Golub Capital BDC, Inc. (GBDC) Earnings Call Transcript
February 5, 2026
Earnings Call Speaker Segments
Hi everyone, and thank you for being with us today. Tim Topicz, our Chief Operating Officer, and Chris Ericson, our Chief Financial Officer, are here with me; if GBDC is new to you, our approach to investing centers on extending first lien, senior secured loans to healthy, resilient middle-market businesses that have the backing of strong, partnership-oriented private equity sponsors. Our earnings press release for the fiscal quarter that closed on December 31st came out yesterday, and an earnings presentation is now available on our website. We'll be referencing that presentation throughout today's call. As is my habit, I'll begin with headlines and a summary of how we performed this quarter; after that, Tim and Chris will take you through our operating and financial results for the quarter in detail. Then, to close, I'll offer some observations about current market conditions and what we see ahead. Let's begin with three headlines. Headline one: even with four industry headwinds that persist, GBDC delivered an okay quarter. Not great, but solid, given the environment. Adjusted NII per share came in at $0.38, equivalent to an adjusted NII ROE of 10.2%. Adjusted net income per share was $0.25, producing an adjusted ROE of 6.7%, and GBDC distributed $0.39 per share. So what are these headwinds? I laid out all four on last quarter's call. Number one, lower base rates. Number two, tighter spreads — not, not only within our market, but throughout nearly every credit asset class apart from subprime. Number three, muted M&A activity, though the second half of calendar 2025 was an improvement over the first half. And number four, credit stress that remains at high levels. Headline two: we anticipate these headwinds lasting for a while, and we are preparing for a challenging 2026. Headline three, which aligns with what we said on last quarter's call: our board of directors took another look at GBDC's dividend policy, and following careful evaluation and in light of the headwinds I just described, the board chose to reset the company's quarterly base dividend to $0.33 per share, or roughly 9% of NAV per share; we also intend to keep the quarterly variable supplemental dividend policy in place going forward. In our view, this change fits with our four long-standing dividend priorities: keeping a stable net asset value over time, minimizing excise taxes over time, adjusting our base distribution level infrequently, and paying as high a dividend yield on NAV as sustainable, consistent with those goals. I'll now hand the call to Tim Topicz to discuss operating performance in the quarter in more detail.
Thanks, David. We'll pick up on slide four. Four main drivers shaped GBDC's adjusted net investment income of $0.38 per share and adjusted earnings of $0.25 per share this quarter. I'll go through them one by one. To start, credit performance overall is still generally solid. About 89% of GBDC's investment portfolio at fair value sits in our top internal rating categories. Names on non-accrual status are still quite few, representing only 0.8% of the total investment portfolio at fair value. That figure sits comfortably under the BDC peer industry average. Adjusted net unrealized and realized losses did rise to $0.13 per share, but they mostly stemmed from fair value markdowns on a narrow tail of weaker borrowers at GBDC, which included $0.06 per share of markdowns on equity investments in those borrowers. Driver number two: GBDC's investment income yield came in at 10%, a sequential decline of 40 basis points, largely the result of lower base rates and, to a smaller degree, a reduced weighted average spread across the portfolio; those headwinds were partly offset by the third driver, a steady reduction in GBDC's borrowing costs, which mirrors the effect of GBDC's debt capital structure being predominantly floating rate. And last, GBDC's earnings kept benefiting from a market-leading fee structure along with one of the public BDC sector's lowest operating expense loads. Now turning to investment activity. GBDC's investment portfolio shrank by a modest 1.5% quarter-over-quarter, landing at $8.6 billion at fair value. Our underwriting stayed very selective and conservative; of the deals we reviewed in the quarter, we closed on only 3.1%, at a weighted average LTV of roughly 43%. Roughly 60% of our origination volume came from leaning on existing sponsor relationships and portfolio company incumbencies, and we made loans to 18 new borrowers. We kept using our scale to lead deals, serving as sole or lead lender on 96% of our transactions in the quarter; our focus remains the core middle market, which we believe still offers better potential for risk-adjusted returns than the larger borrower market. For our originations in the quarter, the median portfolio company EBITDA was $81 million. Still on slide four, let me quickly recap distributions paid and a few balance sheet changes from the quarter. Distributions paid totaled $0.39 per share for the quarter. As David noted at the start, our board of directors has reset the base distribution level to $0.33 per share, and beyond that, we'll assess each quarter a variable supplemental distribution aimed at paying out 50% of earnings above $0.33 per share. Moving on to other balance sheet updates. Net debt to equity held steady quarter-over-quarter, finishing at 1.23 x, inside our target range of 0.85x-1.25 x. During the quarter, we kept opportunistically repurchasing GBDC shares on an accretive basis. Shares bought during calendar year 2025 climbed to 5.5 million shares, or $76.5 million in aggregate value. During the quarter, those capital management transactions produced accretion of $0.01 per share to net asset value. I'll now hand things over to Chris to walk us through our financial results in detail.
