Frontline plc (FRO) Earnings Call Transcript
November 21, 2025
Earnings Call Speaker Segments
Thank you so much. Everyone, I appreciate you joining Frontline's quarterly earnings call. You can really see how people across Frontline—and honestly throughout the tanker business as a whole—have a lively bounce in their step at the moment; we've said before that this market is in our debt, and at last we've begun gathering part of what's owed. I'll do my best not to curse things by putting everything in capital letters, yet saying we're genuinely thrilled about the market shifts that began showing up in Q3 would be putting it mildly. Prior to handing things over to Inger, I'll walk you through our TC figures on slide 3 of the presentation; during Q3 of 2024, Frontline earned $34,300 each day across our VLCC fleet, $35,100 each day across our Suezmax fleet, and $31,400 each day across our LR2 / Aframax fleet; thus far, in Q3 of 2025, we've secured 75% of VLCC days at $83,300 each day, 75% of Suezmax days at $60,600 each day, and 51% of LR2 / Aframax days at $42,200 each day. Once more, every figure shown in this table reflects a load-to-discharge basis, which brings with it ballast days toward the close of the quarter. What that means is that even though we keep securing remarkable freight rates daily, whether the cargo gets loaded prior to New Year's Eve determines if we can count that revenue in Q4. Now I'll hand it to Inger, who will cover the financial highlights.
Thanks for that, Lars. Hello, everybody, and good morning or good afternoon, depending on where you're joining us from. If we turn to slide four, the income statement, I'll walk through a handful of key points. For Q3, our reported earnings came in at $40.3 million, or $0.18 per share, and on an adjusted basis we saw $42.5 million, which works out to $0.19 per share. Looking at it quarter over quarter, adjusted earnings for Q3 were down $37.8 million, and what drove that was mainly a decline in time charter earnings, which went from $283 million last quarter to $248 million this quarter. The reasons behind that were softer TCE rates, together with movements in other income and expenses. Moving on to what it costs to run the ships: those went up by $3.1 million compared with the quarter before. Two things drove that — a $2.5 million drop in the supply rate, plus $1.1 million in costs related to changing ship management for seven LR2 tankers. Partly canceling that out was a $0.5 million decrease in general running costs. On the administrative side, if you set aside the synthetic option revaluation loss — $5.7 million this quarter and $1.7 million in the prior one — the figure came in $0.2 million lower than the previous quarter. Let's now turn to the balance sheets, which you'll find on slide five. What changed on the balance sheet this quarter was largely routine, along with the disposal of a single Suezmax tanker and early repayment of debt drawn under revolving reducing credit facilities. Frontline maintains a solid balance sheet and strong liquidity of $819 million in cash and cash equivalent, which includes undrawn amounts of revolving capacity, marketable securities, and minimum cash requirements bank as of September 30th, 2025; we face no meaningful debt maturities until 2030 and have no new building commitments. Now let's go to slide six, covering the fleet composition, cash-based breakeven rates, and OpEx. Our fleet is made up of 41 VLCCs, 21 Suezmax tankers, and 18 LR2 tankers. Its average age is seven years, and it is 100% ECO vessels, of which 56% are scrubber-fitted. Back in September 2025, we took seven credit facilities we already had — those carried term loan balances outstanding that added up to $405.5 million, plus $87.8 million in undrawn revolver capacity — and turned them into revolving reducing credit facilities worth as much as $493.4 million. Then, across September, October, and November 2025, we paid down $374.2 million in total. That brings our fleet's average cash-based even rate down by roughly $1,300 each day over the coming year. Looking ahead at those next 12 months, we figure average cash-based even rates will land near $26,000 per day for VLCCs, $23,300 per day for Suezmax tankers, and $23,600 per day for LR2 tankers, putting the fleet-wide average at approximately $24,700 per day. The figure takes into account dry-dock expenses tied to fourteen VLCCs, two Suezmax tankers, and ten LR2 tankers. When dry-dock costs are excluded, we project a fleet-wide average of about $23,100, which represents a reduction of $1,600 each day. During the third quarter, the OpEx we reported, dry-dock included, came to $9,000 daily for VLCCs, $8,100 daily for Suezmax tankers, and $9,100 daily for LR2 tankers. Those amounts reflect dry-dock work on a single VLCC along with the finishing of dry-dock for one Suezmax tanker that had its dry-dock wrapped up in the second quarter. Back in Q3 '24, the average OpEx figure excluding dry-dock was $8,500 per day. Let's move on to slide seven, which covers cash generation. Frontline has substantial capacity to produce cash, given its 30,000 earnings days annually. This slide illustrates what we could generate in cash, using exchange rates and tanker earnings benchmarks — TD3C for VLCCs, TD20 for Suezmaxes, and the TD25/TC1 combination for Aframax LR2s, all taken from the Baltic Exchange on November 18, 2024 — and that figure comes to $1.8 billion, which works out to $8.15 per share, translating into a 33% cash flow yield at today's stock price. If spot rates were to improve by 30% over current levels, the cash we could potentially produce would reach $2.6 billion, equivalent to $11.53 per share. I'll now turn it over to Lars.
