Golub Capital BDC, Inc. (GBDC) Earnings Call Transcript
November 19, 2025
Earnings Call Speaker Segments
Hi everyone, and thank you for being here today. With me are two of my colleagues, Tim Topicz and Chris Ericson. If you're new to GBDC, here's what drives our approach: we concentrate on making first lien senior secured loans to middle market businesses that are healthy and resilient, and that have the backing of strong private equity sponsors who operate as true partners. Our earnings press release went out yesterday, covering the fiscal quarter and the year that closed on September 30, 2025, and an earnings presentation is now up on our site. We'll be walking through that deck during this call. My plan is to open with the key headlines and a performance recap for the quarter as well as the full fiscal year. After that, Tim and Chris will walk through the quarter's operating and financial results in greater depth; then I'll return at the end to share a few thoughts on where the market stands right now and what we expect looking ahead; so let's get started. In my view, there are 2 main headlines in today's news. Number one, GBDC delivered a solid quarter and closed fiscal year 2025 on a strong note, helped along by solid credit results throughout our portfolio. Number two, and at the same time, the private credit direct lending market is confronting certain headwinds, and GBDC does not have immunity from them. Let me take each headline and go deeper. Starting with performance. Adjusted NII per share came in at $0.39 for the quarter, which works out to an adjusted NII ROE of 10.4%. Adjusted net income per share was $0.36, giving an adjusted ROE of 9.6%; during fiscal year 2025, GBDC distributed $1.65 per share in cumulative distributions, which equals 10.9% of net asset value per share at year-end. On top of that, GBDC finished fiscal year 2025 with net asset value per share of $14.97. That figure sits $0.34 higher than GBDC's net asset value per share at the time of its IPO in 2010. Only a very small group of BDCs have managed to grow NAV per share since going public, and GBDC is among them. GBDC's results continued the pattern I've described to you across the past several quarters. Credit performance stayed solid overall, and earnings benefited from portfolio spreads that are declining yet still appealing, along with attractive borrowing costs. Meanwhile — and this brings me to the second key headline — the direct lending market is dealing with some headwinds, and GBDC is not shielded from them. What exactly are these headwinds? To begin with, spreads have compressed; and that's not limited to middle market direct lending; tighter spreads have shown up in traditional fixed income, asset-based finance, high yield, and the broadly syndicated loan market. Just about everywhere except subprime, spreads have gotten tighter. The second headwind is that base rates have begun to decline, and the market anticipates further declines. The third headwind, and the most significant one, is that we find ourselves in a credit cycle. Defaults and credit stress in the leveraged loan market are at an unusual level right now. That applies to the liquid leveraged loan space, covering both the broadly syndicated portion and private credit; we've seen this hold true for more than 12 months, and my expectation is that it will persist for a while yet. We'll dig into these headwinds further during today's call, but I want to point out 2 consequences of them. Number one, they're generating a bunch of colorful press coverage about the sector. A number of those pieces are pretty insightful, others not so much. In my closing remarks I'll discuss a few of the insightful ones; and number two, they're producing really substantial dispersion in results across direct lending managers. Certain managers keep delivering solid returns, mostly somewhat lower than last year, yet still solid. And certain other managers are turning in weak results. Last quarter I characterized this as a tale of winners and whiners, and I noted this pattern would persist, and persist it has. Before handing things to Tim and Chris to walk through operating results in greater detail, I want to address our Board's choice to declare a $0.39 per share distribution for the first fiscal quarter of 2026. Alongside that decision, the Board also concluded it would be wise to take another look at GBDC's dividend policy early next year, when we hope to have additional information regarding the forward outlook for rates, asset spreads and financing costs. GBDC intends to tackle the dividend question using the same fundamental approach we've followed since our IPO. For those of you who haven't previously heard me discuss dividend strategy, we're steered by 4 objectives. First, we aim to hold net asset value per share steady across time. Second, we aim to keep excise taxes to a minimum across time. Third, we aim to change our base distribution level only rarely. And last, we aim to deliver as high a dividend yield on NAV as is sustainable, in line with those objectives, the 3 preceding goals; of course, achieving all 4 of these goals simultaneously isn't always possible. And when that happens, we have to strike the proper balance. I'll say more during my closing remarks, but to wrap up my introduction, GBDC posted strong and resilient earnings in fiscal 2025 despite macro surprises and despite market volatility. Today's market is difficult. Yet drawing on our experience across multiple cycles spanning multiple decades, we think this is the sort of environment in which we and other private credit specialists outperform. I'll now turn the call over to Tim Topicz to cover the quarter in greater detail.
