Ellington Financial Inc. (EFC) Earnings Call Transcript
November 6, 2025
Earnings Call Speaker Segments
Thank you. Before we get started, I want to remind everybody that forward-looking statements may be part of this conference call, as defined under the safe harbor provisions of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995. Such statements aren't historical by nature, and they carry risks and uncertainties that are described in our annual and quarterly reports filed with the SEC. Actual results could differ materially from what these statements suggest, so nobody should treat them as predictions of future events. No obligation is undertaken by the company to update these forward-looking statements. With me today are Laury Penn, our Chief Executive Officer at Ellington Financial, Marc Tecotzky, Co-Chief Investment Officer, and JR Herlihy, Chief Financial Officer. The presentation for our third quarter earnings conference call can be found on our website, ellingtonfinancial.com. That presentation will be followed throughout today's call, and the important notice and end notes in the presentation qualify all statements and references to figures. With that, I'll turn things over to Laury.
Thanks, Alaael-Deen. Good morning, everyone, and thank you for joining us today. I'll start on slide three of the presentation. Another quarter of strong performance was delivered by Ellington Financial, with strategic execution highlighted by continued growth in our adjustable distributable earnings, continued growth in our investment portfolio, and continued strengthening of our balance sheet. For the third quarter, GAAP net income came in at $0.29 per share, while ADE was $0.53 per share, a new quarterly high for this metric since we began reporting it in 2022, and once again significantly above our $0.39 per share dividends for the quarter. Higher net interest income from our loan portfolios is the direct cause of the rise in ADE over the past several quarters, reflecting both growth in those portfolios and their strong ongoing credit performance, combined with sizable proprietary reverse mortgage securitization gains at Longbridge, where we now complete roughly one reverse prop securitization per quarter. Robust gains from securitizations of non-QM loans and closed-end second lien loans also benefited our quarterly results. Seven securitizations in total were priced by us during the quarter; that's a record for us. Including transactions completed subsequent to quarter-end, 20 securitizations in total have now been priced by us year-to-date. That's more than triple last year's pace. A tremendous asset for Ellington Financial has become the EFMT securitization franchise, allowing us to access liquidity from many of the largest fixed income investors in the world. Finally, in addition to all these drivers, excellent performance in our securities businesses and strong earnings from our affiliate loan originators, such as LendSure, were also had by us. Shifting to our balance sheet, total portfolio holdings grew by 12% during the quarter as capital continued to be deployed to our highest conviction loan businesses. Portfolio growth was led by non-QM, proprietary reverse mortgage, and commercial mortgage bridge loans, and complemented by opportunistic additions of other residential mortgage loans and CLOs as well. One thing that stood out was Longbridge posting an all-time high for proprietary reverse origination volumes. Borrower appetite for Longbridge's prop offerings keeps expanding, and equally significant, investor appetite for the securitization debt tranches that come out of those loans is holding up well. My view is that Ellington Financial — with Longbridge as our subsidiary and our securitization operation — sits in a singular spot to earn attractive spreads by bridging prop reverse mortgage borrowers and investment-grade debt investors. Turning to how we fund ourselves, we made our balance sheet stronger once again by growing long-term, non-mark-to-market financings along two main avenues. The first was stepping up how quickly we complete securitizations, and the second was widening our reach into long-term unsecured funding. To take the first one: as I noted before, we priced 7 securitizations in the quarter. A key point is that we are nearing pricing of our first-ever securitization of residential transition loans, which would likewise cut our dependence on short-term financing within that strategy, free up capital to redeploy, and generate high-yielding retained tranches for our portfolio. The reason securitizations matter is that they deliver stable, non-mark-to-market funding while lessening our dependence on repo. That gives a major boost to capital efficiency, and I'll go into more depth on this in my closing comments. On top of that, securitizations let us manufacture high-yielding retained tranches carrying valuable call options. These retained tranches are producing some of the best requested returns anywhere on our platform, and they add significantly to ADE, even in the absence of repo financing. Now for the second funding avenue: on the last day of Q3, we successfully priced $400 million of five-year senior unsecured notes, rated by Moody's and Fitch, and distributed widely to institutional investors spanning more than 80 accounts. Over half of the proceeds went toward paying down repo borrowings, while the rest funded new high-yielding investments. Those unsecured notes came in at 7.38%, which works out to a 363 basis point spread over the five-year treasury at that moment. We felt good about the execution and the robust investor demand, and it was encouraging to watch the bonds trade well after issuance; we anticipate better pricing on upcoming deals as we grow into a more seasoned unsecured note issuer, and as we shift a larger portion of our borrowings into long-term financing, which sets up a virtuous cycle. With that, I'll hand the call to JR so he can take you through our financial results in greater detail. JR?