Thanks, Inger. Moving on to slide eight, let's examine the current state of our markets. A lot of you have observed that oil in transit has turned into a fairly mainstream metric for investors who concentrate on shipping. It's sitting at record highs right now. This is occurring while export volumes rise, particularly from the Americas, or across the Atlantic Basin, and we're seeing a favorable trend in the way oil gets traded. Policy shapes behavior, and it has unlocked the arbitrage connecting the Atlantic Basin with Asia. The reversals of OPEC's voluntary production cuts are beginning to show up as genuine gains in export volumes. For October, compared with a year earlier, we're up 1.2 million — 1.3 million barrels per day, when you look at Middle Eastern producers and leave Iran out. Logistical difficulties are mounting around trading sanctioned export oil, and this got further intensified once Lukoil and Rosneft were sanctioned; we have a situation where very strong refinery margin conditions are backing refinery screw drums; so the question becomes, when will we see this perform? Resale asset values are beginning to mirror the jump in freight rates, since tanker order books are close to full all the way through 2028. Let's turn to slide nine. The heading reads, "The Arb is Back." How India in particular, and China too, behaves is producing greater demand for compliant crudes, above all in the Middle East. That pushes up the crude price level for local Middle Eastern crudes, which causes Atlantic Basin grades to price their way into Asia. Ever since 2022 and Russia's invasion of Ukraine, the long-haul trade has been hurting. We've watched Russian oil capture Asian market share while Europe leans more heavily on Atlantic Basin barrels. This appears set to reverse somewhat and might prove a sustainable trend ahead, meaning we're returning to the old-school tanker market in which the VLCC, thanks to its economies of scale, leads the pack; this shift toward a VLCC-centric trade pattern has also been fueled by very strong export figures from Brazil, our new producer Guyana, Canada via the TMX pipeline, and more recently the U.S. as well. The incremental barrel reaching the market today is compliant oil, and compliant oil requires compliant vessels. That means vessels that aren't sanctioned and are mostly under 20 years old. Should this supply trend persist on the oil side, we'll probably witness a sustained contango structure taking shape in the oil market. That would mean inventory builds. Inventories are low across most regions of the world; it's unlikely to mean floating storage given the financing cost, which is far higher today than during the last cycle. We had this effect on the market, but there's an equally intriguing trading pattern that could emerge, and it's known as time. When you're able to load a barrel in the U.S. and sell it two months later in Asia, you effectively get a tailwind on that trade because the price of crude rises over time. Now we go to slide 10. This next topic concerns how the fleet evolves on a net basis, and it's something I end up discussing repeatedly with investors whenever we're on the road presenting the company. Our recycling and scrapping activity is essentially nil, yet our order book is quite sizeable — not frighteningly so, but more vessels are still on the way, and that backlog keeps getting bigger. So we've attempted to lay out a few scenarios here purely to show why our view of this market is so positive. The order book keeps expanding, largely because so little modern tonnage is actually available for purchase on the water. What that really tells you is this: a shipowner or an investor looking to acquire a vessel is best off heading to the yard, and they don't lose out by forgoing freight income, even if delivery takes 18 to 24 months. That dynamic, however, appears to be shifting. With spot rates capable of delivering $5 million — $6 million to the bottom line on a 50-day voyage, you begin asking yourself whether to tap the resale market for a ship you can fix in the next cycle, or instead place a yard order that won't arrive for more than 24 months. As a result, owners can now begin paying up for a resale, and doing so makes economical sense provided these rates persist for some time. The pattern continues whereby other asset classes fill up the yards' order books. Only limited capacity now remains in 2028. Consider the age profile across the global tanker market as a whole — this is really the core fundamental underpinning, at least in our view, of how this tanker market will evolve going forward, or, to repeat what I've said