Frontline plc (FRO) Earnings Call Transcript
August 28, 2026
Earnings Call Speaker Segments
Thanks a lot. Everyone, I appreciate you joining Frontline's call about our quarterly results. This is the strongest quarter Frontline has ever had. The approach we've stuck with over the long haul — expanding voyage days and VLCC exposure through the SLIM period after COVID — has paid off, and our shareholders are enjoying the rewards now. This market has plenty of moving pieces and there's no guidebook. Still, the main point is that what's happening today will matter over the long term. Our slim company is being tested by present conditions, and we're deeply grateful for the effort the Frontline team worldwide is making, keeping the propellers spinning amid these abundant profits. Before handing things over to Inger, I'll walk you through the TCE figures found on Slide 3 of the deck. During 2026's second quarter, Frontline earned $152,700 each day across our VLCC fleet, $11,400 each day across our Suezmax fleet, and $92,400 each day across our LR2/Aframax fleet; thus far, within 2026's second quarter, 86% of VLCC days are locked in at $156,900 each day, 79% of Suezmax days are locked in at $117,400 each day, while the LR2s are closing the gap, having locked in 70% of days at $81,000 each day. Once more, every figure shown in this table uses a load to discharge basis, which carries consequences for ballast days at the close of the quarter. I'll now hand it to Inger to walk you through the financial highlights.
Appreciate that, Lars, and greetings everyone, morning to those starting their day and afternoon to those already well into it. Moving on, please direct your attention to Slide 4, where we'll review the profit statement. For the second quarter of 2026, we're reporting a profit of $659.2 million, which comes to $2.96 per share, along with an adjusted profit of $580.2 million, or $2.61 per share. Just as Lars noted, no other quarter in this company's history has produced a higher profit or adjusted profit. Compared with the prior quarter, adjusted profit for the second quarter rose by $235.3 million, driven mainly by higher TCE earnings. Ship operating expenses came down by $4.3 million versus the prior quarter, largely reflecting the sale of 8 VLCCs during the first quarter and 2 Suezmax tankers during the second quarter, plus greater supplier rebates, though higher general running costs partly offset that. Administrative expenses were $2.4 million lower than the prior quarter. That figure leaves out a $5.3 million synthetic option revaluation gain in the second quarter, as well as a $5.8 million synthetic option revaluation loss in the first quarter. Adjusted interest expense fell by $4.8 million from the prior quarter, thanks to reduced debt and lower interest rates. Finally, depreciation declined by $4.7 million versus the prior quarter as a result of vessel sales. Now let's move to the balance sheet on Slide 5. Frontline's balance sheet remains solid, with very strong liquidity of $1.2 billion in cash and cash equivalents, which includes $901 million of undrawn revolver capacity, marketable securities, and minimum cash requirements bank as per June 30. No meaningful debt maturities come due before 2030. Remaining newbuilding commitments as per end June totaled $601.1 million and relate to acquiring the 9 newbuildings from an affiliate of PML. As outlined in the press release, the company has arranged $737 million in newbuilding financing. Next, let's go to Slide 6. During the second and third quarter of 2026, we lowered our financing costs by combining margin reductions on existing facilities for the remaining tenders with a full refinancing of selected facilities, bringing the weighted average interest rate margin down by roughly 52 basis points, from 178 basis points at the close of the first quarter of 2026 to 126 basis points once the process wraps up in the third quarter of 2026. That decrease came from amendments contributing 24 basis points, refinancings contributing 21 basis points, and newbuilding financing plus asset sales contributing 7 basis points; we face no debt maturities until 2028 and nothing meaningful until 2030, backed by longer tenor across the portfolio, as the maturity chart shows. Now let's look at Slide 7. Fleet competition and cash breakeven rates and OpEx. Once the last VLCC newbuildings have been handed over and 2 VLCCs have been sold, the fleet will be made up of 40 VLCCs, 19 Suezmax tankers and 18 Aframax/LR2 tankers, with an average age of 6.6 years, and it will be 100% < > vessels, of which as much as 69% have scrubbers installed; we project that average cash breakeven rates over the coming 12 months will come to roughly $23,800 per day for the VLCCs, $25,700 per day for the Suezmax tankers and $22,200 per day for LR2 tankers, with a fleet average estimate of about $23,900 per day. That figure takes in dry dock costs for 7 VLCCs, 7 Suezmax tankers and 8 LR2 tankers. When dry dock cost is left out, the fleet average estimate comes to about $22,300 per day, which is $1,600 per day lower. In the second quarter, we booked OpEx, dry dock included, of $9,200 per day for VLCCs, $9,000 per day for Suezmax tankers and $13,300 per day for LR2 tankers. That covers dry dock for 1 VLCC and 3 LR2 tankers. Q2 26 fleet average OpEx, once drydock is excluded, came to $8,700 per day; finally, let's turn to Slide 8 and cash generation. Frontline holds considerable potential for generating cash, with roughly 2,800 earning days each year. As this slide shows, the potential for cash generation, based on the current fleet, TCE rates and average spot market rates as of August 28, stands at $2.3 billion, or approximately $10.35 per share, which gives a cash flow yield of 24% based on the current share price. Should these rates rise by 30%, the potential for cash generation would grow to $3.1 billion, or $30.91 per share. And if these rates fall by 30%, we would see the potential for cash generation drop to $1.5 billion, or $6.80 per share; with that, I'll hand the word back to Lars.
