Home / Transcripts / Ellington Financial Inc. (EFC) · November 5, 2026

Ellington Financial Inc. (EFC) Earnings Call Transcript

November 5, 2026

New York Stock Exchange US Real Estate Mortgage Real Estate Investment Trusts (REITs) earnings 54 min

Earnings Call Speaker Segments

Alaael-Deen Shilleh executive
#1

Thank you. Before we start, I want to remind everybody that this conference call might contain forward-looking statements as defined under the safe harbor provisions of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995. Such statements aren't historical in nature and carry risks and uncertainties that are described in detail in our annual and quarterly reports filed with the SEC. Actual results could differ materially from these statements, and they shouldn't be viewed as predictions of future events. The company assumes no obligation to update these forward-looking statements. With me today are Larry Penn, Chief Executive Officer and President of Ellington Financial, Mark Tecotzky, Co-Chief Investment Officer, and JR Herlihy, Chief Financial Officer. Our earnings conference call presentation is posted on our website, ellingtonfinancial.com. Today's call will follow that presentation, and all statements and references to figures are qualified by the important notice and endnotes in the presentation; with that, I'll turn it over to Larry.

Larry Penn executive
#2

Thanks Alaael-Deen, and good morning everyone. I'll start on slide 3 of the presentation. During the third quarter, Ellington Financial produced strong results even though the market environment was challenging. We posted GAAP net income of $0.31 per share and an annualized economic return of 9.4%. Our adjusted distributable earnings came in at 45 cents per share, once again topping our quarterly dividend of $0.39, and we held book value per share steady even as interest rates climbed sharply and yield spreads widened late in the quarter. Our interest rate and credit hedges softened the late-quarter selloff, reinforcing our already ample liquidity reserves and helping us preserve book value. At the same time, our diversified investment portfolio and origination platforms gave us multiple sources of earnings. Key contributors to earnings this quarter included our retained IOs from non-QM and agency-eligible securitizations, which perform well when rates rise and prepayments slow, plus commercial mortgage bridge loans, corporate credit, and our originator investments, especially LendSure, which turned in another standout quarter. Credit performance across our investment portfolio also improved this quarter, with delinquencies falling and cumulative realized losses staying low. JR will walk through the details; we keep expanding our asset sourcing capabilities. Our growing residential loan portal generated $1.6 billion of loan purchases from 57 sellers this quarter. Along with loan flow from Longbridge and our other channels, the portal supported net portfolio growth even as we keep securitizing loans. Meanwhile, Longbridge stayed solidly profitable, helped by higher origination volumes and significant interest rate hedging gains. The quarter at Longbridge would have been even stronger, but as interest rates rose sharply, a competitor temporarily kept its offering rates down to defend its market share. Origination margins across the industry compressed as a result. With offering rates finally repricing higher, origination margins at Longbridge have been improving so far in the fourth quarter. Although Longbridge's contribution to earnings fell from the prior quarter, that prior quarter was extraordinarily strong, with two proprietary reverse securitizations completed. Turning next to how we're capitalized. In September we added $150 million to our existing 7 3/8% senior unsecured notes. That deal came not long after Moody's changed EFC's rating outlook to positive. We had kicked things off with a $100 million offering, and because institutional demand was so strong, we managed to increase its size by 50%. The pricing on that offering carried a yield spread over Treasuries roughly 70 basis points tighter than what we saw on last year's issuance. With the add-on, the series now sits at $550 million outstanding, and the bigger size plus a wider investor base have already done a lot to improve secondary market liquidity for the issue. The offering gave us extra investment capacity heading into the late-quarter selloff and moved forward our strategy of swapping short-term mark-to-market repo for long-term unsecured debt. Our common equity moves as of late show that same discipline in managing capital. During the first two months of the quarter, we raised about $34 million via our ATM at roughly 100% of book value per share. After the quarter closed, when our stock sold off, we bought back common stock at about 85% of the book value we'd most recently reported. That window didn't stay open long, and we repurchased slightly less than $4 million of our stock. Those buybacks added to book value per share. Should similarly accretive chances come up again, we'd look to seize them, market conditions permitting. Also in September, we finished acquiring a controlling interest in StateBridge, a loan servicer that's fairly small yet well diversified. As of September 30, StateBridge was servicing about 15,000 loans, with unpaid principal balance of nearly $2 billion. What we aim to do is apply Ellington's data and workout expertise to help StateBridge become the top special servicer in mortgages. A handful of enormous players dominate agency servicing. For those mega servicers, special servicing revenue simply isn't material. But we believe a need is emerging, along with substantial potential demand, for a special servicer that's more focused. For Ellington Financial, the strategic worth of StateBridge extends far past our cut of its servicing profits. If StateBridge can improve EFC's results on delinquent loans and REO, that will help us generate superior returns through credit cycles. With that, I'll pass the call to JR, who will take you through our financial results in more detail. JR?