Appreciate that, Tim. If we move to slide seven, it shows how the earnings drivers Tim just walked through and the distributions made during the quarter fed into GBDC's December 31, 2025 NAV per share of $14.84. Adjusted NII per share came in at $0.38, a base distribution of $0.39 per share was paid out during the quarter, adjusted net realized and unrealized losses were $0.13 per share, and share repurchases added $0.01 per share of NAV accretion. Combined, those results pushed net asset value per share down to $14.84. Now on slide 10, we detail our origination activity for the quarter. Net funds growth, which we define as funded commitments plus delayed draw term loan and net revolver draws, minus exits and sales, and net of market value changes in portfolio fair value, fell by $130 million for the quarter; the main reason was that repayments and exits outpaced funded new originations along with delayed draw term loans and net revolver draws. At the bottom of the slide, the weighted average rate on new investments was 8.6%, down 30 basis points from the prior quarter, mainly driven by lower base rates at origination. Investments repaid during the quarter carried a weighted average rate of 9.4%. Slide 11 presents GBDC's overall portfolio mix. As you can see, the breakdown of the portfolio by investment types stayed consistent quarter over quarter, with One-Stop loans still accounting for around 87% of the portfolio at fair value. Slide 12 shows that GBDC's portfolio continues to be highly diversified by portfolio company, with an average investment size of roughly 20 basis points across 420 distinct portfolio companies. On top of that, our largest borrower accounts for only 1.6% of the debt investment portfolio, and our top 10 largest borrowers make up only 12% of the portfolio. We believe GBDC ranks among the most diversified and granular portfolios in the public BDC sector, moderating credit risk through position size. As of December 31, 2025, 92% of our investment portfolio was made up of first lien, senior secured floating rate loans to borrowers spanning a diversified range of what we consider resilient industries. The economic analysis on slide 13 highlights what drove GBDC's net investment spread of 4.6%. Let's go through the slide in detail. I'll begin with the dark blue line, which is our investment income yield. As a reminder, the investment income yield includes amortization of fees and discounts, which declined approximately 40 basis points sequentially to 10%. Our cost of debt, the teal line, fell approximately 20 basis points to 5.4%, reflecting our roughly 80% floating rate debt funding structure. All told, GBDC's weighted average net investment spread, the gold line, decreased modestly quarter-over-quarter to 4.6%. Moving on to slides 14 and 15, let's take a closer look at our credit quality metrics. If you look at slide 14, you'll notice non-accruals rose from the prior quarter, reaching 80 basis points of total investments at fair value, plus 1.3% of total investments at amortized costs, yet they're still quite low both in absolute terms and when compared with the wider BDC sector. In the quarter, non-accrual investments grew in number to 14, since one portfolio company investment came back to accrual status after a restructuring, which was offset by six portfolio company investments being added during the period. On slide 15, we show how internal performance ratings have trended. As Tim mentioned before, roughly 89% of the total investment portfolio stayed in our top two internal performance rating categories. Investments carrying a rating of three, meaning a borrower might potentially perform worse than expected relative to underwriting, or is expected to do so, went up slightly to 10.1% of the total investment portfolio. The share of investments rated one and two — those we think have the greatest likelihood of significant credit impairment — is still quite small, at only 1.3% of the portfolio at fair value. Following our usual practice, we'll skip slides 16 through 19; those contain additional detail on GBDC's financial statements, dividends history, and other key metrics. To close out this section, I'll go over GBDC's liquidity and investment capacity using slides 20 and 21. Let's begin with the key takeaways on slide 21. Our debt funding structure is still highly diversified and flexible. Our debt maturity profile is still well-positioned, with 49% of our debt funding coming from unsecured notes across a maturity profile that is well-laddered. In line with our asset liability matching principle, 81% of GBDC's total debt funding is floating rate or swapped to a floating rate, levels we believe rank among the highest in the sector. GBDC is well-positioned to keep modulating how lower interest rates affect investment income by offsetting them with lower interest expense on its borrowings. All in all, our liquidity position is still strong, and we closed the quarter with roughly $1.3 billion of liquidity from unrestricted cash, undrawn commitments on our corporate revolver, and the unused unsecured revolver provided by our advisor. I'll now turn it back to David for closing remarks.
