasn't climbed all that much, since, naturally, a good number of MRs and LR1s were also delivered over the same period, which left the order. And here we illustrate how fleet growth ought to be speeding up. That said, this is fleet growth overall. When you examine sub-20 fleet growth in '27, it is in fact considerably lower, and across all product tankers, we actually have slightly negative fleet growth in the sub-20 fleet in 2027, which is also very positive. And lastly, here we present the NAV evolution. We show that NAV per share has climbed to nearly $12 per share, while overall NAV has climbed to $1.4 billion — roughly $1.4 billion, up from just over $1 billion at the end of '25. So a substantial rise in NAV, with the shares, even so, still trading at a significant discount to NAV, particularly following the correction witnessed over the last few days, which personally we struggle to understand, though perhaps it reflects anticipation of a more Democratic Congress in the U.S.
That could bring the conflict in Iran to an end sooner. I'm not convinced that's true, though, since the fighting in Iran will probably stop only once acceptable terms exist for ending it. If not, then today's situation — an oil market that is fairly balanced, with all those flows moving through Hormuz — ought to be manageable for a few more months, particularly for oil. On gas, I have to say, the picture is more worrying in that regard. So that could hit the economy harder and might be something that pushes the U.S. to accept worse terms sooner in order to stop the conflict and stabilize the situation in Iran. On dividend policy, our payout ratio has gone up over the past few years, and our debt ratios have come down. Right now we are net cash. We have just announced an interim dividend of $40 million, which our Board approved today. And what we expect is that — given the payout ratio today, we expect the payout ratio from the '26 results to match the 2025 level, so 55%.
Naturally, the Board will need to confirm that, and then our shareholders will do so next year. That covers it, so I’ll hand things over to you for the Q&A.
Matteo Bonizzoni from Kepler Cheuvreux has the first question.
I've got 3 questions. First off: how much did ship-to-ship transfers in the Gulf of Oman matter for supporting rates during the recent weeks and months? My second question concerns the supply side. As you mentioned, orders have now hit 16% of the circulating fleet. And on Slide 31, you show that in 2026 net fleet growth was quite contained at 0.8%, but the following year it should speed up to 3.8%. So maybe a bit of color on what effect that might have on rates under different scenarios. You've already touched on it, but perhaps you could elaborate further on whether those 3 percentage points of net fleet growth are a sort of concern or not a big deal? And the third and last one is about the dividend. I've worked out that on the basis of net profit for 2026, your earnings per share ought to be not far from $1.3 per share. So if you were to pay a final installment consistent with the interim, you should get to roughly a 50% payout on net profit. Is that right?
Let's begin with the STS, since that's where we should start. The STS has mattered a great deal. Absolute volumes have been rising. Yet in September, the share of volumes moving as STS was in fact a little below where it stood in August. So we've also seen more cargoes going directly from A to B. What matters most for the market, I believe, is that volumes keep transiting. And on that front, the market has performed rather well. There was a bit of a dip during the year, but over recent months the trend in transited volumes has been fairly steady upward, and that's despite a very aggressive posture from Iran, with many vessels coming under attack, though often without severe damage. So they keep transiting, and some have needed to pause for repairs. But you also have private ship owners who are drawn by the highly profitable voyages available if you're willing to accept the risk of transiting the strait, and they are doing exactly that. So they've organized themselves and have crews willing to take on that risk.
They're compensating those crews at a higher rate. As a result, this trade has grown. And even with the volatility we're observing, it has meant a substantial volume of oil has moved through. What we're also noticing is that at the outset, the ship-to-ship transfers — the vast majority of them — were taking place in the Gulf of Oman. Lately, we're seeing a portion of ship-to-ship operations happening in locations that are farther away, since there were cases of attacks on vessels while they carried out ship-to-ship transfers in the Gulf of Oman. So the fact that these transfers are now happening in more distant places as well makes this trade even less efficient, and that is also a positive for the market. So I hope that gives you some extra color on this ship matter. On fleet growth, it has been — yes, I said that it is picking up speed. Looking at just MRs and LR1, it's a bit above 3% — actually a bit above 5% if we look across all tankers next year, and that assumes very limited demolition. But the key point is that fleet growth in the sub-20 category across all product tankers is in fact negative. So you have more vessels reaching 20 years, more deadweight tons, if that's my metric, reaching 20 years next year, than you have deadweight tons of product tankers being delivered.