Appreciate that, Laury. Morning, everybody. Looking at the third quarter, our GAAP net income came in at $0.29 for each common share, calculated on a fully mark-to-market basis, and ADE was $0.53 per share. If you go to slide five in the deck, you'll see how portfolio income splits out across strategies: credit gave us $0.42 per share, agency chipped in $0.04, and Longbridge accounted for $0.09. On slide six, the ADE breakdown by segment is shown: the investment portfolio segment produced $0.59 per share, and the Longbridge segment added $0.16. Inside the credit portfolio, net interest income went up from the prior quarter, and we booked net realized and unrealized gains on residential transition loans as well as other loans in ADS. We did see some offset from that increase in net interest income, though — namely, net realized and unrealized losses on non-QM retained tranches, CLOs, forward MSR-related investments, and residential REO. Meanwhile, our loan portfolios continue to deliver solid credit performance, and our affiliate loan originators are still posting strong earnings. There's a new slide in the earnings presentation I'd like to highlight. Go to slide 15. It illustrates just how well our loan portfolios have held up on credit over time, which you can see in the exceptionally low realized credit losses our residential and commercial loan strategies have recorded since each business began. Note that this realized credit loss rate is shown on a cumulative inception-to-date basis. If you looked at those percentages on an annualized basis, they'd come out even smaller. What this metric reflects is how well we've underwritten our loans, and it takes in both the loans that did what we expected and were repaid when they came due, plus the ones that needed individual workout efforts. Over on the top right, you can see cumulative realized credit losses of just 13 basis points across roughly $14.7 billion in residential mortgage loan fundings, which covers non-QM, RTL, home equity, and proprietary reverse mortgages. Then at the bottom right, cumulative losses come to only 47 basis points on over $2 billion of commercial mortgage bridge loan originations going back to before COVID. EFMT's ongoing ADE growth has largely been fueled by combining robust credit results with the elevated yields these loans produce. Turning to agency, during Q3 that book delivered solid outcomes as well, producing net gains on our long agency RMBS positions and the interest rate hedges tied to them. The climate proved helpful for the portfolio overall, thanks to falling rates, less turbulence, and narrowing agency yield spreads. Longbridge posted yet another outstanding quarter, with meaningful contributions coming from originations as well as servicing. On the origination side, the profit came from three things: we originated more prop reverse mortgage loans by volume, margins on HECM reverse mortgage loans came in higher, and we booked net gains tied to the prop loan securitization that closed during the quarter. Over in servicing, the contribution was fueled by base servicing net income, solid tail securitization executions, and a net gain on the HMBS MSR equivalent that mostly reflected tighter HMBS yield spreads. Working against those gains was a net unrealized loss on retained tranches from prop reverse securitizations, which came from faster assumed prepayment speeds, lower HPA projections, and higher discount rates being applied. Now let's turn to how the portfolio moved during the quarter. On slide seven, you'll see our adjusted long credit portfolio grew 11% quarter-over-quarter, reaching $3.56 billion. We saw expansion across our non-QM loans, commercial mortgage bridge loans, other residential loans, and CLOs, along with growth in retained non-QM RMBS from the securitizations we completed this quarter. Several factors worked against those gains: we sold loans into securitizations, recorded net sales of non-agency RMBS, and saw our residential transition loan portfolio shrink as principal paydowns came in faster than new purchases. Within our RTL, commercial mortgage bridge, and consumer loan portfolios, we brought in $352 million of total principal paydowns during the third quarter — that's 21% of the combined fair value those portfolios held when the quarter began, since these short-duration portfolios continued returning capital at a steady clip. Turning to slide eight, you'll see our total long agency RMBS portfolio fell 18%, landing at $221 million, driven by net sales. Slide nine shows our Longbridge portfolio climbing a substantial 37% to $750 million, fueled by a record quarter of prop reverse mortgage loan originations, partly offset by a prop reverse securitization completed during the quarter. Please turn to slide 10 next for a summary of our borrowings. As of September 30th, the total weighted average borrowing rate on recourse borrowings fell eight basis points to 5.99% overall, including a notable 17 basis point drop on credit borrowings. Quarter-over-quarter, net interest margin on our credit portfolio rose 54 basis points, reflecting that lower cost of funds along with higher asset yields, while agency NIM dipped slightly by two basis points. As of September 30th, the ratio of our recourse debt to equity came in at 1.8 to 1, a modest increase from the 1.7 to 1 we reported at June 30th. Meanwhile, our total debt to equity ratio moved slightly lower, going from 8.7 to 1 down to 8.6 to 1. During that quarter, we were able to obtain improved financing terms on two facilities tied to Longbridge. On September 30th, we priced $400 million in five-year senior unsecured notes, carrying a fixed coupon of 7.38%, which represented a 363 basis point spread over the five-year U.S. Treasury at that moment. In keeping with our goal of staying neutral with respect to interest rate movements, we swapped the fixed coupon into a floating rate as soon as it was priced, which allowed us to lock in that 363 basis point spread. The note sale wrapped up during the first part of October, and it'll begin appearing on our balance sheet once the fourth quarter gets underway. By October 31st, unsecured debt made up close to 20% of our recourse borrowings. Just as significant, the share of those borrowings exposed to mark-to-market margining dropped to 61% in October, down from 74% the prior month. We anticipate that our