JR Herlihy executive
#3

Thanks, Larry. Good morning, everyone. I'll begin on slide 5 with the segment results. GAAP net income got a 47-cent-per-share lift from the investment portfolio, and Longbridge chipped in 10 cents per share, in both cases before unallocated corporate other items. Turning now to the ADE reconciliation on slide 6: the investment portfolio's contribution came in flat at 50 cents per share, and Longbridge added 7 cents, compared with 23 cents in Q2. A reduced drag from corporate other helped partly offset that decline, bringing total ADE to 45 cents per share — that is, adjusted distributable earnings of $0.45 per share. As of this quarter, ADE is presented net of incentive fee expense, and prior periods have been restated accordingly. In both Q2 and Q3, that incentive fee amounted to approximately $0.9 million, or 1 cent per share, which brings conformed Q2 ADE down to 59 cents from the 60 cents previously reported. Within the investment portfolio, net interest income remained strong, and net interest margin increased to 3.55% from 3.36%, as higher asset yields more than offset greater funding costs; on slide 7, our adjusted long investment portfolio grew 4.5% quarter over quarter, to $4.7 billion, powered by net purchases across a range of loan categories and by expansion in retained RMBS. Among the loan purchases were opportunistic acquisitions of prime jumbo and scratch and dent residential mortgage loans. Moving to Longbridge on slide 8, originations reached $676 million, up 36% year-over-year and about 15% sequentially. Despite higher rates, September stood out as the strongest month ever for proprietary reverse submissions at Longbridge, as slide 9 shows. The lower earnings contribution stemmed from tighter origination margins and one prop reverse securitization priced during the quarter, versus two in the second quarter. Servicing and enterprise interest rate hedges contributed positively. Results also included a mark-down on retained prop reverse tranches, driven by revised home price projections. The net Longbridge portfolio increased 59% to roughly $1.03 billion, reflecting production growth and the timing of securitizations. Some of that gain reversed once the securitization priced in September settled in October. On financing, recourse leverage rose to 2.2 times from 1.9 times as we grew the portfolio with additional repo, along with debt from our unsecured notes add-on offering. While some proceeds from the notes were used to repay existing repo borrowings, the net repo increase mainly reflected warehouse financing of newly acquired loans expected to be securitized in the near term. Our $150 million September add-on, net of the redemption of roughly $38 million of notes that matured in August, increased unsecured borrowings by about $112 million, to $775 million. Quarter-end leverage also reflected the timing of two securitizations that priced in September but settled in early October. Cash increased to $269 million from $247 million, and total equity rose to $2.03 billion. Total unencumbered assets, including cash, totaled $1.92 billion. On slide 11, roughly 25% of recourse borrowings were long-term and non-mark-to-market, and 17% were unsecured. The weighted average remaining term of repo borrowings was 8.9 months. By the time the quarter closed, the weighted average borrowing rate on our recourse borrowings stood at 5.78%, compared with 5.5% as of June 30. During the quarter, we secured better pricing on two loan financing facilities and extended the maturity on a third. Slide 12 shows where our balance sheet and credit progress stand over the longer term. It compares September 30, 2026 with June 30, 2025 — the quarter-end before we priced the $400 million unsecured offering. Since then, we have increased both our equity cushion and our unencumbered asset base, widened and extended our funding, raised profitability, and strengthened our credit metrics. Across all residential commercial mortgage loans, our 90-day-plus delinquency rate dropped 12 basis points during the quarter to 5.6%, which is 216 basis points under the 7.76% posted at September 30, 2025. Cumulative realized credit losses remained modest. Moody's positive outlook announcement on EFC reflected our consistently strong earnings, improved asset quality, and the progress we have made in bolstering our funding profile. Further into the deck, slides 18 and 19 set out our interest rate, mortgage basis, and credit hedges. As our portfolio grew and market conditions changed, we added to our interest rate and credit hedges this quarter, including our net TBA short position. Within Corporate Other, higher interest rates generated mark-to-market gains on our unsecured notes, partly offset by credit spread tightening related to the September add-on; those net gains were more than offset by losses on the related interest rate hedges and by repayment at par of our 6% notes, which had been carried below par. Results also reflected issuance costs from the add-on offering — expensed in full, as we always do — along with higher income tax expense. Book value per share ended the quarter at $13.53, down just 0.6% after 39 cents per share in dividends. Looking ahead, our quarterly ADE outlook is approximately 45 cents per share, and adjusted distributable earnings came in at $0.45 per share. Results remain sensitive to the ADE contribution from Longbridge, particularly origination margins and securitization timing, and there we assume about one prop reverse securitization each quarter. With that, I'll turn the call over to Mark.

