Ellington Financial Inc. (EFC) Earnings Call Transcript
August 8, 2025
Earnings Call Speaker Segments
Thanks. Ahead of kicking things off, a quick note for everyone: this call might include forward-looking statements, which fall under the safe harbor protections established by the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995. Statements of that kind aren't historical by nature, and they come with risks and uncertainties, all of which are laid out in the annual and quarterly reports we submit to the SEC. What actually happens could end up differing materially from what those statements imply, so they really shouldn't be treated as predictions about future events. The company also isn't taking on any duty to update these forward-looking statements. With me today are Larry Penn, who serves as Chief Executive Officer of Ellington Financial, Mark Tecotzky, our Co-Chief Investment Officer, and JR Herlihy, our Chief Financial Officer. The presentation for our Second Quarter Earnings Conference Call can be found on our website, ellingtonfinancial.com. Today's call will follow along with that presentation, and every statement and reference to figures is qualified by the important notice and end notes included in the presentation. With that, I'll turn things over to Larry.
Thanks, Alaael-Deen. Good morning, everyone, and I appreciate you joining us today; we'll start on slide three of the presentation. Ellington Financial turned in a strong second quarter. We saw contributions across the board, driven by our diversified investment portfolio as well as our loan origination platforms. GAAP net income for the quarter came to $0.45 per share, which works out to an annualized economic return of just about 14%. Meanwhile, book value per share increased from the prior quarter to $13.49. Our adjusted distributable earnings per share also moved higher quarter over quarter, up $0.08 to $0.47, which is comfortably above the $0.39 per share we paid in dividends. The second quarter brought plenty of volatility, but also plenty of opportunity, and once again Ellington Financial demonstrated the strength and adaptability of its platform. At the start of the quarter, tariff-driven uncertainty caused credit spreads to widen, and we were in a strong position, since we came into the period holding a sizable credit hedge portfolio. Lately, our pattern has been to modestly increase corporate credit hedges as corporate credit spreads narrow, and then, if spreads broaden, to cash in on a portion of those hedges. When negative credit shocks hit the whole market, as happened in early April, our corporate credit hedges did more than help keep our book value steady — they also made our liquidity stronger, because the mark-to-market gains on these positions can be accessed in cash every day. When the market sold off in April and liquidity was hard to come by, our strong cash position let us take advantage of the situation and buy securities at appealing prices. The volatility we saw in early April also shaped how we approached securitization. We had completed five securitizations at good moments during the First Quarter, but once early April arrived we halted issuance for a while, and we only started back up once spreads settled down. That patience paid off, since we ultimately finished a total of six securitizations across the second quarter at favorable levels. Thanks to all of that, the size of our portfolio was about the same as the prior quarter. When it comes to securitizations, tactical sales, and the steady principal repayments we get from short-term loans, those were mostly offset by opportunistic purchases along with growth in our mortgage loan portfolios — especially non-QM, proprietary reverse, and commercial mortgage bridge. Going back to adjusted distributable earnings, like I mentioned, we posted a fantastic $0.08 quarter-over-quarter increase, reaching $0.47 per share; that really strong outcome came from both steady credit performance in our loan portfolio and standout contributions from our loan origination platforms, above all $0.13 in ADE contributions from Longbridge. Longbridge's strong quarter came from solid performance across every component of its business. Earnings from origination came from higher volumes and consistent margins across HECM and proprietary reverse, while gains on securitization stemmed from a prop reverse deal completed successfully in May, and servicing revenue consisted of recurring MSR income along with robust tail securitizations. We additionally benefited from exceptionally strong results at Lensure and American Heritage, our non-QM originator affiliates, with each supported by sizable origination volumes and ongoing healthy operating margins. Thanks to the equity interests we hold in these originators, their profits made a meaningful contribution to EFC's bottom line during the quarter. More significantly, we continue to generate substantial net interest income from the non-QM loans and retained non-QM tranches kept on our balance sheet, a large share of which still originate from these two affiliates. Meanwhile, our network of key origination partners continues to grow. In this quarter, we completed an additional equity stake purchase in a company that originates non-QM and RTL loans. As is customary for us, this deal included a forward flow arrangement with the originator, which aligns with our approach of locking in steady supply of premium loans at favorable rates and with reliable timing. Having said that, I'll now hand things over to JR, who will review the financials more thoroughly. JR.
