Golub Capital BDC, Inc. (GBDC) Earnings Call Transcript & Summary
May 5, 2026
What were the key takeaways from Golub Capital BDC, Inc.'s May 5, 2026 earnings call?
In the fiscal quarter ended March 31, 2026, Golub Capital BDC, Inc. (GBDC) reported adjusted net investment income (NII) of $0.34 per share, which covered the declared distribution of $0.33 per share. However, the company experienced a net loss of $0.18 per share due to $0.52 per share in net realized and unrealized losses primarily from fair value markdowns driven by spread widening. Management highlighted that nonaccruals remain low, and they expect most of the fair value write-downs to reverse in future quarters, signaling a cautious optimism about the recovery in credit conditions.
What topics did Golub Capital BDC, Inc. cover?
- Fair Value Write-Downs: GBDC faced a small loss of about 1% of NAV due to fair value write-downs, primarily from 'meaningful spread widening'. Management indicated that 'most of this quarter's fair value write-down will reverse in future quarters'.
- Credit Performance: Approximately 89% of GBDC's investment portfolio remains in the highest performing internal rating categories, with nonaccruals at just 1.4%. Management noted that 'performance ratings for GBDC's borrowers not only remain strong, they actually improved modestly quarter-over-quarter'.
- Investment Income Yield: The investment income yield decreased to 9.7% annualized, down 30 basis points sequentially, primarily due to lower SOFR. This reflects the impact of interest rate cuts from late 2025.
- Share Repurchases: GBDC repurchased 2.2 million shares at an average price of $12.43, representing a 16% discount to NAV. This strategy is part of their capital allocation approach amidst a challenging investment environment.
- Future Market Conditions: Management anticipates a shift towards more lender-friendly conditions, with wider spreads expected to benefit future earnings. They noted, 'we're confident that Golub Capital and GBDC are going to be among the winners'.
What were Golub Capital BDC, Inc.'s May 5, 2026 results?
- Adjusted NII: $0.34 (covered the $0.33 distribution, inline with expectations)
- Adjusted Earnings: -$0.18 (due to $0.52 per share in net realized and unrealized losses, below expectations)
- NAV per Share: $14.35 (declined from previous quarter, reflecting fair value markdowns)
- Investment Income Yield: 9.7% (down 30 basis points sequentially, negative trend)
- Nonaccrual Rate: 1.4% (remains low compared to industry peers, positive indicator)
- Debt to Equity Ratio: 1.24x (consistent with prior quarters, within targeted range)
GBDC's recent performance reflects a challenging quarter marked by fair value write-downs and lower income yields. However, the company's strong credit performance and proactive management strategies position it well for potential recovery. Investors should monitor the evolving credit landscape and management's ability to navigate these challenges, particularly regarding dividend sustainability and market conditions.
Earnings Call Speaker Segments
Hi everyone, and thank you for being with us today. On the call with me are Tim Topicz, who serves as our Chief Operating Officer, Rob Tuchscherer, a Senior Managing Director and Officer of GBDC, and Christopher Ericson, our CFO. If you're new to GBDC, here's what our investment strategy centers on: extending first lien senior secured loans to healthy, resilient middle-market businesses that have the backing of strong, partnership-oriented private equity sponsors. Our earnings press release for the fiscal quarter that closed on March 31, 2026 went out yesterday, and an earnings presentation is now posted on our website; we'll be referencing that deck at points during today's call. Today's format will differ from what we usually do. I'll begin with the headlines and some thoughts on what I believe is taking place in private credit, then Tim, Rob, and Chris will take you through our operating and financial results in detail. After that, we'll open up the line for your questions. So, starting with the headlines: GBDC recorded a small loss this quarter, roughly 1% of NAV, driven mainly by mark-to-market fair value write-downs. Adjusted NII per share came in at $0.34 for the quarter, which works out to an annualized adjusted NII return on equity of 9.5%. Non-accruals stayed low, both in absolute terms and when measured against BDC industry peers. And the performance ratings of GBDC's borrowers didn't just hold steady — they actually ticked up modestly quarter over quarter. Let's dig into that first headline. As I mentioned, the loss this quarter came mostly from fair value markdowns. For longtime BDC investors, and as a primer for newer ones: GAAP treatment of a BDC's loan investments differs from GAAP treatment of loans that banks originate. If a bank originates a $100 loan, that asset remains on the bank's balance sheet at $100 no matter what market interest rates do. The bank has a separate impairment reserve it can draw on to cushion possible credit losses. Bank accounting ignores spread movements. BDC accounting captures spread movements. Each accounting period, we mark our loans to fair value. So when spreads widen, we write our loans down — even if they're paying interest right on schedule, and even if we fully expect them to repay at par. This past quarter brought significant spread widening, and that led us to write down fair values even on credits that are performing well. Now, any time we get a quarter with that kind of