Home / Transcripts / Frontline plc (FRO) · November 20, 2026

Frontline plc (FRO) Earnings Call Transcript

November 20, 2026

New York Stock Exchange US Energy Oil, Gas and Consumable Fuels earnings 49 min

Earnings Call Speaker Segments

Lars Barstad executive
#1

Hello, and thank you. Everyone, thanks for joining Frontline's quarterly earnings call; we're still working in territory with no map, since no playbook exists for what this market has gone through across the last 9 months. One thing I believe matters to point out is that behind the cash generation the tanker industry broadly has shown, there is also operational strain plus rising worry about the safety of our seafarers and about the environment. And as for finance pushing forward and the recent rate correction, that only shifts us away from interstellar earnings — we're running a profit margin of roughly 90%, with revenues at 10x our running costs. Before I hand the word to Inger, I'll walk through our TCE figures on Slide 3 of the deck. In Frontline's third quarter of 2026, we earned $148,500 per day on our spot trading VLCCs, $102,500 per day on our spot trading Suezmaxes, and $67,800 per day on our LR2/Aframaxs; so far in the fourth quarter of 2026, 68% of our VLCC days are booked at $562,600 per day. 69% of our Suezmax days are booked at $324,300 per day, and 68% of our LR2/Aframax days at $190,800 per day. These unprecedented figures all sit up in the 6 digits. I should remind the audience that these numbers remain on a load-to-discharge basis, with the implications of balance days that may come at the end of the quarter. We face — yet despite this, we faced a record-breaking fourth quarter. Now I'll let Inger take you through the financial highlights.

Inger Klemp executive
#2

Appreciate that, Lars. Good morning, everyone, and good afternoon as well. Moving on to Slide 4, we'll review the key points from the profit statement. This quarter's profit came in at $641.4 million, equal to $2.08 per share, while adjusted profit was $530.9 million, or $2.38 per share. Versus the prior quarter, adjusted profit for the third quarter fell by $49.3 million, mainly because our TCE earnings declined. Vessel operating costs came down by $2.1 million quarter over quarter. The main drivers were the disposal of two Suezmax tankers during the second quarter and two VLCCs during the third quarter, along with lower general running costs across the remaining fleet; this decline was partly offset by a decrease in the prior repay. Administrative expenses fell by $1.6 million versus the prior quarter, and that figure leaves out a $1.2 million syntactic auction revaluation loss in the third quarter as well as a $5.3 million gain in the second quarter. Adjusted interest expense was $1 million lower than in the previous quarter, largely because of reduced interest rate margins. Depreciation went up $4.4 million quarter over quarter, driven by 6 new buildings delivered in the second and third quarter, partly offset by vessel sales. Moving on to the balance sheet, which is on Slide 5. Frontline's balance sheet is solid, with strong liquidity of $1.4 billion in cash and cash equivalents; that figure includes undrawn revolver capacity of $1.1 billion, marketable securities, and minimum cash requirements as of the end of September. No debt comes due before 2028, and nothing meaningful matures until 2031. Supporting this is increased tender across the portfolio, as the maturity chart on the slide shows. At September's close, the outstanding new building commitments totaled $288.7 million, tied to the purchase of nine new buildings from Hemen affiliates earlier in the year. As noted in the press release, the company has obtained up to $737 million in new building financing covering all of those buildings. Moving on to Slide 6, we'll examine the financing optimizations we've completed lately. Between June and November 2026, we reduced the weighted average interest rate margin by 60 basis points — from 178 basis points as of the close of Q1 2026 down to 118 basis points on the date of this presentation. That came about by lowering margins on facilities we already had, plus refinancing some of them. The decrease came from amendments contributing 23 basis points, refinancings adding 27 basis points, and new building financing along with asset sales bringing in 10 basis points. On the whole, RCF capacity rose from $473 million when the first quarter of 2026 closed, and afterward climbed to $2.27 billion by the close of the third quarter of '26, with $1.2 billion drawn at that time and $1.1 billion undrawn; this RCF structure gives the company flexibility to actively manage liquidity without holding excess cash on the balance sheet. Let's turn to Slide 7. Now turning to fleet makeup and OpEx cash breakeven. Once the last VLCC newbuilds are delivered and 2 VLCCs are sold, the fleet will consist of — and 18 Aframax/electric tankers, will have an average age of 6.9 years, and will be 100% eco-vessels, with 69% scrubber fitted. For the coming 12 months, we peg the average cash breakeven rate at approximately $24,100 per day for VLCC, $200 per day for Suezmax factors and $2,600 per day for electric tankers, with a fleet-wide average estimate of roughly $23,600 per day. That figure covers trade costs for 10 VLCCs, 6 Suezmax tankers and 7 electric tankers. When you take out dry dock costs, the fleet average estimate works out to roughly $21,800 each day — that's $1,800 a day lower. For the fourth quarter, our recorded OpEx with dry dock included ran $8,400 per day on VLCCs, $10,600 per day on Suezmax tankers, and $13,400 per day on LNG tankers; those figures factor in dry docks for 2 Suezmax tankers and 3 electric tankers during the third quarter. The Q3 '26 fleet average OpEx, excluding — it stood at $8,100 per day. Turning now to Slide 8. Cash generation — the company holds considerable potential for generating cash, with an annual earnings base of approximately 28,000. And as this slide shows, the cash generation potential based on current TCE rates and spot market rates as of November 19 is $4.4 billion, or approximately $19.70 per share, providing a cash flow yield of 44 basis current share price. A 30% increase from current spot market would raise the cash generation potential to about $5.8 billion, or $26.10 per share. And likewise, a 30% increase from current spot market would decrease the cash generation potential $3 billion, or $13.30 per share. With that, I hand the word back to Lars.

