Golub Capital BDC, Inc. (GBDC) Earnings Call Transcript
August 4, 2026
Earnings Call Speaker Segments
Hi, everyone, and thanks for joining us on GBDC's call covering the fiscal quarter that closed on June 30th, 2026. Ahead of getting started, let me briefly note for those listening that anything we say today could include forward-looking statements as defined under the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995. Any remarks that aren't statements of historical fact may amount to forward-looking statements, which aren't promises of future performance or results and carry various risks and uncertainties. A range of factors — among them those we describe periodically in GBDC's SEC filings — could cause actual results to differ materially from what those forward-looking statements suggest. If you'd like the materials we plan to reference on today's earnings call, head to the Investor Resources tab on our homepage, www.golubcapitalbdc.com, and click the Events and Presentations link. You can also find our earnings release on our website under the Investor Resources section. One more thing to note: this call is being recorded. With that, I'm happy to hand things over to David Golub, GBDC's Chief Executive Officer.
Hi everyone, and thank you for being here today. I'm David Golub, and with me are Tim Topicz, who serves as our Chief Operating Officer, Rob Tuchscherer, our Senior Managing Director and Officer of GBDC, and Chris Ericson, our Chief Financial Officer. If you're new to GBDC, our approach to investing centers on making first lien senior secured loans to healthy, resilient middle-market businesses that have the backing of strong, partnership-oriented private equity sponsors. We put out our earnings press release yesterday for the fiscal quarter that closed on June 30th. There's an earnings presentation up on our website, and we'll be referencing it throughout today's call. I'll begin with the headlines and a quick summary of how we performed this quarter. Then Tim, Rob, and Chris will take you through our operating and financial results in greater depth. I'll finish with a few thoughts on where the market stands right now and what we expect going forward, and then we'll open things up for questions. Here's the headline for the quarter. GBDC did much better than the prior quarter, not as well as we'd want, and stronger than it appears; that's quite a lot. It comes in three parts. Let me spend a few moments breaking down each of those three parts. To start, GBDC's results were considerably improved versus last quarter. The data makes that pretty evident. Adjusted net income per share came in at $0.22; that's against a loss of $0.18 per share in the prior quarter, and it works out to an annualized adjusted ROE of 6.2%. What mainly drove the quarter-over-quarter gain was a reduction in adjusted net realized and unrealized losses. Those losses dropped from $0.52 per share in the prior quarter down to $0.12 per share in this one. Meanwhile, adjusted NII per share stayed solid and in line with the prior quarter at $0.34 per share, equating to an adjusted NII ROE of 9.5%. And lastly, GBDC distributed $0.33 per share. If you know GBDC well, the figures I just went through show why this quarter wasn't as strong as we'd want. Since our IPO in 2010, GBDC has produced a 9.4% net IRR on NAV. Comparing that with GBDC's annualized adjusted ROE of 6.2% for the quarter, it's plainly a few points under GBDC's average spanning more than 16 years. You've heard us discuss over many quarters how we're in a credit cycle, how this is a stretch characterized by sustained elevated credit stress; we've also said, including on the prior quarter's call, that in our view what we're witnessing matches a pattern. The pattern is that when conditions move from a borrower-friendly environment toward one that favors lenders, we typically get a stretch of bumpiness in results. I'm not completely taken aback to see some degree of bumpiness in GBDC's results this quarter. My expectation is that we'll witness a substantial degree of bumpiness throughout the BDC industry as results arrive. All that said, certain quarters feel worse than the numbers, and certain quarters feel better than the numbers. When I look at this quarter, what I see strikes me as stronger than what the figures alone suggest. What makes me say that? The net realized and unrealized losses GBDC recorded during the period — that $0.12 per share of loss — came mostly from a handful of junior debt and equity holdings, rather than from the core debt portfolio. Within that core debt portfolio, we observed considerable stability. That matters, since our experience tells us write-downs of the sort we incurred tend to be one-time events. To put it another way, the overall health and resilience across the great majority of GBDC's portfolio gives me encouragement. I'll say more on this when I share my outlook during my closing remarks. For the moment, I'm going to hand things over to Tim, Rob, and Chris, who will walk through the quarter in greater detail. Tim?