notes offering will push our overall cost of funds up by roughly 17 basis points. Keep in mind, that figure doesn't capture the expected accretive gain from adding more assets yielding more than this debt costs us, and it also leaves out the capital reserves that paying down the repo will release — Laury will cover that in greater detail shortly. Consistent with how we approach mark-to-market, we're going to choose the fair value option for these new unsecured notes, just as we've done with our other notes, and run them through the income statement at market. Because of that choice, we took the entire amount of associated deal costs as an expense during October instead of amortizing them across the notes' life. On September 30, cash plus unencumbered assets totaled roughly $1.2 billion, which comes to around two-thirds of our total equity. Book value per share stood at $13.40, while economic return for the third quarter came in at 9.2% annualized. With that, I'll turn things over to Marc.
Thanks, JR. This quarter mattered a lot for where EFMT is heading. Like Laury said, ADE kept expanding and we strengthened the company's resilience. Let me be clear: the repo financing markets are working very well right now, with plenty of liquidity and attractive terms. When we spread our funding across more sources and depend less on short-term repo, EFMT's balance sheet gets stronger. Our debt deal moved us meaningfully in that direction, and so did our 7 securitizations, in which we swapped repo funding for debt that isn't mark-to-market. Resilience also comes from the downside protections we've established, credit hedges among them. Those hedges hurt returns during this quarter, but we're keeping them in place as a key safeguard, particularly now that certain hints of possible trouble in the economy have appeared. Take, for instance, 2 well-publicized bankruptcies that recently hit the corporate credit markets, plus job formation that has softened considerably relative to the start of this year. If risks like these spread more broadly, our credit hedges exist precisely to shield us. Beyond that, our emphasis on higher FICO, low-relativity loans, together with our purchasing activity, makes our portfolio even more resilient. We keep putting money into proprietary technologies that let our affiliate loan originators and other partners originate and deliver loans to us with greater efficiency. Those tech investments are delivering results via larger purchase volumes, since we've widened considerably the range of originators selling loans our way. We're also excited about what technology could do to automate and upgrade many parts of loan underwriting. These technology efforts supported our 12% quarter-over-quarter portfolio growth, which came from expansion in our loan strategies and our capacity to securitize loans efficiently; as rates drift a bit lower, that trend ought to persist, or perhaps speed up; besides adding loan purchasers, we're widening our reach too. Lately we've started buying 2 specific categories of loans that Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac are eligible to purchase, yet private investors have increasingly bought them instead. We anticipate rolling out a securitization of those loans within the next few months. This agency-eligible mortgage space holds particular appeal because the current administration seems at ease with private capital moving into territory the GSEs once controlled. For EFT, this may be a one-of-a-kind moment and a possibly enormous opportunity. Another area we're focused on right now involves purchasing seasoned mortgage loan portfolios from banks. As rates have fallen and spreads have narrowed, plenty of bank portfolios that were once deeply underwater are now far less so, which is tempting many banks to offload what they view as non-core assets. From the beginning of this month, from the beginning of the fourth quarter, more loan packages from bank sellers have reached the market, and thus far we've bought 2 such packages. Going forward, we believe this could grow into a major area for us. Broadly speaking, we're running the same EFMT strategy and growing it as we go. What we do is employ our own switching models to acquire a wide array of mortgage assets, take out the funding via securitizations, and hold onto high-yielding tranche positions in our portfolio, plus call options that could prove quite valuable. This began back in 2017 with non-QM transactions, after which we brought in second liens and prop reverse, and at present we've got an RTL deal in the market, with plans to securitize agency-eligible mortgages on the horizon too. At the same time, as the range of products we purchase and securitize grows, we're giving affiliate loan originators additional avenues to earn money by broadening the product sets available for them to present to their customers; this synergistic tie fuels growth in our portfolio, and it also lifts our affiliate loan originators' profits, which in turn boosts our earnings and our book value per share via the equity stakes we hold in those originators. That strategy is the primary force behind the robust ADE growth this year, particularly given the sizable ADE contributions we've gotten from our retained tranches as well as our stakes in the originators, Longbridge included, naturally. Growing our presence in the securitization markets has turned into a virtuous cycle in its own right. We've established our EFMT securitization brand across the last 8 years, going back to our first deal in 2017, and every additional transaction and loan product reinforces our standing in the market and grows our investor base, which helps produce better execution levels. Going forward, we in fact see a richer opportunity set than was available in the first half of the year. Loan volumes are higher, with mortgage rates now over 80 basis points below where they stood earlier in the year. With a growing footprint in a bigger market, our securitization volumes have risen substantially; even so, the overall credit backdrop has deteriorated. HPA has stalled, a greater number of consumers face financial strain, and many corporations are not merely slowing their hiring but are actively cutting headcount. We'll keep leaning on a data-driven, model-based investment approach to chase high returns while capping downside risk. Now back to Laury.
