Frontline plc (FRO) Earnings Call Transcript
February 27, 2026
Earnings Call Speaker Segments
Thank you so much. Everyone, I appreciate you joining Frontline Ltd.'s quarterly earnings call. Over the last few weeks, while talking with participants in the market, one expression keeps coming up — folks essentially remarking, what a time to be alive. Frontline Ltd. has weathered numerous cycles, yet tanker markets genuinely do change as time passes; our contention is that a cycle resembling this one has never occurred, in which indices and freight derivatives carry such weight within the mechanism that sets freight prices; this drives nearly violent swings as things unfold. For each $200,000 per day fixture concluded physically, an exponential quantity of contractual obligations gets set off, which hands this market a fresh dimension along with extremely thrilling dynamics. Before handing things over to Inger, I'll walk through the TCE figures; let's turn to Slide three in the deck. During the fourth quarter of 2025, Frontline Ltd. posted $7,074,200 per day across our VLCC fleet, $53,800 per day across our Suezmax fleet, and $33,500 per day across our LR2/Aframax fleet. Thus far in 2026, 92% of our VLCC days have been booked at $107,100 per day, 83% of our Suezmax days have been booked at $76,700 per day, and 67% of our LR2/Aframax days have been booked at $62,400 per day. Once more, every figure shown in this table reflects a load-to-discharge basis, together with the consequences of ballast days at the close of the quarter that this brings; even so, regarding the VLCCs, hardly any uncertainty remains given such a large percentage in the book. I'll now hand it to Inger, who will walk you through the financial results.
Thank you, Lars. Good morning and good afternoon, everyone. If we move on to Slide four, we can report a profit of $228,000,000, which works out to $1.20 per share, along with adjusted profit of $30,000,000, equivalent to $1.03 per share, for 2025. Adjusted profit for this quarter was up by $188,000,000 versus the prior quarter, driven mainly by higher TCE earnings, which rose from $248,000,000 last quarter to $424,500,000 in the current quarter — itself a result of stronger TCE rates. We also saw a reduction in finance expenses and ship operating expenses, plus some adjustments in other income and expenses. Ship operating expenses specifically fell by $7,100,000 quarter over quarter, largely because supplier rebates grew by $7,100,000. Turning now to the balance sheet on Slide five: the movements this quarter mostly reflected ordinary items as well as prepayment of debt under revolving reducing credit facilities. Frontline Ltd. maintains a solid balance sheet and strong liquidity of $7.00 $5,000,000 in cash and cash equivalents, which includes undrawn revolver capacity, marketable securities, and minimum cash requirements as of 12/31/2025; we face no meaningful debt maturities before 2030. During January 2026, we divested eight of our oldest first-generation eco VLCCs, generating a total sales price of 831,500,000.0, and once commissions and repayment of existing vessel debt are accounted for, the deal should produce net cash proceeds of roughly $477,000,000. At the same time, we purchased nine latest-generation scrubber-fitted eco VLCC newbuildings from a Herman affiliate, for an aggregate purchase price of 1,000,000,224 billion dollars. Roughly 25% of that price will be paid during 2026, with the remaining 75% due as each vessel is delivered. The company plans to fund this acquisition using cash plus 60% long-term debt financing. Now to Slide six, covering fleet composition, cash breakeven rates, and OpEx. Our fleet is made up of 41 VLCCs, 21 Suezmax tankers, and 18 LR2 tankers, with an average age of 7.5 years, and it is 100% eco vessels, of which 57% have scrubbers fitted. For the coming twelve months, we estimate average cash breakeven rates of roughly $25,000 per day for VLCCs, $23,700 per day for Suezmax tankers, and $23,800 per day for LR2 tankers. That works out to a fleet average estimate of about $24,300 per day. Included in this figure is drydock cost for five VLCCs, two Suezmax tankers, and eight LR2 tankers, and excluding charter cost, the fleet average estimate comes to about $23,300 per day, which is $1,000 lower. OpEx including drydock for the fourth quarter came in at $9,600 per day for VLCCs, $7,600 per day for Suezmax tankers, and $12,400 per day for LR2 tankers; this figure reflects start-up of three VLCCs and three LR2 tankers. Q4 2025 fleet average OpEx, excluding drydock, was $7,600 per day. Finally, let's move to Slide seven, cash generation. After that, we signed time charter deals lasting one year, and during Q1 we also renewed the fleet. Over the coming 12 months, spot days come to roughly 24,400 days. With 27,700 earnings days each year, Frontline Ltd. holds considerable potential to generate cash. This slide shows that, on the basis of current cash generation potential, along with TCE rates, and TCE as of February 27, the figure stands at $2,800,000,000, equal to $12.51 per share, which works out to a cash flow yield of 34% relative to the present share price. Should the current spot market rise by 30%, cash generation potential would grow to $3,700,000,000, equal to $16.84 per share. In the same way, if the current spot market falls by 30%, cash generation potential would shrink to $1,800,000,000, equal to $8.19 per share. Having said that, I'll hand things back to Lars.