Lars Barstad executive
#3

Thanks, Inger. If we move to Slide 9, we'll review what stood out in the market. Attention is still focused on the Middle East, and although it faded somewhat from our thinking during the summer, an MOU had been established between the U.S. and Iran, and risk premiums did start to leave the market; that changed quickly once the summer went quiet, and during the third quarter, trading risks increased in the Black Sea, the Red Sea, and around and within the Gulf of Oman. From where we sit, the biggest shift was that Middle East–based national oil companies started handling their own logistics. Shipowners willing to carry that risk started becoming scarce in the market, and even with the highly paid routes, they essentially quit accepting the danger of transiting the Strait of Hormuz. For Middle East exporters, the sole route to arrange freight for their oil — and remember, this is akin to a national security matter — was to purchase the tonnage themselves and move the oil. That way, they managed to cut the rebates they had to give the market so the oil could be exported. Second, it also brought freight costs down, and they no longer had to pay third parties astronomical sums to get the order moving. So here's essentially where we stand right now: the bulk of the oil transiting the Strait of Hormuz rides on vessels owned by the exporting nations themselves. That fueled a rise in shuttle voyages within the Gulf of Oman, along with prolonged ship-to-ship transfer operations, which pushed selling inefficiencies higher as Q3 wound down and Q4 began. On top of that, we encountered the Yanbu pipeline disruption, plus the risk environment — the Red Sea especially — which compounded these difficulties. We observed that certain crude oil purchasers in fact would rather have the oil shipped in a northbound direction, an arrangement that is extremely inefficient. You load about 3/4 of a ship, take it through the Suez Canal to top up at — and then you sell it all the way around the African continent. All of this has pulled a lot of ton miles out of the market and pushed utilization up to the point where freight rates reach close to $1 million outside of the Strait of Hormuz; yet despite all this, or perhaps because of it, global crude oil exports actually moved beyond September 25 heights, as the chart on the top right-hand side shows — note that this is October numbers, and November numbers are likely to be reduced. During that same stretch, even though the tanker order book continues to expand, the increase — more precisely, how quickly it's rising — has decelerated. And at this point, if you head into the market to place an order for just about any vessel, lead time now stands at 3.5 years. Our view remains that the conditions around us and all that has played out over the past 9 months will have lasting implications for the market. Inventory restocking is on the way. Greater attention to energy security is on the way, and refiners will likewise diversify their feedstock sourcing. Looking at the market charts at the bottom of this chart, certainly, the correction we've seen has been quite dramatic. Still, take a look at the left side of this chart and think about the levels we're really talking about here. VLCC bottoms out at roughly $250,000 a day. Suezmax sits at about $175,000 a day; and you may also notice that Aframax out of the U.S. Gulf has climbed straight back to nearly $200,000 per day. So this is by no means a freight crisis. Let's turn to Slide 10 and talk a bit more about the flows. As we said already, global crude oil exports have gone beyond the highs of September 2025. Part of that, naturally, comes from Middle East cruel oil exports returning to pre-conflict levels. Yet extra crude volumes coming out of the Atlantic Basin play a part as well; and it's also significant that, notwithstanding the strikes on Yanbu, shipments have recovered and brought a sizable lift in supply from that region, as the chart at the upper right illustrates. One more quite noteworthy point, shown in the bottom chart, is that imports into Asia outside China are very strong and stand far above normal seasonal patterns. And you can only speculate about what will unfold if or when China gets back to importing at full volumes. At present they remain about 2 million barrels below the Q4 2025 average. We've likewise observed a few encouraging developments regarding product trade. That trade has mostly underperformed owing to protectionism among producers, and additionally to a lack of sufficient exports, especially out of China. Yet at this point we're starting to witness, from the Middle East at least — a very large refining area — that clean trade is beginning to trickle through even with the disruption in the Strait of Hormuz. Once more, these are figures through October. In my view, anybody tracking the latest developments in the Strait of Hormuz should likely anticipate some moderation here. Still, this is a supply-side long-term pattern that, naturally, contingent on activity, we believe will persist. One point I want to emphasize — I brought this up on the prior slide as well — is that the EIA anticipates global stockpile growth of roughly 4 million barrels per day come 2027. That figure sits alongside their projected consumption level of 104.5 million barrels per day. Given that these inventory additions are largely occurring in the U.S. as well as in Asia, and with the Asian portion in particular, this will involve crude being shipped. And once again, the most recent deterioration in security conditions surrounding the Strait of Hormuz is set to matter over the near term, above all for U.S. export trade. Still, the effect should turn out favorable, since we are already observing it amid the quite rapid shortage of oil flowing out of the Strait of Hormuz right now. Already, arbitrage opportunities originating in the U.S. are beginning to function into Europe. And second, it would begin functioning toward Asia. Let's turn to Slide 11; this is a slide we wanted to present essentially to sort of demonstrate to you how responsive this market is, and in particular the VLCC, to modest shifts in sort of how the fleet of tankers is distributed. Let's say there are a bit over 900 VLCCs out there in the market — and I think it's easier to read this on the chart on the right; sorry, the left and right slides actually show basically the same thing, but the right one is probably clearer. So if we figure there are around — a little more than 900 VLCCs globally right now, 241 of those are either about 20 years old, or dark, or sanctioned. Our belief is that China controls just over 100 VLCCs.