before, the revenge of the old economy stemming from underinvestment in tanker tonnage in particular over a lengthy stretch of time — we now face a situation in which, each year, a fresh batch of ships crosses that magical age threshold we set at 20 years. Take the VLCC chart in the upper right-hand corner; to illustrate our thinking, assuming absolutely no scrapping, no vessels vanishing into the dark, and essentially every newbuild delivered on top of the fleet that exists today, we'd see fleet growth of roughly 15% heading toward 2029, sorry. Yet assuming VLCCs at least cease trading effectively once they reach 2022, that growth comes to just 3.4% through 2029. However, the scenario that is likelier in practice is this: VLCCs get demolished, begin carrying oil under sanctions, or for various other reasons cease being productive members of the fleet once they hit 20 years. That would produce a shrinking fleet even with the order book as it stands — a decline of 2% as we head toward 2029. The remaining charts more or less tell the same story. This, I'd say, is essentially the central reason we think the market before us still has legs. Turning to slide 11, order books — and yes, I've said this many times before. Across the asset classes we're exposed to, the order book equals 16.5% of the fleet as it exists today, with 19 above 20 years. Set the cutoff at 15 years and 44.3% of that fleet sits above 15, while 21.6% of it is sanctioned by either — or OFAC, U.K., AU, and so forth; we also hold the record for the oldest average age in the tanker fleet for more than 20 years. So on to slide 12, the summary, which I've titled old-school bull market, because certain features of this market — and I've spent a long time in it, having actually been present during the stretch from 2002 until 2008 — look familiar from that era, when real trading happened between a sharker and an owner, brokers genuinely had to put in the work to locate the right vessels, and cargoes struggled to attract offers. That gives us high utilization, robust oil exports, and a favorable shift in trade rates. As I've walked through, growth in the compliant tanker fleet is limited — and by compliant I include under 20 years — plus the sanctioned trade pulls in additional tonnage because of logistical difficulties. The age profile overall matters most, as I just said, and notwithstanding those swollen order books, effective fleet growth stays subdued. Refining margins are solid, and the winter market has in fact already begun. Globally on S&E, we could be entering an extended stretch of oversupply, which might generate intriguing trading developments — first for oil, and then for shipping. And rest assured, Frontline stands ready to deliver shareholder returns through our efficient office float fleet. Many thanks — now we'll take questions.
Thanks. Good afternoon. Lars, regarding the final thing you mentioned about shareholder returns from outside, and connecting that with the financing update you gave us today, I completely get it. My view is that the dividend policy is going to stay just as solid as it has been from the beginning of 2024, yet is a new period upon us in which you're also focused on bringing down leverage on the balance sheet? It's obvious the market is strong enough for dividends to remain robust, but at the same time you're producing sufficient cash to reduce debt, and over the past 3 months you've already done a fair amount of that. So is this a new Frontline we're seeing, one where the balance sheet gets as strong as those of some of your publicly traded peers, all without breaking your dividend policy?
No. Our approach differs from that of our competitors. Working with LTVs that are fairly low like these isn't something we're especially at ease with. I believe this stems from our reluctance to put money into this market, and I touched on the reasons for that briefly during the presentation. Resale values have been climbing, meaning they've moved above where the market sits. Given how much we want our assets to produce cash as fast as possible, we've held back from extending things far into the future, committing CapEx to assets that won't arrive for a year or 2 years; and that's essentially where we ended up, plus term chart rates haven't truly supported this either. So really, simply through being rather cautious in our financial analysis, we haven't been willing to make any large-scale moves since completing the Euro now transaction. I'd say that's largely what caused it, or that's the bigger explanation for why we're in this situation, as opposed to us deliberately attempting to shrink our debt.