meaningful spread widening, you'll hear us explain that there's a substantial gap between temporary losses and permanent losses. Realized credit losses are permanent — they never come back. If we're able to steer clear of realized credit losses, the mark-to-market adjustments reverse over time, as borrowers progress toward payoff, as their credit attributes strengthen, or as market spreads tighten. The encouraging part is that, as of now, we believe most of this quarter's fair value write-down will reverse in the quarters ahead. Tim will explain why in a few minutes. Before I hand over the mic, I want to address the bigger picture. That widening in spreads from the quarter we just closed is really just one piece of a bigger macroeconomic story. I want to take a few minutes to walk through what's driving the shifts we're seeing in private credit, what those shifts are doing, and where I believe things are headed next. On several recent earnings calls, we've discussed the headwinds that direct lending is up against. We've discussed base rates coming down roughly 1.5 percentage points since 2022, and we've discussed spreads tightening during that same stretch. The decline in spreads has exceeded 1 percentage point. Add the base rate moves and the spread compression together, and you get 2.5 percentage points to 3 percentage points of drag on returns. We've also discussed credit stress running high and how that shows up in the form of elevated default rates, restructurings happening more often, and greater use of PIK amendments. This past quarter, there's a new headwind we can point to: worries surrounding AI and software. Those four headwinds — base rates coming down, spreads coming down, credit stress running high, and fears about AI — have made a substantial mark. Returns have fallen throughout the public BDC sector, with average returns on equity dropping from roughly 9% across 2023 and 2024 to somewhere between 4% and 5% in the past year, and dispersion has widened considerably as well. In the BDC space, the gap in performance separating top quartile managers from bottom quartile managers has always been wide, yet over the past year it's been especially wide, as top managers saw a modest decline while bottom managers saw a steep one. Then there's the third impact: shareholders have made their views known. Publicly traded BDCs have sold off and now change hands at steep discounts. Redemption requests at non-traded BDCs have surged. Every one of these impacts feeds into one last impact. I'd describe that last impact as the wind changing direction. For years, the market kept tilting further in borrowers' favor; now it's tilting toward lenders instead. This is a fresh trend, and already we're seeing spreads widen and deal terms improve. So what does all this mean? Where do we go from here? Making predictions is something I'm typically quite hesitant about. You've heard me say repeatedly that forecasting has been a difficult business ever since COVID. Based on what I observe today, here are some thoughts on where I believe the market is going. My first prediction is really one I gave last quarter as well. In my view, private credit is having a Darwinian moment. Companies that hold durable competitive advantages, that deliver strong credit performance, and that have long-term capital bases which are well diversified — those companies will adjust and gain share. Companies with weaker credit results or that lean too heavily on retail products — those companies will find things hard. It won't take long before private equity sponsors figure out which credit firms can give them reliable, steady access to attractive financing solutions, and which ones cannot. Everything I've described points to something we flagged twelve months ago: a widening gap between those we term winners and those we term whiners. Here's prediction number two. My expectation is that this stretch of credit pressure will persist for some time. This credit cycle still has room to run. At Golub Capital, we work extremely hard to spot and elevate issues at an early stage, which means we usually get out ahead of the broader market when it comes to identifying and addressing credit problems. What I'm observing, drawing on industry data and, to a smaller degree, on our own portfolio, is that a group of businesses remains that isn't adjusting well to today's economic environment and will ultimately require restructuring — and that restructuring hasn't occurred yet. Now prediction number three. It's my view that market conditions will tilt even further in lenders' favor, particularly should M&A keep rebounding. Capital has departed direct lending, and in certain ways, through ongoing redemptions, it keeps departing. Supply and demand will push spreads wider; those wider spreads will generate near-term losses stemming from the fair value adjustments we referenced earlier. Those same wider spreads will likewise generate medium and long-term gains, thanks to higher earnings on new loans and to the reversal of fair value markdowns taken in prior periods. We have confidence that Golub Capital and GBDC will number among the winners. We hold a very optimistic view of our medium to long-term capacity to deliver premium returns for our investors, in line with our track record of nearly 16 years with GBDC since its public listing; at this point I'll hand the call to Tim, Rob, and Chris so they can walk through operating performance for the quarter in greater detail, and afterward I'll return at the end for questions. Tim.