Appreciate it, David. We'll pick up on slide three and go through what drove GBDC's earnings this quarter. First I'll cover the factors behind the $0.34 per share of adjusted net investment income, and after that break out the credit gains and losses that made up $0.22 per share of adjusted earnings. So, beginning with what drove net investment income. Three items this quarter. One, a better investment income yield. Two, borrowing costs that stayed steady. Three, disciplined management of expenses. Let's take them one at a time. On investment income yield first — 9.9% annualized, up slightly versus the prior quarter. Support for that came from a stable weighted average spread across the portfolio, base rates that held consistent through the quarter, and, to a smaller degree, some modest accelerated fee recognition plus discount accretion connected to a few payoffs. Second, borrowing costs were unchanged at 5.3% annualized — among the lowest of any listed BDC peer, and a genuine competitive edge for GBDC and the people who invest in it. Third, operating expenses stayed lean. GBDC keeps benefiting from its gold standard fee structure. Nothing new worth flagging there — simply ongoing efficiency. Now let's dig into what drove GBDC's $0.22 per share of adjusted earnings. Credit performance overall held up well. Roughly 87% of our portfolio at fair value sits in our top internal rating categories. Investments on non-accrual status stayed minimal, at only 1.9% of the portfolio at fair value — a figure far beneath the average among our listed BDC peers. That said, we did book $0.12 per share of adjusted net realized and unrealized losses during the quarter. The breakdown is as follows. About $0.08 per share of unrealized losses came from markdowns on junior debt and equity investments in two portfolio companies that entered non-accrual status, or were already on non-accrual status, during the quarter. Those losses were partly offset by unrealized gains tied to a small reversal of the spread-driven unrealized losses from last quarter. We booked roughly $0.04 per share of net realized losses. That came mostly from the successful restructuring of RWAM Holdco and Dolphis Midco this quarter. Importantly, the realized losses from those restructurings were more than fully offset by the reversal of unrealized losses on the very same investments. Finally, on a brighter note, we booked $4 million of net realized gains from exiting equity investments in a couple of portfolio companies. As a reminder, GBDC will, in certain cases, co-invest in the equity of high-performing borrowers. Liquidating those equity investments, which historically has usually produced a gain, is among the factors behind GBDC's top-quartile credit performance since IPO. Now, on to balance sheet changes and distributions for the quarter. NAV per share dipped slightly to $14.25 per share. We closed the quarter at net debt-to-equity of 1.23x. That represented a modest decline versus the quarter before, and average leverage across the quarter came in at 1.23x as well. Distributions totaling $0.33 per share were paid out during the quarter. For the fourth fiscal quarter of 2026, our Board of Directors declared a distribution of $0.33 per share. We continued our opportunistic share repurchase program as well during the quarter. 1.1 million shares were repurchased by the company at a weighted average price of $12.90 per share, which works out to roughly a 10% discount to our net asset value as of March 31, 2026. On top of that, the Golub Capital Employee Grant Program Rabbi Trust bought around $31 million, or 2.4 million shares, of GBDC in the quarter for incentive compensation purposes. That took the trust's purchases of GBDC shares to $70 million across the last 12 months. Roughly 8% of GBDC shares outstanding are now held by Golub Capital affiliates. That shows a strong degree of alignment between Golub Capital and GBDC investors. If you turn to slide seven, we've set out the NAV per share bridge on a quarter-over-quarter basis, and you can see how the earnings drivers I just described flow through to GBDC's net asset value per share of $14.25 as of June 30th, 2026. Adjusted NII per share of $0.34 fully covered the $0.33 per share of distribution paid out during the quarter. Adjusted net realized and unrealized losses came to $0.12 per share, and share repurchases contributed $0.01 per share of NAV accretion. When you put it all together, net asset value declined modestly, from $14.35 to $14.25, during the quarter. That wraps up the earnings summary for the quarter. With that, I'll turn things over to Rob, who will take us through our investing activity and portfolio in more detail. Rob?