Appreciate that, Larry. Morning, everybody. For Q2, our GAAP net income came in at $0.45 per common share on a fully marked-to-market basis, with ADE of $0.47 per share. Slide five in the deck lays out portfolio income by strategy: credit contributed $0.61 per share, agency was — $0.01, and Longbridge added $0.11. Slide six breaks down ADE by segment: the investment portfolio segment delivered $0.56 per share, while the Longbridge segment chipped in $0.13 per share. Within the credit portfolio, net interest income rose quarter over quarter, and we also booked net realized and unrealized gains on non-QM loans and retained tranches, closed and second lien loans and retained tranches, and other loans and ABS. Also helping were gains from stakes we hold in companies that originate loans. Working against the better net interest income were unrealized net losses on forward MSRs, along with red ink from residential and commercial REO. By contrast, our agency portfolio recorded a small loss, as agency yield spreads fluctuated and finished the quarter wider overall. Longbridge turned in a standout quarter on both GAAP net income and ADE, helped by robust results from originations and servicing. Within origination, the performance reflected greater volumes for both HECM and proprietary reverse loans, consistent margins on both, and net gains from a securitization of proprietary reverse or mortgage loans. On the servicing front, the positive contribution came from MSR-related income, solid tail securitization executions, and a net gain on the HMBS MSR equivalent — mostly driven by tighter HMBS yield spreads. Partly offsetting those gains were net losses on interest rate hedges. Turning now to portfolio movements during the quarter. Our adjusted loan credit portfolio rose 1% quarter-over-quarter to $3.32 billion, as shown on slide seven. Growth occurred in commercial mortgage bridge loans, non-QM loans, and non-agency RMBS, all fueled by net purchases; those gains were mostly offset by securitization impacts, tactical sales of HELOCs and non-QM loans, and a reduced residential transition loan portfolio, where principal paydowns exceeded new purchases. We also managed to settle a bigger troubled commercial mortgage loan in the quarter, so only one major workout remains. At the same time, across our RTL, commercial mortgage, and consumer loan portfolios, we collected $248 million in principal paydowns in Q2 — that's 15% of what those portfolios were worth in fair value when the quarter began, since these shorter-duration holdings keep sending capital back at a reliable pace and give us great clarity into how credit trends are shifting. On slide eight, you'll see our total long agency RMBS portfolio is still modest but grew 5%, reaching $269 million. On slide nine, you can see that our Longbridge portfolio decreased 1% from the prior quarter, coming in at $546 million. This happened because the effect of a securitization involving proprietary reverse mortgage loans that we finished during the quarter was a bit larger than the effect of new originations in that area. Now please move to slide 10, which gives an overview of our borrowings. As of the end of June, the weighted average rate on our recourse borrowings had declined 2 basis points, reaching 6.07% overall, while credit borrowings experienced a notable 15 basis point decrease. Comparing one quarter with the next, net interest margin in our credit portfolio increased 21 basis points, while agency NIM declined 17 basis points. Since the overall size of our investment portfolio stayed roughly flat from the prior quarter, our leverage ratios also held steady. On both March 31st and June 30th, recourse debt-to-equity came in at 1.7 to 1, and when consolidated securitizations are included, our total debt-to-equity stood at 8.7 to 1. As of June 30th, cash plus unencumbered assets grew to roughly $920 million, which represents over 50% of total equity. Total economic return for Q2 came to 3.3% on a non-annualized basis, and book value per share rose to $13.49. Consistent with our history, no goodwill appears on our balance sheet even though we've completed select corporate acquisitions through the years, and no deferred tax assets are recognized. Consequently, the book value we report is entirely tangible. I'll now hand things over to Mark.