Thanks, Marc. In summary, this was a superb quarter for Ellington Financial on many fronts. We delivered earnings growth and substantial portfolio expansion, and we marked a major inflection point in evolving our financing base, all of which we believe positions us well for continued earnings strength and dividend coverage in the quarters ahead. I'm happy to report that this momentum has carried into the fourth quarter, with securitization activity still robust and origination volume strong at Longbridge and at our non-QM loan originator affiliates, LendSure, and American Heritage Lending. Naturally, we've also been working hard to deploy the proceeds from our unsecured note issuance. In October by itself, we put a portion of the proceeds to work expanding the investment portfolio by over 5%, and as we had planned, we directed the bulk of what was left toward paying down repo. Since our capacity to generate ADE is quite robust, it's helpful to have some ADE in reserve as we head into the fourth quarter, because we anticipate a modest short-term drag on ADE while we put the money from our notes issuance to work. Once those proceeds are deployed, we still expect to capture further, more subtle advantages from the notes issuance down the road, and I'll walk through that now. The initial added advantage comes by way of greater capital efficiency, which results from swapping mark-to-market financing, such as short-term repo, for long-term non-mark-to-market financing. To be specific, and in keeping with how we manage risk in a disciplined way, we hold additional cash and capital reserves against our repo and other mark-to-market facilities as protection from possible market shocks; once repo is replaced with long-term unsecured notes, those reserves can be lowered, which releases capital for redeployment into assets with higher yields, thus amplifying long-term earnings potential even further. As a side note, our securitization financings enjoy comparable advantages. A much more long-term advantage is the second one stemming from our notes offering. We see our move toward a bigger share of long-term unsecured and securitization financing, along with a smaller share of shorter-term repo financing, as a fundamental change in our capital structure. This change is strengthening our balance sheet, improving risk management, and helping earnings remain stable. With our existing $263 million of unsecured notes included, close to 20% of our recourse borrowings were unsecured as of October 31, and over time we plan to raise that share. As this evolution continues, we anticipate seeing improvements in our credit ratings, which ought to let us issue additional unsecured debt on even more favorable economic terms, kicking off a virtuous cycle. Given these multifaceted dynamics, I think our unsecured notes program will let us both construct a more resilient balance sheet and grow our earnings power. Our objective, as it always is, is to provide durable, high-risk-adjusted returns to shareholders through market cycles. Going forward, thanks to conservative leverage, abundant liquidity from our recent unsecured notes issuance, and a steady cadence of securitizations, we think Ellington Financial is positioned well to keep delivering strong and sustainable dividend coverage. Let's open the floor to Q&A. Operator, please go ahead.
Thanks. Morning, everyone. To begin with, regarding the platforms that originate loans, a mortgage rate setting that's more favorable has begun to appear. Could you talk about the way that has shifted the worth of the stakes we hold, and then how operations have performed generally? Has more volume been moving to Ellington? Are there additional places where you want to build out capability, whether at other platforms or brand-new ones, from the standpoint of an originator?
Alright. JR, would you like to discuss valuations in a broad sense — the way we approach valuing things, and how the tailwinds we've seen lately are giving valuations a boost?