Thanks, Tim. Now I'll walk through what happened with our investments in the third fiscal quarter and give you a bit more color on how the portfolio has been performing. If you go to slide eight, during the second calendar quarter of 2026, at the Golub Capital level, our team closed roughly $3 billion in new investment commitments. GBDC took part in those new originations only to a limited degree, with $13 million of new investment commitments during the quarter, reflecting slow repayments along with our intention to concentrate on share repurchases that are accretive. We stayed very selective and conservative when underwriting, and we closed on merely 1.5% of the deals we reviewed during the quarter, at a weighted average loan to value of about 45%. Roughly 54% of our origination volume came from existing sponsor relationships and portfolio company incumbencies, and we extended loans to nine new borrowers. GBDC kept participating in add-on investment commitments to portfolio companies we already hold through secondary market transactions. By drawing on what our Capital Markets desk can do, we picked up additional interests in existing loans to high-quality borrowers at discounts to fair value, and we think that will prove accretive to GBDC's returns over time; we keep using our scale to lead deals, serving as sole or lead lender on 99% of the transactions we did this quarter. Around 78% of our new origination volume in the third fiscal quarter went toward M&A-driven transactions, including LBOs and add-on acquisitions, which extends the momentum from last quarter and shows how we can capitalize on the early signals of a market environment that is more active and driven by M&A. Out of GBDC's $13 million in new investment commitments this quarter, 94% sat in senior secured debt investments. New investments had a total weighted average rate of 8.9%, which encompassed a 5.2% weighted average spread. Now on slide 10, as of June 30th, 2026, GBDC's $8.2 billion portfolio is still well-diversified, spanning 424 different borrowers. You can also see how granular our portfolio is from the small size of our positions. On average, every one of our investments accounts for under 0.2% of the overall portfolio, and our top 10 investments make up only 13% of the overall portfolio, a concentration level that is under half the average among our listed BDC peers. GBDC's portfolio is diversified by industry subsector as well, with 51 individual subsectors represented. Software portfolio companies remain our single largest industry subsector exposure, at 26%. On last quarter's earnings call, I noted that we intended to report back on the extra work we were doing to evaluate how AI affects our software holdings. As you'll remember, we are experts in software lending, having completed over 1,000 software loans representing more than $90 billion in principal across the last 20 years, with a default rate averaging roughly 5 basis points per year. I'm happy to say that this past quarter we finished a full re-underwrite of our current software portfolio. Let me lay out the main takeaways. You'll find additional specifics in a revised version of our quarterly investor presentation, scheduled for release within this month. When we re-underwrote each credit, we took multiple factors into account, such as assessing the revenue model, how critical the product is, data moats, regulatory complexity, and switching costs. Beyond what we evaluated internally, we brought in a top-tier third-party consulting firm—paid for by the manager rather than the fund—to conduct an independent AI risk assessment. That outside consultant examined the dangers of potential product displacement along with end-user workflow risks. It further evaluated how well companies facing greater potential product displacement and end-user workflow risks could adjust to this new environment. According to the findings of our internal AI risk analysis, under 10% of our software portfolio carried elevated AI disruption risk. The third-party consultant's AI risk assessment reached the conclusion that under 3% were at elevated risk. We consider our software-related risk quite manageable, and we see opportunities ahead for Golub Capital in the software space, partly since numerous other lenders are exiting the sector or cutting back their exposures. Turning to slide 11, you'll notice non-accruals ticked up modestly versus the prior quarter, reaching 1.9% of total investments at fair value, yet they stay at quite low levels both in absolute terms and when compared with the wider listed BDC sector. Over the quarter, non-accrual investments went from 19 up to 20, since four additions were partly offset by three portfolio companies being removed. As always, when it comes to underperforming borrowers, our approach is to leverage our deep bench of seasoned investment professionals along with the playbook built over many decades to keep realized losses to a minimum. Slide 12 illustrates how internal performance ratings have trended across the whole GBDC portfolio. As Tim mentioned earlier, roughly 87% of the total investment portfolio stayed within our top two internal performance rating categories, while investments rated three—indicating a borrower that may potentially perform below expectations or is expected to do so—made up 10.6%, somewhat above historical averages. Loans rated 1 and 2, which we view as those most likely to experience significant credit impairment, stayed quite low, at only 2.8% of the portfolio at fair value; at this point I'll hand things over to Chris, who will walk us through our financial results in greater detail.