Appreciate that, Chris. At the start of this call, I mentioned the four headwinds our industry has been up against: lower base rates, tighter spreads, muted M&A, and a protracted credit cycle. Now I'd like to turn to what those headwinds are doing to us. There are also four effects I want to call out. First, private credit ROEs have declined, and that includes the BDC space. Our estimates put public BDC net returns roughly 4 percentage points below where they were a year earlier, on average, using earnings reports through September 30th. Consultants covering the wider private credit fund universe have turned up comparable results; none of this should come as a shock. When loans are floating-rate, lower base rates, lower spreads, and credit losses are bound to take a toll. Second effect: the gap between good managers and, shall we say, not-so-good managers has widened. Alpha has always been abundant in private credit. Right now it's especially abundant. Again, no shock there. What overwhelmingly drives alpha in private credit is keeping realized credit losses to a minimum, and stretches of credit stress are when that gets tested. Third effect: these headwinds have drawn plenty of press coverage, perhaps less colorful than last quarter's cockroaches, but still abundant. And fourth, shareholders have reacted. Their reaction has come through revaluing public BDCs and through more redemptions from semi-liquid BDCs. So which way does the puck go now? Age and experience bring one real advantage: pattern recognition. This moment doesn't feel exactly like earlier ones, but certain elements rhyme, so let me offer my take. Following a stretch of growth and new entrants, private credit is maturing, and in my judgment it will now pass through a Darwinian moment. Certain firms will adapt and thrive; others won't. That isn't a bad thing. We've been through this before, and in some respects this Darwinian moment feels a little overdue. Yes, we're worriers rather than optimists, but that doesn't make us pessimists either. Given what we've experienced across multiple cycles spanning more than 30 years, this is actually the sort of environment in which we and other private credit specialists outperform. We have a playbook for that. It's a playbook that has served us well for decades, including through a number of periods more stressful than this one. The playbook involves being very selective when making new loans, focusing on early detection of borrower underperformance, working with sponsors on early intervention, and addressing problems proactively. Our approach is really all about minimizing realized credit losses and being ready to play offense as opportunities arise. We're confident that this playbook will once again serve us well as we manage through this one. With that, operator, could you please open the line for questions?
Hello, everybody, and good morning. I appreciate the invitation to join. So David, first off, the major subject is obviously software. You happen to be not just among the top private credit organizations, but also among the top early backers in software, so naturally, we'll be asking you about it. I realize this is a difficult question, but do you have any reactions to what AI companies have done lately that has, you know, frightened the software sector and, naturally, the private credit sector as well? Does it create worry regarding your software portfolio, which is, naturally, more focused on enterprise SaaS, perhaps worry, you know, stemming from what took place over the last couple weeks, but also worry about how AI progress might appear in a few years from now, when many of these, you know, credits will remain on your books? Thank you.