Lars Barstad executive
#4

All of these are being used for the crude that China already imports. For the past 6 months, you could say we haven't seen Chinese charters active in the market. And they handle China's imports mainly from West Africa, plus the other cargoes that come out. Then there's a fleet of roughly 200 vessels controlled by national oil companies and other major oil companies. After that, you need to look at the orange last column here, which is really the independent traders and of course Synacor, a fleet that's almost — it's under 400 vessels; this is the fleet affected by trading patterns that keep changing and by arbs opening and closing. That is also the reason any disruption to trade becomes rather severe when it comes to freight rates. Based on what we can assess at present, about 70 VLCCs are engaged in moving crude into and out of the Hormuz Strait. That figure combines the group we refer to as National World Companies with the pure spot players. Even so, this represents nearly 10% of the fleet that is under 20 years old, neither dark nor sanctioned—although if you look at the actively traded fleet, it approaches 20%. We're also aware that this fleet faces constant disruption from attacks, and some market sources are factoring in that somewhere between 1% and possibly 2% of the VLCC fleet is right now either undergoing repairs or, in certain instances, has become a total loss. Next, I'd like to turn to Slide 12 and examine the order books. For anyone who has spent a long time in shipping, this is a worrying picture. In the past, we'd essentially be saying the party is over, yet there is some nuance here. Consider the present elevated order book levels, averaging 27% across the asset classes in which we operate. You should also consider the 15-plus-year column. Those are the ships that will reach that age as the order book gets delivered. This can, and we hope it will, soften the effects of the very large delivery years that are coming up. To illustrate this further, we have a slide on Page 13, where we're attempting to provide some indication or show you the net fleet developments based on how the order books stand right now; we'll introduce a new term, and this is the debit fleet; so this is the fleet that under ordinary circumstances probably wouldn't still exist. This should give us a bit of a buffer down the road, since if the market deteriorates sharply in any way, it's reasonable to anticipate that the debit fleet will begin heading to recycling yards. With that in mind, we're also looking at how the fleet's age profile will shape up on the way to 2030. As things stand with the order book today, we anticipate fleet growth peaking at 6% to 7% in 2028 — and I use "peaking" advisedly. The reason is straightforward: our order book may be quite large, yet the worldwide tanker fleet's average age is the oldest we've seen in decades. Let me move to Slide 14 for a brief recap. There we pose the question of whether we're trading at a low point within the biggest cycle of all time. That headline actually came to me on Monday or Tuesday. We're already seeing freight rates start to climb back up after they dipped somewhat during the past two or three weeks, I can tell you that. Even so, rates are still high by historical standards, and they're exerting some pressure on the oil trading complex as well. This is something that will keep shifting back and forth, since the trade requires space for the freight. What that means is that the arbs have to widen before oil can be moved. We observed this back in October when we reached the peaks — oil essentially ceased moving. At the levels we're seeing today, oil can begin moving once more. My guess is we'll land at a very elevated level, though it will rise and fall with how much oil reaches the market. As noted earlier, worldwide crude shipments now exceed the September 25 peak — and I doubt anyone predicted that back in May or June. Imports into Asia excluding China are climbing past both their historical and seasonal highs, which is encouraging. Energy security and inventory conditions will probably be the main factor shaping longer-run effects, since older fleets, efficiency gains, and shifting trade routes should soften what the order book does, in our view; Frontline remains at the center of that picture with its modern, VLCC-heavy fleet. We should also point out that the long-term period market points to disruptions that persist and to tanker markets that stay fairly strong. With that, I'll open the floor for questions.