Thanks, Rob. I'll take you through GBDC's financial results and how our liabilities are structured for the third fiscal quarter of 2026. To begin with performance: slide 13 lays out the main factors behind GBDC's net investment spread, which rose slightly versus the previous quarter, reaching 4.6% on an annualized basis. Let's go through each component carefully. We'll start with the dark blue line, representing our investment income yield. Keep in mind that this yield factors in amortization of fees and discounts. Sequentially, GBDC's investment income yield climbed roughly 20 basis points to 9.9% annualized, driven by steady weighted average reference rates and spreads throughout the portfolio, along with a boost from accelerated discount accretion and fees tied to loan payoffs during the quarter. Our cost of debt — the teal line — rose slightly, by about 10 basis points, to 5.3%. Taking it all together, GBDC's weighted average net investment spread, shown by the gold line, grew modestly from the prior quarter to 4.6% annualized. Now to the balance sheet, on slide 16: we closed the quarter with roughly $8.2 billion in total portfolio investments at fair value, $4.6 billion in outstanding debt, and $3.7 billion in total net assets. Net debt-to-equity leverage came in at 1.23x for the quarter, a decline of 0.01x from the quarter before, which reflects lower average investments outstanding during the period. Let's turn to GBDC's liquidity on slide 19. On the whole, our liquidity stayed solid, and we finished the quarter with about $2 billion in liquidity, made up of unrestricted cash and undrawn commitments on our corporate revolver plus the unsecured revolver from our advisor. That gives us over 1.3x coverage of our unfunded investment commitments as well as the maturities coming up on our 2026 and 2027 notes. As further support for our balance sheet strength, in May 2026 we issued $500 million of five-year unsecured notes and swapped them to SOFR + 218 basis points. After the quarter closed, we amended certain terms and pushed out the maturity of our syndicated corporate revolver to July 2031, working alongside our 18 bank partners. Total commitments on that revolver stayed at about $2 billion, and an accordion provision permits growing the total facility size to as much as $3 billion. Among the other restated terms, we negotiated the elimination of the 10-basis point term SOFR credit spread adjustment and kept a drawn spread of term SOFR + 1.525% to 1.775%, depending on borrowing base levels. We believe GBDC still carries one of the most competitively priced revolvers among our listed BDC peers. Our debt funding structure, which slide 20 highlights, stays highly diversified across a number of financing markets. At 5.3% annualized, our weighted average borrowing costs remain among the lowest in our listed BDC peer group, supported by a differentiated investment-grade ratings profile. In line with our asset liability matching principle, roughly 80% of GBDC's total debt funding is floating rate or swapped into floating rate, and 64% of our debt funding comes through unsecured notes spread across a well-laddered maturity profile. Once we extended the maturity on GBDC's corporate revolver in July, the weighted average maturity for our outstanding debt stood at 4.8 years as of June 30 — far beyond the 3.1-year weighted average maturity on accruing debt investments, which shows a careful stance on matching assets with liabilities. Now I'll turn things back to David for his closing remarks.
Appreciate that, Chris. During the prior quarter, we rolled out two themes, and from where I sit, each one kept showing up in what we delivered this quarter. To start, we stated our belief that the direction of the direct lending market had changed, and that belief holds. Following an extended stretch in which terms kept tilting toward borrowers, starting in January of this year, our read is that conditions have been becoming more favorable to lenders. The shift is gradual, partly driven by weak M&A volumes. Compared with Q1, deal activity improved during Q2, yet it stayed far under the level we'd call typical. For newly struck deals, pricing has typically widened by 25 basis points to 50 basis points given this change in the wind's direction. The other theme we put forward was our projection of a stretch of heightened credit stress that would persist. We expected that lingering, elevated credit stress would remain a sector-wide drag across calendar Q2, and that call has likewise been borne out; the data shows it, among other places in the just-published Fitch Default report; we believe it will additionally show up as diminished industry returns on equity and wider gaps in results across managers as this quarter's earnings season rolls on. We expect that within such conditions, Golub Capital will, yet again, deliver superior results. Part of the reason traces to our approach; our first priority is lending to companies and sectors that can withstand shocks, and our junior debt exposure is small. That pays off in a setting like this one. Our robust underwriting and monitoring matter too. We believe we excel especially at spotting troubled credits early and at holding down losses on those troubled credits, partly thanks to that early focus. On the whole, my view remains that private credit is having a Darwinian moment. I made that point near the start of this year, and my view hasn't changed. In my opinion, organizations possessing durable competitive edges, solid performance, and long-term capital bases that are well diversified will adjust and gain share. Organizations with weaker credit results or with excessive dependence on particular capital types, such as retail products, will face difficulties. Given these conditions, private equity sponsors will soon figure out which private credit organizations they can rely on for dependable, stable access to attractive financing solutions, and which private credit organizations are unable to deliver that. My sense is that everything here will extend a pattern I began discussing a year ago. It's the widening gap between the winners and the whiners. So then, operator, would you kindly open up the line for questions?