I appreciate that, Inger. Now, if we turn our attention to Slide 8, we can examine what's happening in the market at present. Crude oil consumption appears to be expanding at a solid pace overall, yet the spotlight is squarely on barrels that aren't under sanctions, which is driving significant shifts in trade on a year-over-year basis — you can see this depicted in the chart located on the right side of this slide. The political backdrop surrounding this market is heavy; we're discussing trade relations between the U.S. and India, conversations involving the U.S., Iran, and Israel, as well as talks among the U.S., EU, Ukraine, and Russia. An earlier liberation combined with added pressure on Russia, alongside tensions with Iran, generates powerful tailwinds for our business, since we operate within the compliant segment of oil shipping. On top of that, we're in a setting where a softening U.S. dollar lends support to worldwide oil consumption, and an inflationary economic climate benefits commodities broadly. Vessel asset values are rising steadily. Order books are expanding significantly from 2029 onward, yet given the twenty-year age limit that's being respected, the supply picture down the road stays under control. Now let's go to Slide 9 and examine the flow. Crude oil moving across the globe remains at high levels; in the chart on the right-hand side, we've included the TD3C Baltic index — sometimes called the Dow Jones of the freight sector — and you can observe just how responsive that index appears to be to oil being traded across the seven seas. In this depiction, we notice sanctioned crude grades traveling more slowly, especially the Russian barrels, or being placed into storage, particularly the Iranian ones. That leads to greater utilization of the dark fleet, and the dark fleet subsequently requires additional capacity, or draws new capacity into the pool of dark vessels. Those ships get taken away from the compliant fleet. OPEC Middle East shipments are increasing solidly, which further contributes to the heightened need for compliant and approved tonnage. Yet in spite of the oil, water, and freight conditions we currently face, we observe extremely few charters — in fact, not a single one — exceeding that twenty-year age limit. This bolsters the argument we've been making for years. Robust import expansion into the Far East and India runs counter to the energy transition story, and this is especially true for China. I believe people are beginning to grow accustomed to the phrase energy addition, rather than transition. Long-haul ARBs are under strain, and to clarify what an ARB means, it's essentially the price gap between one continent and another when it comes to oil — and if that gap is wide enough, a trader or oil major can turn a profit by moving the oil across long distances and selling it into a different market. Freight, naturally, is the critical element here, and for instance, should the freight for a VLCC going from the U.S. Gulf to China come to $18,000,000, the charterer is effectively facing $9 per barrel in freight costs, and essentially that spread between the two oil markets has to be sufficient to cover it. That's put some pressure on those ARBs, and we've seen fairly small volumes going from the U.S. over to the Far East. But again, if crude has to move, or right now it has to move, those differentials just have to be priced in a way that accommodates this spread. The extra marginal barrel now satisfies compliance. We've discussed this on prior calls as well, that we don't see any dramatic rise in output out of Iran. We also don't see any dramatic rise in output coming from Russia. Still, compliant crude production and exports are growing, that we do see. The major element is, naturally, OPEC unwinding reductions, yet then you've got nations such as Brazil and Guyana doing very well indeed, and these represent the fresh molecules arriving on the market, and they require compliant vessels. Let's turn to Slide nine and examine fleet development a bit. The order book keeps expanding. Essentially we're in a market where prices for modern tonnage that are the highest in decades — if tonnage is even available