< > phase. Risk is mounting across the Gulf region — the Gulf of Oman and the Red Sea alike. On top of that, the Black Sea carries elevated danger, and the Houthis are once again active. Tanker rates stay elevated, and inefficiencies are what the shipping market is bearing. High risk premiums also show up on particular trades, notably in AG, a market that's fairly illiquid, yet as the bottom left-hand chart at least indicates, the TD3C index — now more or less theoretical — is printing figures approaching $600,000 per day. Our preference is to track TD15, which in this context is being overshadowed. Still, a close look at the left-hand scale reveals it sitting quite near $200,000 per day. Aggressive inventory draws are holding oil balances in check; it surprises us greatly that the oil price stays within a band of, roughly, $100 — $78 and a bit above $90. The U.S., China and the remaining OECD nations are essentially the main drivers behind that inventory growth. Naturally, the question becomes how long drawing can continue. The tanker order book posted over the summer shows lead times from order placement to delivery now stretching into 3.5 years; that means deliveries around 2030, and we see this having generated something of a vacuum in the ordering market following quite frenzied activity during the first half of the year. Longer-term consequences, as fleets keep aging, will center on the inventory refill narrative, energy security policies; and should there be some form of relief or some form of resolution between the U.S. and Iran, sanctions relief might factor in as well. A storm is what we're in the middle of, I'd say, yet the longer-term consequences are at least simpler to interpret. Turning to Slide 10 and attempting to examine somewhat what lies behind us, analyzing the market after the fact is in fact simpler. That 82% reduction in crude oil exports from within the Strait of Hormuz has occurred. I realize this is something of a big question mark, since certain agencies report exports exceeding what gets recorded out of the Middle East. Others report less. Regarding ocean transits through the Strait of Hormuz, Frontline belongs to the school of fault but holds the view that we're somewhere between 4.5 million to 5.5 million barrels per day. China's crude imports, we believe, have provided a cushion to the oil price, and have in fact fallen by 35% over the same period. What has happened is a huge expansion of inefficiencies in the market, amounting to a 23% rise in idling days for VLCC; though I should note this isn't waiting time, nor time in which owners such as ourselves are fiddling around attempting to determine what to do. The main reason comes down to the trade pattern itself, where inefficiencies are working their way into all parts of the voyage, and on the contract side and getting paid, you end up waiting. We've also observed a big rise in trade, especially between Latin America and the East of Suez. What this does is effectively tighten fleet supply even though volumes have fallen. The growth in STS transfers < > and around Singapore and Malaysia contributes to this too. Picture it: cargo that once went from the inner Middle East Gulf to, say, Japan is now essentially a 3x trip. First you go from < > to Fujirain as a kind of shuttle operation. Then, via SDS, you put the oil onto a different vessel that carries it to Malaysia, where an STS operation happens before Japanese control ships bring it into Japan. So essentially the same barrels are being moved in a way that gets less and less efficient. We do notice, however, that tracking data has big gaps, and that confuses us along with most market analysts, since many vessels are going dark, which creates a large blind spot. The headline figures might not reflect the market anymore. What does reflect the market, though, are the rates we're actually collecting. On the next slide, flows out of the Atlantic Basin have increased both in outright volume and, more significantly, in the distances being sailed; in a normal market, you'd see roughly equal volumes moving from, say, the U.S. Gulf into Europe and into Asia; right now a bigger share of what's exported from the Atlantic Basin is taking the long way around. Because of the Houthis action, we're also seeing very specific inefficiencies affecting the Yanbu export, which used to sail through the Red Sea, and now increasingly goes northbound, basically by way of you fill up what we also see 3 quarters full, take it through the canal, and then load the remaining barrels in < >, which is the end of the streamed pipeline. The supply shortfall in the Middle East is further offset by inventory draws in practically every corner of the world, with the U.S. and China contributing the most. Asia ex China has raised its sourcing, again adding or creating the same < >. Even with the volume shortfall, as mentioned earlier, the inefficiency and the growing businesses produce the high tanker demand we're seeing now. The big question, though, and this is the question as winter gets close, is how long can and will withdraw on inventories as we head toward the