Hi, all. Morning. David, regarding capital allocation, I appreciate the stance that emphasizes deleveraging and buybacks — could you speak to how much of that came from the other factor, meaning the quality and cost of fresh investment opportunities? Should that preference carry on now that you've brought leverage down somewhat, or ought you to lean more cautious, say, if new investment opportunity isn't strong and credit headwinds persist in the industry?
That's a solid question. We must constantly weigh the trade-offs among repurchasing stock, putting money into new investments, and keeping leverage within our target range. Every one of those is a goal we hold and wish to accomplish, and trade-offs exist among them. You accurately noted that during this last quarter, when payoffs came in relatively slow, we chose to reduce the pace of new investing activity so we could meet our objectives regarding repurchases and regarding a bit of deleveraging. I believe payoffs will rise, and that will afford us far more flexibility to engage more in new investing activity, while at the same time still meeting our leverage goals and our repurchase goals; we will need to keep watching all these various options and weighing the pros and cons of each against the others, since I think at their core these are alternative uses of capital. I think it matters greatly for you, Finn, and I know you've zeroed in on this previously, as have others, to zero in on the emphasis we place on repurchasing shares. When BDC shares trade at a discount, they trade at a discount to what managers claim fair value is. I think that's a truly important fact to keep in mind as you consider why certain ones do repurchase their shares and certain ones don't.
I agree, that's quite useful. I just want to ask something else about pressure on credit; over the past two quarters, and in this one as well, we've noticed somewhat more of it in the home services segment. You've got a bit of exposure there. Wondering whether you might lay out any themes at play in that area — is it essentially the same story as the healthcare roll-up problems, or is it tied to the K-shaped economy, or what have you.
What you're pointing to, I believe, is a real pattern, and I'd characterize that pattern as tied less to home services as such and more to companies whose fortunes are affected when homes sell at a slower pace. Some solid pieces have been written about this. Since 2022 we've been in a stretch where mortgage rates have climbed. Should you own a home and hold a mortgage taken out before 2022, you're hesitant to part with it, since any new mortgage would cost you far more, even if a move is something you'd like to make. As a result, moving activity has declined. In my view, part of why certain home services companies are facing softer demand comes down to this: the volume of moves sits under normal levels. My sense is that cannot go on indefinitely. This strikes me as a problem that cures itself. That said, I don't expect it to be cured by tomorrow. Continued pressure is likely in that space for companies that depend on, or are swayed by, how much moving activity occurs.
That's everything I had. Thanks very much.
Morning, and I appreciate you taking the question. I just have one about deal activity — regarding the transactions you closed during the quarter, you noted a slight widening uptick in spreads on some new investments. Could you expand on that a bit more? How do the terms and documentation now compare with what you were seeing back in the March quarter? Thanks.
Absolutely. My sense is that most people across our sector went into 2026 anticipating significantly higher M&A volumes than what 2025 delivered. When the calendar flipped and we moved through January and February, that expectation didn't materialize. Instead, Q1 brought a decline rather than growth in M&A activity. Ken, during Q2 we did observe some modest improvement, though the landscape for private equity-sponsored M&A remains highly restrained and muted. The headline figures can be somewhat misleading, since overall industry M&A totals are heavily shaped by a handful of massive strategic transactions. Within the private equity world specifically, deal activity has stayed depressed. That's led, I believe, to heightened rivalry and greater scrutiny focused on whichever transactions do close. To some extent, that offsets both the wider spreads and the better terms we'd otherwise have experienced in private credit during Q2. We did still see some of that. During the prepared remarks, I noted pricing got better by roughly 25 to 50 basis points. Terms have also improved somewhat, along with leverage levels. So really, things overall look somewhat stronger than what that spread rise alone suggests. That said, I expect we'll see additional improvement. I believe more will come once M&A recovery becomes clearer. Looking ahead across the next several quarters, my expectation is that we'll witness two things: a rise in M&A activity, plus continued betterment of the terms and conditions that private credit players can secure on newly originated loans.