Mark Tecotzky executive
#4

Thanks JR. EFC delivered a solid quarter, particularly considering a market environment that held far more landmines than the first half of the year. Yields on the 2-year note and the 10-year note both travelled through ranges greater than 80 basis points, and credit spreads showed volatility as well. EFC came through that storm; we priced two non-QM securitizations, along with one agency-eligible securitization earlier in the quarter before spreads widened, and still managed to price three additional deals late in September at strong levels despite the uptick in volatility; we've kept pricing deals into Q4 as well. Our credit hedges and our interest rate risks are always disclosed in our earnings presentation. In calmer markets, holding these protections usually creates a modest drag on returns. But you can take advantage of the attractive opportunities that appear during a market dislocation only when you're set up to go on the offensive while other participants are fleeing in fear. Our disciplined approach to hedging is a key factor behind the nearly 10% annualized economic return we delivered this quarter and why we're entering Q4 from such a position of strength. The results from Longbridge and our other mortgage origination partners stood out as especially notable, LendSure in particular. Set that solid performance against the far weaker outcomes posted by numerous mortgage originators that trade publicly; our model is plainly a differentiated one, in which a symbiotic partnership linking Ellington with our originators has generated strong returns across cycles. Ellington gives them steady liquidity along with data and analytics, and they give Ellington, in return, a steady flow of loans that are well underwritten. StateBridge also closed during the quarter. Building out a best-in-class servicing platform for late-stage delinquencies will take time, but we believe advances in AI can cut both the time and the cost. Across the past several years, we have pursued numerous partnerships that help us vertically integrate more of the residential and commercial mortgage loan life cycle. StateBridge marks another significant move in that same direction. The thing that truly struck me during this quarter was how resilient both the non-agency mortgage market and our business model proved to be; thanks to our loan portal and a diversified set of origination partners, we can adjust our loan purchase pricing on the fly—responding not just to interest rates but also to shifts in securitization economics. Despite rate swings, spread swings, wars, an uncertain Fed path, and strains abroad, especially in France, the securitization markets continued to operate, which let us keep purchasing loans and converting them into securities. A steady spread remained available that paid originators for bearing execution risk. Even though securitization spreads have gotten wider, we still have more say over when we execute, thanks to our relationships with twenty-four lenders, borrowing capacity we haven't drawn on, and a growing base of unsecured funding. Whenever we take deals to market, we adjust our structures to match what investors want. In Q3, we introduced the traditional sequential pay structure to non-QM, which let us address senior investors' concerns about extensions, since higher mortgage rates are reducing borrowers' incentive to refinance. Other non-QM issuers quickly adopted that approach. At EFC, the new structure led to tighter overall execution, which helped improve the economics of the investments we retained. Additionally, in October we completed pricing on our inaugural securitization of owner-occupied conforming balances; Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac may purchase these loans, provided loan-level price adjustments apply. From our perspective, those adjustments frequently exceed considerably what is required to compensate investors for anticipated credit losses. This represents a further move by private capital into areas conventionally handled by the GSEs, and we see potential profitability in it for EFC. Furthermore, our strategy involving small Agency CMBS delivered a profit, including what hedges contributed. The retained pieces of our non-QM and agency-eligible securitizations did especially well, along with related hedges. A number of these holdings have IO-like traits, and prepayment speeds continue to fall short of expectations, which underpins their valuations. You've all witnessed a lot of pressure in commercial real estate. EFC's exposure to CMBS is quite small, though it did act as a mild drag this quarter. We see the rise in interest rates this quarter as a clear negative for real estate values, both commercial and residential. When rates go up, selling and refinancing can become more difficult for our commercial mortgage bridge borrowers and our residential transition borrowers. In commercial bridge, we're proceeding with heightened caution while still uncovering appealing opportunities. We also think the opportunity set in CMBS has become noticeably more attractive; now I'll hand it back to Larry.