Thank you, JR. This quarter's results have me quite pleased; it seems to me that EFC has moved up to another level. Contributions came from all across the investment portfolio, spanning our stakes in originators plus a major boost from the Longbridge segment. Even after distributing a sizeable dividend, our book value per share still rose. Over the last 10 years, we've carefully and deliberately put together the components of vertical integration, and that structure is now showing up at full strength in our GAAP earnings, ADE, and securitization volumes. Along the way, we've acquired equity positions in a number of mortgage originators and helped them grow. Our group of originator affiliates keeps gaining market share, produces substantial loan volumes for EFC, and runs at a very profitable level. We've purposefully built Ellington Financial's loan business so that our stakes in mortgage originators give us a dependable flow of high-quality loans, which we can convert through securitization into high-yielding investments for our portfolio. Today, because of a strong origination portal our technology team built, EFC buys non-QM loans from a broader set of lenders, who reach our competitive pricing and smooth workflow via a web-based platform. As our loan volume grows, we can securitize more often, which cuts market risk while also generating those high-yielding retained investments for our portfolio. Every additional securitization widens the pool of loans where we gain from valuable call options and reinforces our reputation as a best-in-class securitization platform. A platform with a strong brand is an enormous competitive edge. It lets us bring our liability costs down compared with rivals, refine our pricing, and obtain the loans we consider most appealing. One bright spot this quarter: we managed to raise both ADE and net interest margin even as our overall portfolio size stayed roughly flat. A key reason for this efficiency gain is our growing portfolio of high-yielding securitization retained tranches, which deliver outsized ADE. EFC completed six securitizations during this quarter, which is the highest number in the company's history. Those transactions swap out repo financing in favor of long-term funding that isn't subject to mark-to-market adjustments, giving us a steadier balance sheet and protection against potential disruptions in funding. Beyond that, our warehouse lenders have watched us execute these deals so reliably that they're now inclined to extend improved terms on EFC's warehouse lines. Turning to commercial real estate lending, our bridge loan operation is growing again, with a greater supply of quality properties to lend against and additional sponsors we're keen to partner with. This growth has been significantly driven by our collaboration with Sheridan Capital. Similar to what we accomplished with non-QM, we've been able to lower the cost of funding for this product too, since our lenders recognize both the expansion of our footprint and the strength of our collateral and sponsors. In the same way as non-QM, the narrowing of financing spreads in our commercial bridge operation has provided a massive boost to our net interest margin. We're expanding NIM from both directions — adding higher-yielding assets like extra retained tranches and more commercial bridge loans, while simultaneously cutting funding costs across multiple parts of the portfolio. As a result, we succeeded in widening the NIM on our credit portfolio by 21 bps this quarter, despite the fact that asset spreads across the market generally compressed. We also saw sizable profit inflows this quarter from the network of affiliated originators in our portfolio. Through EFC, those affiliates gain access to steady, attractive loan pricing. Taking advantage of that pricing leverage, they've expanded their footprint in the market as well as their bottom-line results. Our stakes in these mortgage originators have delivered excellent returns, and that holds true even with rates where they are today. If rates were to fall substantially going forward, the payoff could be even greater — I'd anticipate a notable rise in both transaction volume and operating margins under those conditions. The past several months brought considerable change at FHFA, among them a significant shake-up on the boards of Fannie Mae and Freddie. Assuming the government-sponsored enterprises contract as anticipated, a wider opening emerges for Ellington Financial to move into numerous additional lending categories that Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac step away from. Such shifts in the market might broaden our securitization platform and let us put capital to work in new areas that are both quite deep and quite lucrative. Caution is always warranted about certain matters. Our foremost concern is appreciation in home prices. Softness in housing values, previously confined to certain regions, has now spread more broadly. We're keeping a close eye on this and feel our pricing adequately accounts for the risk. After last week's jobs report led many to revise their economic projections, the likelihood of reduced interest rates has grown, which could give HPA some backing. In the meantime, our research group keeps examining the monthly remittance reports thoroughly. Finally, as our loan volumes expand, we must remain sharply focused on execution. We recognize the need to deliver steady pricing along with top-tier service to our origination partners, and to make sure our securitization process keeps running smoothly. We also have to keep a close eye on the data coming in, studying it carefully so we can tweak our lending standards on the fly whenever we spot trouble brewing in housing or with consumer finances. Now I'll hand it back to Larry.