Alright, and as a quick follow-up, I'd like to challenge things a bit regarding slide 10, and then give you a chance to challenge me back. Given the rate outlook you just presented on the earlier slides, I believe the idea of scrapping vessels at 22 years and at 20 years is somewhat misleading. What I mean is, when people are earning that much money, they don't scrap ships. So perhaps you could walk us through how those vessels end up being less efficient, or not fully utilized, and yet still exit the net fleet supply without actually being scrapped? Because if investors are expecting to see large scrapping volumes in the years ahead with rates as strong as you believe they are, and I happen to agree, they might end up disappointed. So in what way do those ships become less efficient and still contribute to utilization without real scrapping?
Alright, so, you know, I'd actually intended to push back on that. No, what it really comes down to is that the reason breaking up or reprocessing—to phrase it more kindly—hasn't taken place is that these vessels serve a second function, correct? And years ago, that second function could have been turning them into floating storage or production facilities. There could have been alternatives—floating tanks, that sort of thing. But the second function that has been around since 2019 or 18, 19 onward is moving sanctioned crude; and obviously that has paid owners who are willing to participate in this business a great deal of money. The thing is, we work around the compliant markets, and we bind ourselves to the compliant oil market; and inside that compliant oil market, whether you're Exxon, whether you're Shell, Glencore, or whoever else you happen to be, you're trading on the margin. If you trade on the margin and you're trying to insure 2 million barrels of oil on a vessel over 20 years old, the price of that insurance will be so steep that you'll struggle to make ends meet. So that means, and it also limits your optionality concerning how you can trade that oil, because you'll be compelled to remove roughly 80% of the terminals that just have a blanket ban on ships older than 20 years of age. So effectively, and we truly witness this, you don't really need to verify which vessels are sanctioned by OFAC. You can just draw a line at 20 years. The vessels on the Suezmax and the VLCC side that go beyond 20 years and aren't sanctioned, you can literally count on one hand. And we truly observe a big efficiency loss in the tanker space once the ship reaches 18 years. And I think the bit of proof in the pudding here is that the compliant oil market has actually had a dreadful development in volume over a sustained period of time, yet we've still had poor rates, but we haven't had car crash kind of rates. And this is basically because ships become less tradable, less efficient, limited use, actually starting from the year from when they turn 17 and a half years. So it's possible that we'll get a wall of scrapping, but I really don't believe that's going to happen. I think the alternative use is going to remain for a long time, unless, of course, the sanctions are lifted all around. But now we also have another problem here, which is that a sanctioned vessel isn't easily recycled because the recycling industry is actually a real business, and they access financing, and they deal in many ways in dollars. You're correct that vessels can often keep operating beyond the typical 20-year limit when they serve a particular niche. Take India, for instance. If a vessel is registered under India’s flag and committed to serving one refinery there, then you control every part of the value chain for that crude movement, which means the ship can continue operating until it reaches 25 years old. That said, the only job it would be permitted to perform is bringing feedstock into an Indian refinery. Even then, this accounts for only a small portion of the total market, and Indian refiners recognize they can’t absorb excessive exposure in that area, because you basically have no other option but to keep sailing that same Middle East-to-India round trip — a limitation that has persisted for 17.5 years.
Great. Thanks for the answers.
Hi there, good afternoon, and thank you for fielding my questions. Lars, to begin, perhaps I could piggyback on what you were saying regarding that sanctioned tonnage — India and China, as you noted, are now taking on additional compliant barrels. That leaves a greater number of non-compliant ships potentially with fewer jobs, so I'd like to hear your view on what's currently unfolding with the dark fleet amid this reduced employment, and whether the picture might look different over the coming 6 to 12 months.