Appreciate it, David. Moving to slide three, we'll walk through what drove GBDC's adjusted NII of $0.34 per share along with adjusted earnings of -$0.18 per share. Driver number one. Credit quality overall continues to hold up well. Roughly 89% of GBDC's investment portfolio, measured at fair value, still sits within our top internal rating categories. Positions on non-accrual status stayed quite minimal, at only 1.4% of the total investment portfolio at fair value. That figure sits comfortably beneath where GBDC's listed BDC peers average. Driver number two. GBDC's investment income yield came in at 9.7% annualized, a sequential drop of 30 basis points. That decline largely reflected a full quarter's worth of lower SOFR in the wake of the rate cuts made in late 2025. Driver number three. GBDC's borrowing costs fell 20 basis points, landing at 5.2% annualized — among the cheapest borrowing costs across the listed BDC peer group. This drop likewise stemmed from lower SOFR, a counterbalance that underscores one benefit of GBDC's debt capital structure, which is mostly floating rate. Driver number four. GBDC's earnings kept gaining from a gold standard fee structure as well as one of the lightest operating expense loads among listed BDC peers. Last, as David flagged earlier, widening credit spreads accounted for most of the $0.52 per share of net realized and non-realized losses, which produced a loss of $0.18 per share for the quarter. On balance sheet changes and distributions during the quarter, NAV per share fell to $14.35 per share; we closed the quarter at 1.24 x net debt to equity, in line with earlier quarters and inside our target range of 0.85 to 1.25. Average leverage across the quarter was 1.21 x, a slight step down versus prior quarters. Distributions paid during the quarter totaled $0.33 per share. Our board of directors has declared a distribution of $0.33 per share for the third fiscal quarter of 2026. Throughout the quarter, we kept up our opportunistic buybacks of GBDC shares on an accretive basis. The company bought back 2.2 million shares during the quarter at a weighted average price of $12.43 per share, roughly a 16% discount to December 31st, 2025 net asset value; separately, the Golub Capital Rabbi Trust acquired about $19 million, or 1.5 million shares of GBDC, during the quarter to fund incentive compensation awards. Now over to slide seven, where you can see how the earnings drivers I just described fed into GBDC's March 31st, 2026 net asset value per share of $14.35. Adjusted NII of $0.34 fully covered the $0.33 per share base distribution paid out during the quarter. Adjusted net realized and unrealized losses came to $0.52 per share, plus $0.02 per share of net asset value accretion from share repurchases. Combined, these results pushed net asset value per share down to $14.35; let's now break down the $0.51 per share of unrealized losses on slide eight. Investors should keep in mind that unrealized losses aren't all the same. When they stem from credit, they frequently don't reverse. If borrowers meet their obligations, those paper losses gradually unwind as the loans pay down or spreads narrow. One thing worth asking as you make sense of what GBDC reported: what portion of the unrealized loss recorded in the quarter ending March 31st is probably going to turn out to be only temporary? There's no certain way to know until after the fact, but we think it helps to examine how much of that unrealized loss sits within borrowers whose performance is meeting or exceeding what we assumed when we underwrote them; based on what we've seen, losses of that kind tend to come back over time. According to our early review, the large bulk of unrealized losses was tied to borrowers doing at least as well as we had projected when we underwrote them. As you may remember, GBDC's internal performance ratings sort borrowers along these lines; borrowers carrying a rating of four or five, for instance, are delivering in line with or ahead of underwriting expectations, and we anticipate that they will keep performing as expected. Of the $0.51 per share of net unrealized losses recorded this quarter, roughly 70%, which works out to $0.35 per share, originated from borrowers rated four or five. Since those borrowers are doing well, we believe the fair value adjustments booked this quarter were mostly the product of market spreads and will probably unwind over time. To put it another way, were GBDC a bank and not required to record fair value adjustments tied to market spreads, the quarter would have shown a profit. Even so, we don't assume the expected reversal of unrealized losses will simply happen. Our attention is firmly on steering clear of permanent credit impairment and keeping realized credit losses to a minimum. Those who have invested in GBDC for a long time know our approach. Disciplined underwriting, hands-on portfolio monitoring, spotting potential weaknesses early, and stepping in early to resolve those weaknesses. The other 30% of net unrealized losses, amounting to $0.16 per share, came from borrowers rated three or lower. These markdowns capture a combination of market spreads and additional credit deterioration among known troubled credits; indeed, most of the $0.16 per share of unrealized losses involved borrowers that were on non-accrual status as of March 31st, 2026, or portfolio companies that had previously been restructured. I'll hand the call to Rob Tuchscherer now so he can take you through our portfolio in greater detail.