Understood, that's quite useful. If I could just ask one more thing. In that software loan book, you saw the bottom three risk grades move up quarter over quarter — I was hoping you might discuss whether any patterns stand out, anything specific that's behind some of that shift. Thanks.
Sure. Let's revisit something we discussed right at the start of this year, Ken. Someone put a question to me: "With all this AI, you've got competitors out there claiming it amounts to nothing much." My answer was quite direct: "It does not amount to nothing much." AI has caused a truly major shift in what coding costs, and this major shift, which people didn't fully see coming, will produce winners and losers across the industry. What I also noted back then was that I believe our position is strong for this; software lending is our area of expertise; we've done it successfully for a very long stretch; and we've been considering AI as it relates to what we do in lending. Every bit of that holds. I'll add as well that we aren't flawless. Rob Tuchscherer mentioned how, during our re-underwriting and while reviewing our portfolio alongside an outside consultant, we found that a small but identifiable portion of our software loans involved companies vulnerable to certain AI-related problems. My sense is we are witnessing that. My sense is it's starting to show. My sense is this will turn into an ongoing theme, not only for us but across the whole industry. Software will split into winners and losers. I'd say our portfolio is quite manageable, though a few cases within it involve us singling out some losers, or some companies that may face challenges, and factoring that into valuations.
Understood. That's quite useful. Appreciate it once more.
Hello, good morning. I appreciate you fielding my questions. Given the patterns observed throughout the sector, credit conditions have been returning to normal. On this call, you're mentioning some movement occurring inside your portfolio as well. So, how solid a handle do you figure you have when it comes to sort of mapping out the tail inside the portfolio? As things stand, would you say the tail inside the portfolio is essentially fully identified, or is it still expanding right now? We're still fairly early in this process of normalization. I'm merely wondering where you believe the industry stands regarding the tail that we've witnessed rising throughout the space, and then too, I suppose, inside GBDC's portfolio.
Appreciate that, Paul. If there's one essential thing for investors and analysts to zero in on at this moment, it's precisely the direction you were taking. A credit cycle is upon us. I've said so for a year. For some time, others refused to accept it. I believe little of that refusal remains. A credit cycle is upon us. Credit stress is elevated. Within people's portfolios, this will produce winners and losers, and between different managers, it will produce winners and losers, since it's throughout credit cycles that dispersion among different managers grows truly markedly pronounced. That has already begun to appear. I believe we'll witness additional instances. Among the patterns I've observed across 30 years is that certain managers outperform others at spotting problems early. Spotting problems early is something we believe in enormously. Our emphasis on this stems from the fact that, based on what we've experienced, once a troubled situation is caught early, far more possibilities exist that you can pursue alongside a sponsor and a management team. Should you arrive at a problematic situation late, once liquidity problems exist, typically no decent possibilities remain and you're choosing among poor and awful ones. This early spotting is a major focus for us. That drives us, in my view, to spot our tail sooner than other people do. It likewise drives us, in my view, to assign a more precise value to that tail, since we're tracking it. That, I believe, is our current position. I believe we're at a stage where we've largely finished identifying the credits in our portfolio that will face difficulties. Throughout the industry, I believe, others haven't reached that same stage, and that will become apparent over this quarter and the next several quarters.
Appreciate that, David. That's really useful. And then, I suppose, regarding the expansion you're observing — since growth does still exist out there, obviously, and it clearly varies from one industry to another — how would you characterize the quality of that growth that you continue to see in sponsor-backed portfolios? Perhaps it's decelerating, not as robust as before, but I'm just interested in what portion is organic versus growth that's simply getting harder and maybe needs additional M&A to reach those adequate growth rates.