for purchase that sits on the water, which means the ship can trade immediately — are so elevated that it drives players toward the yards. Other asset classes like LNG and containers keep filling yards' order books, yet tanker ordering is clearly speeding up for 2029, particularly in China. As the chart in the upper right-hand corner shows, it displays essentially the efficiency decline of a ship as it gets older, and the curve begins to fall at roughly 10 years of age and then worsens further until it becomes nearly negligible by the time it reaches 20 years. Keeping this in mind, as we progress and head into 2029, we will encounter the generations of vessels that were delivered near 2010 and afterward, and that's a sizable population of vessels which will then, once more, be 20 years old and subject to this worsening efficiency curve. With that in mind, even though ordering is speeding up and we have a substantial number of ships anticipated to arrive in 2029, and it's essentially being added every single day, it isn't alarming given this, considering the fleet's age and the fleet profile. Our view is that we have a runway of two to three years that is very good before supply might turn into a concern. We also anticipate ahead that yard capacity is going to expand, particularly in China. These aren't necessarily new yards, rather yards that haven't constructed tankers or at minimum haven't specialized in tankers, but now they're adding berths so they can serve this industry; we think another trend will develop as we continue here, considering or assuming this rate environment holds, that Korea and Japan are going to boost their emphasis on constructing tankers overall, and VLCCs specifically, as margins on such contracts begin to rival what they can get for containers or LNGC. Let's turn to Slide 11, where the tables we're familiar with are. I won't take up much of your time with this slide. One thing worth mentioning: our method—which we intend to keep applying the same way—depends on data linked to when an IMO number is officially recorded. Because of that, the numbers are bound to trail reality somewhat. Among market participants, the common view is that the order book-to-ratio for VLCCs probably sits at 20% by now, but that picture will emerge more distinctly down the road, once those contracts are filed and IMO numbers are handed out. That said, let's move on to the summary. I've changed the headline. So we're also seeing take the center stage, with Suezmax and Aframax coming afterward, question mark. Honestly, there isn't much uncertainty left to debate, because Suezmaxes have already started picking up pace while Aframaxes are red hot. What we're dealing with is a market that is tight at its core, which produces wild swings. On the oil side, both demand and supply are trending in a good direction, particularly when it comes to compliant barrels. The way the worldwide tanker fleet is distributed by age, combined with declining efficiency, is squeezing the balance between available supply and demand. Values for assets are climbing, and the investment case is being validated by both the spot and period markets. The unstable political environment is driving energy insecurity — circumstances in which tankers usually prosper — and Frontline Ltd.'s streamlined business models have a habit of generating meaningful returns for shareholders going forward. Thank you so much. We're now ready to take your questions.
Good afternoon, and thanks so much. Lars, there's a lot I could ask you about, but I won't be greedy. Two questions is where I'll stop. First off, clearly we're in a parabolic moment at present. We've witnessed this a time or two in the past, but like you mentioned, the fundamentals this time around appear quite different. That said, rates can't climb forever. At some stage, a ceiling exists. So what would serve as the catalyst for a plateau, and perhaps some modest relief from where we are now? Would it be something geopolitical? A seasonal development? A Sinacor development? What removes a bit of the chill from this market, which would still leave us with truly excellent rates, just possibly below where they're heading this week?