Thanks, Finian. Sure, the SaaS apocalypse — let's get into that. There's a genuine problem at play here. This isn't merely some market overreaction. Beneath the recent trading moves, I believe there are two central things — call them viewpoints or realizations. First, AI capabilities are moving ahead faster than almost anyone anticipated, and that's particularly true when it comes to tools that simplify coding; the Claude improvements this month are simply the newest example of this pattern, though the pattern itself has been building. Second, some software businesses, as a consequence, face exposure to being disrupted by AI. My sense is we'd sign on to both viewpoints, and we believe the market has it right — AI will produce winners alongside losers. We also believe that everyone — and your question hints at this — everyone has to come at the AI situation with some humility. The complete answers aren't available to anybody; this technology is new, and it's been progressing at a speed that even people who specialize in the field didn't anticipate. I want to dig deeper into our thinking on who comes out ahead and who falls behind, but first let me explain what shapes our thinking. You touched on several pieces of that. In brief, this is our specialty. Software companies have been our investment focus for 20 years. Across that stretch we've closed 1,000 software deals; this is what we're good at. During those 20 years, just five defaults have occurred. Of the $145 billion in software commitments we've made, 0.25% has gone into default. Our team is excellent. We have 25 professionals devoted to this. Between us we bring more than 200 years of combined experience in the sector, spanning numerous credit and technology cycles, and our approach has been exactly what you'd anticipate — very Golub in character. Our own underwriting method has been built in-house. It begins with a risk mapping framework that is proprietary, and that framework directs us toward business models we find appealing. It directs us away from business models we regard as carrying different kinds of vulnerability. We've built proprietary diligence templates, which let us stress-test that resilience, AI risk included. AI risk is something we've examined for years; so what does that lead us to favor? Let me share a few examples. Enterprise-critical platforms appeal to us, and such platforms share certain traits. They feature sticky, embedded workflows. Their implementation cycles run long; moving clients over to competing products is difficult. Market leaders holding proprietary datasets appeal to us. In some cases customers generate those datasets, in others not; either way, an AI rival can't readily copy a proprietary dataset. Working with sponsors who bring expertise appeals to us. They engage early, they themselves know AI deeply. They steer their portfolio companies toward staying ahead of disruption. What turns us off? Well, our exposure is quite limited when it comes to software centered on content creation, software centered on analytical overlays, and software that is tool-based. Our view is that those sectors will see plenty of companies come out on the losing end. As a result, we constantly review what we hold. Identifying trouble early is something we strongly believe in. Still, when you live through a stretch like the one happening now, with the way the market is behaving, it triggers an instant reaction here at Golub Capital to go through the portfolio. So that work has been underway in real time, and what we've found up to this point is that our confidence in the portfolio is quite high. We aren't claiming AI carries zero risk. We know enough to recognize that humility is essential, and that we must remain extremely watchful when it comes to AI risk. That said, judging by our current position, we feel very good about how the portfolio stands.
Thanks, that’s really useful context. I’ll stay with this subject for my next question as well. We get a lot of incoming questions that essentially ask about loan-to-value ratios and what those could imply. From what it seems, you and others in the industry continue to put money into software using what look like typical capital structure terms, though naturally that reflects the prior quarter’s figures and similar information. Given what we’re seeing in the public markets, is there something comparable happening—a kind of slowdown—either on your end or among private equity players? And then, even more significantly, if that were to occur, do you believe that would cause risk to grow? For instance, when you look back at healthcare services from a few years ago, those business models relied on roll-ups to generate their EBITDA synergies and so on—does software contain that same kind of factor, where a greater cost of equity and a greater cost of debt would by themselves become an issue?
At this point, I'd say it's too soon to draw any firm conclusions, but let's walk through a few possible paths. Under one path, getting capital becomes substantially harder for software businesses — even solid ones — whether through the broadly syndicated loan market or the high yield market. My take is that this actually works in favor of private credit specialists such as ourselves, since it would create more opportunities, better pricing, and stronger and stronger and stronger capital structures; however, both we and others will have to decide which transactions we regard as genuinely resilient and which ones we don't. I, I have confidence in our ability to make those calls; so in my view, Finn, that path is broadly a good thing. A second path has this turning out to be a blip, with the market surging back and, you know, us rapidly returning to the state we were in before this most recent market move started. My sense is that's improbable. I believe there are sufficient genuine elements to the insights around AI risk that a swift rebound probably won't happen. And the third path I'd highlight sits somewhere in the middle. It's one where the market grows more — what's the right word? — selective regarding which companies and which credits it favors and which it doesn't. In my view, that third path is where things are headed over the longer term. But my hunch is we'll pass through path one on the way to path three.
Very helpful. Thanks, David.
Hi everyone, and thanks for letting me ask my questions. To start, in the remarks you prepared, you mentioned that you're bracing for a tough 2026. I was hoping you could elaborate a little on that. Is it tied, you know, in a wider sense to the leverage lending space? Are you also expecting some emerging difficulties over at GBDC? And is this really about profits and credit quality together, or just one of those? Any more detail on what you said would really help.