Yes. Actually, for a change, we're seeing a growing number of ships simply lying at anchor, unmanned, with the keys still sitting in the ignition. These represent the earliest generation of sanctioned tonnage that emerged from Iran and Venezuela roughly five, six years back. With those, you'll likely never manage to establish who the owner was. Then there's the middle category, and in fact there are efforts — including commercial ones — underway in which you can essentially purchase sanctioned ships, though a license is required, and the key license comes from the U.S. There's genuinely some movement on that front at present, although given that the federal government in the U.S. shut down for a period recently, things haven't run especially smoothly over the past couple of months. Still, talks continue about whether a mechanism could be established whereby, in exchange for a fine, you'd gain access to the recycling market — and to that market only. I believe that might work as a way forward. On one hand, local authorities truly need to step in to prevent environmental harm from those ships abandoned with keys in them, and on the other, an expanding business could develop around this licensed yet also fined recycling activity. After all, if you're buying a sanctioned ship, its value is effectively zero. Yet if it's worth half of what normal recycling would fetch, there's still money to be made; so whether this becomes the answer, I can't say, but at minimum it's under discussion. Even so, the reality remains that different nations honor sanctions to differing extents. Oil tends to flow regardless; I hold no illusions about the enormous volume of Iranian crude currently somewhat bottled up, or the enormous volume of Russian crude struggling to find a buyer. I'm quite confident it will find a buyer, and most likely will do so via ships that are either entirely sanctioned, partially sanctioned, or something in between; so that parallel business, I suspect, will remain with us for some time; however, the incremental barrel today no longer originates from sanctioned countries. The source is actually the compliant fleet, and that segment is the sole portion of the market that matters to us.
That's quite fascinating. Thanks. So if we stay on the compliant barrels topic, you pointed out the boost that the futures curve provides for cargoes picked up between the Middle East and Asia. As you mentioned, that isn't floating storage. So I'm curious about the impact on vessel demand, since it seems the contango in the curve aligns well with typical voyage durations regardless.
Yeah. No, at present, we don't truly have that contango. And honestly, I'm not an authority on oil pricing, but I'm fairly taken aback by how strong the oil price is, given the oil-in-transit figures we see. And remember, that oil-in-transit is a mix, obviously, of sanctioned oil piling up. It also includes oil meant for sanctioned terminals backing up. Plus there's commercial oil, which is also held up because of weather too. That's a classic old-school winter market situation, where you've got some harsh weather near major ports; so we're seeing longer waiting periods to unload, mainly because of that. Yet with that sort of oil pile sitting or stuck in the logistics chain, I'm surprised front oil can hold at these levels. But regardless, if you trust EIA or IEA or any of those market specialists, we're set to enter an inventory-building phase for roughly the next 6 months. However, to reach that point, for it to even be possible, we can't have a sharp accreditation on oil. So you end up with this contango-shaped curve. And that's intriguing, as I said in the presentation, since we usually see trade routes lengthen when there's some carry in the oil curve. And it doesn't have to support floating storage, because for that you'd need around 2, 2 and a half dollars monthly to make it work. But just a slight 50%, sorry, $0.50 contango assists or smooths the trading process, essentially, since you gain a small boost when trying to place a cargo.
Understood. I appreciate you answering my questions once more.
Happy to help.
Thank you. Hi, Lars and Inger. Good afternoon.
Hey there, Omar.
I've got 2 questions for you. First off, I'd like to ask specifically about the LR2s. Clearly, there's somewhat of a significant disconnect between what's happening in the dirty and clean markets, and I just wanted to, if you could just remind us how you are trading those. And then as well, do you have anything to say about some of the chatter from last month that you had sold or were in the process of selling that whole LR2 fleet?
Alright, let’s take the final one first — that answer is no — and then we’ll go to the first one. Honestly, this spread is a bit of a surprise to us at the moment too. You’re an expert analyst as well, and you’re aware that when refinery margins are high, lots of oil moving through the system would usually produce a large volume of product exports. That hasn’t happened yet. Still, I’d say the setup for LR2s is looking more and more exciting, for a couple of reasons. First, because crude markets are relatively stronger, many LR2s are in fact trading dirty, which means only a limited number of LR2s are clean and available to carry a clean cargo right now. Second, Suezmaxes especially are earning so much in crude that there’s simply no economic case for cleaning up to take a clean cargo at these levels. So my point is, I don’t think that market needs much to flip; it can turn quite strong, or you can see those exponential rate moves, basically because right now you don’t have a Suezmax cleanup or a VLCC cleanup sitting as a cap on the LR2 market. But I don’t have a very solid factual explanation for why we’re in this situation; even so, I think we’ve already seen some small signals. LR2s have gained $5,000 to $10,000 per day in just the past week. At this point we’re probably near the $35,000 per day mark, maybe slightly above; it wouldn’t take much to push it higher. So let’s see.