That's a really excellent question. My sense is that seasonality plays a role. Ordinary seasonal patterns exist as well. Frankly, we're accustomed to seeing markets that are fairly balanced at this point in the calendar, often because U.S. refineries enter turnaround, which frees up additional barrels for export, and we're basically entering that window right now. So potentially we could see a few additional months in which these rates hold up, subject to how the flows develop. After that, though, a summer low will arrive, and that's practically unavoidable. Whether that summer low takes us from $200,000 per day down to $100,000 per day, though, is nearly impossible to determine. Beyond that, one should recognize that a single dominant importer exists in this market — China — and over the years they've accumulated a massive amount of inventory. For whatever reason, they might opt to essentially slow things down somewhat for some stretch of time, and that too would generate volatility. My expectation is that this will happen, but pinning down when such a thing could occur is extraordinarily hard.
Absolutely. Thanks for addressing that. The next item might be somewhat challenging too, but it's just a matter I've been thinking about. For what seems like 50 years, no one has attempted what your Korean counterparts are currently engaged in, and that encompasses your shareholder, whom plenty of folks likely would have expected to be the one making such an attempt. Why has nobody previously sought to corner the VLCC market, and in what ways could that go disastrously for them? What would the risks be, I suppose? And lastly, how are you arranging Frontline Ltd. so that you remain insulated should things go catastrophically for this participant?
That's a fine question, and you're correct that it hasn't truly happened on a significant scale in the tanker sector for as long as my memory stretches. Yet there's a comparable tale from the mid-2000s about a specific individual from Taiwan, though that concerned the dry bulk segment. Central to his achievement in dry, and possibly central to any achievement the Korean player could enjoy, is that you enter a market that's already fundamentally tight, so not much is required to burden or decelerate the supply side of tanker capacity prior to getting these extreme movements. Additionally, as nearly everyone knows, when you examine freight prices purely empirically, the moment utilization shifts from 90% to 95%, the movements become exponential. That would be my reasoning for why this can happen. I won't discuss why Mr. Fredriksen hasn't examined this, but the point is, we're a publicly traded stock company; naturally, this is simpler to accomplish if you're a private entrepreneur in this sector and, naturally, prepared to stake a considerable sum of money on such a wager. In what ways could it go wrong? In such scenarios, and we've witnessed them previously, perhaps on a reduced scale, it ultimately becomes a contest of nerve, whoever can endure the longest. That's what makes me hugely enthusiastic about the upcoming months and the summer and so on, since we'll observe some highly intriguing dynamics at work, but one thing I'm 100% sure about is that volatility will occur.
That's really useful. Thanks, Lars.
It sounds as though charterers share your read and are prepared to commit to more vessels on a term basis. Is that fair to say — is the TC market simply busier — or have rates climbed to a point where owners feel more at ease? Oh, that's quite interesting. Another thing I found interesting was what you said about new tanker yard capacity starting up, so I'm sorry if this came up already and I missed it. Any sense of how long these projects might take and when the first ships could be delivered?
As I believe I mentioned in my introduction today, this market has changed a great deal over the past 20 to 25 years. Take, for instance, the Middle East market for VLCC transport from the Middle East to Asia — that market once had plenty of physical liquidity. What has occurred across the years is that an increasing number of players now use the index itself to set the freight, essentially writing floating contracts priced off the Baltic index quote, to the point that only a small amount of liquidity actually gets transacted in the market. So at times, price visibility has proven rather challenging. As a parallel, for each physical barrel of Brent oil produced, it typically changes hands tenfold on paper, and in freight we've witnessed somewhat of the same tendency or trend. This turns into a problem when everyone prices their freight off an index that spirals out of control, and then all at once you must hedge and must reach the paper market, or you must buy back hedges for those who have taken ships on time charter and essentially hedged portions of the curve in that exposure and so on, and you wind up with a highly vibrant FFA market, as any FFA broker today would confirm. You get these ebbs and flows along the curve, from panic to a kind of quiet until panic returns. In recent weeks, the index simply keeps relentlessly printing what is physically being done, yet it isn't as though 10 cargoes get fixed daily; perhaps two to three cargoes get fixed daily, but the pricing exposure surrounding that quote is huge, and this sets off an almost self-propelled move going forward. I believe it's worth noting this isn't manipulation, but the market is fundamentally extraordinarily tight. One could argue that freight rates may be advancing largely because of this tightness as the panic ebbs and flows. Regarding new tanker yard capacity starting up, it's 2029. A shipyard, which is already in operation, is currently promoting a new berth they intend to construct — since the yard is already there, it's not exactly a greenfield situation — but essentially they're bringing in an additional berth capable of handling the VLCC construction. That's set for 2029, meaning three years from now.