Thanks, Mark. Through 2025 so far, EFC's GAAP earnings and ADE have both come in above our dividend payouts, and I'm confident that pattern will hold for the rest of the year. Riding that wave, we've gotten off to a terrific start in the third quarter, with four securitizations priced already, which lifts our year-to-date count to 15. Strong results keep coming from both our investment portfolio and our origination platforms. The third quarter has picked up right where Longbridge left off — July actually notched a fresh record for originations in 2025. We're especially thrilled about the new HELOC for Seniors offering from Longbridge, since we think it could grow into a real earnings driver for EFC. We haven't discussed it much prior to today, but Mark brought up the obvious advantages coming from the just-completed rollout of the non-QM loan origination portal at Ellington, letting our approved non-QM sellers lock in loan sales to EFC via a completely automated web-based system. Thanks to this proprietary tech, we can dramatically scale up how many non-QM loans we purchase, and it also gives our loan origination partners real-time market feedback while making the whole underwriting process more efficient. Through our non-QM portal, we've broadened and further diversified where we originate by strengthening ties with affiliate and non-affiliate originators equally, as brand-new origination partners join the platform basically each week. Turning to the rest of the year, EFC is genuinely hitting on every cylinder at this point, and I feel quite optimistic that we'll keep covering our dividend with room to spare and grow book value per share. At the bottom of slide three, you can see we're accomplishing this while still maintaining a solid liquidity position and modest recourse leverage, which leaves us with plenty of room to seize any exceptional opportunities that come along, as happened in April. Last, we're dedicated to making our liability structure even stronger, both through extra securitizations and by deliberately growing our unsecured borrowings as time goes on. With that said, let's turn it over to Q&A. Operator, please go ahead.
Morning, everyone. Could you discuss what the forecast looks like for Longbridge in a scenario where rates come down, and in what ways that would benefit the business? And given that volumes seem to be rising everywhere for many other kinds of asset mortgages too, what kind of effect does that have? Is there somewhat of a redirection of focus among some of the producers toward other loan categories? If you could just take us through all of that.
Appreciate that, Bose. I'll take the Longbridge portion, and after that I'll hand things off to Mark for the remaining piece of what you asked. Lower rates would certainly be a benefit to Longbridge in a few distinct ways. To start with, what people in the reverse space call principal factors, as I understand it, is essentially the share of a home's value that a borrower can pull out. Naturally, that depends on how old the borrower is, correct? The older someone is, the bigger that percentage becomes, which effectively means a higher LTV, a higher starting LTV on that mortgage. When rates come down, those principal factors go up, since everything runs through a present value calculation, largely tied to where the 10-year Treasury sits. As you'd expect, the more borrowers can extract, the more appealing reverse mortgages become. That holds for the HECM product, where HUD essentially sets those principal factors, those principal balance factors. It also holds for our proprietary product, because once again, we'll anchor things to where long-term rates stand too. We will definitely see more activity, and in the past we've observed a very strong correlation. When rates fall, particularly the 10-year Treasury, the amount borrowers can get, effectively their starting LTV, rises, and that clearly draws borrowers toward taking out additional reverse mortgages. Naturally, it raises the loan balance on every one of those they take out. With fixed-rate loans too, and our portfolio contains both kinds, falling rates will also bring a lot of refinance activity. I'd point out that over the last several years, Longbridge's market share has grown. You're discussing capturing a bigger slice of the whole universe, counting loans that got originated, likely including some from lenders no longer operating. I'd point out that we, having watched which way Longbridge's business has been heading, and they're performing incredibly well right now, even with rates at today's levels, we in fact hold a specific hedge within the Longbridge segment, essentially in recognition of this phenomenon. When rates rise, we earn on the hedge, and when rates decline, we lose on the hedge, though that gets offset by stronger origination refinance activity. I'll hand it to Mark for the rest of what you asked.
Yeah, hey, Bose, could you say that latter portion one more time?
Sure. What I was saying in the back half was simply this — if volumes rise, well, plenty of the other classes of mortgage assets, I just wondered if a number of the originators move over to different things, or whether many of the people you work with stay committed to the product?
Our originator stakes are nearly all tied to non-QM, with residential transition lending playing a smaller role. I believe what you've noticed is that certain bigger non-banks are originating more non-QM loans while agency volumes remain quite depressed. My expectation, should rates decline from current levels, is that you could observe some non-banks shifting their emphasis toward their primary agency operations and away from non-QM. As for the originators we partner with, they are essentially always centered on non-QM.
All right, excellent. Actually, I just want to ask about your view on home prices. If home prices keep moderating, possibly turning negative, do you see that as a real possibility, or how would you assess the chances of that occurring? What's your perspective on how that might affect credit spreads?