Of course. Like I said when I gave my prepared comments, we believe the current market backdrop is a difficult one. So if things are trending downward, they'll likely decline somewhat further. Spreads sit essentially at a 5-year trough, and although they appear to have steadied to some degree, the older portfolio still isn't sitting at the same place as the newer one. On M&A, everyone came into this year declaring, "This is the year it finally kicks off. We're about to see the dam burst." What I still observe is a subdued M&A landscape, and I want to see... I want to see additional activity. I'm not claiming it's off the table. I'm saying we haven't witnessed it so far; and last, regarding credit, I believe, you know, a credit cycle is underway, and I've kept saying this for a number of quarters now. You know, I think we're witnessing heightened credit stress both in the broadly syndicated arena and in private credit, and everyone is sorting through their problems, ourselves included. I think we're positioned strongly, Ethan, compared with the rest of the industry; but I think there's been quite a bit of overly rosy talk across the industry, and I want to be completely straightforward with you and with our investors that right now this is a difficult environment. You know, generating the ROEs we aim to generate is tougher for us under present conditions than it has been in recent years. That isn't to say I lack optimism about what GBDC can achieve over the long haul. I do have it. But I think one part of our role is to speak plainly about whether we're facing headwinds or tailwinds at a given time.
Got it. Thanks for that. And then, separately, I was hoping to dig into the deployment picture a little. I realize you basically just said that a wide-ranging rebound in M&A isn't showing up yet, but suppose that does happen — leverage sits near the ceiling of the band, and you're out there repurchasing stock right now, which strikes me as sensible, yet I'd love some detail on the way you're balancing those competing uses of capital when resources may be limited.
I think your framing captured it nicely. Several objectives have to be weighed against each other, and given that the stock trades at a sizable discount to NAV, we'll stay active repurchasing shares, since we believe that benefits shareholders. At the same time, with portfolio turnover, we'll be seeking the strongest chances to put that capital back to work in appealing new loans. So several things are going to be happening concurrently. We need to strike the proper balance.
Alright. Many thanks.
Hey, everyone. I really don't want to keep dwelling on the software angle, but how do you assess the dangers posed by what you might call unknown unknowns? I mean, when you present the argument for your moats, as everyone refers to them — you know, proprietary, entrenched, software, sticky software, proprietary data, and so on — what dangers arise from the possibility that those moats prove shallower than people currently believe them to be; it appears to be an industry-wide pattern that you and your rivals point to the very same moats; and what's the — to say it plainly, AI agents are pretty skilled at scraping data and repurposing it for themselves. So in certain situations, proprietary data may not remain proprietary. Given how quickly AI is advancing, what dangers do you see of those moats disappearing? As you mentioned, certain aspects are speeding up more than experts would have predicted just a couple of years back. Perhaps two years from now it will be more capable of constructing pathways over those moats than you presently expect.
Okay, Robert, that's a really good question. Let's break it down once more by looking at a few possible paths. Take the path where AI keeps moving forward quickly. Under those conditions, when you've got enterprise companies sitting on large customer bases and relationships that are hard to unwind, what those businesses face begins as a slowdown in growth. So the earliest consequence you'd expect from that is weaker stock prices tied to weaker growth paths, and that weaker growth would show up both in fewer new logos and in some existing customers drifting away. A second tier of risk would be that the danger grows big enough that you don't just get slower growth — you actually get some negative growth. You'd get some decline in revenues. Still, for solid software businesses, I'd say an instant collapse is pretty improbable. What you'd get is more of a slow melt rather than a blowup. Then there's a third path — the blowup path — where AI delivers a capability so powerful compared with what the incumbent offers that it basically swaps out the incumbent offering within a brief window. Of those three, I'd call that one the least probable. So when we look at where things stand today, what this points to — what my three buckets point to — is that we probably ought to, first, watch how the equity market responds, and second, watch how the credit market responds, since for AI to become a genuine issue for credit markets, we'd need path two or path three to play out. We have to get well beyond path one, at minimum across a meaningful number of instances.
Thanks for that, Color — really considerate of you. Thank you. Building on what you just said, and picking up on your point: suppose we're in scenario one, and you're holding these assets for a while — you know, growth could be slower, and the equity holders could end up losing capital, though you might still get a chance to exit, or you might not. Looking ahead, would you anticipate doing fewer software deals, given, you know, the... Is it about risk and return? Because the deals that are still getting done seem to be priced fairly tight; it's loosening up slightly; but given that the risks could be so disproportionately large, would you expect a shift in, say, how much software you'd want to bring into the portfolio over the coming five years, Color?