Larry Penn executive
#5

Thank you Mark; this quarter drove home the lesson we've absorbed at Ellington over our operating history spanning more than 30 years. Safeguarding book value and purchasing power when markets are volatile is essential for strong results over the long run. This past quarter we outperformed most other mortgage REITs by a wide margin, owing—as always—to our disciplined employment of interest rate hedges and credit hedges alike, together with conservative protocols for liquidity and risk management. The opportunity set is plainly richer in the fourth quarter, which we entered with considerable dry powder and financial flexibility, further supported by the substantial additional long-term capital we raised, in both debt and equity. At the same time, principal repayments from our short-duration commercial mortgage bridge loans and residential transition loans continue to supply capital for reinvestment. Because our business spans multiple lines, we can move capital between the loan and securities markets whenever a selloff in one sector produces appealing relative value. The steady loan volume we get from our portal and from originator relationships is supplemented by purchases made opportunistically. Well into the fourth quarter, we have capitalized on some compelling chances to grow a number of our loan portfolios. We have also lately acquired interest-only securities on the secondary market at prices we consider very attractive. We continue to monitor the pressures on our established operations, especially those stemming from elevated interest rates and the wider uncertainty across real estate markets. That said, I’d note that when rates climb, Longbridge’s proprietary loan products frequently become more competitive against FHA loans. Going forward, we keep assessing chances to re-enter the preferred equity market, as long as the pricing is sensible. We also plan to issue more unsecured notes as time goes on, whenever market conditions allow. The aim is to further reinforce EFC’s credit profile so it can support improved ratings and narrower issuance spreads. Lastly, we think our present monthly dividend of $0.13 per share is still suitable. Our ADE has been running considerably above our dividend during this year, yet REIT distribution requirements rest on taxable income rather than ADE. Market volatility in the fourth quarter might still influence our full-year taxable income and the distribution requirements that follow from it. Depending on those REIT requirements, we prefer to retain surplus earnings in order to grow book value per share and, by extension, underpin future earnings; with that, let’s open things up for Q&A. Operator, please go ahead.

Crispin Love analyst
#6

Thanks. Morning, and I appreciate you taking our questions. So first, on reverse mortgage — Crispin? Yeah, can you hear me?

Larry Penn executive
#7

Yes, good morning Crispin.

Crispin Love analyst
#8

Great, thanks. To start with, on reverse mortgage originations alone, which were very strong this quarter — if you look at slide 9 — could you talk about what the outlook is for the reverse mortgage space, what key factors are driving that strength, and whether those levels are sustainable, or whether there was anything unusual in the quarter?

Larry Penn executive
#9

If anything, we're hoping for and expecting what I'd call continued growth as we go into next year. Can we keep up these kinds of massive percentage increases, 40% year-over-year? Clearly that won’t last indefinitely, but we do expect the product to keep building momentum. The demographics work in its favor, and obviously I believe the product makes a great deal of sense. We’re also expanding the range of products and launching new ones; we brought some out this past year, and more will come next year. I think we definitely anticipate additional growth — additional, very strong growth. As I said, the prop product, which is more profitable for us than the agency product, is advantageous on many fronts, particularly because borrowers are able to borrow more, which tends to happen when rates rise rather than when they fall.

Crispin Love analyst
#10

Thanks, I appreciate that. Turning to the book value result—clearly a standout relative to peers, as you mentioned. Could you go a bit deeper on the specific steps you took to protect book value, particularly in September, and how quickly you were able to act? And given where rates have moved since quarter end, can you offer any kind of preview for October book value, or at least how hedges have changed quarter-to-date?

Larry Penn executive
#11

I'll let Mark address some of the actions we took, but bear in mind that a portion of this is simply having hedges in place, keeping them there, and staying disciplined, so that nothing drastic becomes necessary. We follow very strict protocols for adjusting our credit hedges and for adjusting our interest rate hedges. I believe we're among the only mortgage REITs—and this has held true for many years—that makes heavy use of TBA short positions, for instance against the non-QM book, right, where the convexity characteristics are very similar. It simply makes a great deal of sense. You're starting out with a lot of spread, and it lets you sleep better at night. You saw the results, right, if you carry a decent amount of TBA hedges there. Mark, I don't know whether you'd like to add anything else,