Yeah, so, thinking back, we have an internal portal that we rely on, and it pulls data from all sorts of places, and then it puts it all together; that lets us really drill down into local markets. If I compare what we're seeing today with six months back, and I brought this up in the prepared remarks, six months back there was some softness in home prices, but it was pretty contained, you know, the Gulf Coast of Florida, the Gulf Coast of Texas, possibly San Francisco. Looking at it today, I'd say the places where softness is showing up are broader. We chalk it up to several things combined. First, the most clear one, I think, is that, you know, home prices are way up. There are affordability problems just with what a home costs; beyond that, taxes and insurance costs have been climbing in certain areas, and that's making the affordability problem worse. We build that into our pricing; we watch it really carefully; as far as a national HPA projection goes, I believe HPA over the coming year nationally will be pretty subdued, you know, a couple percent. What stands out to me is that many forecasters have been trimming their HPA assumptions. I'd say six months to a year back, we were likely somewhat more bearish than most forecasters. I'd say at this point we're probably around the middle of the pack, since we've kind of maintained our, we sort of anticipated this softness would materialize. If you compare non-QM delinquencies today with where they stood, say, in 2020, delinquencies are certainly higher. I think during the first five or six years of non-QM's life, and it's a fairly new product, right? It really got going in 2016; so, 2016 to 2021, I think performance was amazingly good. Because of that, you've seen plenty of tranche upgrades. I'd say at this point it's more or less performing as expected. Delinquencies have risen from, you know, if you consider how much credit enhancement exists in securitizations, you still have enormous amounts of, you know, enormous amounts of credit enhancement compared with expected losses. Securitization spreads have held in nicely, but performance is more normalized than it was three or four years back.
Okay, great. Thanks.
The approach we've followed involves, for the most part, putting equity into platforms that we've partnered with for some time. These are platforms familiar to us, where conversations have been happening continuously regarding their views on credit and their approach to underwriting. A few of the deals that drew more attention this year involved larger, more mature platforms, which call for a bigger capital commitment. On the non-QM and RTL sides, we've preferred writing smaller checks, locking in some volume, and then expanding that originator thanks to the kind of financial muscle EFC provides, such as warehouse line support and similar resources. We also pass along to these platforms what we observe regarding credit performance tied to guidelines, and we may engage in forward trades with them. From our standpoint, opportunities should keep coming. I'd say it's unlikely we'd pursue a major acquisition in non-QM needing a big check, simply because we've managed to lock in volume through a different approach — a small check plus some sweat equity — and that's served us well.
Yeah, let me build on that, Mark — I'm in complete agreement. When you consider how much volume we lock in from one of these investments relative to the investment itself, the ratio has been quite substantial. We prefer that versus some of those other higher-profile deals you've observed, where the efficiency wouldn't come close, so to speak. We aren't attempting to build — I mean, our investment portfolio in these kinds of companies sits around the $60 million mark, JR, roughly that. Excluding, excluding Longbridge. Right, $60 million, $70-something million. Longbridge stands apart, of course, since it's a one-of-a-kind company. The investment there — most of what we put into that platform is held in MSRs, which function as a yield-generating asset for us. Regardless, we're happy with the playbook we've executed thus far, and I don't foresee us writing any massive checks to acquire originators, which would also introduce some cyclicality. Great. Thank you. I appreciate all of that. Could you just give us your latest thoughts on credit quality? I understand you had some bridge multifamily workouts. I believe only one remains as of today. Please walk us through the progress there, your current take on the credit portfolio, and also how much the workouts are dragging down net interest income at present? Oh, do you want to handle that?
Alright, alright. Let's hope that feedback issue isn't happening now. So, as I mentioned, we've got just a single sizable workout left, since we completed one during Q2. There are additional delinquent loans we're handling as they go through resolution, but apart from the one I pointed out, none of them strike us as major hits to earnings. That particular loan I mentioned carries a fair value above $30 million. During the past several calls, we've noted it would require some time, and we're still dealing with it, though resolution will probably stretch over a longer horizon. Beyond that, your resolutions are progressing swiftly through the pipeline. In our queue, delinquency percentages for both residential and commercial will be presented, just as we consistently do in MD&A and the notes. You'll notice patterns that keep developing. Some of those percentages we're observing don't really capture how fast we resolve things, and crucially, the strong recovery rate, so to speak, in light of the delinquency. Our view is that examining both simultaneously gives the best picture. Short-term delinquencies considered alongside final resolution proceeds, and our realized losses—essentially the outcome of combining those two—remain very low throughout all these residential and commercial loan approaches.