Thank you, Tim. I'll move on now to walk through the investment activity we saw in our 2nd fiscal quarter, and I'll also share a bit more background regarding how the portfolio has performed. Let's go to slide nine. During the 1st calendar quarter of 2026, here at the Golub Capital level, our team closed more than $3.3 billion in new investment commitments. GBDC took part in those new originations only to a limited degree, recording $17.7 million of new investment commitments during the quarter, reflecting slow repayments along with our preference to concentrate on share repurchases that are accretive; we continue to be extremely selective and conservative when underwriting, and we closed on merely 1.9% of the deals we reviewed this quarter, at a weighted average loan-to-value of roughly 42%; roughly 69% of our origination volume came from leaning in on relationships with existing sponsors and incumbencies at portfolio companies, and we extended loans to 10 new borrowers; we keep using our scale to lead transactions, serving as the sole or lead lender on 94% of the deals we did this quarter. Our focus stayed on the core middle market, which we define as borrowers generating annual EBITDA of between $10 million and $100 million, a segment we think still provides better potential for risk-adjusted returns than what the larger end of the market offers. For the originations we made this quarter, the median portfolio company EBITDA came to $76 million. Roughly 57% of the new origination volume in our second fiscal quarter went to support M&A driven transactions, including LBOs and add-on acquisitions, which extends the momentum from last quarter and underscores our capacity to gain from the early indications of a market environment that is more active and driven by M&A. Out of GBDC's $18 million of new investment commitments this quarter, 98% sat in senior secured debt investments. The total weighted average rate on new investments was 8.8%, and that figure included a weighted average spread of 4.9%. Let's turn to slide 11. At March 31st, 2026, GBDC's portfolio of $8.3 billion stays well-diversified, spanning 420 separate borrowers. The count of portfolio companies held by GBDC has grown by almost 26% across the last three years, which strengthens our diversification even further. Our small position sizes also show how granular the portfolio is. On average, every one of our investments accounts for under 0.2% of the portfolio overall, and the top 10 investments we hold make up only 13% of the portfolio overall, a concentration level that comes in at under half the average among our listed BDC peers. GBDC's portfolio also enjoys strong diversification across industry subsectors, with 52 distinct subsectors included. At fair value, software portfolio companies account for about 26% of GBDC's portfolio. Before I turn to credit quality, I'd like to say more about our software portfolio, given the recent investor interest in how AI might cause disruption. Before getting into the details, let me remind everyone what shapes our perspective; put simply, at Golub Capital we are specialists when it comes to software investing. Our history of investing in software companies stretches back a long way, over 20 years. Across that span, we have finished more than 1,000 software deals, amounting to over $90 billion in commitments. We've proven ourselves in this space too. Across that 20-year stretch, our yearly default rate has come in at only 0.05%, which works out to 5 basis points. On top of that, we have an excellent team — 25 investment professionals devoted solely to this, bringing more than 230 years of combined experience navigating various credit and technology cycles. Our underwriting method is well honed, built on a belief we've held for a long time: the software companies with the strongest credit profiles tend to be the dominant names within a particular niche. Such winners usually deliver platforms that are critical to the enterprise, featuring workflows that are sticky and deeply embedded, lengthy implementation periods, and substantial costs to switch. Starting in 2023, we added a structured approach for evaluating AI risk borrower by borrower, applied to every new software deal as well as throughout our existing software holdings. This approach looks at possible AI risk at the levels of both product and end market; our view remains that AI risk differs from one software company and subsector to another, so it must be assessed borrower by borrower, case by case. Last, 95% of what we've invested in software sits in first lien senior secured loans, backed by a substantial equity cushion. Often, we're lending at a 35% loan-to-value, meaning the borrower's enterprise value would need to fall by 65% before a senior debt position would even start to be impaired. Turning to slide 12, you'll see that among our current software holdings, which make up roughly 26% of GBDC's portfolio, 95% of the software investments fall into internal performance ratings categories four and five — our highest rated categories. The performance ratings across our software portfolio stack up well against the overall GBDC portfolio. This quarter, we re-underwrote our software portfolio and introduced a new metric: degree of AI disruption risk. From our analysis, we've determined that just 8% of the software portfolio faces an elevated level of AI disruption risk. We intend to keep tracking AI disruption risk in the quarters ahead and to report our findings; on slide 13, you'll notice non-accruals ticked up slightly QoQ, reaching 140 basis points of total investments at fair value, though they remain quite low both in absolute terms and when compared with the wider listed BDC sector. Non-accrual investments grew to 19 during the quarter, as five portfolio company investments were added. By and large, the financial condition of our portfolio companies stayed solid. Our portfolio's average interest coverage ratio rose QoQ to 1.8 x. Average leverage across the portfolio also held up well, dropping roughly 0.25 turns of debt to EBITDA compared with year-end 2024. Beyond that, sound enterprise values keep supporting our loan positions, with loan-to-value ratios holding steady at about 45%. Slide 14 illustrates how internal performance ratings have trended across the whole of GBDC's portfolio. As Tim mentioned previously, close to 90% of the total investment portfolio stayed within our top two internal performance ratings categories. Investments that carry a rating of three — meaning a borrower could potentially, or is anticipated to, perform worse than expected — fell quarter over quarter to 8.7%. Meanwhile, the share of loans with ratings of one and two, the ones we view as most likely to experience meaningful credit impairment, stayed extremely small, at only 2.2% of the portfolio measured at fair value. At this point I'll hand things over to Chris, who will walk us through our financial results in greater detail.