Jon Chappell analyst
#5

Lars, I want to begin at the point where you wrapped up on the longer-term period market. From what I can see in the press release, you currently have 17 ships on time charter, and that's quite elevated when you consider Frontline's track record of leaning more toward the spot market. You've discussed plenty of uncertainty and plenty of volatility, that recent pullback over the last couple of days and the tick-up. Does that give you a chance to perhaps keep adjusting the Frontline operating model, capitalize on maximum inefficiency and disruption, and lock in additional cash flow? Or would you rather stay fully exposed to the spot market?

Lars Barstad executive
#6

Well, that's a fair question. And as you're very well aware by now, though for the audience's benefit, most of the TCE cover we have in place is fairly short dated, meaning a lot of these period charter contracts were fixed early in the year. Without a crystal ball, we genuinely didn't foresee this happening at the time they were concluded. So this will roll off beginning in Q1 and through Q1, which means we get an opportunity to reload time charter recovery at higher levels. When we choose to do so is hard to predict, because the challenge in this market is that the near-term cash generation available on spot makes these time charter curves steeply backward dated. So making those decisions does sting somewhat; but as a general point, you should expect Frontline to carry a considerably higher degree of time charter coverage going forward than in prior years. I hope that answers your question.

Jon Chappell analyst
#7

It does, yes, and that leads nicely into my follow-up as well. I mean, clearly the current spot market levels make this painful, but as you more or less hinted at, even if I didn't put it plainly, those figures do have some fragility to them. I found that first bullet point on your last slide quite compelling, especially the commentary about the challenges facing the oil trading complex. Would you say what happened in October represents something like a perceived ceiling on how high rates can climb before global trading patterns begin to shift? And given the possibility of a higher floor from inventory restocking, ongoing inefficiencies, geopolitical uncertainty, and now perhaps a ceiling we can actually pinpoint, does that mean things become more violent within a range that may be tighter though still extremely elevated? Is that your view for the next 12 months?

Lars Barstad executive
#8

That's really difficult to answer. These boundaries aren't fixed, right? What we witnessed, and what sent rates skyward, was in my view driven more by desperation than by economics, with refiners confronting the need to cut refinery runs, which costs far more than any freight expense could. But I also think the reason we came off the peaks was likely a much greater volume of oil. The oil market overall became much better supplied as trade through Hormuz grew fairly efficient. So to get at that question, ultimately it comes down to how much oil volume will be available to the market, and as oil products have shown for at least a few weeks now, there's been plenty. Yet if the export difficulties, or the challenges to oil exports from the inner Middle East Gulf, continue in the weeks ahead, we might face a situation where the marginal barrel becomes much harder to obtain; and then both traders and refineries would need to factor in higher freight costs. So it's partly a question of whether it's the dog or the tail, whatever that expression is. But I think the, so it's true that freight to some degree put a stop to the yards. It's equally true that this coincided with far more oil volume flowing through than people had anticipated, particularly in the Middle East. So it's hard to say. The thing to watch, of course, is that volume, or the reduction in volume that we've marked and observed recently, being able to pass through the Strait of Hormuz.