Appreciate that, David. Now turning to Slide 4. At GBDC, the adjusted net investment income figure of $0.39 per share, along with adjusted earnings of $0.36 per share, resulted from 4 principal drivers. To begin with, credit performance has remained healthy on the whole. Roughly 90% of GBDC's investment portfolio, measured at fair value, falls within our highest internal rating tiers for performance. The $0.03 per share in adjusted net unrealized and realized losses was mostly attributable to restructurings we completed successfully over the quarter involving certain loan investments that previously carried nonaccrual status, along with chosen write-downs affecting a certain portion of GBDC's tail of underperforming borrowers. The level of investments on nonaccrual status dropped to a very small figure, 0.3%, or 30 basis points, of the total investment portfolio at fair value. That figure remains considerably under the average for the BDC peer industry. Next, profits benefited from spreads that, while shrinking, stayed appealing — matching what we've seen in recent quarters. At GBDC, the investment income yield reached 10.4%, down 20 basis points from the prior quarter. The main reasons were: first, a slight drop in weighted average base rates; and second, mild narrowing of the weighted average portfolio spread over the quarter. Those pressures were partly balanced out by a quarter-over-quarter rise in fee and dividend income connected to specific early loan repayments, plus a dividend linked to the recapitalization of one portfolio company. Third, a reduction in GBDC's borrowing costs helped partially counter the quarter-over-quarter drop in investment income yield. Two primary factors were at play there. To start, we felt the entire quarter’s effect from adjusting the pricing on GBDC’s syndicated corporate revolver, setting the drawn spread at 1-month SOFR plus 1.525%, alongside a 32.5 basis point fee on unused amounts. Next, we chose to redeem the last remaining legacy GBDC 3 debt securitization before its stated 2030 maturity date. Together, these moves brought effective borrowing costs down to 5.6% annualized for the quarter, a level we consider best-in-class for the industry. Fourth, our results got a boost from reduced operating costs, reflecting GBDC's industry-leading fee arrangement: a base management fee of 1%, an incentive fee of 15%, and an 8% income incentive fee hurdle. That structure stands to matter more and more as reference interest rates come down and investment spreads stay near historic lows. On the portfolio side, GBDC's investments dipped slightly from the prior quarter, landing at just under $8.8 billion on a fair value basis. Driving that decline were $371 million of repayments and exits, partly offset by $60 million of new investment commitments funded during the quarter. Our underwriting remains very selective and conservative — we closed on only 3.8% of the deals we reviewed this quarter, with a weighted average LTV of roughly 42%. About half of the origination volume we generated came through sponsors we already work with and incumbent positions within portfolio companies, and we also saw a rise in completed transactions involving first-time borrowers. Our size keeps allowing us to take the lead on transactions — during the quarter, we served as the only lender or the primary lender on 90% of them. Our attention stayed on the heart of the middle market, since in our view that segment keeps providing stronger return potential once risk is factored in compared with the market for large borrowers. For the quarter, the midpoint EBITDA figure on what we originated was $61 million. Looking at it from one angle, larger-cap deals are facing tighter pricing and structures, since public credit markets remain strong and more players are competing. From another angle, because we can originate across such a wide range, GBDC has the flexibility to chase appealing risk-adjusted returns. Consider the market for bigger borrowers: this quarter, Golub Capital acted as joint lead arranger for a $4.5 billion unitranche facility supporting Clearlake's purchase of Dun & Bradstreet — the largest private credit LBO ever recorded to date. Also, within our primary middle-market focus, we acted as the lead lender and administrative agent for a fresh unitranche facility extended to Olo Inc., which helped facilitate Thoma Bravo's take-private transaction involving a top-tier supplier of essential technology infrastructure for restaurant chains across the United States. Now, turning to Slide 4, I'll provide a quick overview of the distributions we paid out and a few balance sheet adjustments that occurred this quarter. For the quarter, total distributions reached $0.39 per share. Our ratio of net debt to equity declined slightly from the previous quarter, ending at 1.23x, which remains within the 0.85x to 1.25x range we target. During the quarter, we seized chances to buy back 368,000 shares, which brought our total for the fiscal year to 2.9 million shares, representing $40.6 million in aggregate value. Once the quarter closed, GBDC repurchased an additional 2.5 million shares, paying an average of $13.69 per share — that distinguishes us from numerous other BDC managers, who prioritize AUM growth above all else. In evaluating buyback opportunities, our goal is to maximize returns for investors. I'll now turn things over to Chris, who will take us through our financial results in greater detail.