Okay, absolutely. Thanks, Crispin. Valuations for the stakes happen semiannually with outside parties, and on the two other occasions we make adjustments tied to interim P&L. Generally, what the valuation firms examine comes down to roughly 3 inputs: historical earnings, projected earnings, and multiples versus the market. A few things are influencing this, I believe. Some publicly reported transactions have occurred at multiples to book, at premiums to book. Meanwhile, book value has grown since earnings have been so strong; in lots of these situations, we're receiving distributions from those earnings as well, which lets us send cash back and then put it to work again. What I'd say is that robust earnings results have shown up in a larger book value, while also creating additional liquidity for these platforms and pushing multiples higher. There's a table inside our 10Q that walks through the earnings multiples our valuations imply, and those aren't sitting at the same levels as one especially noteworthy deal from the past couple of months. It's at a premium to book, mirroring the platform's earnings power, yet not at the premium that transaction showed. If that answers the question, what I mean is earnings have pushed book value, which has pushed values, and interim P&L simply shows up in our mark-to-market as we realize the gain from those earnings.
Right, so on the new product side — Crispin, that was your question, correct? We're considering taking positions in some new products, is that what you meant?
Yes, that is correct.
Right. Marc, nothing new on the product front that I know about. There is a possibility we'll bring on a bit more servicing capacity, though only modestly — but other than that, no, I don't know of anything. Marc, do you know of any?
Yeah. So Crispin, the main point I'd make is that adjustable rate mortgages are beginning to account for a growing portion of newly originated loans. Among certain agency originators, that figure reaches 10%. Looking back at the earliest period of non-QM — I'm referring to 2015, 2016, 2017 — those products were entirely adjustable rate. Everything used to be seven-year ARMs, correct? Demand for adjustable rate mortgages is now emerging, and this partly reflects the steeper yield curve, since a seven-year ARM can be priced somewhat below a fixed rate offering; that's a newly introduced product. It's something we've been collaborating on with a number of our affiliates and other originators.
Great, Marc. That's helpful. Marc, your remarks about purchasing loans from banks caught my attention. Could you elaborate a bit further on that opportunity? Is it mostly commercial real estate loans? Does any residential lending factor in? And which kinds of banks are involved — is it mainly community banks, or do larger institutions participate too?
Both of the deals I mentioned during the prepared remarks involved residential mortgage loans. It turns out one of those was in fact adjustable rates; these were smaller banks; they weren't the large GSIBs. A lot of banks are sitting on portfolios that they are eager to restructure; I believe this is more of a problem and plays a bigger role in the agency MBS market, where many banks continue to hold large portfolios of Fannie Twos, Fannie Two and Apps, which have been a real weight on NIM. I find it somewhat interesting that most of the M&A activity involving banks over the last couple of years has been followed, after each deal, by fairly sizable portfolio restructurings. Should M&A pick up, I believe that will result in more activity from banks shedding loans they have kept in portfolio for some time. I simply think the natural process of lower yields, a steeper yield curve, and tighter credit spreads is raising the price of certain loans on balance sheet to the point where the trade-off of accepting a loss and getting to reorient the portfolio becomes palatable. I expect more of that to continue if the rate environment remains where it is now.
Great. Thank you, Marc. I appreciate you all taking my questions.
Thank you, Crispin.
Morning, everyone. Bose isn’t here—this is Frankie speaking instead. Starting with the topic of credit: you brought up a softer consumer, some weakening in employment, and HBA turning negative. Could you expand on what’s showing up across your portfolio, and also on which areas currently offer the strongest places to put capital?
Absolutely. So there's that new slide JR mentioned, and it lays out plainly how our lending activity is performing on the credit side, both in residential and in commercial. What I'd say is this: when you break consumer spending down by income bracket, the softness is mostly concentrated among the bottom 50% of earners. You can observe the effect in subprime auto, in lower FICO credit cards, and in parts of the FHA and VA portfolios, which generally carry weaker credit quality than Fannie and Freddie paper does. Among higher-end borrowers, though, spending has kept going, and their credit performance—which is really our focus—has been very strong. I also included in the prepared remarks those observations you've all seen: a rise in the count of companies discussing layoffs. Those layoffs that certain corporations have been bringing up could plausibly hit some borrowers earning higher wages. As things stand today on credit performance, everything is doing well, and we've achieved a great deal of progress this year, I believe, in resolving some delinquencies that existed in the small-balance commercial portfolio. I wanted that point included since it's on our radar, and we're giving it thought.