Greg Lewis analyst
#9

Lars, I’d really like to hear more about Slide 11 and those 70Bs that are sort of involved in that shuttle trade. What I’m really trying to get at is this: you said some of them are, like, captive fleets. Did we perhaps see ships that had been used for storing oil move into the shuttle trade, as we think about those vessels? What’s the utilization like, because those ships would be passing through anyway—kind of like, I guess, maybe what are the waiting times on the far side of the Strait that are either holding things up or reducing utilization? When we think about those 70Bs, how inefficient do we think that is for the market?

Lars Barstad executive
#10

That’s a very good question, and also a very difficult one to answer. I’d like—I’d like to answer it perhaps in a different way. There are players in this market. We are also publicly—we have not carried out the Hormone trade; if you look at some of the figures they are making public, it’s roughly half of what the TV3C index has implied. So that essentially means that, even though your headline figure is above $1 million per day, what you can actually generate from it in TCE terms, because of inefficiencies, because of the weighting you just mentioned—and it’s not, as you say, a 10- to 11-day voyage to go dip in and out of the Strait of Hormuz. Obviously it takes much longer given the changing security situation, attacks; you don’t want to sail the moment there is activity. The STS activity takes time as well. And maybe a way to load at the terminals and all that. So it appears the inefficiency is fairly high in that trade, and what you’re actually able to capture—as a shipowner—is a little less in TCE-equivalent terms than maybe the market had anticipated. As Frontline, we don’t take part in that trade, but of course, we note the headline figures. But I think that maybe answers some of your questions. Second, we were just in Dubai a couple of weeks—sorry, a week back, met basically all our key clients in the region. And we understand that the incidence in the shuttle market is quite underreported. So it has been an increasing threat, and you have incidents occurring 2, 3 times a day. Of course, not necessarily severe, but enough to mean the vessel needs to go for some sort of repair before it can take part in the trade again. So—but bear in mind, the 70 vessels, this is also a floating target. But I think this is probably a good point to mention how U.S. You can get an amnesty or be removed from the OFAC list if you sort of apply, and that option has become available. During that application, you actually need to clarify what purpose the ship serves or will serve. From what we understand, participating in this shuttle trade is the only purpose permitted. So as we go forward, that figure of 70 could in fact rise, since that is your sole possibility to make use of vessels that U.S. sanctions hit heavily.

Greg Lewis analyst
#11

All right, that's quite helpful. My follow-up concerns the order book. It's laid out plainly in the chart, but once you look more closely at those numbers, it's obvious to everyone that roughly 60 vessels are scheduled for delivery next year, followed by that substantial ramp-up the year after. Essentially, here's what I want to ask. In ordinary years, my impression is that certain shipyards or ships have slipped into the subsequent year. It appears there's about 5% to 10% slippage in a typical year; so I'd be interested in your view on that. And then, separately, I'd imagine you've carried out extensive diligence on a good number of these shipyards and likely paid a visit to most of them. What do you think these yards are truly capable of — moving from an industry output of 60 ships to 130, which means, as hard as '28 appears, might we envision a situation where '28, '29, and '30 sort of flatten out.

Lars Barstad executive
#12

Yes. Both are solid questions. And slippage was something of a recurring theme in our presentations back before 2020. And you're correct, it actually varied from 5% to 15% in any given year. And I believe it matters for you and the audience to grasp that. I really don't think we could deliver 60 or 100 VLCCs into the market in any year without the markets actually coming under some pressure. The question is whether the pressure we're seeing will seriously damage the market, or whether it will only nudge rates slightly during what is roughly the peak delivery window. From what we understand, the majority of the 2027 vessels are in fact arriving in the latter half of the year, which of course might pose a challenge; but everything hinges on roughly where the market stands at that moment. What matters is the state of affairs between the U.S. and Iran and, broadly, the energy complex. With that said, let's move on to the yards. From what we can tell — and this is something we've witnessed firsthand — a number of the priciest yards, the ones that brought on substantial capacity over the past two years or so, are now beginning to have trouble securing a skilled workforce. The way these facilities operate is that you take an existing yard, put in a dock, and then you're able to construct what amounts to a fresh series of vessels, correct? But staffing that dock takes a great many workers. You require plenty of skilled welders along with other types of personnel who are quite highly qualified. We've gotten to a point where, even over in China, they're struggling to lock this down—so much so that certain shipyards have started stationing themselves outside competitors' gates, pitching jobs with their own kind of arrangement to folks on their way out after a shift. That's creating a certain amount of wage inflation too, in terms of how workers are compensated. So my sense is that, even in China, you're probably getting close to the ceiling on how much further it can expand from here. That leaves us feeling reasonably at ease that we won't see an aggressive jump in capacity to biopsies. And also, I think it's worth noting that — it still shows that other segments, non-tank segments, are ordering vessels at the various yards too; so it's — there's no margin pressure on these guys as of yet.