All right. Yeah. So perhaps there's some convergence taking place right now. Okay. And Lars, I realize it seems like you gave a "no comment" when it comes to selling the LR2s, but indulge me for a moment. If you were possibly, or if you were to think about selling those LR2s, what do you picture the use of proceeds being? Maybe somewhat in line with John's question, would it lean more toward paying down debt, which it sounds like maybe you're not inclined to do? Would it be a special payout, or would you think about rolling into the Suezmax and VLCC classes?
I believe, in a sense, what we're doing with this presentation is giving you the answer without stating it outright. And ever since we began growing the VLCC segment of our fleet, we have exercised a great deal of patience. Over the past 5 years, that segment has expanded by 33%. The number of vessels we operate has doubled. Unfortunately, the trading pattern that emerged following Russia-Ukraine provided essentially no support for VLCCs. Now — and I hope I'm not tempting fate by saying this — but it appears that, at least at this moment, things are falling into place; and that's when economies of scale come into the picture. So in a longer-term sense, if we were to sell off the LR2s, I believe we also share the view that this market still has room to run, as you can see from what our model shows — fairly modest growth, at least in our model, in the overall supply of tankers, and in fact especially when it comes to VLCCs; and we also hold the belief that oil demand will likely continue rising for a few more years. I think it would only be natural for us to concentrate on the big guns — the VLCCs.
Appreciate it, Lars. I think that comes through pretty clearly without being said outright. Then one final item — regarding how things have actually gone so far in Q4, obviously there's a solid, sizable lift in your earning capacity arriving here across each of the three segments. But this is among those rare instances where such a disconnect exists between what you're reporting as the realized average quarter-to-date in Q4 and where spot rates currently sit; so you've addressed, let's say, looking only at the VLCCs, 75% of 4Q at 83,000. The spot markets indicate well above 100. Load-to-discharge accounting complicates matters somewhat when we consider the realized average across the entire quarter. Based on where things stand, do you believe there's additional room above that 83,000 figure during this quarter, or should we expect those 100,000+ rates to essentially become more of a January phenomenon?
My answer to that would be to look at the loading windows currently being booked. Take a fixture done today for a VLCC in the Middle East, where rates stand at roughly $130,000 per day. The cargo loads on the 11th, or the 10th to 11th, of December, which means just 20 days fall into Q4 once that cargo is loaded, so half of it lands in January. Go to Brazil instead, and fixtures are already being done around the 20th, maybe even later, for loading, leaving only 5 to 10 days that would count toward Q4. U.S. Gulf loadings look more or less the same. So I won't rule out that we bring in additional money before the year ends, yet I can't state with certainty that we will. We'll simply have to wait and see.
Okay. Thanks, Lars. I appreciate it. I'll turn it over.
Thanks. Thanks, Lars Barstad here. If I got your point right, then yes — during COVID we did have extremely high levels of floating storage. Of course, that came mostly from demand vanishing literally overnight while supply had no way to keep pace. On top of that, we were operating with zero interest rates, so capital was essentially available at no cost. That matters a great deal here, because when you buy or take a position in 2 million barrels, that's a fairly substantial sum of money, and you have to finance it. That financing feeds into what it costs to keep oil on a ship. That's the reason I brought up that for floating storage to be commercially viable on vessels, you need roughly $2.50 per month, or $2, and $2.50 per month, around that level. That represents quite a steep contango. We also know we're actually in a slight acquisition phase at the moment, so it's far from that. What we're observing on storage right now stems more from logistics, distress, or weather. So commercially speaking, it isn't that. I'm not sure whether that addressed your question. Yes. Thanks. The second point: I've noticed the U.S. has one set of sanctions for the black, dark fleet. The U.K. has another. The EU has yet another; and if you combine. Has anything shifted that would cause the overall dark fleet to be squeezed harder under all these different sanctions? What do you think?