Yes. And Marc, to build on that, regarding slide 15, let me stress again what JR noted in the prepared remarks—these figures are non-annualized. They're cumulative. Take our commercial mortgage loan business and bridge loan business, which stretches back at least 10 years, gosh. When you look at 47 basis points of cumulative losses, that spans over 10 years. Clearly, anything expressed on an annualized basis would be far smaller. On the resi side, once more, 13 basis points reaches back many, many, many years. This performance makes us really pleased. As Marc puts it, we've stayed laser-focused on FICO, and that has truly benefited us. Naturally, in RTL, every loan we make carries personal guarantees. We feel quite good about our position; there were a couple of loans we discussed on some fairly recent earnings calls. In the small-balance commercial space, one of those has been resolved. The other is actually moving along quite well toward resolution, I'd say later next year, but the outlook is promising. We genuinely feel good about our position.
Thanks, that's helpful. Over the last 12 months, you posted a solid ADE. Is it possible we might see some kind of increase in the dividend level? And can you put a number on the drag on ADE you referenced for Q4?
Okay, so when it comes to that drag—I believe JR said that our total cost of funds, assuming nothing else changes, starting from where we are right now, would come to roughly 17 basis points, correct, JR?
Yes.
It's greater. Yeah. Once more, what I'm saying is, we truly have some solid ADE available as a buffer coming in, so to speak; I still think our belief is that we'll keep managing to cover the dividend. I don't wish to claim — I wouldn't state that we've got any intentions. We definitely have no intention of cutting the dividend. I believe it simply sits at a level currently, an 11-handle yield. I think that's a solid dividend; we just intend to keep covering it, and covering it the way we've done.
Thanks; that's everything from my side.
Hi, thank you. A small question regarding what you said about the overall credit environment and credit results. If you look at the credit hedge portfolio, it seems the hedge positions' size went down a bit in 3Q. I was wondering whether you might offer a few remarks on how you're thinking about the danger of ground-based spread widening, and how you're currently handling the credit hedge portion of the portfolio. Thanks.
Yes. The decline in the credit hedge was, I'd describe it as, somewhat of a blip, so to speak, since we were on the verge of; we actually priced that deal. On September 30th, right. At quarter-end. Essentially, since we were flooded with cash, we determined that for a short-term period, we'd reduce that credit hedge. Clearly, the credit hedge exists for a rainy day and for resiliency during a market shock, and having essentially all that cash flowing in removed the necessity for as much of a credit hedge. I do anticipate that it will keep growing as we put that cash to work, as we've discussed, in new high-yielding investments that are more correlated, clearly, to overall market risks. I'd see that as somewhat of a blip when it comes to that large downward move there.
Understood. Alright, that's clear. You mentioned aiming to put the money from the debt issuance to work by the close of the quarter. Clearly, your team has managed some issuance on the common equity side via the ATM program too. Should we assume the debt issuance lowers your desire for common equity in the near term, or is the amount issued there modest enough that it barely shifts things?
Yes. We're able to put capital to work fairly fast. I want to point out that our ATM issuance has been accretive. I believe that matters a great deal. Definitely intend to continue that. Yes, precisely. I think we enjoyed a solid quarter for ATM issuance. Given all the flow we've discussed on prior calls, we can put capital to work fairly rapidly, by and large. There are so many strategies available for us to put money into, and we select whichever ones appear most attractive at any given moment. I'd say we don't truly see them as substitutes. More ATM issuance isn't just accretive these days, it also benefits our G&A ratios and similar metrics. There are simply many solid reasons to continue it. Naturally, we. Don't wish to, we prefer seeing our stock trade at a premium, and we don't want to take any hasty action that might alter that.
Right, and I’ll build on that. We said October’s portfolio gained over 5%. We didn’t give an exact figure, but that sits on a $4 billion base. So at 5%, that’s $200 million there; we brought in $400 million and said over half of it is going toward paying down repo. And in Q3 our portfolio grew 12%. I think the takeaway, reinforcing what Laury said, is that putting money to work and growing the portfolio hasn’t been a problem for us lately. We did issue accretively through the ATM in the quarter compared with where book value per share ended at $7.30.
Yep. Okay; that's helpful. Thank you.
Thank you.
Thank you.
Yes. Hello. Thanks a lot. Good morning. Regarding Longbridge and the proprietary reverse mortgage offering, you said origination volume hit a record. I wanted to ask, in that market, how does the competitive landscape appear to you folks? Right. Competition is limited; especially in the prop space, you find HECM issuers, which are originators. Those exist in greater numbers, I suppose you could say. Taken as a whole, Longbridge ranks second in that space. When it comes to volumes, certain measures occasionally put us first; in prop, essentially there are two rival companies. A public company is one of them. The other is not. My view is that the reason it's harder for other players to originate that product is a lack of the sort of capital base and the outlet for the product that we possess in a vertically integrated manner, since we have Ellington Financial to read that needs to put money to work. We have the originator, clearly, that can originate the product for us; competition in that space is definitely reduced.