Once these ships pass the 20-year mark, they begin to be used in more marginal trades. They obviously don't leave the market, but many of them moved into shadow fleet activity and sanctioned trades. Yet there's a ceiling on this sanctioned trade. Venezuela, naturally, was among the places where such vessels were deployed, and that is no longer sanctioned trade. Russia, of course, is a significant sanctioned trade, but only if it's conducted above the price cap, and Russian exports have fallen substantially. So there's less space for sanctioned vessels in that area. And so this market for ships over 20 years old, which will become rather crowded in the years ahead owing to the fleet's aging, is going to lower the profitability of these vessels, cut their productivity, and encourage their demolition. Many charters, then, have a policy against chartering vessels older than 20 years, the oil majors especially. Some terminals likewise won't accept ships more than 20 years old. So I think that although you can't focus solely on overall fleet growth, which might be a worry for next year, you also need to consider these other nuances.
When you factor in these other elements, the outlook for next year becomes considerably more positive. Last, on the dividend: the market is quite strong at the moment, correct? It's standard for us to give some sensitivity around Q4 and the fiscal year '26 results. So if we assume $50,000 on free days, our profit for the year would come in at roughly $166 million, right? And this isn't something where — normally we'd use considerably lower numbers here, right? The reason we built more variability into the sensitivity this time is that it also covers '27 and '28, and '28 especially will be very difficult to forecast in terms of where the market will stand at that point. But for '26 specifically, we actually feel that $50,000 isn't really a stretch. Given where the market sits today on the remaining free days, we could potentially do even better than $50,000. So we might even exceed $166 million, right? But if we take $166 million as the assumption, then 55% of that number would point to a dividend next year that is higher...
$91 million. $166 million — that's $91 million.
That's $91 million. So next year, that would suggest a dividend of roughly $50 million, following the interim dividend of $40 million.
Massimo Bonisoli from Equita has the next question.
I have 2 questions. The first is about the current trading environment. You've already fixed about 25% of the Q4 spot days at approximately $62,000 per day. Can you update us on where you're fixing the remaining spot days today, especially in MR and LR1, and are current market levels still broadly in line with the recent market indications of $70,000 to $80,000 per day? The second question concerns coverage for 2027. Given how strong the spot market is, at what TC level would you fix? Or would locking in additional 2027 coverage look attractive to you? What's the hurdle rate here?
Yeah. Thanks, Massimo. Those are good questions. Off the top of my head, yes — the reason we said a moment ago, when answering Matteo's questions, that we feel quite confident about achieving $50,000 on the free days is that it isn't a stretch. It's because right now we have a few vessels on subjects, a few LR1s at a much higher level than that, right? I mean, in the LR1 market today you're still fixing at around $100,000 per day. And then on the MR2 — and that's exactly why we have our exposure, because our MR1s are covered — yes, it's between $60,000 and $80,000 per day, I'd say, in the market today, right? So those are still very positive figures. When markets are this strong, it's hard to predict how long they can remain at these extraordinary levels. But if they stay at these levels for a few more weeks — we don't need them to stay for very long — then we will basically have fixed the rest of the year, given that voyages get fixed around 1 week to 10 days earlier, or sometimes even more, and then it takes some time for the voyage to be performed, right? Sometimes they're also quite long voyages — we've been fixing some vessels on voyages of some 50 days, 60 days as well.