Right, so regarding that $30 million workout, we've now reached a stage where we're nearly at break even on it. You could describe it as an annual drag of under a penny. After we've substituted it with one of our — as you know — and put that capital back to work in one of our standard strategies, you'd likely see an additional $0.04 each year on the plus side. That works out to a $0.05 per year swing — yearly, not quarterly — which we're kind of anticipating in 2026, correct? Resolving that loan isn't something happening in 2025, but I'm hopeful it happens in 2026. Great. Appreciate it, and thanks for the call.
Thank you, Christian.
Okay, thank you. I have a question about Longbridge. Larry, you touched on the new HELOC for Seniors offering that they have. Could you give us some detail on what exactly this product involves and in what ways it's different from what you'd call a standard HELOC? Then for the second part, given the momentum Longbridge is showing overall, has your thinking shifted regarding the earnings contribution from them over the long-term run rate? Perhaps you could also address how that might influence your view on the dividend level. Thanks.
Yeah, absolutely. I mean, a handful of quarters back, our expectation was that Longbridge would be adding $0.09 of ADE each quarter. Clearly, we've exceeded that. My outlook is one of cautious optimism that we'll keep exceeding it. This HELOC for Seniors program might not take effect immediately, obviously, but my sense is it could sell very well. Essentially, it works much like other reverse products, since there's no maturity tied to a specific date, yet unlike those other reverse products, it carries no negative amortization. You don't feel the squeeze of a set maturity date. I believe that addresses both aspects of what you asked.
All right, understood. Thanks, everyone.
Appreciate it, and good morning. You mentioned holding leverage at a modest level given today's conditions while you wait for chances. What's your thinking on the capacity, should loan volume accelerate, to manage an ordinary increase? Would additional capital be required for that, and how willing would you be to pursue it?
The final portion of what I said at the end touched on this — when I look at how we're capitalized, more unsecured debt could be useful, in my view. That strikes me as the sensible next move for us. This is really about the future, but eventually, it would be wonderful if a growing share of the liability side of our balance sheet consisted of longer-dated unsecured debt. Spreads in the debt markets — both high-yield and non-investment grade — have tightened considerably, particularly for issuers that are newer, relative to not so long ago. For a business like ours, swapping out a great deal of our shorter-maturity funding for unsecured debt with longer maturities could be excellent. We could maintain modest leverage while also putting that capital to work in assets generating higher yields — certainly higher than the debt, given current spread levels. That's the direction we'd be eager to pursue. Across many markets, if this turns into a virtuous cycle, as our execution on unsecured notes improves, then those notes' cost of funds becomes competitive with what we pay on repo and warehouse financing. Clearly that's a superior capital structure compared with carrying short-term debt on the balance sheet; this is a very long-horizon view, and it's where we'd aspire to be. Other mortgage-sector companies have pulled that off successfully.
All right, so I suppose what I'm wondering is, in the near term, how scalable do you figure that is, and how deep would that market need to be for you folks to consider growing it?
Depth isn't a problem at all — that's simply not the concern. For us, I'd say it comes down to whether we can get it over the line; the opportunity exists, in my view. Beyond that, I won't say anything more.
Great. Appreciate it.
Hey, thanks. There's really just one thing left that hasn't already been addressed, and it concerns what you said about FHFA and the possibility that the GSEs' footprint could shrink, specifically with regard to non-QM. That's a subject we've discussed before, and it makes sense intuitively. What I'd like to ask is whether you'd be willing to go into a bit more detail about how that might actually take shape — in other words, does it simply mean additional opportunities, or could it also open the door to different product types and new distribution methods rather than relying on what you already have? It feels like we're heading toward some kind of development involving Fannie and Freddie — you can't really avoid it — and in fact, news stories about it have been appearing during this very call. What I'd really like is to get some detail on how that situation could present itself as a market opportunity, particularly from Ellington's perspective.