colder season in the Northern Hemisphere. Looking at the top right chart, this is always the onshore < > inventories. We have drawn materially. The total, including kind of other inventories as well, is actually getting close to 0.5 billion barrels. We've still got plenty of barrels left to pull, yet there's definitely a ceiling on how much further the different countries will accept going, given this highly unstable environment we find ourselves in. Let's turn to Slide 12 and examine the order books. Those order books keep expanding, or kept expanding, I should say, as we head into Q3. Right now, if you take the headline figure for VLCCs, the order book stands at roughly 33.5% of the fleet as it exists today. That said, my view is that one ought to consider the efficient fleet; and as we point out here, approximately 166, 167 vessels fall outside what you might call the commercially traded fleet, which means the VLCC order book today is actually quite near 40%. Should you run that same sort of exercise for the < > class on plan is < >. What you'll arrive at is that the present order book to fleet ratio sits in the mid-30s percent. In fact, we are approaching the levels seen in 2009 and — and that means 2008, 2009. Naturally, that's something to worry about going forward. Even so, when you examine how old the fleet is, something we genuinely lacked to this degree back in the late 2010, the picture appears much better balanced.
If you turn to Slide 13, what you'll notice is that across the asset classes we participate in, the order book today totals roughly 707 ships. As those get delivered across the coming 5 years, 578 vessels will be approaching the 20-year mark, so assuming nothing gets scrapped, we end up with 1,293 vessels in total reaching that age. That obviously makes the present order book look tiny by comparison. Then, taking the summary from this presentation, today's market makes earlier cycles look small. I want to point you toward the orange column over on the right-hand side. If you consider 2004, which we regarded as the strongest market we'd ever witnessed, we are now at nearly double that level. The index is somewhat misleading, since a portion of it is of course weighted by both TC1 and TV3, which are inner AG loadings, yet even with that included, we are far past anything from prior years. And as I said earlier on in the presentation, a constrained global oil supply creates inefficiencies, and we observe new trades plus trade lines that are much longer. A growing worry is beginning to emerge regarding the supply cushion supplied mainly by the U.S. and China. Then there's the Russia-Ukraine situation, which is pouring fuel on the fire, with heightened risk in the Black Sea. On top of that, we foresee lower Russian product exports ahead. Even though in many instances these are sanction barrels, it still feeds into the products pool and especially impacts diesel supply down the road. Growth in the tanker order book is decelerating because lead times keep extending; we likewise see that yard expansions are stretched. It has been a little while now since we heard about new births being launched, especially in China. Should the present situation carry on into the winter, energy security along with the inventory picture will probably dominate the narrative. Once again, Frontline sits center stage thanks to our VLCC heavy, efficient business model. And we do observe that the long-term period market is in fact beginning to price in these disruptions continuing for a considerably longer stretch. With that, I'd like to open things up for questions and answers.
During the prior quarter, you mentioned — I believe the figure was 5% of the fleet — that you estimated was parked outside the straight, and that contributed to the inefficiencies. You brought that up again today. Clearly you had plenty of other data points, but do you have any fresh update on that? And related to that, is it only immediately beyond the straight? Or is there a significantly broader geographic zone we're discussing where numerous vessels are waiting and essentially compounding the inefficiencies?
What's surprising is that we're in fact seeing that the count of ships idling beyond Oman — you might say the Gulf of Oman — extending essentially the whole way down the Indian Coast has in fact gone up; though that rise comes alongside the growing volume. < > the Middle East via STS. So first, you've got the pipeline feeding into < > and the one we shut outside; but second, you now have — or have at least had — greater traffic in vessels departing, you've got the pipeline feeding into Ferrara and the Omani Coast beyond. But second, you now have — or have at least had — greater traffic in vessels departing for STS business. Pinning down the timing here is rather hard. That means if you're a charterer and you reserve the vessel, you won't precisely know the date that STS ship will be ready for you. So this generates plenty of delays; that's why we're in fact seeing the population parked in that specific region actually expanding — entirely illogical, frankly, given the present market situation.