Compared with other spaces. I believe our competitive position is excellent. Because our securitization is performing so well, we have actually been able to offer borrowers better terms, since the securitization outlet has given us better execution over the past several quarters. That has turned into better rates for borrowers, which has also turned into higher volumes for us, correct? We can offer better terms, and we can achieve higher volumes; that is essentially what has been happening there, and with luck, that will keep going.
All right, fantastic. Yeah, and if I could pivot quickly over to the credit portfolio. Looking at it quarter over quarter, it looks like Non-QM was the largest, drew the most investment from one quarter to the next. I'm curious what you're seeing in that space and what makes it so appealing to you. Yeah, thanks.
Marc? Non-QM isn't one single thing, correct? You've got loans to investors. You've got owner-occupied loans. Documentation types span a spectrum, from Full Doc to bank statements and several others. I suppose we've been involved in the Non-QM market since 2014. That was the year we made our first commitment in our initial portfolio company, LendSure. Across the last 11 years, we've devoted substantial time and energy toward developing our credit modeling, our prepayment modeling, and strengthening ties with our originator affiliates — the ones where we hold part of the company — along with others I'd describe simply as origination partners, where we may not own any stake, yet we maintain ongoing conversations about underwriting guidelines. We've got a group of people out on the road essentially daily, meeting originators, speaking with underwriters, speaking with appraisers, considering what truly constitutes best practices when it comes to the process of originating loans; we possess a genuinely deep, native grasp of that market. It has expanded. You've witnessed Fannie and Freddie refrain from widening their guidelines, and in certain respects, narrow them. You've got, I'd say, 10 to 15% of the home buying universe that the GSEs don't serve well. That's genuinely the heart of Non-QM. I think a few developments have occurred for Non-QM over the last year or so. First, there's been a broad-based migration upward in FICO, which we favor. There's still been plenty of discipline on LTV. The bulk of what we do on a portfolio basis sits below 70 LTV in aggregate. You've seen securitization volumes spread significantly this year. The non-QM securitization market has expanded considerably, and it's become more liquid and more commoditized, and it's drawn in a larger universe of investor-grade bond buyers. All of those factors together have worked in concert to tighten spreads. The ability to purchase loans that are well underwritten to higher FICO borrowers and then securitize them with tighter spreads — materially tighter spreads on the IG bonds than what you were looking at across much of 2024 — and to have greater certainty of execution because there's more liquidity in the market, has turned it into an asset class where we have scale; it's leaving our portfolio with very attractive retained investments; it's really those two things. It's the volume, the scale, the underwriting discipline we've brought to it. Levered with these tighter investment-grade spreads, that has made that sector very attractive to us. below 70% LTV in aggregate.
Great. Thank you so much.
Thank you.
Hi there, and thanks. Morning to everyone. We've got a quick follow-up regarding the Longbridge portfolio. So, if we consider all the potential gains Longbridge could deliver, would reaching its target returns call for additional leverage? What is your view on how much leverage sits in that portfolio? And what level of leverage would be both the goal and something that can be maintained over time there?
Thank you. In my view, additional leverage isn't needed. To start with, a big chunk of Longbridge's — and here I'm referring to the originator, not the segment, okay? — a big chunk of Longbridge's equity sits in its servicing, correct, particularly the HECM servicing portfolio. That servicing delivers a really strong yield with zero leverage involved. It yields far more than forward servicing does; that's point one. As for the proprietary reverse loans, the ones that land on our balance sheet — EFC's balance sheet — whether before or after securitization, certainly, during the period we're building them up for securitization, leverage will be present, right? Then again, after securitization, when we keep only the residual, so to speak, that no longer really demands it. Since we do consolidate those, from a consolidation standpoint, you know, leverage could appear larger in that view. Once more, this is financing that's locked in long-term and isn't subject to mark-to-market. Our perspective is that we simply hold a fairly modest retained interest, and it calls for no extra leverage. My sense is that additional leverage won't be necessary there. Naturally, when origination volumes grow, you'll need greater warehouse financing. But that's more of a fleeting thing, so to speak — temporary.
Alright, that's pretty fascinating. Let's circle back to Non-QM briefly—what do you think about convexity risk in that area at the moment? As you just mentioned, it seems like brokers and loan officers have come such a long way. The asset class is better in quality, clearer, and more liquid. That said, we're curious how it might react if rates went down, even considerably lower. And also your capacity to replenish that portfolio should rates decline. Thanks a lot, everyone.
Marc?