Sure, Mark here. Looking back over history, what share of mortgages that are eligible for a Fannie or Freddie guarantee fee end up actually going to Fannie or Freddie? The figure today remains fairly substantial, correct? For instance, before the financial crisis, a huge number of loans were getting securitized via the private label market, and credit enhancement costs in that private label market ran cheaper than at the GSEs. Then the financial crisis hit, the private label market seized up, spreads grew extremely wide. From 2010 until perhaps 2015, the GSEs turned into essentially the sole option around, I'd say. You witnessed non-QM's growth. Non-QM is fascinating since it truly caters to borrowers who don't meet Fannie or Freddie loan criteria; currently Fannie or Freddie, everything is Full Dock, you know, W2, you know, W2 1040 style underwriting. A lot of bank statement loans get done by non-QM. A lot of debt service coverage ratio loans get done by non-QM. We lend to an LLC; those are activities the GSEs won't touch. What we observe as the most immediate opportunity, and we've added somewhat to the portfolio, is that the GSEs possess a cross-subsidy mindset whereby they don't set the price of their insurance purely based on risk. It isn't truly risk-based pricing. A number of their pricing choices get steered by, sort of, their mission. When you examine the G fee pricing along with the loan-level price adjustments for second homes and investor properties, the insurance cost there vastly, vastly, vastly surpasses historical losses and vastly, vastly surpasses forecasts of losses to come, right? It's in those segments where you've seen loans meeting Fannie or Freddie eligibility; they carry a Fannie or Freddie cert. They carry MI when above 80. Investors who opt to self-insure and capture the additional spread are now purchasing those loans, or else they're flowing into private label securitizations, right? That's where I view the most immediate opportunity set. As you noted, headlines keep coming and ideas keep getting floated regarding Fannie and Freddie's future. I believe we'll need to wait and see how that unfolds. The most immediate concrete item we're currently pursuing involves these second homes and investor loans that meet Fannie or Freddie guarantee fee eligibility. What Fannie and Freddie levy vastly, vastly surpasses sensible expectations of credit losses since they wish to, they don't view those as central to their mission, and they wish to deploy profits from those loans to subsidize other loans that are more central to their mission.
Got it. Is that why, I mean, RTL is something you all have done for a while, but it's just more kind of in vogue, I guess, it seems like. Is it simply that pricing keeps climbing for those landing inside that G fee, correct? It's just shifting further toward the private market. Is that the situation?
When you mentioned RTLs, did you mean residential transition loans?
That's right.
Yeah, that's a segment where Fannie and Freddie really haven't had a presence. Those tend to run 6 months.
Oh, my apologies, you meant investment properties. Sorry about that.
What I was getting at is this scenario: a property has been completely redone, and a buyer intends to purchase it as an investment to lease out. In the past, Fannie and Freddie have backed a large share of loans like that. On those loans, credit results have been superb. The pricing add-ons applied to the lending have been much, much greater than what sensible loss projections would justify. You have observed participants in the private label sector come forward and essentially say, "Hold on, we are willing to assume that credit exposure at a reduced cost."
Understood. All right, that is useful. Thank you.
Absolutely. I appreciate it.
Hello, and thanks. Good morning to everyone. To build on what we've been talking about, at this moment would you say your outlook is more positive regarding the RTL segment or non-QM? RTL appears to offer potentially greater yields, yet non-QM likely provides funding that's more consistent along with leverage availability. In what way should investors account for these differences? Which area of the market today would you identify as delivering the superior return after adjusting for risk?
Both of these are attractive to us, and each one occupies a sizable position on our balance sheet. Larry noted during his prepared comments, I believe, that we're looking into the possibility of completing an RTL securitization. In the past, this was a balance sheet item for us, funded mostly through repo financing. At this point, we're examining how to shift that funding approach. With non-QM, I'd say there are additional options available, correct? You're able to keep loans on the balance sheet using repo financing, you're able to pursue a securitization, you're able to take a vertical slice, you're able to take a horizontal slice. Those call options are available to you. Perhaps rates will decline, or some other development will occur. When the moment is right, you'll exercise that call option. As an owner of loans and a sponsor of deals, the non-QM market offers you what I'd call a fuller opportunity set of possible actions; when it comes to expected return, no material difference between them stands out to me. Each one, I believe, serves a distinct market, and each plays a separate role within the portfolio. What stays consistent for us is that we've enjoyed maintaining deep relationships — whether through an equity stake or continuing dialogue — with the majority of originators behind both of those products. That, we've found, is genuinely valuable. You've got a team traveling around holding literally everyday conversations with originators regarding what's happening with lending, what's happening with guidelines, what's happening with HPA; that sort of ongoing exchange, in my view, is what has remained consistent across both of those sectors, and it explains why we're comfortable giving each one a meaningful allocation of capital.