Appreciate it, Rob. Now I'll go over how GBDC performed and what its liability structure looks like for the second fiscal quarter of 2026. To begin with performance: the economic analysis shown on slide 15 points out what drove GBDC's net investment spread of 4.5%. Let's go through that slide piece by piece. We begin with the dark blue line, representing our investment income yield. As a reminder, amortization of fees and discounts is part of that investment income yield. On a sequential basis, GBDC's investment income yield dropped roughly 30 basis points to 9.7% annualized, mainly a reflection of the full quarter effect from the rate cuts that occurred in the fourth calendar quarter of 2025. Our cost of debt, shown as the teal line, came down by about 20 basis points to 5.2%, which reflects a funding structure where roughly 80% of our debt is floating rate. All told, GBDC's weighted average net investment spread, the gold line, edged lower. Now to the balance sheet on slide 18. We closed the quarter with total portfolio investments at fair value exceeding $8.3 billion, $4.7 billion of outstanding debt, and $3.7 billion of total net assets. At quarter end, net debt to equity leverage stood at 1.24 x, roughly unchanged from the previous quarter, reflecting lower average investments outstanding during the quarter, partly offset by fair value markdowns and share repurchase activity. Now for GBDC's liquidity on slide 21. Broadly speaking, our liquidity position is still solid, and we finished the quarter with about $1.4 billion of liquidity consisting of unrestricted cash, undrawn commitments on our corporate revolver, and the unsecured revolver our advisor provides. Our debt funding structure, which slide 22 highlights, is still quite diversified and flexible. At 5.2% annualized, our weighted average borrowing cost remains low — something we consider among the lowest across our listed BDC peer group — and it rests on a differentiated investment grade ratings profile. In line with our asset liability matching principle, 80% of GBDC's total debt funding carries a floating rate or has been swapped to one, which leaves us well positioned to keep modulating how lower interest rates affect investment income by offsetting them with reduced interest expense on our borrowings. Unsecured notes make up 51% of our debt funding, spread across a well-laddered maturity profile. Our next unsecured note maturity comes in August 2026; we keep assessing new issue pricing levels in the unsecured debt market. Crucially, we have the necessary liquidity available under our revolving credit facility and the balance sheet flexibility to reduce refinancing risk tied to these maturing bonds. With that, operator, please open the line for questions.
Good morning, and thanks for the chance to ask. I've just got one about the software loans in the portfolio. You mentioned the new AI risk framework, and I believe roughly 8% of investments were flagged as at risk there. Could you expand a bit on what traits those investments share, what they have in common, and what kind of mitigation might be carried out down the road on investments of that type? Thanks.
Sure, thanks Ken. I'll kick things off, and Rob, perhaps you can chime in after I finish. For background, we began lending to software when virtually no other lenders were doing so. Being a lender in this space at a contrarian moment isn't something that makes us uneasy. In certain respects, all the chatter you're hearing today regarding software risks actually benefits us, since we grasp the distinction between strong software credits and weak ones, and it translates into reduced competition. What we observe in the market currently is that numerous peer lenders who'd begun moving into software lending over the past few years now want to tell their shareholders how they're cutting back their software exposure. They're simply not taking part in marketplace opportunities for new loans. That's just a bit of background. The exercise Rob described entailed examining our portfolio through the lens of how much AI disruption risk it carries. He accurately noted that 8% of the approximately 25% of our portfolio that sits in software — so roughly 2% of our portfolio overall — falls into a category of elevated AI risk; that doesn't mean we expect to lose money on those loans. They might carry low leverage. They might be close to maturity. Plenty of other factors feed into whether we'll see elevated credit loss risk on these loans; this rating system matters a great deal both for assessing new loans and for helping us determine, from a monitoring standpoint, what our objectives with those borrowers ought to be. For instance, it would be sensible to conclude that when elevated AI disruption risk shows up, we'll want to shrink exposure, or we'll want to be compensated for the exposure we hold. We might raise pricing. We might boost equity cushions. We might take other measures that lower risk. Which sorts of companies land in this category? The biggest pieces of the category are companies providing tools that let others who write code do it more effectively. Historically, this has been a major software company category. It isn't one we've traditionally been drawn to, but we do hold a couple of exposures that belong here. I'd call that the largest component of the group. Rob, should you wish to elaborate further, go right ahead.