Mark Tecotzky executive
#12

any

Larry Penn executive
#13

particular actions we took. No,

Mark Tecotzky executive
#14

Larry's point strikes me as exactly right. Our hedging approach in Q3 was identical to what we've always done; the difference is just that, as I believe I suggested during my prepared remarks, it carried more weight in Q3 because rates rose so steeply. Basically, when we look at any position at Ellington Financial — a non-QM loan, an agency pool, an IO, whatever it might be — we ask ourselves how much that asset's price moves with interest rates, and how much it moves with other spread products, like investment-grade corporates or TBA mortgages. We think about the amount of spread risk exposure we're willing to hold; as a rule, we avoid taking interest rate risk, and our toolkit and data are adequate to run historical models or regression analysis and get quite precise results. On non-QM, Larry brought up the loans we buy through the portal nightly, the loans we buy from origination partners, and the loans we buy from other originators — correct? Once we've bought those and plan to securitize them, we think about how the investment-grade tranche of those securitizations will perform relative to corporate spreads and TBA spreads. Our hedges are in place, so we maintained discipline in Q3 and maintained discipline in Q4. Honestly, the task is becoming simpler in some ways, since liquidity in the non-agency mortgage space is significantly greater today than it was just two years back. Across non-QM, jumbo, agency-eligible, and HELOCs, roughly $250 billion to $275 billion in deals will likely get priced this year. That works out to about $5 billion weekly. You keep getting fresh price points that help sharpen your read on spread movements. And with our volumes rising, the window needed to build up to deal size and get pricing done has shrunk considerably. The risk we take when hedges decouple from the underlying asset has also been reduced; nothing was changed in Q3, and nothing has been changed in Q4 either; hedges simply played a bigger role in Q3 when it came to preserving book value than they did during the first 6 months of this year.

JR Herlihy executive
#15

To close out my answer to you, Crispin, regarding October: you know how we operate — we publish a monthly book value per share estimate on a lag, and October will follow that same pattern; it will come out later in November. October has plenty of moving pieces, doesn't it? Rates have moved higher, and the strong results we saw in Q3 from IOs and rate hedges are going to partially give back, though loans and securities provide some offset. If rates come down, assuming nothing else changes, originators could see more volume and improved margins, although that can take time to show up. A lot is shifting right now, including the pricing AAAs are demanding on new securitizations, and those spreads have widened over about the last month as the market has been volatile. We'll have an October update later in November, and you'll see how different parts of the market have been impacted, but I think the diversification in our portfolio really proves its value in conditions like these—or frankly, in any market.

Crispin Love analyst
#16

Great. Thank you. I appreciate all that detail. JR, I figured I'd give it a shot, but I get it. Thank you.

JR Herlihy executive
#17

Thanks, Crispin.

Frank Labetti analyst
#18

Hi there, morning everyone. Frank Ciliberti here, sitting in for Bose.

JR Herlihy executive
#19

I

Frank Labetti analyst
#20

I'd like to return to the prop reverse mortgage topic. You wrote down the retained prop reverse mortgage tranches because of updated home price projections. Could you explain what shifted in your assumptions, how much cushion is left, and whether your new outlook changes your go-forward view on new originations? Thanks.

Larry Penn executive
#21

Regarding our outlook, it definitely plays into our pricing, but on the revision side, we update our forward home price projections each month and each quarter, and we use them to project cash flows across all of our securities, especially the reverse mortgages, where you clearly have forward home price exposure. It was really just a result of the weakness we saw specifically in the housing market during the third quarter. That's an actual, right? Then, of course, we layer on top of that the long-term projections, which come out of, again, internal models that we have here, housing models. I think the biggest change probably among all of those was actually what we saw in the third quarter.

Frank Labetti analyst
#22

That's really useful, thanks. So during the quarter you raised equity near book value and afterward bought back some shares. Could you talk through how the return from buying stock back at a discount compares with the new investment opportunities you mentioned earlier, and then, yeah?

Larry Penn executive
#23

Sure, yeah. Look, for a long time — many years, I think — we treated 80% as the threshold; now that our stock has been trading at a premium to book more consistently, hovering around book, and in the past month or so it's actually been below book, we want to seize that opportunity. We don't see it as an either/or. Low asset prices let us do buybacks, and we see a real chance to purchase our shares at a 15% discount; with just a few days left before the window shut, we seized it. As my prepared remarks noted, barring unusual market conditions, I expect us to keep that same discipline around the 85% level, which will of course give shareholders support. They should feel confident that we are behind them in backing the share price. Frankly, I see buying stock at that level as a solid trade for the company. Consider what it does for our book value per share—that accretion, which we can then essentially reinvest. You could almost treat it as profits: the lift to book value per share will simply go toward supporting our earnings and supporting our ADE. We believe it makes sense on many levels, and we intend to keep doing it.