Understood. Lars, I appreciate you taking the time. Thanks.
Hello, Lars. My first question is this: as you navigate these intriguing circumstances, what approach will you take regarding spot versus time charter? The second concerns the dark fleet, which has been a challenge for us, and at last sanctions are arriving and whatever actions were required have now been taken. Even so, although the likelihood is 50%, should Russian crude oil — and should the conflict end and the sanctions be removed — it will likewise enter a compliant fleet. In such a scenario, what do you expect will occur in the market? And the final issue: if this persists and, clearly, you do everything possible to maximize the cash, it turns into a cash pile. Clearly, you are distributing a substantial portion of it; but at what moment do you think you will begin deleveraging the balance sheet, or will you remain levered?
That is a fine question. As we have previously stated, what we offer our investors is spot returns, meaning essentially you need not purchase a vessel; you can simply purchase Frontline Ltd. Occasionally we will opt to exploit elevated markets to attempt to lock in revenues; we lack a policy or anything of that sort, yet we possess a golden rule of one-third, so in theory, under certain conditions our board would be at ease with us reaching time charter coverage of 30%. As you have observed from what we did, we reported the seven one-year time charters; in today's report, we also disclosed an additional one completed a week later. We operate in this modus operandi to attempt to secure some longer-term income. However, we are so constructive regarding this market that we are not truly committing yet, at least over the longer term, perhaps because we genuinely do believe there remains some upside for the longer-term contract, but those are also rising rapidly. I will not rule anything out, but you will not find Frontline Ltd. in a position where 50% of our exposure has been placed on time charter, since that is not really what our investors want, we believe. Had you asked me this in September 2022 about sanctions and the dark fleet, I would have described it as an instantly bearish proposition, but so much time has elapsed. Should the Russian barrel become a compliant barrel, you will likely see half of the capacity return to the compliant fold on the shipping side, yet the other half will essentially be disqualified because of age, and the same applies to servicing the Iranian oil. Sure, there are plenty of vessels, but most of them were already slated for scrapping years back, largely because they’re too old. As a result, only a small number will realistically re-enter compliant service. On top of that, compliant-market players scrutinize a vessel’s past extremely closely, so it’s quite difficult to disguise a tanker that has carried illicit cargo. One thing I should mention: we saw this exact situation back in 2016, when Iran sanctions were relaxed. Iran has a state-owned tanker operator, NITC, and any effort to lift sanctions will inevitably bring in shipping firms under national control. In Russia’s case, that means Sovcomflot and possibly additional companies. Still, when you look at those fleets, the core issue remains age. So honestly, we’d be glad to see those barrels enter the compliant market. Regarding leverage, we intend to remain levered, since each share purchased in Frontline Ltd. gives you exposure equivalent to 1.4 vessels, essentially thanks to our borrowing. We continue to think that’s the right approach. Of course, I can’t dismiss any possibility, but we have no desire to reduce leverage beyond what naturally occurs as debt gets repaid. The real benefit of cash is that it flows to you.
Alright, well done, and wishing you every success going forward.
I really appreciate that.
Much appreciated for tuning in, and I trust you share my enthusiasm regarding what lies ahead. My sense is that the tanker market's moment has arrived, so let's make the most of it. Many thanks.
That brings us to the end of today's conference call. We appreciate everyone for joining in. At this point, you're all free to disconnect. Have a great day.
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