Alright. The second one is more about strategy. Clearly, this is a once-in-a-generation market at the moment, as you showed on that final slide. And my sense is that Frontline's history and the way it operates have been evident for three decades. Yet you're now doing certain things that weren't really done previously — the time charters, such as the 2 out of the 3-year time charter, plus the special dividend. Might this be a chance to genuinely reshape the capital structure? I'm aware Inger has accomplished plenty in bringing the cost of debt down and extending every maturity. But could you apply part of this generational upside toward reducing leverage? Or is that simply not something embedded in the DNA?
No, I'd say it isn't truly embedded in our DNA. As I believe I've mentioned on numerous occasions, we follow a sort of informal approach of attempting to cover roughly 1/3 of our revenues while also covering 1/3 of our key costs, whether fuel or interest rates. At present, market conditions have more or less pushed us to lock in a portion of the revenues on VLCCs. And in fact we're slightly above 30% at this point while we await delivery of the final newbuildings; but I don't believe that has really altered the manner in which we view capital allocation — our proposition to investors is — it remains that we distribute all of it and then leave it to the investor to determine whether she wishes to reinvest — that will only kind of — and it's never actually going to interfere with our dividends; but I think the special dividends, which you mentioned, which resulted from selling 2 ships, the reason we chose to simply pay it out was essentially because we didn't really perceive much of any upside in putting it back into the market under the current kind of price environment we find ourselves in; so I think kind of Frontline will simply carry on as we've always done. We hand the money to our shareholders. The leverage we currently carry is comfortable given the present market and where we stand on asset values and so forth. So I think one should kind of bear that in mind going forward.
I wanted to ask — if you could pick up on this, Lars, more about the thinking behind — regarding what John raised about choosing those longer-term time charters. I'm genuinely interested, since these clearly were opportunistic. In the past, we've observed plenty of 1-year deals — it feels like, well, whatever the rate happens to be then, but 1-year time charters do exist in the B market. I'm quite curious about how — and you hinted at this — how deep does the market actually run for 2, 3, and possibly longer time charters on VLCCs as we sit here eyeing the second half of the year? Is there genuinely customer appetite for such deals, such that we might witness — maybe not at frontline levels, but a genuine uptick in this sort of term business down the road? Or was this more of, say, a one-time thing?
No, that's an excellent question. Back when these 2 time charters — the 2-year and the 3 — got signed, I'd characterize the depth as fairly thin; yet now that we've moved through the summer, it's become quite deep. That's partly what we hinted at during our presentation too. It appears that what people regard as smart money is increasingly keen on locking in longer-term contracts; so we're discussing oil majors along with large operators. So right now we could readily fix 3, 4, 3-year time charters if we were prepared to take today's rates, which are — well, still below $80,000 per day, but getting nearer. And it might even exceed $80,000 depending on where you can position the vessel. So I'd say this is — none of us has a crystal ball in this business, correct? That's exactly why, naturally, you often wind up committing slightly too soon when you look back. Still, I have to say the liquidity simply wasn't present either. So really you just had to choose. But at this point I believe the game has shifted somewhat; and we're seeing — a solid signal, I think, is the FFA market. As of now, excluding the Middle East, meaning excluding CB3C, the TD22, the U.S. Gulf to Asia type of marker, that paper is trading at roughly $100,000 per day for 2028. at a point when 115 VLCCs are being delivered; so I think the market may be beginning to price in some of those tailwinds we've talked about in the scenario that — well, first off, the assumption is this situation will last a while, which will only create additional draws on the inventory, which will only reinforce the tailwinds emerging from this deal eventually. I'm glad to report that, at this point, there's a lot of depth in that market. One more thing I want to bring up, and I probably ought to have said this earlier: besides completing the 2 time charters, we disposed of 2 vessels. What this really represents is our method for seizing the inner AG profits, since the party ready to hand over that sort of cash for a ship nearly 10 years old — that buyer had his reasons, essentially because the purchase would let him take complete command of the logistical chain for moving oil through the straight offormus, given that owners are in fact beginning — even the more sort of daring owners are beginning to show some hesitation about selling through the straight offormus, which means if you're an exporter in the Middle East or inner AG, you come out far ahead by simply shelling out $135 million for a 10-year-old vessel and running the whole logistical chain yourself. Yet as far as we're concerned, because we don't trade into the AG, or at least not at present, that gave us a means of grabbing that premium. That's why we likewise just distributed the proceeds to shareholders.