Paul, I believe the Golub Capital Altman Index figures are quite illuminating with respect to what you're asking. Those figures indicate that the economy is still expanding. Revenue and EBITDA at our portfolio companies are still rising. The rate of that expansion is modest, particularly when adjusted for inflation. Modest is the word. It's weaker than what we saw right after COVID. It isn't poor. It isn't a downturn, but it is plodding growth. I expect this trend to persist. Certain anomalous developments could arise, such as what's happening in the Middle East, which might push things in a worse direction. At present, I observe considerable momentum and considerable durability in the U.S. economy within this slow to medium growth band. So what are the implications for M&A volumes? In my view, the private equity ecosystem contains plenty of buyers and sellers who have been holding back. A stretch of stability is what's required — a stretch with reduced uncertainty regarding rates and reduced uncertainty regarding energy prices — and then we'll begin to witness an increasing amount of M&A, which I believe would be extremely beneficial for the PE ecosystem.
Understood. Thanks for that; that wraps up my questions.
Good morning, everyone. David, if I may return to software, I almost want to apologize for that. In short, I believe three of the new non-accruals you reported this quarter were software. Did all of them fall within the group you'd have viewed as having elevated AI risk, or are additional themes also at play within the software kind of segment? Your software segment is quite broad given how you define it. Are other problems occurring there, or were all of those problems ones you'd describe precisely as, say, moving to the table quickly and placing them on non-accrual sooner than you think some others might be prepared to do?
That's a great question, Robert. I don't think there's ever only a single reason for almost anything in life. I don't want to lead everyone to think that, oh, this is all just AI. There are always multiple issues; in certain cases, there are acquisitions that have been made where the integration maybe isn't going as smoothly as was expected. It's very difficult to successfully generalize about sources of or reasons for underperformance. I would also say, I think AI is and will continue to be a meaningful factor.
Understood, thanks. Moving on from that, the figure you mentioned — your in-house evaluation put it at under 10% being exposed to heightened AI risk. And the outside party, I believe it was under 3%, assuming I caught that right. That's quite a gap, with the third party looking considerably more upbeat than what your own team concluded — though maybe credit folks just tend toward pessimism. You offered some detail there; did it matter much? Is there a pattern explaining why their review, the one done externally, landed at a noticeably rosier view than the one you did internally?
Honestly, I see those two figures as far closer to each other than you're suggesting. I wouldn't fixate too much on how far apart they sit. Our rating criteria aren't identical. Nobody agreed on what the foundation for an evaluation should be, or on precisely what those terms signify. My takeaway, or the lesson I'd draw from these separate analyses, would actually be the opposite — both figures are small. That's what truly matters here, Robert; both are small. Truthfully, in my view, were we to survey the entire software sector, the share of software businesses likely to face heightened risks tied to AI is considerably greater than what we hold. We concentrate on enterprise risk platforms that are tightly woven into their customers' operations, that govern data, that serve as systems of record, that frequently sit in regulated sectors where security and similar concerns prove difficult to handle. That explains why our software stands on solid footing. It comes down to the decisions we've taken, the underwriting calls we've made across a long stretch of time regarding what qualifies as a Golub software credit. That, I believe, is the central point I'd want you and everyone else to walk away with.
Understood. Thanks for that. If I may squeeze in one more, very quickly. Regarding the dividend, during earlier quarters, you mentioned that you would take another look at it, or reconsider the policy, in light of what's happening in the industry, correct? Tighter spreads, moderate base rates. That was then. At present, it seems spreads have drifted somewhat upward. The outlook going forward for base rates could be tilted more toward increases than decreases, or at minimum holding steady. I doubt we'll see three-month SOFR at any point soon. Forecasting rates isn't my job. Would you agree that the dividend is, of course, always being reviewed, but do you believe any reconsideration would probably be more of a longer-term matter if we remain in a setting where SOFR is somewhat elevated and spreads are somewhat wider near term, and the reconsideration might not be needed?
Those things obviously help, don't they? Base rates that are higher are beneficial. Wider spreads are beneficial. Any time we discuss dividend policy, I simply want to remind everyone of how we think about it. What we do is aim to distribute an amount that represents a solid payout for shareholders, while simultaneously keeping NAV stable and avoiding changing our dividend too often. All of those are factors we must balance. I would say last quarter's trends gave a bit of help on that front. I suspect few of us anticipated the SOFR forward curve would reverse course, and it has; that's a positive development when it comes to projecting earnings power down the road. This is something we'll need to keep monitoring; it's simply part of managing floating rate debt. You have to be continually examining what the forward earnings power looks like.