Appreciate it, Tim. Now let's look at Slide 7. Here you can observe how the earnings drivers Tim just walked through, along with the distributions we paid during the quarter, fed into GBDC's NAV per share of $14.97 as of September 30, 2025. Adjusted NII per share came to $0.39, which matched the base distribution of $0.39 per share that was paid out in the quarter, while adjusted net realized and unrealized losses totaled $0.03 per share. Taken together, these results pushed net asset value per share down to $14.97. Now onto Slide 10, where we break out our origination activity for the quarter. Net funds growth — which we define as new funded commitments minus exits and sales, and net of market value changes in portfolio fair value — fell by $192 million during the quarter, since repayments and exits exceeded funded new originations along with delayed draw term loan and revolver draws. At the bottom of this slide, you'll see the weighted average rate on new investments came in at 8.9%, down 30 basis points from the previous quarter, driven by tighter new origination spreads and lower SOFR reference rates. Investments that were repaid during the quarter carried a weighted average rate of 9.8%. Slide 11 lays out GBDC's overall portfolio mix. As you can see, the breakdown by investment type held steady quarter-over-quarter, with one-stop loans still making up roughly 87% of the portfolio at fair value. Slide 12 demonstrates that GBDC's portfolio stays highly diversified across portfolio companies, with an average investment size of about 20 basis points spread over 417 distinct portfolio companies. On top of that, our largest borrower accounts for only 1.5% of the debt investment portfolio, and our top 10 largest borrowers make up just 12% of the portfolio. We consider GBDC to be among the most diversified and granular portfolios within the public BDC sector, managing credit risk through position size. As of September 30, 2025, 92% of our investment portfolio was made up of first lien senior secured floating rate loans to borrowers spanning a diversified range of what we view as resilient industries. The economic analysis on Slide 13 brings out the drivers behind GBDC's net investment spread of 4.8%. Let's go through this slide carefully. I'll begin with the dark blue line, representing our investment income yield. As a reminder, investment income yield includes amortization of fees and discounts. GBDC's investment income yield dropped roughly 20 basis points sequentially, landing at 10.4%. Our cost of debt, shown by the teal line, fell about 10 basis points to 5.6%, which reflects our roughly 80% floating rate debt funding structure while also benefiting from a full quarter contribution of the amendment to our syndicated corporate revolver and the decision to early repay the final outstanding legacy GBDC 3 debt securitization during the quarter. All told, GBDC's weighted average net investment spread, the gold line, dipped modestly quarter-over-quarter to 4.8%. Moving to Slides 14 and 15, let's take a closer look at our credit quality metrics. Looking at Slide 14, nonaccruals came down to 30 basis points of total investments at fair value and 60 basis points of total investments at amortized cost. The count of nonaccrual investments stayed put at 9 investments, since 1 portfolio company investment was disposed of and 1 portfolio company investment went back to accrual status after the restructuring, which was offset by 2 portfolio company investments being added in the quarter. On Slide 15, we show how internal performance ratings have trended. As Tim mentioned earlier, almost 90% of the total investment portfolio stayed in our top 2 internal performance rating categories, and investments rated 3 — which signal a borrower may have the potential to perform below expectations or is performing below expectations as compared to at underwriting — remain low at only 9.6% of the total investment portfolio. The share of loans rated 1 and 2, the loans we think are most likely to experience significant credit impairment, stayed very low at only 1% of the portfolio at fair value. As is our usual practice, we'll skip Slides 16 through 19. Those slides contain more detail on GBDC's financial statements, dividend history and other key metrics. I'll finish this section by going over GBDC's liquidity and investment capacity on Slides 20 to 21. To start, let's look at the key takeaways on Slide 21. Our debt funding structure continues to be highly diversified and flexible. Our debt maturity profile is still well positioned, with 49% of our debt funding in unsecured notes across a well-laddered maturity profile. In September, we took advantage of favorable market conditions to issue an additional $250 million of our 2028 notes at a yield to maturity of 5.05%, which we swapped to a floating rate of SOFR plus 172 basis points. In line with our asset liability matching principle, 81% of GBDC's total debt funding is floating rate or swapped to a floating rate — levels we believe rank amongst the highest in the sector, positioning GBDC well to modulate the impacts of lower interest rates on investment income through offsetting lower interest expense on its borrowings. Overall, our liquidity position remains strong, and we finished the quarter with approximately $1.2 billion of liquidity from unrestricted cash on drawn commitments on our corporate revolver and the unsecured revolver provided by our adviser. Now I'll hand it back over to David for closing remarks.