All right. All right. That's really useful. Then I had one thing about — I wanted a bit more clarity regarding Slide 12, where you laid out how you see the VLCC fleet, those 900 vessels. Just when we consider those — and I believe you said there are perhaps 170 ships that aren't truly in the active fleet, maybe they're engaged in infrastructure or other sorts of matters. Is that the sanctioned fleet? Or is that separate — are those other vessels, since the sanctioned fleet, as I'd imagine, is trading? Like, how should we think about where the — and I'm also wondering, when we consider that sanctioned fleet, is it fair to view it as those roughly 170 sanctioned vessels all being 15-plus year old ships? Or does it spread more widely across the, I suppose, the age profile of the fleet?
No, I think — no, it's more — so any vessel beyond 20 years is almost — nearly all of them are sanctioned in the commercial sort of markets where we operate, very few players except vessels that are north of — or older than 20 years. Some are trading, but they're trading then sort of internally for big oil majors or refiners where they sort of handle the technical management and the betting of the ship themselves. So that would nearly put like an equal sign between 20-plus and sanctioned — so talking about the sanction fleet, we aren't really seeing sort of utilization increase on that fleet; but what we are seeing is that although extremely slowly, more and more are getting sort of sold for recycling. So it's a very, very sort of slow trend because you do face sort of the sanctions as you — the recyclers face it when they need to want to purchase the steel. But there are sort of starting to — we're starting to see movements there where actually some of these ships are getting removed.
Lars, that was a solid quarter. A couple of things I wanted to ask about. First, when do you expect China — once winter sets in, will China return to the market? And if that happens, how do you view the market then? Second, about Suez. There's a drought, and clearly only a limited number of vessels will be able to pass through Suez now. What does that do to flows for the smaller ships...
Yeah. Well, first on China, I'd say the issue you're bringing up is essentially the major one — the single biggest question in all of shipping, because China has at times cut back its imports, essentially by half. From what we hear from people in the industry, Chinese domestic demand hasn't really fallen much; so — and given imports are lower by somewhere between 3.5 million and 5 million barrels per day, they certainly have to be pulling from inventories. They hold an enormous stockpile of oil. In recent years they've in fact been adding to inventories, in the run-up to the situation in 2026. So they enjoy a very large buffer. Yet eventually, someone in Beijing will begin to feel that perhaps we ought to be somewhat cautious about carrying on this way. Whether we've reached that point, I can't say. Whether we'll reach it 1 year from now, I can't say either. It's extremely hard to predict. But it's — this ranks among the truly major questions. Still, I'd argue it matters more for the price of oil than for shipping right now. Naturally, it might push shipping much higher if they begin aggressively pursuing barrels; but I'd say this is more a matter of oil price than of shipping. As for Suez, with respect, you may be mixing up Suez with the Panama Canal. It's the Panama Canal where the decline is happening, and that's where we're observing lower volumes, though not really we — since the Panama Canal gives priority to containers and natural gas and LPG vessels, and given the rates and how transits are arranged, very few tankers use that Canal anyway. As for Suez, that hasn't yet become a problem anyone has had to deal with.
Plus, a further query regarding demolition—what's your take? Since the market's performed so strongly, we haven't observed any scrapping at all. Yet looking ahead, over the coming, let's say, 12 to 24 months, how do you see it?
No. Like I said briefly earlier, we're noticing a few modest encouraging signs when it comes to recycling, or scrapping, as you put it. The problem stems from the fact that recycling is likewise an industry denominated in dollars. Consequently, they struggle when it comes to actually handing over cash for a sanctioned vessel. What we've observed is that U.S. authorities have shown willingness to grant exemptions for ships whose owners aren't themselves sanctioned. That means a number of fairly well-known recyclers have managed to approach U.S. authorities. Here's the vessel, here's its history. These are the owners. Could we perhaps purchase this and obtain an exemption or a license allowing us to buy this ship for recycling, and they've received a yes. So the count of vessels in this situation, we're discussing roughly the teens. So relative to the enormous sanctioned fleet right now, it isn't material. Still, it's at least a beginning; how things will develop down the road is really hard to predict, but it's at least a favorable step.