Understood. Thanks very much.
Hi there, good morning, everyone. You brought up a few possibilities, I believe, in the secondary market here. Could you perhaps just assist us in gauging the size of that, what volume was completed? My guess is perhaps during this quarter it wasn't especially substantial, considering the general levels of investment. Do you believe there's still a chance for this moving forward? Also, maybe could you roughly estimate the percentage discount at which a few of those purchases were carried out?
Absolutely. Allow me to pull back a bit, since this, once more, isn't a topic that has received a lot of — in my view, it's confusing, with misinformation. There's been a run of pieces in the press concerning how secondary sales of private credit, that this is novel and negative, and I'd like to argue the reverse. In my view it's longstanding and positive; for over a decade we've had a desk at Golub Capital dedicated to sales and trading of private credit loans; when it comes to this, we lead the market. This is something we've done for a very long time. Why is it positive? Well, at times within private credit borrower lending groups, a lender is looking to sell. If you consider this in the most basic of situations, they hold an old fund. They wish to rebalance and allocate their capital elsewhere. They have a debt facility approaching maturity. They've lost faith in a sponsor or a sponsor relationship. Many different reasons exist. From the perspective of a borrower, when a lender is looking to sell, the options they face are either keeping a dissatisfied lender within their group, or bringing in a new lender; in our view it's nearly always preferable for them to bring in a new lender, and facilitating that is our business; along the way, we also, thanks to this position we hold as the biggest sales and trading party, we also manage to see plenty of things. Occasionally what we see, we'd like to purchase. In the calendar year to date, Golub Capital's sales and trading activity has surpassed $2 billion. For us it's a record first half. Throughout the platform, we've encountered some chances to purchase certain loans we consider appealing. Does it constitute a major portion of the platform's total origination activity? No. The overwhelming majority of what we do is arrangement, origination of new loans; in our view having this sales and trading expertise is a significant competitive advantage for the platform; in our view it benefits our sponsor clients since we can assist them in swapping dissatisfied lenders for satisfied ones. In our view it benefits our investors since it provides us a source of information and opportunities that aren't broadly available. For GBDC in calendar Q2, this wasn't a meaningful source of new investment activity. Thanks for bringing that up, since I see it as a case that shows how the Golub Capital platform holds a competitive edge.
Got it. Thanks for that. Let me ask one more thing. During your prepared remarks, you mentioned that certain markdowns tied to spreads from the prior quarter had partly reversed. On a different company's call, I believe we heard them suggest their net asset value still faced some strain during 2Q because of this. So I'm curious whether you could identify anything that explains that gap, correct? Could it come down to which markets each of you targets?
In Q2, I don't believe we experienced much valuation movement in the portfolio linked to spreads. My view is that mostly happened in Q1. During Q2, there was a modest rebound — by which I mean spreads tightened — within the larger size segment of the private credit space. It wasn't much. Stabilization was the key narrative. Across the industry's Q2 results, what I expect you'll observe is valuation shifts connected to credit. My anticipation is that we'll witness quite a few of those; that's typical when you're inside a credit cycle.
Understood, Ethan.
Appreciate it, everyone, for joining us. In the same way as always, should anything come up that wasn't addressed on this call, or occur to you afterward, don't hesitate to get in touch, and we're eager to speak with you once more 1 quarter from now.
This concludes today's call. Thank you for attending. You may now disconnect.
Read the full transcript via the API
You're viewing the first half of this call. Get the complete Golub Capital BDC, Inc. transcript - plus 132,000+ transcripts from 7,000+ companies, speaker segments and full-text search - through the EarningsAPI REST API or hosted MCP server.
Get an API key View API docs →For developers and AI pipelines
Programmatic access to Golub Capital BDC, Inc. earnings transcripts and 132,000+ others is available through the
EarningsAPI REST API and the hosted MCP server.
Quarterly plans from $162 - full transcripts, speaker segments, full-text search,
and the /api/v1/transcripts/recent polling endpoint for ETL pipelines.