Frank Labetti analyst
#24

Great. Thank you.

Larry Penn executive
#25

Actually, Doug, before you get to that question, I want to add just one more point regarding what Frankie asked — namely, I want to say again that when it comes to buying back stock at a discount, that's exactly why — ask your question and I'll come back to this afterward. Sorry, go ahead.

Doug Harter analyst
#26

Thanks, and good quarter — you clearly came through it with relative strength. Could you discuss where the opportunities might be to bring on additional originator partners, particularly since others in the industry may be in need of capital or finding the higher rate environment difficult?

Larry Penn executive
#27

What I can tell you is that we're constantly evaluating it. Some deals we're examining are more active than others. You could describe them as being in the pipeline — nothing is imminent — but we're reviewing a few platforms, and some of those are larger than others. We do expect — though again, this isn't necessarily something we expect over the short term — that there could be platforms put up for sale, and we would certainly take a very close look at that.

Doug Harter analyst
#28

Great. I appreciate it. Thank you.

Marissa Lobo analyst
#29

Thank you. Looking across your portfolio and the various asset classes—residential transition, home equity, non-QM, commercial—where would you say spreads have widened the most compared with the underlying credit fundamentals? And between residential and commercial, where would you most want to deploy incremental capital?

Mark Tecotzky executive
#30

Yep. Hey, Marissa, Mark here. In the third quarter, the sharpest widening we observed that didn't appear to us justified by any fundamental shift—nothing in the data pointed to a real change in the dynamics—was on the residential side. Residential is a little different, because spreads there respond to volatility, right? You saw volatility climb along with higher rates, and a handful of funds had fairly large, well-publicized liquidations. Residential spreads widened a lot, and nothing in prepayment behavior or home prices was unusual enough to explain it. In my prepared remarks I mentioned that we are in fact seeing higher interest rates, and I recognize a great deal has reversed since the quarter closed, right? At quarter-end, the 10-year note got to roughly 5.30-something in early October, and since then much of that rise has been given back. Even so, while we were operating with a 10-year around 5.30 and mortgage rates near 7.40, we saw those elevated rates as a drag on HPA in both the residential and commercial segments. To us, it looked like a bigger issue on the commercial side, since many of the loans we and others are involved in carry floating rates. On the residential side, borrowers have generally gotten 30-year terms, fixing their payments for three decades or fifteen years—either way, locked in for a long stretch. On the business lending front, a large number of your loans carry floating rates, and with the Fed raising rates once during the quarter, borrowing costs for those sponsors went up. In certain sectors it has simply been hard to generate additional income, correct? On multifamily properties, pushing rents higher has proven difficult, while property taxes, insurance premiums, and upkeep costs have all climbed. As a result, some of these sponsors appear squeezed at both ends, and that is, I suppose, where we found a more fundamental concern. Some of that pressure should ease in the current quarter as interest rates come down, though we continue to watch the situation closely.

Marissa Lobo analyst
#31

Great, thank you for that color. On LendSure, you mentioned yet another strong quarter. We keep hearing about how difficult the broader non-QM origination environment has been. Could you elaborate on what allowed LendSure to perform so well amid that volatility, and are gain-on-sale margins changing at all as of today?

Mark Tecotzky executive
#32

I'd say they've been at this for quite a while. In 2014 — which is 12 years back now — we made our initial equity investment in LendSure, and that same management team has stayed in place across all 12 of those years. Before LendSure, that group — that management team — operated a different mortgage company. Their experience spans many decades in an inherently cyclical business, and they bring a refreshing discipline to operations — to how the expense side of the balance sheet is managed and to how credit risk is kept under control. In my opinion, they have gained market share. I also believe the partnership with Ellington Financial is truly symbiotic, because we are able to give LendSure consistent pricing even when volatility hits. Some peers that don't have a partnership with a deep capital pool like ours, I think, don't get that benefit. From where I sit, LendSure can take a rather longer-term view of the origination process, since it knows we will make adjustments to our spreads — yet those adjustments will be rational and reasonable — and we can offer them a certain degree of consistency, and we will buy loans that certain other participants in the space are unable to purchase. That, I believe, matters a great deal. That consistency, which Ellington Financial delivers to LendSure and which LendSure then passes along — the model is mainly wholesale — to its brokers, has helped them capture additional market share, and they don't have to offer the lowest rate on every single loan each day. They've been at this for 12 years now, and they've shown an ability to keep pricing steady, to consistently close loans within a reasonable timeframe, and to consistently provide great service. They've been picking up market share, and I believe those factors explain it. I think LendSure truly has an exceptional management team — one that's hard to replicate.