I'm Audrey Z, calling in from China Securities. Lars, I want to thank you once more for taking part in our March webinar alongside Chinese institutional investors. To start off, I'd like to ask about that recent VLCC deal — as we understand it, you offloaded 2 VLCCs for roughly $270 million. Given how strong rates are right now, my sense is this was your call to divest those VLCCs; so how did you weigh the price you got against what those 2 tankers would have been worth in present-value terms if you'd kept running them? That's my first question.
Yes. No, again, that's a great question. We ran through 2 main strands of analysis when weighing this up. The first was essentially: what is the implied worth of the assets Frontline holds? Since the market prices us at a multiple of nearly — well, at that moment, it stood above 1.3x NAV. The implied worth of the vessel actually came out higher than what we ended up getting. But then the second strand — and here's where it becomes a bit less, shall we say, mathematical. It leans somewhat on having lived through this market. The market we operate in ranks among the most volatile anywhere on earth, perhaps the most volatile of all. That volatility makes clear that nobody truly knows what lies ahead in the coming period. We examined the assets. For us to turn down a sale at that level, we would have needed to believe we'd earn close to $70,000 daily, every single day, until that vessel hit 20 years old — or those vessels hit 20 years old. When you consider how our market has historically behaved, we felt that was a bold ask; so naturally, it was the top price ever achieved for that generation of ships at that point. That's essentially the analysis; so in essence, what we do is ask what's required to hit a 15% return on equity, which is the level Frontline aims for in order to justify an investment case; and that gave us this rate requirement; and then we asked how probable it was that such a rate requirement would materialize. We figured possibly not. Maybe over the coming couple of years, but not across 9.5 years or — pardon me, 11.5 years or 11 years, whichever figure applied back then. So that's essentially the analysis. Still, you raise a very fair point. It wasn't a simple call to make while sitting in the middle of a market where, at that time, a VLCC was earning roughly $100,000 daily. It's, of course, something that — that demands serious thought.
Okay, that makes a lot of sense and it's really useful. Now for my second question, it's about cash breakeven rates. What I saw is that even though financing margins came down — and I believe you did a really excellent job bringing your financing cost down — the Suezmax cash breakeven level actually went up past the VLCC breakeven, which is the first time that's happened since 2021 according to our quarterly tracking. So is the 25,700 figure already capturing the advantage from those lower financing margins? If yes, then what else caused that rise? And what direction should we anticipate for the Suezmax cash breakeven during the second half of 2026?
Apologies, I couldn't catch everything you were asking about, but I believe you meant the Suezmax breakeven rate. Is that right?
Let me put my question forward once more. Really, what makes the Suezmax cash breakeven figure exceed even the LCC cash breakeven rate for Q2?
Right. What drives that is the dry dock portion within the cash breakeven rate — for the Q2 cash breakeven rates it runs far above what we saw in the Q1 cash breakeven rates. Beyond that, during Q1 we had undrawn debt, an RCF, sitting undrawn against one vessel, and that gets treated as drawn in the Q2 breakeven rate.
All right, that's good. So should we anticipate that the Suezmax cash breakeven for Q3 and Q4 will follow the same pattern as Q2? Because my understanding is that the Suezmax cash breakeven is going up.
I'm not certain I caught what you just said. Could you repeat the question?
Yeah. In fact, when it comes to Q3 and Q4, regarding what the Suezmax cash breakeven would look like, my view is that it's going up.
My apologies, these cash breakeven rates apply to a 12-month forward window; that's 12 months forward starting from the second — from the conclusion of June 2026. Those 4 quarters carry you to the close of June 2027. So this $25,700 cash breakeven rate for Suezmax vessels covers the 12-month stretch ahead, meaning it takes in Q3, Q4, Q1 and Q2 of 2027. It's an average. So yes, and the reason is exactly what I mentioned earlier: you've got a dry dock of 7 vessels during that stretch, something absent from the earlier cash breakeven rate that we presented to you as of the end of the first quarter.
Thanks a lot; and to everyone, I appreciate you tuning in. This is genuinely a remarkable market we're seeing, and we're already a good way through Q3. So I'm eager for our call in the next quarter. Thanks so much.
I appreciate it, and that wraps up the call for today. We're grateful that you joined us. You're welcome to hang up at this point.
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