Yeah, and let me build on that point, Mark, if I may. To start, as Mark indicated, the securitization market for non-QM is now highly developed, and it has also grown rather elastic, meaning that as spreads tightened on the asset, spreads on the liability side tightened quite favorably as well. We keep a very close watch on that. We've discussed this portal of ours, and we will absolutely modify the rates offered to our lenders who supply us with product through that platform, will absolutely modify them according to where securities stand, where we observe securitization spreads. Non-QM securitizations are plentiful, and information keeps coming our way constantly. That product, I definitely expect us to keep purchasing; we've sold packages too. Incidentally, for quite some time now, we've been utilizing vertical risk retention rather than horizontal risk retention. What that means is that the riskier tranches of securities we hold onto when issuing, we retain the ability to sell those on the open market; incidentally, we've done so on occasion. We've sold the horizontal risk that was freely tradable, since we used vertical risk retention. The non-QM market, I believe, will absolutely remain a component of our strategy. Mark already touched on this, and RTL fits into it too — we're currently looking into securitizing that product. That's something we have not yet done. The structure would resemble a revolver. Each of the two markets brings its own benefits, in my view. With non-QM, liquidity is clearly much greater, while RTL carries shorter maturities, which is another feature we appreciate. During the prepared remarks we noted that following the trouble that emerged across the commercial bridge loan space once rates climbed in 2022, the current situation has actually opened up a great deal of opportunity. We're now seeing additional non-performing loans come in for bid, along with more bridge loan possibilities, solid sponsors, solid properties. A significant share of our attention has certainly gone toward that area.
Thank you guys so much for the color today.
Thanks, Eric.
Hey everyone, how are things? My apologies for that. Regarding the broader opportunities within non-QM, I recall you brought up — no, my mistake, not non-QM, but rather the senior HELOC area. What does that opportunity look like in your view, and what are the intentions for this product?
We've only just launched it. I'd prefer not to offer any forecasts about where it might go, but this is a one-of-a-kind offering, correct? We believe — I believe — nobody else has this in the market. If you simply consider how straightforward that offering is, it really is logical. Time will tell whether it does well. It will simply be, well, it will simply be extra upside, clearly, since as I mentioned earlier, Longbridge's numbers have been outstanding, and our expectation remains that they will stay that way; this might genuinely bring an additional element to that. At this moment I would rather avoid giving any forecasts, yet the offering is extremely logical.
Understood, that helps. JR, I'd like to hear your perspective on the dividend relative to earnings for this quarter, and whether you and the board need to observe that moving in a certain direction before it can increase, or simply any thoughts you have regarding the dividend.
Okay, I'll go ahead and take that one. Thank you, Larry. As I mentioned, the ADE and GAAP earnings we've generated this year have been sufficient to cover the dividend. I have strong optimism and confidence that this will keep being the case. Like I said, we truly have everything running at full capacity. If a change comes, I believe it would be an increase. I'd share with you that we've favored a highly consistent dividend. Looking back at 2018 — I just checked, so that's more than 7 years in the past — our payout was quite near where it stands today. Back then it was paid each quarter rather than every month. I believe we made the correct choice by maintaining our dividend at a very steady level across what has been a really extended stretch of time. I genuinely think that if a subsequent adjustment occurs, it will be upward, though I truly don't wish to predict the timing of it. Clearly, that's something the board must decide, and because our dividend has been so stable, it wouldn't be a choice made without careful thought. I think adding more unsecured notes to our balance sheet might serve as a trigger for that too, correct? Since that would allow us to raise our leverage safely and generate additional ADE and, you know, dividend capacity, so to speak, in that manner. I can see many possible triggers for raising the dividend, but I don't want to attempt to attach a particular timeframe to it.
Understood, that's quite useful. Sorry if I overlooked this, but did you provide any update on book value for the quarter so far?
Not so far. That's something we'll handle afterward in this month, August, as part of normal business. We did mention that Q3 has begun well when it comes to securitization volumes, with the platforms performing nicely, with Longbridge reaching its peak month of the year. No figure has been provided as of yet, though we will provide one afterward in this month.
Right, so that usually comes out around — what — probably the fourth week of the month is when we'd normally release it. Yeah, around then.
Got it. Great. Thank you, guys. That's all for me. I appreciate it.
Thank you.
Appreciate it. Everyone, that wraps up the last question we had on the docket. So this brings today's session to a close; many thanks to each of you for joining us on the Ellington Financial Second Quarter 2025 Earnings Call. At this point you're free to hang up, and we hope the rest of your day is great. Take care.
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