Appreciate that, Chris. Like I mentioned at the start, GBDC turned in yet another quarter of strong performance, capping off a robust fiscal year 2025. Let's pivot and begin with how we see things shaping up for the economy and the BDC sector, and after that I want to get into the recent wave of sensational press coverage regarding the private credit world. When it comes to the broader U.S. economy, what we're seeing today is muddled. Looking at one side, the American economy keeps displaying remarkable staying power. That's evident in the Golub Capital Middle Market Report for Q3, which revealed ongoing healthy growth in revenues and EBITDA on a year-over-year basis throughout our portfolio, though the pace was somewhat slower than what we witnessed in 2024. Sure, there are areas of softness, particularly among lower-end consumers. Still, on the whole, the economy is performing pretty well. Flipping to the other side, we keep seeing a story of businesses that aren't adapting effectively to today's conditions. That shows up in the broadly syndicated market's default rate, which currently sits at roughly 2.5x the historical average, and also in how realized and unrealized losses have grown across the BDC space broadly. As I've noted for a number of quarters now, we remain in a drawn-out credit cycle. One reading of the softness in certain BDC share prices lately is that the market is focusing more intently on credit concerns, particularly the rise in realized and unrealized losses at certain BDCs. Our expectation is that heightened credit strain will stick around, and we anticipate it will keep affecting various BDCs in varying ways. That lines up with what I stated last quarter. We believe the divide between winners and whiners will grow wider, and the winners are going to be those possessing demonstrated competitive edges and an extensive history of minimal credit losses through multiple cycles. Last, I want to close by touching on some of the recent press coverage concerning private credit. There's been an unusual volume of vivid and dramatic press pieces about private credit, and while some raised valid points, others were, from my perspective, not especially well informed. Jamie Dimon stirred up some commotion with his remarks about spotting a cockroach, but our view is that he was making a significant point. He was not, as a matter of fact, singling out private credit. Reading the transcript, what he accurately conveyed is that we're in a stretch of elevated credit stress; that makes this a fitting moment to be cautious, to be diligent, to scrutinize your portfolio thoroughly, to hunt for issues and to seek ways through early intervention to reduce the possibility of credit losses. If that rings a bell, it ought to. This is business as usual at Golub Capital and GBDC. A second batch of articles dealt with First Brands and Tricolor, 2 high-profile bankruptcies that Golub Capital and GBDC had zero exposure to. Certain commentators have claimed these represent instances of private credit gone wrong. We don't see it that way. The debt at First Brands sat within the broadly syndicated loan market, while Tricolor's was in the securitization market. Golub Capital style private credit wasn't present at either company, and no private equity sponsor stood behind either one. From where we sit, it's strange to point the finger at private credit for these two situations. Zooming out, our belief is that private credit, when executed properly, is boring — and that boredom is deliberate. Golub Capital provides first lien senior secured loans to resilient companies in resilient industries, with top-quality private equity firms backing them. That's what we've done for over 20 years. We've spent that time assembling a set of competitive advantages, and those have let us deliver consistently low credit losses along with strong returns to our investors. This playbook has served us well for decades, and our expectation is that it keeps serving us well down the road. With that, operator, please open the line for questions.
I wanted to ask about how easy it is to find co-invest opportunities — not really about this particular vehicle, but more about what's happening in the broader market. Over the last 1, 3, and 5 years, has anything shifted when it comes to how available or how good those companies are where you're able to obtain equity co-invest?