Right, so we're feeling pretty optimistic about the remainder of this year. The way things are set up is extremely, extremely constructive for the market. And I'd say the picture for next year looks quite strong as well. That's the reason period rates are sitting so high. We'll be looking to secure a bit more coverage on certain of our vessels. We'll aim to do that step by step, since even though period rates are elevated, spot rates are at such levels that locking vessels into time charter means giving up considerable upside, and we already hold fairly solid coverage for next year. Still, I do expect we'll fix additional vessels on time charter over the weeks and months ahead, lifting that coverage for next year past 40%, perhaps nearer to 50% in the months to come. After that we'll revisit our strategy and consider whether to push that coverage higher. But we're in the market evaluating opportunities constantly. That said, we aren't rushing into anything, because the market outlook is very firm over the coming weeks.
Our next question is from Climent Molins at Value Investor's Edge.
We’ve discussed at length the big rise in LR2s being traded as Aframaxes. But have you observed anything comparable in the LR1 or Panamax segment? And second, have you employed any of your LR1s in dirty trade? And would that be something you’d look at?
Apologies — regarding that final part of the question, have we observed…?
If you've noticed any LR1s being traded dirty—meaning they're carrying crude—and if that's something you'd be open to considering.
Yeah, yeah. Okay. That's a good question. No, I think with the LR1, you've seen less of that swing. There are also very few LR1s actually being delivered. What happened is that as LR2 or Aframax prices rose quite a lot, the extra cost of turning an LR2 into an Aframax — or converting an Aframax into an LR2 — became quite attractive, because relative to the vessel's total cost, that added flexibility, which comes from coating the tanks, costs much less as a share of the vessel's overall cost. So many owners who had always planned to trade the vessels dirty ordered LR2s instead. Then, of course, you also had this exceptional market for dirty trades, with Aframax vessels earning incredible money, and that has drawn in a lot of LR2s that probably weren't intended to trade dirty in that market. On the Panamax side, the Panamax fleet is — well, you have a smaller Panamax fleet, much smaller than the LR1 fleet, which is the reverse of what you see with Aframaxes and LR2s. And often the Panamax vessels, or the LR1s that trade dirty, are very old vessels. The fleet hasn't been — there hasn't been much investment in this segment of the market.
A lot of those ships operate in the dirty trade across the Americas. And we haven't taken part in that market, because the design of our LR1s is better suited — they offer really strong cubic capacity for moving lighter products. That makes them highly competitive for naphtha or jet fuel shipments, yet comparatively weaker when it comes to moving dirty products. You also see that gap in the LR1 Panamax segment. It might show up less clearly in the rates. So we recently made the decision to dirty one of our LR1s. That's the first vessel we've dirtied. So it's actually a very good question. And we'll see how well we can trade this ship dirty. But the first voyage we're doing is earning a very, very good rate. And hopefully, we'll manage to do very well trading this vessel dirty over the coming months.
That's really useful. And this is probably anybody's guess, but if a peace deal between Russia and Ukraine is reached, how far—and particularly how quickly—do you think they could scale up product exports?
It's unclear to me just how badly the Russian refineries have been hit, and therefore how much time repairs would take before they could increase exports again. At first, perhaps even while raising production, they may have to hold back some products in order to rebuild domestic inventories before they can get exports back to the same levels they were shipping ahead of this wave of Ukrainian attacks. Unfortunately, I'm not able to give a solid estimate of how long that would take.
Yeah, that's a hard one. I figured I'd give it a shot.
<<operator_script>> Sirs, we have no further questions in the queue right now. I'll hand it back to you for any closing comments you'd like to make.
Yes. Thanks, everybody, for joining our call today and for the really interesting questions — and I look forward to speaking with you next year, when we approve our full year '26 results. Thank you.
Appreciate it. Goodbye.
Thanks for being with us, everyone. That brings this call to a close. Please go ahead and disconnect your devices.
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