Yeah, you've got it right. But actually, there's a very strong correlation between these sanctions. So usually it comes down to timing. When the EU sanctions a vessel, OFAC tends to follow about two weeks after, and then the U.K. moves at roughly the same time. So there's a lot of overlap between these various regulatory entities or regulatory bodies. Still, no question about it, things are getting tighter — and this is global politics, isn't it? I think it doesn't take a rocket scientist to understand that the U.S. Right now, Russia is under a great deal of pressure — mainly aimed at getting them ready to sit down at the negotiating table. Take the sanctions on Rosneft and Lukoil: that move was designed as a direct strike, meant to cause major disruption for the industry and for Russian exports. We're talking about half of their export volumes, which Rosneft and Lukoil were handling. Eventually, those barrels will end up somewhere, no question. Still, my sense is that this pressure will keep building until the entire situation reaches some kind of resolution. You remember how last year's fourth quarter wasn't so hot — the signals never really picked up. This time around, though, if the fourth quarter turns out well, what's your read on the first quarter? Given where things stand right now, will Q1 match last year's strength, or even beat it? So you're asking me to weigh in on a market that swings around more than practically anywhere else on earth. The mere fact that it behaves this way tells you it isn't running efficiently. Forecasting it is extraordinarily difficult. Still, judging by what we can see right now, this market is showing no indication of weakness. What we have is a classic, very tight physical shipping market. Then again, nobody can say what next week holds. You see, when you add up the compliant crude producers picking up market share, the dark fleet getting targeted, the overall volumes, and — at least right now — no collapse in Chinese consumption, it all matters. As a matter of fact, China is purchasing every commodity to build up additional reserves. So when you combine all of that, Q1 can hold these rates. I'm not requesting a forecast from you, but it appears Q1 could be stronger than Q4, or at least match it. Yeah. No, no. Under these conditions, it's sustained. Yeah, yeah. No, absolutely; and we highlighted it in this report. Certain core fundamentals are present that won't shift in the near term. Some crucial market drivers exist now that weren't there in Q4 of last year, to phrase it that way. Thanks, Lars; and wishing you all the best. Thank you.
Correct, that's true. So assuming you got comparable rates, then your free cash flow per share would exceed $20. Is that accurate? Yes, provided you run that across 365 days, indeed. That could occur. Fine. Another item: I came across something stating that India refuses tankers older than 22 years; does China follow a comparable rule? Well, China isn't really consistent on this point. They operate essentially two distinct oil networks, one of which goes by the name T-Ports. These are large refineries under private ownership. Naturally, they have somewhat different requirements. The terminals likewise belong to private owners. Yet when you examine China's government-run system, along with UNIPEC, which is essentially the largest, they typically apply a 15-year sort of cutoff. Of course, they possess latitude somewhere between 15 and 20; however, it's quite uncommon to see them accept a vessel substantially older than 17 years. So it's somewhat flexible. Regarding India, I haven't encountered or heard of what you're mentioning. What I do know is that when you sail under India's flag and you're an Indian vessel owner, they have so far at minimum permitted trading right up to 25 years. All right. I'm grateful for the responses to these questions. Thank you.
Yes. No — thanks again for joining us. Without question, these are genuinely exciting times. And I hope the remainder of your year turns out great. Thank you. On the VLCC side, the daily rate stood at $149,000, and we saw levels of $240,000, $260,000, $280,000, and $300,000 back in 2006.
That wraps up the conference call for today. We appreciate everyone joining in. At this point, you're all free to disconnect. Enjoy the rest of your day.
Read the full transcript via the API
You're viewing the first half of this call. Get the complete Frontline plc transcript - plus 132,000+ transcripts from 7,000+ companies, speaker segments and full-text search - through the EarningsAPI REST API or hosted MCP server.
Get an API key View API docs →For developers and AI pipelines
Programmatic access to Frontline plc earnings transcripts and 132,000+ others is available through the
EarningsAPI REST API and the hosted MCP server.
Quarterly plans from $162 - full transcripts, speaker segments, full-text search,
and the /api/v1/transcripts/recent polling endpoint for ETL pipelines.