Yes. Thank you, David. To expand on the points David made regarding the various characteristics, as I noted in my comments, our approach examines this on two distinct planes. The first is from the product angle, and the second is from the perspective of the end user. When you consider the small number of companies that fall into the category we'd label as carrying elevated danger of AI-related upheaval, David brought up a single product type, namely development tools. Another example would be something tied more heavily to generating content. A company like Pluralsight, which all of us know quite well. Turning to the end market angle, there are enterprises serving end markets that might not be experiencing workforce cuts at present yet could face them down the road. Take, for instance, contact center or call center style operations — those are the kind we'd be watching with greater attention. Once more, this is truly a metric oriented toward what lies ahead, since the portfolio's results have stayed quite robust. From where we sit, as I said, we will keep tracking the threat of AI disruption, carry this evaluation forward, and share what we find over the next several quarters.
Excellent. That's really useful. If I could, one more question regarding how we're deploying capital. I noticed that during the quarter you bought back a portion of shares. As you look ahead, would you rather focus more on buybacks instead of putting money into new investments? Thank you.
My sense is that we will keep assessing the optimal methods for deploying our capital. Providing an absolute answer to what you're asking isn't easy. We need to consider the opportunities available to us, and share buybacks are part of that. New investment possibilities are part of that too. So is, you know, operating inside the leverage targets we've set. A lot of elements factor into this.
Excellent. That was quite useful. I appreciate it once more.
Hi, everyone. Thank you for fielding the question. Kenneth addressed a few of the things I was going to ask, but perhaps just one thing for David. In the comments you made at the start, you mentioned that, according to industry data you've been reviewing, there may be a group of businesses throughout the sector — portfolio companies throughout the sector, borrowers — that truly aren't adjusting well to the current economic environment. I suppose I'm just wondering what your assessment is of the reason these businesses either haven't adjusted or haven't managed to adjust. Is it tied to capital structure? Is it tied to something about the underlying business, the sector they operate in? Any common patterns you're able to identify concerning those businesses would be useful.
Absolutely. To begin, let's discuss a few of the signals we're observing that point to heightened credit stress. It shows up in Fitch default data. It shows up in how occupied restructuring advisors and restructuring lawyers are. It shows up in the volume of PIK amendments being processed. It shows up in the broadly syndicated market, in the share of that market trading under 85. There's a wide range of data points that I believe are apparent and that demonstrate we're in a stretch of somewhat heightened credit stress. During certain earlier stretches similar to this one, that heightened credit stress was clustered within one industry. Consider, for example, the fiber telecom crisis from the early 2000s. At present, we don't truly observe that. It isn't concentrated in a single industry. There are, however, certain red threads — recurring themes. The first recurring theme that gets discussed is the K-shaped recovery — businesses aimed at the lower-end consumer. The lower-end consumer is financially squeezed at present. It shows up in subprime auto data, subprime credit card data. Given the recent rises in gas prices, my expectation is that this will deteriorate further. A second red thread involves businesses that benefit when people sell their home and relocate to another home. The pace of relocating is extremely low at present, because people are locked in by low interest rate mortgages they obtained before interest rates climbed. If you're in the furniture business, the home decor business, or the HVAC business, all of these are tied to a substantial degree to relocations. Those have been experiencing some pressure. A third red thread involves certain situations where we've observed shifts in consumer behavior. During COVID, there was a very substantial rise in interest in buying across virtually all outdoor sports: hiking, fishing, hunting, boating, bicycling. A number of those categories have experienced reduced spending levels in the stretch since then, and it didn't really return to the prior normal. The level has dropped beneath what we used to see as typical. Those illustrate the point. Certain situations, I would argue, tie more directly to the private equity world. You had businesses carrying too much debt, acquired at extremely steep multiples, with excessive leverage during the 2021 and early 2022 peak LBO boom; in certain instances, from a capital structure perspective, those businesses were never built to withstand a +5% move in interest rates. My view is this isn't a single driver, Ethan. My view is that multiple distinct themes are visible in today's market. I believe that's part of why the current credit cycle is stretched out to an unusual degree. It isn't a case where only one sector must undergo restructuring. A great many businesses across many sectors have to do that.