Marissa Lobo analyst
#33

Thanks so much.

Larry Penn executive
#34

Hi, before we move to the next question, Mark — yes, thanks. Mark, I've got a question for you. How much wider would you say non-QM spreads are today compared with, say, where things stood prior to the big selloff, at 5.30% versus 7.40%?

Mark Tecotzky executive
#35

If you adjust for options, my guess is we're still at least 10 OAS wider.

Larry Penn executive
#36

Sure, but looking at it on a price basis, it's comfortably less than a point wider, isn't it. Yeah. What I really want to get at — and this connects to Frankie's question — is this, okay? Sure, the set of opportunities has become broader, and that has to do with buying back stock. When we repurchase shares at 85% of book, our leverage comes in a bit above 2 to 1, correct? That's obvious from what we regard as the best gauge of it. We are repurchasing our own assets, correct, at — let's put it this way — a discount of more than 5 points, approximately 5 points. That represents a remarkable chance, wouldn't you agree? Our approach should be rigorous and data-driven. Assets widening by 5 points is not something we've observed. Non-QM — essentially our core specialty, as Mark mentioned — has not widened by even a single point. This is an extremely attractive opportunity. Purchasing at 85% of book value — which is a 15% discount — means we are essentially repurchasing our assets at roughly 5 points below their value. There is no way to replicate that in the market. So in truly unusual market conditions—which is why I put that caveat on what I said before—you could indeed find some extraordinary buying opportunities, and those would outweigh repurchasing your own shares, say at 85% of book value. Our approach to capital management is meant to be highly scientific. As I mentioned, we've moved the threshold—raised it, in effect—from the 80% level we had previously to roughly 85% now. Consider what we did earlier this year: we sold common stock at a premium, on an accretive basis, and directed those proceeds toward retiring a preferred issuance that had become floating-rate and costly. We're constantly looking at capital management moves that could improve how our capital structure is set up. Book value per share stays on our radar — we avoid offerings that dilute too much and favor buybacks that add value; we also watch G&A expense ratios and how reducing our capital base affects them, since that naturally flows through to earnings per share and ADE, and we keep those in mind; we also recognize that having a liquid stock benefits shareholders. Cutting down the common equity capital base, with everything else held constant, works against us. Our goal is to strike the right balance across all of these considerations, and as I mentioned earlier, when you look at 85%, every metric indicates this represents a strong deployment of a portion of the funds available to us, and we remain highly disciplined about maintaining liquidity on hand.

JR Herlihy executive
#37

Okay, building on that last point — we don't have any near-term maturities that need refinancing. As a matter of fact, in September we tacked on additional unsecured financings, and we pushed our unencumbered assets up to nearly $2 billion, with a healthy share of that sitting in cash. We've held onto earnings to the point where book value per share began the year at $13.16, and after the dividend we're up 37 cents, reaching $13.53 as of September 30th. So we've got the liquidity, we've got the retained earnings, and we have the capacity to act opportunistically — and sure, we'd only bought back $4 million before the window shut, but as Larry said, this can be a really exciting opportunity, for the company and for shareholders alike, to create value and drive accretion to book value per share.

Larry Penn executive
#38

Apologies — operator, let's take the next question.

Trevor Cranston analyst
#39

Hi there, thank you. My question concerns the StateBridge investment that your firm made. First, I just want to get clarity: is that business mainly a special servicer, or does it also handle performing servicing? Then, as a second part, do you view that investment as a kind of offset to some of the credit risk you hold, in the sense that it may be a company with a greater growth opportunity when delinquency levels are rising? Thanks.

Larry Penn executive
#40

That's an intriguing way to look at it. Mark, would you like to take that question?