Analyst analyst
#13

There are 2 things I'd like to ask. The first one concerns inventory plans. As you're aware, a lot of countries have said they intend to build their crude oil inventories higher than they were last year. Freight rates therefore matter a great deal in deciding when those inventories get refilled, correct, since the oil will need to be exported. So could you give us a sense of what level freight rates need to reach before countries would begin considering rebuilding their crude oil inventories?

Lars Barstad executive
#14

That's a tricky one, Rahul. Still, I appreciate that you raised it, because it's a very good point. When this situation arose in February, certain large consuming countries — I can mention India, I can mention Korea, Indonesia, Vietnam — found themselves lacking enough storage, neither strategic nor commercial, and that created a problem for them. And you're right to say there are plans to expand their capacity for storing oil, both commercially and strategically; but in my view it isn't really a freight issue. My view is that it's a question of oil price. At least from what history shows us, China appears to be driven by low oil prices. That's the moment when they step in and refill their inventories. And freight isn't really the thing that, sort of, stops them from bidding it up. Once more, though, we also believe we won't have this kind of October supermarket lasting for an extended period. If you genuinely want an answer, at present we appear to have fairly normalized markets; we see the trade working, yet we're still kind of between $200,000 and $300,000 per day on a VLCC. So perhaps that's your answer.

Analyst analyst
#15

All right. For my second question, exports out of the Atlantic Ocean have risen quite a bit this year. And from a structural standpoint, that route appears set to grow increasingly significant for crude oil exports. So as this transition gradually shifts away from the Middle East toward the Atlantic over time, what kind of impact do you expect that to have on the tanker market?

Lars Barstad executive
#16

I believe it will be quite favorable. And when you examine it, India has essentially already indicated it will, and Korea has already made a commitment to take additional barrels from Atlantic Basin exporters down the road; but what's really interesting here is what happens then to the Middle East barrels, since they'll need to locate a different destination. And so I think you could see a very intriguing trade pattern emerging, with growing flows from the Atlantic Basin into the Far East. Yet at the same time you'd actually also get larger flows from the Middle East into the continent. That's the ideal sort of storm for us as shipowners; so — but generally speaking, I think we will see it build gradually once this comes to fruition.

Analyst analyst
#17

Could you help us understand roughly what kind of impact that would have — suppose, for argument's sake, that you needed to move 1 million barrels out of the Middle East to Asia, or instead from the Atlantic to Asia, how much extra VLCC demand would that create?

Lars Barstad executive
#18

Well, right there on the verge length, it comes to 30%.

Analyst analyst
#19

Audrey Dong here, from China Securities. I believe you've already addressed part of this. What I'd like to understand is, when we look at 2027, three main factors come into play: cargo volumes that are growing, average voyage distances that get shorter as Middle Eastern barrels take the place of Atlantic supplies, and extra vessel days taken up by shuttle operations and STS transfers. How would you weigh their combined effect on vessel demand alongside newbuilding deliveries adding supply, and under what conditions would you expect average real CC spot TCEs in 2027 to go above the already strong levels seen in 2026?

Lars Barstad executive
#20

Well, thank you, Audrey. If I had a precise answer to that, I likely wouldn't be in this job; it's more like an equation full of unknowns, isn't it? And I think that if you suppose we continue along the current path — with the time-consuming trade, or day-consuming trade, out of the Middle East, the Atlantic basin behaving as it does at present — and you bring a substantial number of modern, efficient vessels into the market, we definitely won't see the kind of market we had in October, since additional capacity is entering this market. Also, I doubt the Middle East will significantly exceed the volumes they achieved earlier in October. That may partly address your question. That said, the situation will remain quite fluid, and it will continue that way going forward. So perhaps I would frame my answer differently. Extremely savvy charterers are prepared to pay $100,000 daily on a 3-year time charter for a VLCC, and the backwardation in the curve indicates that the market we have now and the one we had a month ago will not persist indefinitely, correct? Even so, the lowest point will end up much greater than anything seen during earlier downturns. That's the way I'd put it.

Lars Barstad executive
#21

Much appreciated, and thanks for tuning in. These are quite interesting times, and to some extent exhausting ones. Here's hoping there's some kind of resolution to the Middle East situation. And we'll watch how it unfolds. Thank you.

Operator operator
#22

This concludes today's conference call. Thank you for participating. You may now disconnect.

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