Understood. Appreciate the breakdown.
Hello there, folks. I said I wouldn't revisit software, yet here I am doing exactly that. Could you share some insight into the growth trends? What I have in mind is something like net revenue retention, whether that's recurring revenue or comparable-store sales type measures. When I examine the Altman figures you release — which, as I understand it, represent a data set spanning the whole platform — there's clearly been a deceleration in software expansion. Sure, it's still expanding across the past few quarters. How much does that actually relate to the holdings inside the BDC, and might you offer any detail on metrics showing how those holdings perform, compared with, once more, the picture the Altman figures suggest?
Thanks, Robert. For anyone who doesn't know the reference Robert is making, each quarter we put out an index known as the Golub Capital Altman Index. It examines revenue and EBITDA expansion during the initial two months of every quarter, and we can break those figures out for certain industry sectors where we have enough companies for the statistics to carry meaning. Robert has it right — looking at the information across, I'd say, the past six quarters, the encouraging part is that we keep observing expansion throughout the U.S. economy in general and throughout the software sector, with both top-line and profit growth. What we're noticing is a deceleration in both revenue and earnings expansion. What's interesting is that this deceleration isn't confined to software — it's widespread, spanning many industries. One of the more resilient industry segments we've observed happens to be software. There's no bias, Robert, such that the software businesses in the index differ materially from those held in the GBDC portfolio. Anywhere we have figures, we present them. My read of the figures is that the software sector is still in good shape, that currently you aren't witnessing AI devour the software sector. What you are witnessing throughout the whole U.S. economy is a modest deceleration in expansion.
Understood. Thanks. Turning to what we might expect for origination. A sort of market recap — Q1 was a bit slower. Once Q2 got going, things began to pick up, though hardly like a rocket ship. How do you see it playing out — I mean, all of those factors were pent up, PE exits, and so on. Those all remain in place, but that doesn't guarantee they occur this year. I mean, what's your take on how that might trend? We've been through a stretch of volatility. Sometimes recovering from that takes a while. Spreads are wider, and so forth. I mean, what's your sense of how — and this is a crystal ball moment — the remainder of the year might unfold when it comes to activity and broader market trends?
Yeah. So far today we haven't discussed a certain elephant in the room, namely the oil markets and what's happening in the Straits of Hormuz. Relative to your question, I believe that's a very large factor. To forecast where M&A trends go, you almost have to make an assumption regarding the Straits. Under one scenario, we get a near-term resolution, oil prices come down. Going forward, there's reasonable predictability about energy prices. That scenario, I think, points to significant momentum and recovery in M&A. Under the other scenario — continued uncertainty, not lack of clarity, higher oil prices, you know, growing shortages in parts of the world of, you know, jet fuel and fertilizer and petrochemicals — I think that points to a prolonged stretch of relatively impaired M&A activity, because uncertainty is not the friend of deals. You can have bad news and still have deals, but uncertainty is very challenging for deals. Robert, I'm not sure which of those two paths we're gonna see. I'm hopeful that we'll see some resolution, and that we'll be in the first of those two scenarios. Right now, I don't think anybody can be certain which of those is gonna transpire.
Understood. Thanks. This is a fairly speculative thing to ask, so I'm grateful. Goodbye.
Hello, everyone. Might you address whether the dividend can be maintained after the reduction made in the prior year? Coverage of the dividend is reduced compared with, roughly speaking — that was approximately a pro forma figure in the previous quarter. Compared with the current situation, particularly given conditions featuring ambiguity in the Middle East, along with credit normalization, which might weigh on earnings across upcoming quarters.
Excellent question. You give background once more. A dividend reduction was completed by us not long ago, and determining the appropriate amount proved difficult owing to ambiguity regarding base rates, ambiguity regarding spreads, ambiguity regarding credit. Numerous distinct elements affect earnings power. My view is that the level we reached was a solid one. My view is that if you examine our NII per share for the most recent quarter, it demonstrates the earnings power of the company as it stands now. My view is that we discussed on the call multiple distinct routes to raising that earnings power, among them wider spreads and among them, you know, gains, both realized and unrealized gains. This is something we will have to keep monitoring and examining and ensure that we keep placing our dividend appropriately as a floating rate loan fund. We must react to the market.
Alright, thanks. Perhaps I overlooked this during the opening remarks, but might you offer additional detail regarding what drove the rise in PIK? Within that total, roughly what portion of PIK stemmed from your standard PIK as intended versus PIK from amendments?