Yeah. Hey, Eric. What I'd say is that it was interesting; during the most recent remittance cycle, jumbo speeds went up quite a bit. You didn't observe a comparable rise in Non-QM. If we look back at 2020 and 2021, we know that Non-QM loans can prepay very quickly, at speeds above 40 CPR, correct? This rate movement has definitely made prepayments — and understanding them, and valuing them — a central issue, because in a securitization, what you keep, a big chunk of the investment, is basically a kind of crypto IO; we hedge that risk. I also believe this decline in rates is adding substantial value to the call options as well, right? You still have the option to get loans at face value that started out at 103 and, if rates shift, might be valued at 105. The call options stay with us. They perform well when rates go down. There's also the XSI, our excess spread piece, which carries exposure to quicker prepayment speeds. Still, by grasping how prepayments work and methodically lowering a portion of that risk through prepayment penalties—something about 30% of the market uses—that's genuinely one of our central strengths, isn't it? Take something like the servicing portfolio we acquired from Arlington — or getting a handle on IOs and inverse IOs, or grasping how various types of borrowers respond to prepayment options. That's an area where I'd say we excel. We put a huge amount of time into it. There's a lot of institutional knowledge here, I believe. You've got it exactly right. Prepayment speeds are something we're watching closely. So what does that mean for portfolio size? Typically, when a refi wave hits, the market doesn't really shrink. It's just that. What borrowers are doing is trading in an old loan for a new one. I don't see it making it any harder to remain invested. A lot of times, during a refinancing boom, the overall market gets bigger. That's because some borrowers who refinance end up pulling cash out, so an older loan gets swapped for a new one that's a bit larger. Our team has stayed really dialed into the prepayment risk tied to each loan, making sure it's correctly hedged, and hedged across the yield curve. When it comes to volume, I'd expect a significant jump. I also think it opens up plenty of opportunity.
Yeah, let me tack on one more point. To start, I'd like to note that, just like Marc mentioned, we run these models obsessively, correct? So, when we're holding those loans in warehouse before they get securitized—the Non-QM ones, correct? Those come with negative convexity. We're short. In part, we're also short TBAs versus those loans, plus other interest rate hedging instruments, right? What we've got is a short position in something negatively convex against a long position in something else that's negatively convex. That's a help. I think that's yet another place where the way we operate is pretty different from how others do it. My next point: if you turn to page 14, you'll see this clearly at the whole-portfolio level. What you'll find on page 14 of the presentation is our interest rate sensitivity analysis. In the Q, I believe we also extend out to 100 basis points. What I mean is, looking across the entire portfolio, even factoring in that prepayment risk exists. As Marc mentioned, a portion consists of IOs where we hold long positions within our retained Non-QM tranches, correct? Even after accounting for all of that, the negative convexity across the whole company is genuinely quite limited. Once more, looking at page 14, is there some negative convexity present? Absolutely. You'll notice modest decreases in equity when there's a 50 basis point decline or a 50 basis point rise, yet these are truly fairly modest. We actually model this particular aspect extremely closely, drawing on more than 30 years of experience.
Yes. Thanks a lot, everyone. I’m grateful to you all.
Thank you.
Hello, and thank you. Marissa here, filling in for Doug today. I just have a single question, and it's a wider one regarding the reverse mortgage sector. With today's market circumstances—especially what's expected when it comes to HPA cooling off and the changing regulatory landscape—what effect do those factors have on how you view the continuing opportunity in that space?
All right. So regarding regulation, honestly there isn't a whole lot happening right now. People brought up possible enhancements — what they call HMBS 2.0 — yet it appears to have hit a wall. On the regulatory side, genuinely very little is taking place. Turning to HPA, that certainly is significant. Whenever we carry out prop reverse securitization, we hold onto what you could call the residual, which means we bear long-term HPA exposure. As I believe we said during the prepared remarks, given that HPA has somewhat plateaued, we reduced the mark on those pieces we retained from the prop reverse mortgage securitizations. Once again, the impact stayed fairly limited and was counterbalanced by, clearly, numerous other factors at work within the portfolio. This is something we monitor very carefully, and it will influence what that portfolio is worth. You should also keep in mind that substantial cushioning exists there, correct? Prop reverse mortgages get originated — actually, every reverse mortgage, right — at initial LTVs that are extraordinarily low. Consequently, your exposure isn't really to shorter-term HPA so much as it is to ultra-long-term HPA. What I mean is, over the short term, the LTVs we're discussing sit well under 50%, well under.
Understood — that helps. Thanks a lot. That wraps up the last question we had for today. We appreciate everyone for joining the Ellington Financial third quarter 2025 earnings conference call. At this point you're welcome to hang up, and we hope the rest of your day is great.
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