Robert, what I anticipate is that risk will get repriced by the market. So answering that is difficult unless I assume something about the way information gets absorbed by the market and what that implies for spreads going forward. Spreads have already been repriced in the broadly syndicated market. New software deals, you know, won't be coming out at the same spread levels as existing borrowers, whose loans trade at 95, 90, or 85. Those deals, the market is saying, are underpriced. So without more data on how the private markets absorb what's happening now, and especially what that means for pricing, structure, and leverage on new deals, your question is hard to answer. It would surprise me if Golub Capital stopped being a top software lender. This is something we're very good at; the sponsors who are the best in the business at this are relationships we have in depth; but as for your question about a specific capital deployment goal, answering it seems premature.
Understood. Thanks. That's reasonable.
Hi, good morning. I appreciate you taking my questions. Staying on the software topic, could you perhaps discuss, broadly speaking, what's happening with software trends, maybe the sort of pre-AI disruption risk or whatever, you know, the disruption risk that the market is currently pricing in. What prompts my question is the Golub Altman Index, or the middle market index that you publish — I've observed that revenue growth in the tech sector has sort of declined here across the past several quarters; and, you know, what have the underlying trends been, I suppose, generally for that industry? Perhaps what's causing that slower growth.
Sure. Thanks, Paul. That's an excellent question, and I believe it matters that all of us stay focused on certain of those trends, while also considering, you know, AI risks over the longer term; so when we examine the Golub Altman Index figures in order, what we observe is that the technology/software segment has, over time, consistently expanded more quickly than the remainder of our portfolio. That said, similar to the remainder of our portfolio, we've observed a degree of deceleration in year-over-year growth within that sector. And when you sort of peel back this onion further, what we observe is a slowdown in bookings, in select cases. And this holds true not only within the Golub Capital portfolio. I believe throughout software at both larger companies and mid-sized companies, we've witnessed across the past two years, some deceleration in new bookings trends. Put another way, corporate clients are taking longer to adopt and pay for new software products compared with the earlier period. So, you know, what explains that? Well, it's difficult to identify that subsequent layer of the onion, since there are actually a variety of different reasons. In part it's companies grappling with cost pressure. In part it's companies absorbing prior investments in tech. I don't believe it's a broad move by corporate customers, a broad move away from adopting new software applications and using them to enhance their businesses. I think that continues. I think what we're seeing right now is somewhat of a cyclical pattern, in which software bookings are below where they were, and I think that will probably return.
Thanks, that’s really useful, David. I appreciate it. Maybe just one final question about your portfolio at GBDC. I was curious whether you could share, if you’re able, what portion of the portfolio, or of the software book, is made up of ARR-based structures. And I suppose any extra detail you can give on that regarding conversion and companies that are close to cash flow break even, that sort of thing. And perhaps more broadly too, just how you view the defensive structure or the thesis behind those kinds of deals, given that risk is rising today.
Sure. So for those of you who aren’t experts, what Paul is referring to is loans known as ARR loans, or recurring revenue loans, where the framework for credit underwriting isn’t the usual EBITDA coverage or interest coverage data. Instead, it would rely more on revenue multiples and the expectation that this will become EBITDA in a few years’ time. So we were early originators of ARR loans, as you know, roughly 10 years ago. We’ve actually cut back our exposure to ARR loans in recent years as pricing on those loans has become tighter, and we believe their attractiveness has diminished. So the share of the GBDC portfolio that is in ARR loans has in fact declined significantly in recent years, as many of our older ARR loans converted into EBITDA loans, converted into traditional loans, and as we’ve lowered the volume of new ones. After this call, Paul, I will check what we’ve disclosed on this and what we can disclose, but that’s the general trend. Now, I do think that besides spreads being tighter, in an environment where bookings trends have, you know, declined, I think ARR loans are harder. That’s not to say they’re all good or all bad. But, you know, this is always a case where you need to judge individual loans on their merits. But, you know, it’s a..; it’s been a more difficult space.
Understood. That's really useful once more, David. Thanks. I'm finished.
Thanks, operator. I want to express my appreciation to everyone for spending part of their morning with us. If anything came up that we weren't able to address today, don't hesitate to get in touch, and we're eager to reconnect with all of you when the next quarter comes around.
That wraps up the call for today, everyone. We appreciate your joining us. You can go ahead and hang up now.
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