To give you some context and background, equity co-invests have frequently been done by Golub Capital alongside the debt investments we make. On occasion, we also make stand-alone equity investments; roughly 400 equity co-investments have been completed by us during the past 20 years. We examine the track record we've built with those equity co-investments, and it is quite strong. From an IRR perspective, it's comparable to what a top-tier private equity firm would show. Neither our approach nor the availability of equity co-invests, as we've historically done them, has shown any meaningful change. Whether that lines up or doesn't line up with what other firms are seeing, I can't say for sure. I'm not sure other firms exist that are as disclosive as we are regarding the strategy, the number, or the track record of their equity co-invest. So speaking to the whole industry isn't something I want to do, but I'd be comfortable stating that we're not really seeing a shift in our approach or in how available the equity co-invest we make is.
Alright. I had a question out of curiosity — there's plenty of discussion these days regarding continuation funds, and it appears transactions are getting done through that route. And clearly, private credit is providing leverage into those. So I'm not sure whether, simply given the larger volume of deal flow involving continuation vehicles and similar structures, you'd have more chances to put money to work now versus previously. Anyway, thanks for your response. I appreciate it.
Hi, Robert — if you're speaking, nothing is coming through on our end.
My apologies — I had myself on mute. Sorry about that. David, I'd like to revisit what you said during your closing remarks regarding the economy's condition and that muddled view — certain segments performing nicely, others not so much. Are there any patterns you could identify? Clearly, wage inflation remains present, yet overall inflation also persists. So are there specific sectors — looking back a few years, health care had troubles where wage inflation and health care lacked sufficient pricing strength to handle it, at least somewhat? Are any sectors emerging right now where cost inflation is beginning to surpass the capacity to pass along pricing?
Yes. That's a solid question, Robert. I would point to one sector where I feel some optimism and another where I hold some worries. The one giving me optimism is that I believe we're starting to witness — and will witness more — effects from the big beautiful bill's provisions, which made capital spending more appealing to companies by letting them, in numerous instances, obtain an immediate deduction for such capital spending. I think some unlocking of capital spending is already visible, and I'm not merely referring to the AI boom. I believe that will prove quite beneficial for the economy overall. The sector giving me worries is the subprime consumer. There are several distinct data points, all of which signal that the subprime consumer is experiencing stress. Looking at credit card data, you've observed not just higher delinquencies, but also diminished spending. You observe rising delinquencies in subprime mortgage. We've witnessed substantially higher delinquencies in subprime auto. So I think this mirrors a low-end consumer who is stretched. We aren't seeing wage increases in that segment like we did during the earlier post-COVID stretch. And to your point, we are seeing food cost inflation along with housing — especially rent increases — that I consider problematic; so it's a mixed picture. It is, as I mentioned, muddled, and I warn everyone against having too much confidence in forecasts, because the precision of predictions concerning the macro economy during this post-COVID stretch — the track record has been weak.
Thanks for that explanation. Turning to the other topic, spreads, correct? What I mean is they've tightened. Tightening has happened across the board, hasn't it? So as you were saying, private credit spreads have more or less held onto their premium. Given that, what danger do you see that this premium fails to hold? And conversely, what conditions do you figure would have to come about for spreads generally to widen absent some credit disaster sparking it?
Once more, an excellent question, Robert. There's somewhat of a legend out there, I believe, that your question dismantles. That legend holds that private credit spreads tightened owing to an imbalance between capital supply and capital demand; a fine hypothesis, yet it fails to account for spread tightening throughout a wide range of debt categories, such as investment grade, high yield, the broadly syndicated sector, and securitization. I mean it's everywhere other than subprime; thus spreads serve as a confidence gauge. And at present, investors are voting with their feet that they'd prefer to hold debt investments of various sorts rather than other investments. For the spread situation to shift, I believe a shift in perspective is required, a fairly widespread shift in sentiment. At the moment, investor optimism runs high. I think we would need fresh facts to emerge that would lead investors broadly to reset. And that reset, I believe, would likely touch not only private credit, but numerous investment categories, equities included.
Absolutely. I appreciate all of you spending part of your morning with us. As usual, if there’s any topic or matter we didn’t address well enough today, don’t hesitate to get in touch. We’re glad you joined, and we’re eager to speak with you again in 3 months.
This concludes today's conference call. You may now disconnect.
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