That wasn't something we included in what we said today, as far as I recall. Honestly, I can't recall precisely what the Q contains on this point. I'd like to request that we get back to you once we've gone through what has been disclosed, and then we can pass that along to you.
Okay, that's reasonable. Fine. Thanks.
David, Derek, this is Tim. Let me just chime in on that and say that, broadly, most of the PIK interest we have relates to borrowers where, when we underwrote the deal, we built a PIK toggle into the credit agreement — not PIK amendments meant to help portfolio companies from a community standpoint. That covers the bulk of it. Compared with the previous quarter, PIK interest income did rise this quarter. The main reason was a single portfolio company that chose to toggle a larger amount of PIK interest this quarter than it had the quarter before. I hope that clarifies things a bit more.
Yes, thank you, I appreciate the color.
Good afternoon, and thanks for fielding my questions. Let me return to software and ask one or two things there. I'm curious how you go about handling any kind of software restructuring, or talks on that subject, with the software company given the current climate. My sense is that most of those businesses would rather steer clear of insolvency, or anything signaling a possible restructuring — and certainly of bankruptcy — because of worries about, obviously, keeping clients. I'd guess you might be getting involved a bit sooner than you typically would. So I'm wondering: is it mostly just a routine check-in with most of these companies, or are you inclined to be somewhat more aggressive about taking action earlier in today's environment?
Once more, I'll offer a few thoughts on that, and then I'll turn it over to Rob, who has led our software underwriting work for years, so he can weigh in too. Our method never changes. You need to spot issues quickly. When issues are spotted quickly, we as lenders, as sponsors, and the management teams have more choices available to fix them. We strongly believe in not hiding problems, and instead in raising them and talking them through right away. That holds for software, and it holds for other sectors too. With software, we also keep very close communication with our sponsor clients and with our management teams. As we see it, when it comes to portfolio companies, we have two sets of partners: the sponsor and the management team. At times one matters more, at times the other does. This isn't an asset class where you write a loan, stick the document in a drawer, and pray. That won't work as a way to run a direct lending program. We do the exact reverse; we put in a lot of effort to engage with our sponsor clients and our portfolio companies, supporting them in good times and in bad. Rob?
Honestly, there isn't a great deal for me to contribute here. I'd say you're right that our approach to managing the portfolio is quite systematic, and it reaches across each of the four verticals we operate in. When it comes to how we go about things or the way we approach them, I don't see a meaningful distinction. Another thing worth noting in circumstances like these, I believe, is that while it's always a matter of striking a balance, since 95% of the software holdings in our portfolio sit in first lien senior secured loans and are thoroughly diversified, we walk into these conversations feeling fairly confident about our place in the capital structure and where we stand. That, I think, serves us well when we're engaged in these talks with sponsors, whether someone is requesting an amendment or there's a certain amount of underperformance.
Understood. Thanks for that. This is quite useful. Just one question at a broader level. I mean, when it comes to market activity, where has that sort of moved to given these conditions? I mean, does the market still exist for things like sizable buyouts, you know, the bigger unitranche deals, financings of acquisitions at $1 billion+? Or has it become somewhat more resistant at present to larger transaction sizes, and you're observing perhaps more activity somewhat lower down in the market? That's it from me. Thanks.
I believe we're observing activity spanning the size spectrum, I don't believe it's confined to either small or large only. I, you know, I think that when it comes to assembling a, a bigger set of lenders keen on a specific transaction, it's tougher in software at the moment. In certain ways, it's tougher for extremely big deals since some of the bite sizes of certain participants in the market who have interest in the large market, those bite sizes have declined amid slower subscriptions and redemptions in the non-traded space.
Understood. And then I suppose, if you'll allow me to squeeze in one final item on this subject, just one last thing. Regarding the strain coming from redemptions along with what you just brought up — has that had any effect on the market in any manner from certain of your more typical rivals, like the commitment sizes you referenced, or the way pricing works, you know?
Well, I believe all of us operate in a world where supply and demand rule. Right now there's a reduced amount of capital out there seeking new investments; that could be the single largest element driving what I called in my prepared remarks a change in the direction the wind is blowing, which has pushed the market away from favoring borrowers and toward favoring lenders instead.
Thanks. I just wanted to say I appreciate all of you for tuning in this morning and for asking your questions. As usual, if there's something you're curious about that we didn't get to, or didn't get to as thoroughly as you'd like, don't hesitate to get in touch. I'm looking forward to speaking with everyone again in 3 months.
This concludes today's conference call. Thank you for joining. You may now disconnect.
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