Mark Tecotzky executive
#41

Right now, Trevor, those operations are pretty small — they cover just a few distinct functions. They do a bit of RTL servicing, plus they handle some DSCR servicing. From my perspective, after observing the servicing sector over the last four or five years — and the consolidation there has been understandable but quite significant — when we initially got into non-QM, Rushmore was handling our servicing. We regarded that as a great platform, and we essentially had one of our people stationed there who kept a very close eye on all of our business with them, and that working relationship was superb. Then Mr. Cooper bought them. Mr. Cooper was huge in the agency business, and the amount of volume we had at Rushmore simply wasn't big enough to make a real difference there. After that, Mr. Cooper was acquired by Rocket, correct? We also had other investments in EFC, and in that case our servicing was handled by a servicer called Gregory, which Great Ajax had controlled. In our view Gregory did a very good job with late-stage collections, but we can no longer work with that servicer, right? They've closed it down. We examined the situation closely, and nothing stood out as a compelling path that would let us secure what we consider top-tier protocols, engage in real two-way communication, and actually bring our analytics plus our inherent product knowledge and hands-on expertise to bear on producing results. To be clear, getting this fully developed will require time. I believe it will pay off for EFC, though I fully acknowledge the point you raised as well — namely that modification guidelines from FHA are clearly shifting, the delinquency backlog at that agency has expanded, and the non-QM segment overall is expanding. At the beginning, non-QM delinquencies were extremely low, since we benefited from a strong COVID home price appreciation tailwind—and clearly that tailwind isn't present today. We expect non-QM delinquencies to rise somewhat, moving toward levels that align better with sensible expectations; for a number of years they sat far beneath those levels. It would not surprise me in the least if, as we continue building this out and show the resolution quality we believe StateBridge is capable of achieving, opportunities emerge for others who might want to use their services. I'd say the first thing—and what we're truly concentrated on right now—is getting it built, correct? What I find really compelling about this process is that AI and some of the technology that has emerged over the past 3 or 4 years lets us stand up a servicer more quickly and at lower cost than was possible in the past. That consideration helped tip the scales in favor of us proceeding with this investment, and we have devoted substantial resources to it—including a great many highly skilled individuals who have constructed intricate systems—and they are working diligently. In my view, this will clearly be beneficial for EFC and provides us with an additional layer of protection should the economy weaken and should HPA fall. I also believe that down the road there's a chance to charge fees for services, as long as we genuinely succeed in creating something top-notch.

Larry Penn executive
#42

Hey, allow me to chime in with a little insider perspective, so to speak. This ties into what you were asking about whether this could function almost as a countercyclical move, given what might be brewing in what we'll simply call the delinquency market. Back when we first took a look at StateBridge, the original plan was going to be—Mark, I'm certain you remember this—the original plan was going to be roughly a joint venture with us plus a few other parties, and I won't mention names, but other big participants in the mortgage space. They became somewhat distracted. I think one of those firms wound up getting bought by another party, if I'm not mistaken. Either way, it simply demonstrates that the market genuinely requires this; and would StateBridge become wildly profitable just from the lending volume we send their way? No. Like Mark mentioned, our goal is to make this the top special servicer. Once that's established and people can see it—given the shortage and the factors we went over earlier, which Mark also covered, about actually being able to capture the attention of the mega servicers and secure the best special servicing at the standards that investors such as ourselves, and others, require—I believe the business will then come their way. For sure, and even considering what we currently view as the delinquency pipeline, after we've built this out, I think StateBridge will have ample business to expand and prosper on.

Trevor Cranston analyst
#43

Got it. Thanks for all the detail, everyone.

Mark Tecotzky executive
#44

Thank you, Trevor.

Timothy D'Agostino analyst
#45

Hello, and thanks for taking my questions. I believe most of the points have already been covered, so I just wanted to ask a quick follow-up about an answer given to an earlier question. You mentioned 2027 and adding new products at Longbridge. I think it would be great to hear a bit more detail on what borrower needs those new products are meant to address, and then perhaps whether you could share some characteristics, or really any input at all, on those potential new products in 2027. Thank you.

Larry Penn executive
#46

Thanks for the question, but I'm not able to give any specifics about the products themselves. Still, you can picture it — you're working with, let's just say seniors, to keep things simple. Often there are situations where a reverse mortgage, in the purely traditional form, might not be the ideal fit, but some other hybrid offering might be — something between a reverse and a standard product. You could picture options where you're paying some interest, though less interest, and you could picture many different products. We're working on some, we have several in the pipeline, and really, we'll keep addressing the reality that an enormous amount of home equity exists out there that homeowners in many cases want and need to access. A first mortgage, particularly when a first mortgage is already in place, isn't always the most economical answer. In situations like that, where a first mortgage already sits on the property, you won't consider a first mortgage that's a reverse to take its place — though in some cases you will, if continuing to make monthly payments becomes a problem. Some kind of product that releases home equity makes a great deal of sense, and there are simply many, many ways to structure those that can make a great deal of sense for the consumer.

Timothy D'Agostino analyst
#47

Thank you. That's all for me today.

Operator operator
#48

Thank you. That brings the Q&A portion and today's program to a close. Ladies and gentlemen, we appreciate your participation. You can now disconnect. Good day.

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